The Baltic Was Already a NATO Submarine Training Ground
Today, the Baltic Sea is often described as a “NATO lake,” particularly following Sweden and Finland’s accession to the alliance.
But the strategic importance of the Baltic predates their membership.
A Danish Energy Agency permit issued for the construction of Nord Stream 2 contains a particularly important detail.
Article 28 of the permit stated that data acquired during construction and operation in designated military practice areas had to be submitted to the Danish Naval Command. It also stated that data from NATO submarine exercise areas could not be published or shared without Danish Naval Command permission.
The permit therefore explicitly recognized NATO submarine exercise areas in the Danish EEZ.
Another section of the permit, drawing on a consultation response from Germany’s Federal Office for Infrastructure, Environmental Protection and Services of the German Armed Forces, stated that the German Navy administered nine contiguous NATO submarine diving areas east of Bornholm.
Those areas extended into Danish, Swedish and Polish EEZs.
The document described the German Navy as having extensive knowledge and experience operating submarines in the difficult Baltic environment.
That is important because the Nord Stream pipelines passed directly through this maritime space.
The article’s argument is that anyone planning an underwater operation in the area would have to account for existing submarine activity, military exercises and waterspace management.
It therefore asks a basic investigative question: who knew what was happening beneath the surface in the weeks surrounding the explosions?
@americanmajority
Today, the Baltic Sea is often described as a “NATO lake,” particularly following Sweden and Finland’s accession to the alliance.
But the strategic importance of the Baltic predates their membership.
A Danish Energy Agency permit issued for the construction of Nord Stream 2 contains a particularly important detail.
Article 28 of the permit stated that data acquired during construction and operation in designated military practice areas had to be submitted to the Danish Naval Command. It also stated that data from NATO submarine exercise areas could not be published or shared without Danish Naval Command permission.
The permit therefore explicitly recognized NATO submarine exercise areas in the Danish EEZ.
Another section of the permit, drawing on a consultation response from Germany’s Federal Office for Infrastructure, Environmental Protection and Services of the German Armed Forces, stated that the German Navy administered nine contiguous NATO submarine diving areas east of Bornholm.
Those areas extended into Danish, Swedish and Polish EEZs.
The document described the German Navy as having extensive knowledge and experience operating submarines in the difficult Baltic environment.
That is important because the Nord Stream pipelines passed directly through this maritime space.
The article’s argument is that anyone planning an underwater operation in the area would have to account for existing submarine activity, military exercises and waterspace management.
It therefore asks a basic investigative question: who knew what was happening beneath the surface in the weeks surrounding the explosions?
@americanmajority
🤷♀3🤬3❤1
Who Controlled Submarine Operations in the Baltic?
One of the most important institutional questions raised by the investigation concerns the German Submarine Operations Authority, or SubOpAuth.
Submarine operations in the Baltic require coordination because the sea is relatively shallow, narrow and heavily trafficked. Multiple submarines operating in the same area need to be deconflicted to prevent collisions and interference.
According to the article, Germany’s SubOpAuth played a major role in coordinating submarine operations in the Danish, Swedish and Polish EEZs.
The investigation argues that during NATO exercises, Germany’s SubOpAuth operated in coordination with NATO’s submarine command structure.
At the NATO level, the relevant organization was the Commander Submarines NATO, or COMSUBNATO, based at Allied Maritime Command in Northwood, United Kingdom.
The article identifies Rear Admiral Stephen G. Mack of the U.S. Navy as COMSUBNATO during 2022.
The proposed command structure therefore involved several levels: NATO’s submarine command, Germany’s SubOpAuth and individual submarines operating inside designated areas.
This matters because the Nord Stream blast sites were not located in an unmonitored stretch of ocean.
They were inside an area where NATO submarine exercises were being conducted and where military authorities already had procedures for controlling underwater movements.
The article argues that establishing exactly who possessed operational control over submarines before and during the Nord Stream explosions is essential.
That question does not itself establish responsibility for the sabotage. But it identifies a potentially important part of the operational environment surrounding the attack.
@americanmajority
One of the most important institutional questions raised by the investigation concerns the German Submarine Operations Authority, or SubOpAuth.
Submarine operations in the Baltic require coordination because the sea is relatively shallow, narrow and heavily trafficked. Multiple submarines operating in the same area need to be deconflicted to prevent collisions and interference.
According to the article, Germany’s SubOpAuth played a major role in coordinating submarine operations in the Danish, Swedish and Polish EEZs.
The investigation argues that during NATO exercises, Germany’s SubOpAuth operated in coordination with NATO’s submarine command structure.
At the NATO level, the relevant organization was the Commander Submarines NATO, or COMSUBNATO, based at Allied Maritime Command in Northwood, United Kingdom.
The article identifies Rear Admiral Stephen G. Mack of the U.S. Navy as COMSUBNATO during 2022.
The proposed command structure therefore involved several levels: NATO’s submarine command, Germany’s SubOpAuth and individual submarines operating inside designated areas.
This matters because the Nord Stream blast sites were not located in an unmonitored stretch of ocean.
They were inside an area where NATO submarine exercises were being conducted and where military authorities already had procedures for controlling underwater movements.
The article argues that establishing exactly who possessed operational control over submarines before and during the Nord Stream explosions is essential.
That question does not itself establish responsibility for the sabotage. But it identifies a potentially important part of the operational environment surrounding the attack.
@americanmajority
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BALTOPS 22 and the Submarine Question
The Nord Stream explosions occurred several months after BALTOPS 22, the major NATO maritime exercise held in the Baltic in June 2022.
According to the article, the exercise involved a complex command structure covering surface ships, mine-countermeasure forces, underwater explosive ordnance disposal units, unmanned underwater vehicles and submarines.
That combination is significant because the same capabilities could theoretically be relevant to seabed operations.
