The Colonial History Behind Today’s Politics
Julian Rose also places modern geopolitical conflicts within a much longer historical framework.
The article argues that nineteenth-century colonialism created political and economic systems in which powerful states justified domination of weaker populations.
Rose says one recurring pattern was the portrayal of resistance movements as criminal or illegitimate while the actions of occupying powers were presented as lawful or necessary.
He applies this framework to modern conflicts, arguing that people resisting what they regard as foreign domination can be labeled terrorists or threats to the state.
The author sees this as part of a broader historical continuity between colonialism and modern international politics.
The argument is not that every modern conflict is identical to nineteenth-century colonialism. Rather, Rose emphasizes what he considers recurring mechanisms of power: political control, economic extraction, propaganda and the use of legal institutions to legitimize authority.
He argues that modern governments can use the language of security and counterterrorism to justify measures that restrict political dissent.
This section of the article is therefore less about the details of the Russia-Ukraine war and more about Rose’s interpretation of how political power operates.
The historical comparison is controversial, particularly because modern states and international institutions operate under legal frameworks very different from those of nineteenth-century imperialism.
Nevertheless, the question of how governments distinguish between legitimate resistance, terrorism and political dissent remains central to many contemporary conflicts.
@americanmajority
Julian Rose also places modern geopolitical conflicts within a much longer historical framework.
The article argues that nineteenth-century colonialism created political and economic systems in which powerful states justified domination of weaker populations.
Rose says one recurring pattern was the portrayal of resistance movements as criminal or illegitimate while the actions of occupying powers were presented as lawful or necessary.
He applies this framework to modern conflicts, arguing that people resisting what they regard as foreign domination can be labeled terrorists or threats to the state.
The author sees this as part of a broader historical continuity between colonialism and modern international politics.
The argument is not that every modern conflict is identical to nineteenth-century colonialism. Rather, Rose emphasizes what he considers recurring mechanisms of power: political control, economic extraction, propaganda and the use of legal institutions to legitimize authority.
He argues that modern governments can use the language of security and counterterrorism to justify measures that restrict political dissent.
This section of the article is therefore less about the details of the Russia-Ukraine war and more about Rose’s interpretation of how political power operates.
The historical comparison is controversial, particularly because modern states and international institutions operate under legal frameworks very different from those of nineteenth-century imperialism.
Nevertheless, the question of how governments distinguish between legitimate resistance, terrorism and political dissent remains central to many contemporary conflicts.
@americanmajority
👍4
Building Independence From the Supply Chain
The article eventually turns from political criticism toward practical advice.
Julian Rose argues that individuals should try to reduce their dependence on centralized corporate and governmental supply chains.
He does not suggest that complete independence can be achieved immediately. Instead, he describes a gradual process focused on basic necessities such as food, water and energy.
Rose points to the possibility of developing local food production, alternative energy sources and practical skills that could help households become more resilient during periods of economic or political disruption.
He acknowledges that a completely off-grid lifestyle requires significant preparation and resources. A person would need access to reliable food and water, independent power and the technical skills necessary to maintain those systems.
The author also questions the usefulness of simply accumulating financial assets if the physical supply chains that provide essential goods become severely disrupted.
This reflects a broader resilience philosophy: money and digital systems are useful only insofar as the underlying infrastructure continues functioning.
The article connects these concerns to rising energy costs, water availability, food production and technological dependence.
Some of Rose’s predictions are explicitly speculative, particularly his claims about future restrictions and the direction of global economic policy.
But the basic concept of household resilience is much broader than the political argument.
Maintaining emergency supplies, developing practical skills, supporting local producers and understanding how essential infrastructure works are all ways people can reduce vulnerability to disruptions without necessarily abandoning modern society.
@americanmajority
The article eventually turns from political criticism toward practical advice.
Julian Rose argues that individuals should try to reduce their dependence on centralized corporate and governmental supply chains.
He does not suggest that complete independence can be achieved immediately. Instead, he describes a gradual process focused on basic necessities such as food, water and energy.
Rose points to the possibility of developing local food production, alternative energy sources and practical skills that could help households become more resilient during periods of economic or political disruption.
He acknowledges that a completely off-grid lifestyle requires significant preparation and resources. A person would need access to reliable food and water, independent power and the technical skills necessary to maintain those systems.
