These monthly frontline changes of a net gain of Minus ~486.9 km² are the worst for Russia since the November 2022 Ukrainian Kharkiv counteroffensive.

Other maps, such as Deepstate, will not show such a large Ukrainian advance as they have not yet updated their maps in areas where Ukrainian forces are actively counterattacking (Lyman, Komar, Stepnohirsk, Novopavlivka, Kupyansk, Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Sumy) due to OPSEC and informational purposes.

This was a very bleak month for Russia on the frontline, but a very productive one for them when it comes to mid-to-long-range strikes. It's likely that in the coming months, the monthly changes will once again flip back in favour of Russia, and stabilise in the low-hundreds of km² throughout winter.

The situation in the Lyman direction for Russia is showing signs of stabilisation.

Ukrainian attacks on Zarichne from the north and west were repelled, along with their infiltrations towards the northern outskirts of Torske. They are accumulating west of Zarichne, in the forests and treelines, likely for repeated assaults on the town. Russian forces retain control over the centre of Zarichne, and are counterattacking against Ukrainian infiltrators in the southern streets, who are trying to cross the Zherebets river and enter the centre of Torske.

In the forests east of Lyman, Ukrainian forces have been unable to clear the remnants of the Russian bridgehead north of Yampil. Russian forces are counterattacking along the railway line and in Yampil itself, trying to re-establish control over positions in the grey-zone, and gain access to the wide expanse of forests largely devoid of positions for deep infiltrations towards Lyman.

In the north, Ukrainian forces are still trying to clear the remaining Russian bridgeheads west of the Zherebets River, but have been unable to fully recapture the villages of Ivanivka and Novolyubivka, despite some advances in the forests to the west. Nevertheless, some Ukrainian infiltration groups and DRGs have been able to cross the river and sporadically enter the Terny and Nevske areas. Russian forces are conducting clearing operations against these infiltrators northeast of Torske.

If Russia is able to maintain its limited presence west of the Zherebets River, then they may attempt to push the Ukrainians back during Autumn and try to stabilise the frontline east of Lyman by Winter. If not, then it's likely that the frontline will stabilise along the river for much of Winter.

High resolution satellite imagery released by AviVector reveals that a Russian Su-35S and Su-34 were destroyed by yesterday's Ukrainian drone strikes on Khanskaya Airbase, Adygea Republic.

Over the last few days, Russia has deployed at least a dozen new missiles of various types (Iskander-M, Oniks-M, Zircon) to border regions (Kursk, Bryansk, Rostov) for their upcoming large-scale missile attack on Ukraine. Thus, there are at least 40 ground-launched missiles accumulated, although not all of them will be used in a single attack.

Western intelligence warned the Ukrainian GUR that there could be a large attack tonight. The potential targets include energy infrastructure in Kyiv City, Kyiv Oblast, Dnipro, and Kremenchuk.

If the attack doesn't take place tonight, it's possible that it will be combined with the next attack involving strategic aviation.

The IDF claims to have killed a platoon commander in an elite Hamas "Nukhba" company in a targeted assassination strike on the Nuseirat Refugee Camp, Central Gaza Strip.

Presumably, he was one of three Nubkha platoon commanders in the Nuseirat Battalion of Hamas' Central Brigade.

Vehicle losses have been released for the month of September.

Primary credit: @HeyHey_Hayden TG

In total, Russia lost 32 vehicles whilst Ukraine lost 175. A ratio of 1:5.5

Excluding Armoured cars/MRAPs, which skew the ratio as Russia hardly utilises them at all whilst Ukraine does so in huge number for transport purposes, Russia lost 32 vehicles whilst Ukraine lost 69. A ratio of 1:2.2

Regarding self-propelled artillery, which is a great indicator of capacity to inflict attrition, Russia lost 7 vehicles whilst Ukraine lost 37. A ratio of 1:5.3

Russian losses are counted by UkraineWarSpotting. Ukrainian losses are counted by LostArmour. Credit to HeyHeyHayden for compiling numbers.

Of course, these vehicle losses are all geolocated and only completely destroyed vehicles are counted. There could of course be some mistakes.

The common cope that i hear: “But Russia uses only civilian vehicles! Ukraine actually cares about the lives of their soldiers! Civilian vehicles are not counted in this!”

Are we still seriously falling for “meatwave assaults” in 2026?

A) I have spoken to Ukrainian soldiers that confirm the AFU also uses civilian vehicles in non-combat roles, for transport purposes. Russia does the same. In a war of attrition, cheap but good enough equipment is better than extremely expensive perfect equipment.

B) Adding onto that, Russia has a huge domestic war economy which can churn out so many civilian vehicles that it wouldn’t matter how many were destroyed. If Ukraine’s military vehicles such as SPGs, IFVs etc are destroyed, it needs to wait on deliveries from the west.

C) If AFU command cared about the lives of their soldiers, the Robotyne and Kursk mass suicides would never have happened. Ukraine quite literally burned through tens of billions of dollars worth of Western vehicles in Kursk oblast alone.

D) Even if vehicle losses favoured Ukraine by 2x, this would be nowhere close to the relative attrition needed to be inflicted upon Russia, because of Russia’s industrial capacity.

E) Keep in mind that armies collapse long before they are physically out of manpower or vehicles, as per historical examples such as the Germans in WW1 Collapse is induced when overall attrition inflicted reaches a critical point. Drones only mask this attrition and delay the final outcome. Ukraine is obviously far far closer to this critical point than Russia.

Russian Geran-4 jet-drones struck two Ukrainian radar systems in Poltava and Odesa Oblasts. Reportedly P-37 and 35D6 radars.

There has been a significant increase in Russian strikes on Ukrainian radar systems recently.

Two Russian Kh-59/69 cruise missiles are flying past Kherson Oblast to Kryvyi Rih/Vysokopillya from the southeast.

Approximate movements.

They are flying further to Kropyvnytskyi.

They seem to be flying to Kanatove Airbase.

2-3 missiles.

15 km from Kanatove Airbase.