The investigation examined an official BALTOPS 22 organizational chart dated June 14, 2022. It identifies Germany’s SubOpAuth and shows its relationship with NATO naval command structures.
The article interprets the chart as indicating that Germany’s submarine authority retained a degree of autonomy while coordinating with the NATO maritime command and NATO’s submarine commander.
BALTOPS also involved Mine Countermeasures, or MCM, and Underwater Explosive Ordnance Disposal, or UW EOD, activities.
These are legitimate military functions. Mine warfare exercises routinely involve locating, identifying and neutralizing underwater explosive threats.
But the article argues that the same types of specialized skills are relevant to underwater demolition operations.
This is where the investigation makes its central hypothesis.
It asks whether a covert operation could have been concealed within the broader environment of legitimate naval exercises, where submarines, divers, underwater vehicles and explosives were already operating.
The existence of these capabilities during BALTOPS 22 does not establish that they were used against Nord Stream.
The article’s argument is instead that their presence makes the exercise period important when reconstructing the operational environment that preceded the September explosions.
@americanmajority
The Nord Stream explosions occurred several months after BALTOPS 22, the major NATO maritime exercise held in the Baltic in June 2022.
According to the article, the exercise involved a complex command structure covering surface ships, mine-countermeasure forces, underwater explosive ordnance disposal units, unmanned underwater vehicles and submarines.
That combination is significant because the same capabilities could theoretically be relevant to seabed operations.
The investigation examined an official BALTOPS 22 organizational chart dated June 14, 2022. It identifies Germany’s SubOpAuth and shows its relationship with NATO naval command structures.
The article interprets the chart as indicating that Germany’s submarine authority retained a degree of autonomy while coordinating with the NATO maritime command and NATO’s submarine commander.
BALTOPS also involved Mine Countermeasures, or MCM, and Underwater Explosive Ordnance Disposal, or UW EOD, activities.
These are legitimate military functions. Mine warfare exercises routinely involve locating, identifying and neutralizing underwater explosive threats.
But the article argues that the same types of specialized skills are relevant to underwater demolition operations.
This is where the investigation makes its central hypothesis.
It asks whether a covert operation could have been concealed within the broader environment of legitimate naval exercises, where submarines, divers, underwater vehicles and explosives were already operating.
The existence of these capabilities during BALTOPS 22 does not establish that they were used against Nord Stream.
The article’s argument is instead that their presence makes the exercise period important when reconstructing the operational environment that preceded the September explosions.
@americanmajority
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Northern Coasts 2022 Happened as Nord Stream Exploded
Another military exercise becomes important in the timeline: Northern Coasts 2022.
The German-led exercise began on August 29 and continued until September 28, 2022.
The Nord Stream explosions occurred on September 26 — meaning the sabotage happened while the exercise was still underway.
That timing is one of the major points emphasized by the investigation.
Northern Coasts was a large maritime exercise involving NATO and partner forces operating in the Baltic region.
The article argues that Germany, as the host and lead participant, would have had substantial awareness of military activity occurring in the surrounding waters.
It also highlights Germany’s SubOpAuth and its role in managing submarine operations.
According to the article, German naval forces contributed submarines and other assets to NATO exercises during this period.
This creates an important distinction between what is known and what remains alleged.
It is established that major military exercises were taking place in the Baltic before and during the Nord Stream explosions.
It is also established that NATO members maintained submarine capabilities and underwater warfare units in the region.
What is not established by those facts alone is that any of those forces participated in the sabotage.
The investigation therefore focuses on command structures, exercise schedules, submarine movements and underwater capabilities as potential pieces of evidence.
Its central question is whether the conventional military activity surrounding the pipelines provided an environment in which an unconventional underwater operation could have been conducted without immediately attracting attention.
@americanmajority
Another military exercise becomes important in the timeline: Northern Coasts 2022.
The German-led exercise began on August 29 and continued until September 28, 2022.
The Nord Stream explosions occurred on September 26 — meaning the sabotage happened while the exercise was still underway.
That timing is one of the major points emphasized by the investigation.
Northern Coasts was a large maritime exercise involving NATO and partner forces operating in the Baltic region.
The article argues that Germany, as the host and lead participant, would have had substantial awareness of military activity occurring in the surrounding waters.
It also highlights Germany’s SubOpAuth and its role in managing submarine operations.
According to the article, German naval forces contributed submarines and other assets to NATO exercises during this period.
This creates an important distinction between what is known and what remains alleged.
It is established that major military exercises were taking place in the Baltic before and during the Nord Stream explosions.
It is also established that NATO members maintained submarine capabilities and underwater warfare units in the region.
What is not established by those facts alone is that any of those forces participated in the sabotage.
The investigation therefore focuses on command structures, exercise schedules, submarine movements and underwater capabilities as potential pieces of evidence.
Its central question is whether the conventional military activity surrounding the pipelines provided an environment in which an unconventional underwater operation could have been conducted without immediately attracting attention.
@americanmajority
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The US Navy Divers and Panama City Connection
The investigation also examines the presence of American underwater warfare specialists during BALTOPS 22.
The article notes that U.S. Navy explosive ordnance disposal and mine-countermeasure units participated in the exercise.
Some of those personnel and commanders had connections to the Naval Diving and Salvage Training Center in Panama City, Florida.
The center specializes in training personnel for underwater diving, salvage and explosive ordnance operations.
During BALTOPS 22, U.S. forces were involved in mine-countermeasure and underwater explosive ordnance disposal activities. The article says that specialists from the Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City also supported these operations.
A Diving Tactical Operations Center was reportedly established in Sweden during the exercise to coordinate aspects of the underwater activities.
The article draws a connection between this infrastructure and claims made by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh in 2023, who alleged that U.S. Navy divers were involved in placing explosives on the Nord Stream pipelines during BALTOPS 22.