The author also questions the usefulness of simply accumulating financial assets if the physical supply chains that provide essential goods become severely disrupted.
This reflects a broader resilience philosophy: money and digital systems are useful only insofar as the underlying infrastructure continues functioning.
The article connects these concerns to rising energy costs, water availability, food production and technological dependence.
Some of Rose’s predictions are explicitly speculative, particularly his claims about future restrictions and the direction of global economic policy.
But the basic concept of household resilience is much broader than the political argument.
Maintaining emergency supplies, developing practical skills, supporting local producers and understanding how essential infrastructure works are all ways people can reduce vulnerability to disruptions without necessarily abandoning modern society.
@americanmajority
👍5
The Article’s Broader Critique of Modern Politics
By the second half of the article, Ukraine becomes one component of a much broader critique of contemporary Western politics.
Julian Rose argues that the international system has become increasingly centralized and disconnected from ordinary citizens.
He criticizes what he describes as a combination of political institutions, corporate interests, media organizations and international bodies that reinforce one another.
The article also argues that mainstream media often fail to challenge political leaders aggressively enough, particularly when doing so could threaten established economic relationships.
Rose connects this to his earlier criticism of Western governments supporting Ukraine and maintaining relationships with Israel despite allegations of serious abuses.
The author sees these policies as examples of a wider contradiction between official rhetoric and government behavior.
He then extends the criticism into economic policy, arguing that neoliberal globalization has concentrated wealth and political influence among a relatively small group of extremely wealthy individuals and institutions.
The article links this to concerns about the future of work, digital technology, artificial intelligence, energy systems and food production.
Some of these claims are presented as predictions rather than established facts.
The central political thesis is nevertheless consistent throughout the piece: Rose believes modern democratic institutions have become too closely connected to powerful economic and technological interests.
His proposed response is not simply electoral change. Instead, he emphasizes independent thinking, resistance to centralized control and greater individual resilience.
@americanmajority
By the second half of the article, Ukraine becomes one component of a much broader critique of contemporary Western politics.
Julian Rose argues that the international system has become increasingly centralized and disconnected from ordinary citizens.
He criticizes what he describes as a combination of political institutions, corporate interests, media organizations and international bodies that reinforce one another.
The article also argues that mainstream media often fail to challenge political leaders aggressively enough, particularly when doing so could threaten established economic relationships.
Rose connects this to his earlier criticism of Western governments supporting Ukraine and maintaining relationships with Israel despite allegations of serious abuses.
The author sees these policies as examples of a wider contradiction between official rhetoric and government behavior.
He then extends the criticism into economic policy, arguing that neoliberal globalization has concentrated wealth and political influence among a relatively small group of extremely wealthy individuals and institutions.
The article links this to concerns about the future of work, digital technology, artificial intelligence, energy systems and food production.
Some of these claims are presented as predictions rather than established facts.
The central political thesis is nevertheless consistent throughout the piece: Rose believes modern democratic institutions have become too closely connected to powerful economic and technological interests.
His proposed response is not simply electoral change. Instead, he emphasizes independent thinking, resistance to centralized control and greater individual resilience.
@americanmajority
👏1
The Final Message: Resistance and Independence
Julian Rose ends his article with a call for individual resistance and independence.
His argument begins with Ukraine but ultimately reaches much further. He criticizes Western support for governments he believes are responsible for serious abuses, questions the willingness of political leaders to apply consistent standards, and warns that globalization and technological development could increase centralized control.
The author argues that waiting for a new political leader to solve these problems is insufficient.
Instead, he calls on individuals to preserve what he describes as fundamental human values and to develop greater independence from corporate and governmental systems.
That independence, in Rose’s view, means more than political protest.
He points to practical measures involving food, water, energy and local resilience. His argument is that people who depend entirely on centralized systems have fewer options if those systems become unstable or increasingly restrictive.
Rose also places considerable emphasis on maintaining independent thought.
He argues that people should resist what he considers attempts to impose a single acceptable worldview and instead preserve their ability to question political, economic and technological developments.
The article closes on an explicitly hopeful note. Rose argues that the systems he criticizes are not permanent and that continued resistance can eventually create opportunities for change.