Hersh’s account has been disputed and has not been established as fact by a court.
The 21st Century Wire investigation is attempting to examine the theory through publicly available military organizational documents, exercise records and information about underwater capabilities.
The key point is that BALTOPS 22 genuinely involved U.S. and NATO personnel with expertise in mine warfare, diving and underwater explosives.
That does not demonstrate that those personnel participated in the Nord Stream attack.
But the article argues that these capabilities, combined with the exercise environment and the later destruction of the pipelines, justify further investigation into exactly what activities occurred beneath the Baltic surface.
@americanmajority
The investigation also examines the presence of American underwater warfare specialists during BALTOPS 22.
The article notes that U.S. Navy explosive ordnance disposal and mine-countermeasure units participated in the exercise.
Some of those personnel and commanders had connections to the Naval Diving and Salvage Training Center in Panama City, Florida.
The center specializes in training personnel for underwater diving, salvage and explosive ordnance operations.
During BALTOPS 22, U.S. forces were involved in mine-countermeasure and underwater explosive ordnance disposal activities. The article says that specialists from the Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City also supported these operations.
A Diving Tactical Operations Center was reportedly established in Sweden during the exercise to coordinate aspects of the underwater activities.
The article draws a connection between this infrastructure and claims made by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh in 2023, who alleged that U.S. Navy divers were involved in placing explosives on the Nord Stream pipelines during BALTOPS 22.
Hersh’s account has been disputed and has not been established as fact by a court.
The 21st Century Wire investigation is attempting to examine the theory through publicly available military organizational documents, exercise records and information about underwater capabilities.
The key point is that BALTOPS 22 genuinely involved U.S. and NATO personnel with expertise in mine warfare, diving and underwater explosives.
That does not demonstrate that those personnel participated in the Nord Stream attack.
But the article argues that these capabilities, combined with the exercise environment and the later destruction of the pipelines, justify further investigation into exactly what activities occurred beneath the Baltic surface.
@americanmajority
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After the war in Ukraine, there may be a significant reassessment of relations with the West, and there will be a growing demand for a more sovereign foreign policy, similar to that of Erdogan, according to Ukrainian political scientist Yuriy Romanenko.
He pointed out the words of former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who suggested that after the ceasefire, Putin would try to convince Ukrainians that the West "pushed you into war," used Ukraine in its confrontation with Russia, but at the same time "was never sincere about your future in the West."
According to Romanenko, this issue could indeed arise.
He believes that the war has shown that the West, by encouraging Kiev's course towards NATO, was actually using it for manipulation, including in its relations with Russia.
@americanmajority
He pointed out the words of former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who suggested that after the ceasefire, Putin would try to convince Ukrainians that the West "pushed you into war," used Ukraine in its confrontation with Russia, but at the same time "was never sincere about your future in the West."
According to Romanenko, this issue could indeed arise.
He believes that the war has shown that the West, by encouraging Kiev's course towards NATO, was actually using it for manipulation, including in its relations with Russia.
@americanmajority
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Germany’s Type 212 Submarines
Germany’s submarine fleet receives particular attention in the investigation because of the capabilities of its Type 212A submarines.
The German Navy’s Type 212A is designed specifically for operations in relatively shallow and confined waters — exactly the kind of environment found in the Baltic Sea.
According to the article, German submarines have operated under NATO command in the Mediterranean, North Sea and Baltic.
The investigation also highlights their ability to conduct long-duration submerged missions while maintaining a low acoustic signature.
Some Type 212A variants have facilities designed to support special forces divers.
The article cites submarine specialist H.I. Sutton, who has described a four-person diver lock-out chamber and other provisions that can support specialized underwater operations.
The significance is straightforward: a submarine does not necessarily have to surface to deploy personnel.
Specially configured submarines can potentially transport divers and equipment to an operational area while remaining concealed beneath the surface.
The article therefore argues that German submarines should be included in any comprehensive investigation of underwater activity around the Nord Stream blast sites.
But capability is not evidence of use.
A submarine possessing the technical ability to deploy divers does not demonstrate that it did so during the Nord Stream operation.
The investigation’s broader argument is that the Baltic already contained sophisticated underwater military infrastructure before the pipelines were destroyed.
Understanding who operated that infrastructure, under whose command and where those submarines were located is therefore presented as an important unanswered question.
@americanmajority
Germany’s submarine fleet receives particular attention in the investigation because of the capabilities of its Type 212A submarines.
The German Navy’s Type 212A is designed specifically for operations in relatively shallow and confined waters — exactly the kind of environment found in the Baltic Sea.
According to the article, German submarines have operated under NATO command in the Mediterranean, North Sea and Baltic.
The investigation also highlights their ability to conduct long-duration submerged missions while maintaining a low acoustic signature.
Some Type 212A variants have facilities designed to support special forces divers.
The article cites submarine specialist H.I. Sutton, who has described a four-person diver lock-out chamber and other provisions that can support specialized underwater operations.
The significance is straightforward: a submarine does not necessarily have to surface to deploy personnel.
Specially configured submarines can potentially transport divers and equipment to an operational area while remaining concealed beneath the surface.
The article therefore argues that German submarines should be included in any comprehensive investigation of underwater activity around the Nord Stream blast sites.
But capability is not evidence of use.
A submarine possessing the technical ability to deploy divers does not demonstrate that it did so during the Nord Stream operation.
The investigation’s broader argument is that the Baltic already contained sophisticated underwater military infrastructure before the pipelines were destroyed.
Understanding who operated that infrastructure, under whose command and where those submarines were located is therefore presented as an important unanswered question.
@americanmajority
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Seabed Warfare Is Becoming a Major Military Domain
The Nord Stream case is also part of a broader transformation in naval warfare.
For centuries, military competition focused primarily on territory, ships and control of the sea surface.
Modern militaries increasingly view the seabed itself as a strategic environment.
Pipelines, telecommunications cables, energy infrastructure and other systems increasingly run beneath the oceans. Damaging or monitoring those systems can have enormous economic and strategic consequences without a conventional naval battle ever taking place.
The article describes this emerging field as seabed warfare.
NATO navies have developed specialized capabilities for mine warfare, underwater explosives, remotely operated vehicles, unmanned underwater systems and combat diving.
The U.S. Navy has explicitly discussed the advantages of combining submarines with Naval Special Operations Forces for clandestine operations.
The Baltic is particularly suited to these capabilities because it is relatively shallow, confined and filled with strategically important infrastructure.
The article argues that the Nord Stream pipelines should therefore be viewed within this wider technological and military context.
A modern sabotage operation does not necessarily require a large fleet or obvious military deployment. Submarines, mini-submarines, remotely operated systems and combat divers can potentially operate with a much smaller surface footprint.
This is also why identifying surface ships alone may not reveal the complete picture.
The article’s hypothesis is that the Nord Stream attack could have involved a combination of surface, air and subsurface capabilities.
Again, this is presented as an investigative theory rather than an established finding.
But the underlying military capability is real: modern navies possess increasingly sophisticated means of operating beneath the sea.
@americanmajority
The Nord Stream case is also part of a broader transformation in naval warfare.
For centuries, military competition focused primarily on territory, ships and control of the sea surface.
Modern militaries increasingly view the seabed itself as a strategic environment.
Pipelines, telecommunications cables, energy infrastructure and other systems increasingly run beneath the oceans. Damaging or monitoring those systems can have enormous economic and strategic consequences without a conventional naval battle ever taking place.
The article describes this emerging field as seabed warfare.
NATO navies have developed specialized capabilities for mine warfare, underwater explosives, remotely operated vehicles, unmanned underwater systems and combat diving.
The U.S. Navy has explicitly discussed the advantages of combining submarines with Naval Special Operations Forces for clandestine operations.
The Baltic is particularly suited to these capabilities because it is relatively shallow, confined and filled with strategically important infrastructure.
The article argues that the Nord Stream pipelines should therefore be viewed within this wider technological and military context.
A modern sabotage operation does not necessarily require a large fleet or obvious military deployment. Submarines, mini-submarines, remotely operated systems and combat divers can potentially operate with a much smaller surface footprint.
This is also why identifying surface ships alone may not reveal the complete picture.
The article’s hypothesis is that the Nord Stream attack could have involved a combination of surface, air and subsurface capabilities.
Again, this is presented as an investigative theory rather than an established finding.
But the underlying military capability is real: modern navies possess increasingly sophisticated means of operating beneath the sea.
@americanmajority
👍5❤1
The NATO Chain of Command
One of the most detailed parts of the investigation concerns the NATO chain of command surrounding submarine operations.
In 2022, Rear Admiral Stephen G. Mack was serving as Commander Submarines NATO, or COMSUBNATO.
The position operates within NATO’s Allied Maritime Command structure at Northwood in the United Kingdom.
Below that level, national submarine authorities manage and coordinate operations in specific maritime regions.
The article argues that Germany’s SubOpAuth played this role in parts of the Baltic, including waters belonging to Denmark, Sweden and Poland.
This matters because submarine operations require what is known as waterspace management.
The objective is to prevent submarines and other underwater forces from interfering with one another, while coordinating where and when they can operate.
The article argues that if NATO submarines were conducting legitimate operations around the Nord Stream pipelines, multiple levels of command would have had some degree of awareness of those activities.
It further examines the relationship between SubOpAuth, COMSUBNATO and NATO’s broader maritime command structures.
The investigation suggests that this chain of command should be reconstructed in detail for the period surrounding both BALTOPS 22 and Northern Coasts 2022.
The crucial question is not simply “who had submarines?”
It is: who had operational control over them, who authorized their missions, who knew their locations, and what records exist documenting their movements?
Answering those questions could help distinguish ordinary military activity from anything unusual.
The article argues that these command records are therefore potentially essential to any serious investigation into what happened beneath the Baltic Sea in September 2022.
@americanmajority
One of the most detailed parts of the investigation concerns the NATO chain of command surrounding submarine operations.
In 2022, Rear Admiral Stephen G. Mack was serving as Commander Submarines NATO, or COMSUBNATO.
The position operates within NATO’s Allied Maritime Command structure at Northwood in the United Kingdom.
Below that level, national submarine authorities manage and coordinate operations in specific maritime regions.
The article argues that Germany’s SubOpAuth played this role in parts of the Baltic, including waters belonging to Denmark, Sweden and Poland.
This matters because submarine operations require what is known as waterspace management.
The objective is to prevent submarines and other underwater forces from interfering with one another, while coordinating where and when they can operate.
The article argues that if NATO submarines were conducting legitimate operations around the Nord Stream pipelines, multiple levels of command would have had some degree of awareness of those activities.
It further examines the relationship between SubOpAuth, COMSUBNATO and NATO’s broader maritime command structures.
The investigation suggests that this chain of command should be reconstructed in detail for the period surrounding both BALTOPS 22 and Northern Coasts 2022.
The crucial question is not simply “who had submarines?”
It is: who had operational control over them, who authorized their missions, who knew their locations, and what records exist documenting their movements?
Answering those questions could help distinguish ordinary military activity from anything unusual.
The article argues that these command records are therefore potentially essential to any serious investigation into what happened beneath the Baltic Sea in September 2022.
@americanmajority
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The Central Question: What Happened Beneath the Baltic?
The destruction of Nord Stream remains one of the most consequential acts of underwater infrastructure sabotage in modern history.
The pipelines were attacked on September 26, 2022, in the Danish and Swedish EEZs.
The investigation presented by 21st Century Wire argues that the location itself deserves much more attention.