Whether readers agree with his broader political interpretation, the final message is clear: do not assume that political change will come automatically from above. Rose believes individuals must actively preserve their independence, develop practical resilience and continue questioning institutions that exercise power over their lives.
@americanmajority
Julian Rose ends his article with a call for individual resistance and independence.
His argument begins with Ukraine but ultimately reaches much further. He criticizes Western support for governments he believes are responsible for serious abuses, questions the willingness of political leaders to apply consistent standards, and warns that globalization and technological development could increase centralized control.
The author argues that waiting for a new political leader to solve these problems is insufficient.
Instead, he calls on individuals to preserve what he describes as fundamental human values and to develop greater independence from corporate and governmental systems.
That independence, in Rose’s view, means more than political protest.
He points to practical measures involving food, water, energy and local resilience. His argument is that people who depend entirely on centralized systems have fewer options if those systems become unstable or increasingly restrictive.
Rose also places considerable emphasis on maintaining independent thought.
He argues that people should resist what he considers attempts to impose a single acceptable worldview and instead preserve their ability to question political, economic and technological developments.
The article closes on an explicitly hopeful note. Rose argues that the systems he criticizes are not permanent and that continued resistance can eventually create opportunities for change.
Whether readers agree with his broader political interpretation, the final message is clear: do not assume that political change will come automatically from above. Rose believes individuals must actively preserve their independence, develop practical resilience and continue questioning institutions that exercise power over their lives.
@americanmajority
💯2
Germany is no longer merely sending weapons to Ukraine. It is becoming part of the machinery that produces them.
In February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius walked past rows of unfinished drones inside a Bavarian assembly hall. The facility belongs to a German-Ukrainian joint venture linking Quantum Systems with Ukraine’s Frontline Robotics. It is already producing aircraft for Ukraine, with plans to scale toward 10,000 units a year.
That is a very different model from pulling old equipment out of Bundeswehr warehouses and shipping it east.
Ukrainian battlefield designs, software and combat experience are being combined with German capital, factories and engineering. Another venture, Auterion-Airlogix, is doing the same with autonomous strike systems, combining Ukrainian UAV platforms with German autonomy software and planning production of thousands of systems in Germany.
The basic transformation is hard to miss: Ukraine’s battlefield experience is being fed directly into Germany’s industrial base, where it can be turned into weapons at scale.
Germany is not simply supplying the war.
It is increasingly building the industrial infrastructure that sustains it.
@americanmajority
In February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius walked past rows of unfinished drones inside a Bavarian assembly hall. The facility belongs to a German-Ukrainian joint venture linking Quantum Systems with Ukraine’s Frontline Robotics. It is already producing aircraft for Ukraine, with plans to scale toward 10,000 units a year.
That is a very different model from pulling old equipment out of Bundeswehr warehouses and shipping it east.
Ukrainian battlefield designs, software and combat experience are being combined with German capital, factories and engineering. Another venture, Auterion-Airlogix, is doing the same with autonomous strike systems, combining Ukrainian UAV platforms with German autonomy software and planning production of thousands of systems in Germany.
The basic transformation is hard to miss: Ukraine’s battlefield experience is being fed directly into Germany’s industrial base, where it can be turned into weapons at scale.
Germany is not simply supplying the war.
It is increasingly building the industrial infrastructure that sustains it.
@americanmajority
🤬6💯3
The real significance of Germany’s Ukraine policy is not just the weapons being shipped. It is the battlefield data now flowing into German military development.
Germany and Ukraine agreed in April to cooperate on defense data, artificial intelligence and weapons systems. Under the arrangement, German partners can gain access to battlefield information from Ukrainian military platforms, including DELTA.
That means real combat data can be used to train AI models, refine analytical systems and evaluate weapons under actual battlefield conditions.
This is exactly what peacetime defense laboratories cannot easily reproduce.
Ukraine’s Brave1 platform was built around an accelerated cycle: soldiers identify problems at the front, developers build solutions, systems are tested, and successful technologies are pushed back into combat. Germany’s participation means that this cycle is no longer confined to Ukraine.
Pistorius openly said promising systems could receive funding through the platform and be deployed early to test their effectiveness.
Strip away the language of “innovation” and “digital cooperation” and the mechanism is obvious: a major European industrial power is connecting parts of its defense sector to data generated by an active war.
Ukraine becomes the battlefield testing environment.