Those waters were already designated NATO submarine exercise areas. Germany’s Navy had a formal role in managing submarine operations. NATO’s submarine command structure was active in the region. Major naval exercises had taken place before and during the period of the explosions.
BALTOPS 22 involved submarines, mine-countermeasure forces, explosive ordnance specialists and underwater systems.
Northern Coasts 2022 was underway when the pipelines exploded.
Germany operated sophisticated Type 212 submarines capable of extended submerged operations and, according to the article, equipped to support specialized divers.
The investigation uses these facts to advance a hypothesis: that a covert underwater operation could potentially have been conducted within the broader military environment already present in the Baltic.
That remains a hypothesis.
The publicly established facts about NATO exercises and submarine capabilities do not, by themselves, establish that NATO forces carried out the Nord Stream sabotage.
The article’s central argument is instead that these activities should form part of the investigation and that submarine movements, operational orders, command authority and exercise records should be examined.
The deeper question is therefore not merely who possessed the capability.
It is who was operating beneath the Baltic at the relevant times, under whose authority, and what those forces were actually doing.
Until those questions are answered, the underwater dimension of the Nord Stream case remains an important area for investigation.
@americanmajority
The destruction of Nord Stream remains one of the most consequential acts of underwater infrastructure sabotage in modern history.
The pipelines were attacked on September 26, 2022, in the Danish and Swedish EEZs.
The investigation presented by 21st Century Wire argues that the location itself deserves much more attention.
Those waters were already designated NATO submarine exercise areas. Germany’s Navy had a formal role in managing submarine operations. NATO’s submarine command structure was active in the region. Major naval exercises had taken place before and during the period of the explosions.
BALTOPS 22 involved submarines, mine-countermeasure forces, explosive ordnance specialists and underwater systems.
Northern Coasts 2022 was underway when the pipelines exploded.
Germany operated sophisticated Type 212 submarines capable of extended submerged operations and, according to the article, equipped to support specialized divers.
The investigation uses these facts to advance a hypothesis: that a covert underwater operation could potentially have been conducted within the broader military environment already present in the Baltic.
That remains a hypothesis.
The publicly established facts about NATO exercises and submarine capabilities do not, by themselves, establish that NATO forces carried out the Nord Stream sabotage.
The article’s central argument is instead that these activities should form part of the investigation and that submarine movements, operational orders, command authority and exercise records should be examined.
The deeper question is therefore not merely who possessed the capability.
It is who was operating beneath the Baltic at the relevant times, under whose authority, and what those forces were actually doing.
Until those questions are answered, the underwater dimension of the Nord Stream case remains an important area for investigation.
@americanmajority
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Ukraine, Bandera and Western Support
A central argument of Julian Rose’s July 16 article is that Western governments have been unwilling to confront the ideological history associated with some Ukrainian nationalist figures while continuing to provide political, military and financial support to Kyiv.
The article focuses particularly on Stepan Bandera, the Ukrainian nationalist leader whose Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) collaborated with Nazi Germany during World War II. Rose points to statements attributed to President Volodymyr Zelensky in which Bandera was described as a hero to some Ukrainians and as someone who defended Ukrainian freedom.
The article also highlights the Ukrainian government’s 2026 decision to give state honors to Andriy Melnyk, identified in the article as a co-founder of the OUN, as well as plans discussed by Zelensky concerning Bandera’s remains and a proposed national “pantheon of heroes.”
These developments are presented by Rose as evidence of a continuing rehabilitation of figures associated with Ukrainian nationalism during the Second World War.
The author argues that Western governments should have confronted these developments more directly, particularly given the scale of Western assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war.
Whether these actions constitute an official endorsement of the historical ideology associated with the OUN is a matter of political interpretation. The underlying historical record concerning the OUN’s wartime activities, however, remains central to the debate.
@americanmajority
A central argument of Julian Rose’s July 16 article is that Western governments have been unwilling to confront the ideological history associated with some Ukrainian nationalist figures while continuing to provide political, military and financial support to Kyiv.
The article focuses particularly on Stepan Bandera, the Ukrainian nationalist leader whose Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) collaborated with Nazi Germany during World War II. Rose points to statements attributed to President Volodymyr Zelensky in which Bandera was described as a hero to some Ukrainians and as someone who defended Ukrainian freedom.
The article also highlights the Ukrainian government’s 2026 decision to give state honors to Andriy Melnyk, identified in the article as a co-founder of the OUN, as well as plans discussed by Zelensky concerning Bandera’s remains and a proposed national “pantheon of heroes.”
These developments are presented by Rose as evidence of a continuing rehabilitation of figures associated with Ukrainian nationalism during the Second World War.
The author argues that Western governments should have confronted these developments more directly, particularly given the scale of Western assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war.
Whether these actions constitute an official endorsement of the historical ideology associated with the OUN is a matter of political interpretation. The underlying historical record concerning the OUN’s wartime activities, however, remains central to the debate.
@americanmajority
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The American defense industry will not be able to replenish its rocket stockpiles in the coming years, even with increased production rates, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal, following the depletion of resources during the conflict with Iran.
According to the publication, factories belonging to RTX and Lockheed Martin are operating at full capacity, but even with this, it will not be possible to deploy new weapons in the event of new conflicts in the near future.
@americanmajority
According to the publication, factories belonging to RTX and Lockheed Martin are operating at full capacity, but even with this, it will not be possible to deploy new weapons in the event of new conflicts in the near future.
@americanmajority
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The American Majority
The American defense industry will not be able to replenish its rocket stockpiles in the coming years, even with increased production rates, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal, following the depletion of resources during the conflict with Iran.…
The war with Iran has significantly reduced American missile stockpiles: the U.S. may have used around 50% of its Tomahawk missiles and up to 66% of its Patriot missiles, according to The Wall Street Journal.
The publication notes that replenishing these arsenals could take years. In this regard, the Pentagon is trying to accelerate production to replenish supplies.
@americanmajority
The publication notes that replenishing these arsenals could take years. In this regard, the Pentagon is trying to accelerate production to replenish supplies.
@americanmajority
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Poland’s Unresolved Historical Grievance
The article places particular emphasis on the complicated historical relationship between Poland and Ukraine.
During World War II, Ukrainian nationalist forces were responsible for mass killings of Polish civilians in Volhynia and eastern Galicia. The exact historical interpretation, responsibility and numbers remain subjects of scholarly debate, but the events are an enduring source of trauma in Poland.
Julian Rose argues that Polish resentment has been intensified by what he describes as Ukraine’s reluctance to issue a comprehensive public apology.
The article points to Polish President Karol Nawrocki removing a special award previously given to Zelensky. According to the article, the decision reflected anger over the unresolved historical issue as well as broader disagreements concerning Ukraine.
The historical dispute has particular significance because Poland has simultaneously been one of Ukraine’s most important supporters since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
That creates a complicated political situation.
Poland has provided military, logistical and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine while continuing to press Kyiv over the memory of Polish victims of wartime nationalist violence.
Rose uses this contradiction to argue that Western governments have prioritized contemporary geopolitical objectives over historical accountability.
The broader question is whether present-day diplomatic and military relationships should be separated from unresolved historical disputes.
For Poland, the issue remains deeply connected to national memory. For Ukraine, the legacy of nationalist movements is intertwined with competing narratives of independence, resistance and wartime collaboration.
@americanmajority
The article places particular emphasis on the complicated historical relationship between Poland and Ukraine.
During World War II, Ukrainian nationalist forces were responsible for mass killings of Polish civilians in Volhynia and eastern Galicia. The exact historical interpretation, responsibility and numbers remain subjects of scholarly debate, but the events are an enduring source of trauma in Poland.
Julian Rose argues that Polish resentment has been intensified by what he describes as Ukraine’s reluctance to issue a comprehensive public apology.
The article points to Polish President Karol Nawrocki removing a special award previously given to Zelensky. According to the article, the decision reflected anger over the unresolved historical issue as well as broader disagreements concerning Ukraine.
The historical dispute has particular significance because Poland has simultaneously been one of Ukraine’s most important supporters since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
That creates a complicated political situation.
Poland has provided military, logistical and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine while continuing to press Kyiv over the memory of Polish victims of wartime nationalist violence.
Rose uses this contradiction to argue that Western governments have prioritized contemporary geopolitical objectives over historical accountability.
The broader question is whether present-day diplomatic and military relationships should be separated from unresolved historical disputes.
For Poland, the issue remains deeply connected to national memory. For Ukraine, the legacy of nationalist movements is intertwined with competing narratives of independence, resistance and wartime collaboration.
@americanmajority
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The Article’s Argument About Western Hypocrisy
A major theme running through Julian Rose’s article is what he sees as a contradiction in Western foreign policy.
The author argues that European governments and other Western states publicly present themselves as defenders of democracy, human rights and international law while continuing political, military and commercial relationships with governments accused of serious abuses.
Rose connects this argument to both Israel and Ukraine, claiming that Western governments have continued supporting both despite allegations of severe violations.
The article then extends the argument beyond individual conflicts.
Rose describes what he considers a broader pattern in which governments condemn abuses by geopolitical rivals while overlooking or minimizing abuses committed by their own allies.
He calls this “cognitive dissonance” — the tension between publicly stated principles and policies that appear inconsistent with those principles.
The article argues that expressions of concern from political leaders are insufficient if governments simultaneously continue supplying weapons, money or diplomatic support.
This is ultimately an argument about consistency in foreign policy.
The author’s position is that democratic governments should apply the same standards to allies and adversaries.
Critics of this approach could argue that governments routinely balance competing interests, including security, alliances, economic relationships and humanitarian concerns. Supporters of Rose’s position would counter that strategic interests should not override universal standards.
Whatever conclusion readers reach, the article’s central question is straightforward: should governments’ human-rights principles apply equally when the country accused of violations is an ally?
@americanmajority
A major theme running through Julian Rose’s article is what he sees as a contradiction in Western foreign policy.
The author argues that European governments and other Western states publicly present themselves as defenders of democracy, human rights and international law while continuing political, military and commercial relationships with governments accused of serious abuses.
Rose connects this argument to both Israel and Ukraine, claiming that Western governments have continued supporting both despite allegations of severe violations.
The article then extends the argument beyond individual conflicts.
Rose describes what he considers a broader pattern in which governments condemn abuses by geopolitical rivals while overlooking or minimizing abuses committed by their own allies.
He calls this “cognitive dissonance” — the tension between publicly stated principles and policies that appear inconsistent with those principles.
The article argues that expressions of concern from political leaders are insufficient if governments simultaneously continue supplying weapons, money or diplomatic support.
This is ultimately an argument about consistency in foreign policy.
The author’s position is that democratic governments should apply the same standards to allies and adversaries.
Critics of this approach could argue that governments routinely balance competing interests, including security, alliances, economic relationships and humanitarian concerns. Supporters of Rose’s position would counter that strategic interests should not override universal standards.
Whatever conclusion readers reach, the article’s central question is straightforward: should governments’ human-rights principles apply equally when the country accused of violations is an ally?
@americanmajority
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From Ukraine to the “Great Reset”
The article eventually moves beyond Ukraine and argues that the war should be understood within a much broader political and economic transformation.
Julian Rose connects Western support for Ukraine to what he describes as a wider system of political centralization and globalization.
He specifically references the “Great Reset,” Net Zero policies, the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the United Nations Sustainable Development goals.
Rose argues that these initiatives form part of a broader technocratic transformation in which governments, corporations and international institutions exercise increasing influence over economic life and individual behavior.