Germany becomes part of the development and production pipeline.
@americanmajority
Germany and Ukraine agreed in April to cooperate on defense data, artificial intelligence and weapons systems. Under the arrangement, German partners can gain access to battlefield information from Ukrainian military platforms, including DELTA.
That means real combat data can be used to train AI models, refine analytical systems and evaluate weapons under actual battlefield conditions.
This is exactly what peacetime defense laboratories cannot easily reproduce.
Ukraine’s Brave1 platform was built around an accelerated cycle: soldiers identify problems at the front, developers build solutions, systems are tested, and successful technologies are pushed back into combat. Germany’s participation means that this cycle is no longer confined to Ukraine.
Pistorius openly said promising systems could receive funding through the platform and be deployed early to test their effectiveness.
Strip away the language of “innovation” and “digital cooperation” and the mechanism is obvious: a major European industrial power is connecting parts of its defense sector to data generated by an active war.
Ukraine becomes the battlefield testing environment.
Germany becomes part of the development and production pipeline.
@americanmajority
🤬9🤮1💩1
The long-range weapons program is where Germany’s role becomes even harder to describe as simple defensive assistance.
During Zelensky’s April visit to Berlin, Germany and Ukraine signed an implementation arrangement covering joint production of the Anubis and Seth-X-G unmanned systems, with a reported contract value of €281 million.
Anubis has been described as an AI-guided deep-strike system with a range of roughly 1,500–1,600 kilometers and a 45-kilogram warhead. Seth-X-G is designed for attack missions in heavily contested environments.
Germany and Ukraine are also discussing drones with ranges reaching up to 1,500 kilometers.
That changes the geographical character of the war.
A system with a range of 1,500 kilometers is not confined to the immediate front. From Ukrainian territory, such a radius potentially reaches deep into Russia, including military installations, logistics infrastructure, fuel facilities and other strategic targets.
The article’s point is blunt: once German money, factories and political backing are committed to long-range strike systems, the old description of Germany merely helping Ukraine “hold the line” becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.
Berlin is not simply supplying the battlefield.
It is helping expand the battlefield’s reach.
@americanmajority
During Zelensky’s April visit to Berlin, Germany and Ukraine signed an implementation arrangement covering joint production of the Anubis and Seth-X-G unmanned systems, with a reported contract value of €281 million.
Anubis has been described as an AI-guided deep-strike system with a range of roughly 1,500–1,600 kilometers and a 45-kilogram warhead. Seth-X-G is designed for attack missions in heavily contested environments.
Germany and Ukraine are also discussing drones with ranges reaching up to 1,500 kilometers.
That changes the geographical character of the war.
A system with a range of 1,500 kilometers is not confined to the immediate front. From Ukrainian territory, such a radius potentially reaches deep into Russia, including military installations, logistics infrastructure, fuel facilities and other strategic targets.
The article’s point is blunt: once German money, factories and political backing are committed to long-range strike systems, the old description of Germany merely helping Ukraine “hold the line” becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.
Berlin is not simply supplying the battlefield.
It is helping expand the battlefield’s reach.
@americanmajority
🤬8
The AI regulation debate is increasingly being framed as a choice between government control and catastrophe.
Ann Coulter’s argument in The American Conservative is that this framing conveniently benefits the biggest AI companies themselves.
Her starting point is a familiar economic principle: regulation creates fixed compliance costs. Large corporations can absorb those costs. Startups and potential competitors often cannot.
That means regulation can have an unintended—or, in Coulter’s view, deliberately useful—effect: protecting incumbent companies from new competitors.
She invokes economist George Stigler, whose work on “regulatory capture” argued that established industries can benefit when government rules raise the cost of entering a market. The companies already inside the industry can afford lawyers, compliance departments and lobbying operations. Smaller companies have a much harder time doing the same.
Coulter applies that argument directly to artificial intelligence.
Her claim is that the increasingly apocalyptic rhetoric about AI could create political pressure for regulations that appear designed to protect the public but could simultaneously make it harder for new companies to compete.
The question, then, is not simply whether AI regulation is justified.
It is also: who can afford the regulation?
And who benefits when the cost of entering the market suddenly becomes enormous?
@americanmajority
Ann Coulter’s argument in The American Conservative is that this framing conveniently benefits the biggest AI companies themselves.