The article then links this perceived transformation to digitalization and surveillance.
Rose warns that expanding digital communications systems, data centers, smart infrastructure and increasingly automated economic systems could produce a society in which governments and corporations possess unprecedented quantities of information about individuals.
He describes this as the development of a surveillance state.
These claims go considerably beyond the immediate question of Western support for Ukraine and represent the author’s broader political interpretation.
The article’s underlying argument is that foreign policy, economic policy and technological development cannot be considered separately. Instead, Rose sees them as interconnected parts of a wider political system.
Readers can disagree about whether these developments constitute a coordinated agenda or simply reflect separate technological and economic trends.
But the article uses Ukraine as an entry point into a much larger critique of Western governance, globalization and the growing role of technology in society.
@americanmajority
The article eventually moves beyond Ukraine and argues that the war should be understood within a much broader political and economic transformation.
Julian Rose connects Western support for Ukraine to what he describes as a wider system of political centralization and globalization.
He specifically references the “Great Reset,” Net Zero policies, the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the United Nations Sustainable Development goals.
Rose argues that these initiatives form part of a broader technocratic transformation in which governments, corporations and international institutions exercise increasing influence over economic life and individual behavior.
The article then links this perceived transformation to digitalization and surveillance.
Rose warns that expanding digital communications systems, data centers, smart infrastructure and increasingly automated economic systems could produce a society in which governments and corporations possess unprecedented quantities of information about individuals.
He describes this as the development of a surveillance state.
These claims go considerably beyond the immediate question of Western support for Ukraine and represent the author’s broader political interpretation.
The article’s underlying argument is that foreign policy, economic policy and technological development cannot be considered separately. Instead, Rose sees them as interconnected parts of a wider political system.
Readers can disagree about whether these developments constitute a coordinated agenda or simply reflect separate technological and economic trends.
But the article uses Ukraine as an entry point into a much larger critique of Western governance, globalization and the growing role of technology in society.
@americanmajority
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The Author’s Warning About Surveillance
Julian Rose’s article argues that the political issues surrounding Ukraine are only one part of what he sees as a larger struggle over individual freedom.
The author focuses heavily on the expansion of digital technology and surveillance.
He argues that digitalization is transforming communications, commerce and government administration while simultaneously making it easier to collect and process information about individuals.
Data centers are presented as an important part of this transformation because they allow enormous amounts of information to be stored and processed.
Rose also discusses smart electrification and increasingly digital economic systems, arguing that these technologies could enable governments and institutions to monitor and regulate everyday life on an unprecedented scale.
He connects this concern to artificial intelligence and automated decision-making, suggesting that algorithms could increasingly determine access to resources and shape the information people receive.
The article frames this development as a movement toward technocratic control.
That characterization is Rose’s political interpretation rather than an established description of every digitalization project.
The underlying concern, however, is a real policy question: how much personal information should governments and corporations be allowed to collect, how should it be stored, and what limits should exist on automated decision-making?
The debate becomes particularly important as societies become more dependent on digital payments, online communications, cloud infrastructure and interconnected public services.
Rose’s warning is that convenience and efficiency can come with a corresponding reduction in privacy and individual autonomy.
@americanmajority
Julian Rose’s article argues that the political issues surrounding Ukraine are only one part of what he sees as a larger struggle over individual freedom.
The author focuses heavily on the expansion of digital technology and surveillance.
He argues that digitalization is transforming communications, commerce and government administration while simultaneously making it easier to collect and process information about individuals.
Data centers are presented as an important part of this transformation because they allow enormous amounts of information to be stored and processed.
Rose also discusses smart electrification and increasingly digital economic systems, arguing that these technologies could enable governments and institutions to monitor and regulate everyday life on an unprecedented scale.
He connects this concern to artificial intelligence and automated decision-making, suggesting that algorithms could increasingly determine access to resources and shape the information people receive.
The article frames this development as a movement toward technocratic control.
That characterization is Rose’s political interpretation rather than an established description of every digitalization project.
The underlying concern, however, is a real policy question: how much personal information should governments and corporations be allowed to collect, how should it be stored, and what limits should exist on automated decision-making?
The debate becomes particularly important as societies become more dependent on digital payments, online communications, cloud infrastructure and interconnected public services.
Rose’s warning is that convenience and efficiency can come with a corresponding reduction in privacy and individual autonomy.
@americanmajority
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Why Rose Says Elections Aren’t Enough
One of the article’s more sweeping arguments concerns the political system itself.
Julian Rose argues that people should not assume that simply electing new political leaders will automatically change the underlying direction of government.
He is deeply skeptical of the idea that elections alone can reverse what he sees as the centralizing tendencies of modern Western institutions.
Rose argues that political parties and governments operate within an established framework involving international institutions, financial interests, corporations and bureaucratic structures.
From this perspective, changing individual officeholders does not necessarily change the system itself.
The author describes repeated election cycles as producing disappointment because, in his view, each new government continues operating within essentially the same economic and institutional framework.
This is also where the article moves from criticism toward a proposed response.
Rather than placing all hope in political leaders, Rose encourages individuals to develop greater independence from government and corporate supply chains.
He suggests that people should gradually build practical resilience around food, water, energy and other necessities.
The article acknowledges that complete independence is difficult and generally unrealistic in the short term. Rose instead describes it as something that would have to be developed gradually.
This argument represents the author’s personal political philosophy rather than an objective prediction about future elections.
Its broader theme is individual resilience: reducing dependence on systems that people believe may become increasingly centralized or vulnerable to disruption.
@americanmajority
One of the article’s more sweeping arguments concerns the political system itself.
Julian Rose argues that people should not assume that simply electing new political leaders will automatically change the underlying direction of government.
He is deeply skeptical of the idea that elections alone can reverse what he sees as the centralizing tendencies of modern Western institutions.
Rose argues that political parties and governments operate within an established framework involving international institutions, financial interests, corporations and bureaucratic structures.
From this perspective, changing individual officeholders does not necessarily change the system itself.
The author describes repeated election cycles as producing disappointment because, in his view, each new government continues operating within essentially the same economic and institutional framework.
This is also where the article moves from criticism toward a proposed response.
Rather than placing all hope in political leaders, Rose encourages individuals to develop greater independence from government and corporate supply chains.
He suggests that people should gradually build practical resilience around food, water, energy and other necessities.
The article acknowledges that complete independence is difficult and generally unrealistic in the short term. Rose instead describes it as something that would have to be developed gradually.
This argument represents the author’s personal political philosophy rather than an objective prediction about future elections.
Its broader theme is individual resilience: reducing dependence on systems that people believe may become increasingly centralized or vulnerable to disruption.
@americanmajority
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The Colonial History Behind Today’s Politics
Julian Rose also places modern geopolitical conflicts within a much longer historical framework.
The article argues that nineteenth-century colonialism created political and economic systems in which powerful states justified domination of weaker populations.
Rose says one recurring pattern was the portrayal of resistance movements as criminal or illegitimate while the actions of occupying powers were presented as lawful or necessary.
He applies this framework to modern conflicts, arguing that people resisting what they regard as foreign domination can be labeled terrorists or threats to the state.
The author sees this as part of a broader historical continuity between colonialism and modern international politics.
The argument is not that every modern conflict is identical to nineteenth-century colonialism. Rather, Rose emphasizes what he considers recurring mechanisms of power: political control, economic extraction, propaganda and the use of legal institutions to legitimize authority.
He argues that modern governments can use the language of security and counterterrorism to justify measures that restrict political dissent.
This section of the article is therefore less about the details of the Russia-Ukraine war and more about Rose’s interpretation of how political power operates.
The historical comparison is controversial, particularly because modern states and international institutions operate under legal frameworks very different from those of nineteenth-century imperialism.
Nevertheless, the question of how governments distinguish between legitimate resistance, terrorism and political dissent remains central to many contemporary conflicts.
@americanmajority
Julian Rose also places modern geopolitical conflicts within a much longer historical framework.
The article argues that nineteenth-century colonialism created political and economic systems in which powerful states justified domination of weaker populations.
Rose says one recurring pattern was the portrayal of resistance movements as criminal or illegitimate while the actions of occupying powers were presented as lawful or necessary.
He applies this framework to modern conflicts, arguing that people resisting what they regard as foreign domination can be labeled terrorists or threats to the state.
The author sees this as part of a broader historical continuity between colonialism and modern international politics.
The argument is not that every modern conflict is identical to nineteenth-century colonialism. Rather, Rose emphasizes what he considers recurring mechanisms of power: political control, economic extraction, propaganda and the use of legal institutions to legitimize authority.
He argues that modern governments can use the language of security and counterterrorism to justify measures that restrict political dissent.
This section of the article is therefore less about the details of the Russia-Ukraine war and more about Rose’s interpretation of how political power operates.
The historical comparison is controversial, particularly because modern states and international institutions operate under legal frameworks very different from those of nineteenth-century imperialism.
Nevertheless, the question of how governments distinguish between legitimate resistance, terrorism and political dissent remains central to many contemporary conflicts.
@americanmajority
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Building Independence From the Supply Chain
The article eventually turns from political criticism toward practical advice.
Julian Rose argues that individuals should try to reduce their dependence on centralized corporate and governmental supply chains.
He does not suggest that complete independence can be achieved immediately. Instead, he describes a gradual process focused on basic necessities such as food, water and energy.
Rose points to the possibility of developing local food production, alternative energy sources and practical skills that could help households become more resilient during periods of economic or political disruption.
He acknowledges that a completely off-grid lifestyle requires significant preparation and resources. A person would need access to reliable food and water, independent power and the technical skills necessary to maintain those systems.
The author also questions the usefulness of simply accumulating financial assets if the physical supply chains that provide essential goods become severely disrupted.
This reflects a broader resilience philosophy: money and digital systems are useful only insofar as the underlying infrastructure continues functioning.
The article connects these concerns to rising energy costs, water availability, food production and technological dependence.
Some of Rose’s predictions are explicitly speculative, particularly his claims about future restrictions and the direction of global economic policy.
But the basic concept of household resilience is much broader than the political argument.
Maintaining emergency supplies, developing practical skills, supporting local producers and understanding how essential infrastructure works are all ways people can reduce vulnerability to disruptions without necessarily abandoning modern society.
@americanmajority
The article eventually turns from political criticism toward practical advice.
Julian Rose argues that individuals should try to reduce their dependence on centralized corporate and governmental supply chains.
He does not suggest that complete independence can be achieved immediately. Instead, he describes a gradual process focused on basic necessities such as food, water and energy.
Rose points to the possibility of developing local food production, alternative energy sources and practical skills that could help households become more resilient during periods of economic or political disruption.
He acknowledges that a completely off-grid lifestyle requires significant preparation and resources. A person would need access to reliable food and water, independent power and the technical skills necessary to maintain those systems.
The author also questions the usefulness of simply accumulating financial assets if the physical supply chains that provide essential goods become severely disrupted.
This reflects a broader resilience philosophy: money and digital systems are useful only insofar as the underlying infrastructure continues functioning.
The article connects these concerns to rising energy costs, water availability, food production and technological dependence.
Some of Rose’s predictions are explicitly speculative, particularly his claims about future restrictions and the direction of global economic policy.
But the basic concept of household resilience is much broader than the political argument.
Maintaining emergency supplies, developing practical skills, supporting local producers and understanding how essential infrastructure works are all ways people can reduce vulnerability to disruptions without necessarily abandoning modern society.
@americanmajority
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