Her starting point is a familiar economic principle: regulation creates fixed compliance costs. Large corporations can absorb those costs. Startups and potential competitors often cannot.
That means regulation can have an unintended—or, in Coulter’s view, deliberately useful—effect: protecting incumbent companies from new competitors.
She invokes economist George Stigler, whose work on “regulatory capture” argued that established industries can benefit when government rules raise the cost of entering a market. The companies already inside the industry can afford lawyers, compliance departments and lobbying operations. Smaller companies have a much harder time doing the same.
Coulter applies that argument directly to artificial intelligence.
Her claim is that the increasingly apocalyptic rhetoric about AI could create political pressure for regulations that appear designed to protect the public but could simultaneously make it harder for new companies to compete.
The question, then, is not simply whether AI regulation is justified.
It is also: who can afford the regulation?
And who benefits when the cost of entering the market suddenly becomes enormous?
@americanmajority
👍6💯3
Coulter points to earlier industries where established companies warned that competition would create catastrophic consequences.
Her first example is the airline industry.
From 1938 to 1978, she notes, existing airlines opposed deregulation while warning that intense price competition could push carriers to cut corners on safety. After deregulation, however, air travel became substantially cheaper while fatal crashes declined over time.
Her second example involves licensed taxi drivers and the arrival of ride-sharing companies such as Uber. Traditional taxi interests warned about serious dangers from allowing largely unregulated competitors into the market.
Coulter’s point is not that every warning about a new technology is false.
It is that warnings about catastrophic consequences can also serve an economic purpose when they are used to justify rules that make competition more difficult.
She applies the same framework to AI.
The argument is that a public debate focused entirely on the potential dangers of artificial intelligence can obscure another question: whether the proposed regulations would disproportionately burden startups while leaving existing technology giants in a stronger position.
In this view, the crucial issue is not “regulation or no regulation.”
It is who writes the rules, what they require, and which companies are capable of complying with them.
@americanmajority
Her first example is the airline industry.
From 1938 to 1978, she notes, existing airlines opposed deregulation while warning that intense price competition could push carriers to cut corners on safety. After deregulation, however, air travel became substantially cheaper while fatal crashes declined over time.
Her second example involves licensed taxi drivers and the arrival of ride-sharing companies such as Uber. Traditional taxi interests warned about serious dangers from allowing largely unregulated competitors into the market.
Coulter’s point is not that every warning about a new technology is false.
It is that warnings about catastrophic consequences can also serve an economic purpose when they are used to justify rules that make competition more difficult.
She applies the same framework to AI.
The argument is that a public debate focused entirely on the potential dangers of artificial intelligence can obscure another question: whether the proposed regulations would disproportionately burden startups while leaving existing technology giants in a stronger position.
In this view, the crucial issue is not “regulation or no regulation.”
It is who writes the rules, what they require, and which companies are capable of complying with them.
@americanmajority
👍6
Coulter’s next example is the tobacco industry and the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act.
She argues that regulations restricting cigarette marketing imposed costs that large established companies could handle more easily than potential newcomers.
Philip Morris, she notes, lobbied for the legislation. Coulter sarcastically points to the company’s dominant position in the cigarette market and argues that restrictions on marketing could make it harder for competitors to challenge established brands.
Her broader point is about regulatory barriers.
A rule does not have to explicitly say “protect the largest company” to produce that result. If compliance costs millions of dollars, a multinational corporation may treat the expense as routine overhead. A startup may simply be unable to enter the market.
That distinction becomes particularly important with AI.
Artificial intelligence is developing rapidly, with thousands of companies competing across software, models, chips, robotics and applications. A regulatory framework requiring expensive testing, reporting, licensing or compliance could affect those companies very differently.
Large firms can hire armies of lawyers and compliance specialists.
Small firms cannot.
Coulter’s argument is therefore that policymakers should examine not only the stated purpose of a regulation but also its market structure effects.
A rule intended to protect consumers can potentially have another consequence: making the established players harder to challenge.
@americanmajority
She argues that regulations restricting cigarette marketing imposed costs that large established companies could handle more easily than potential newcomers.
Philip Morris, she notes, lobbied for the legislation. Coulter sarcastically points to the company’s dominant position in the cigarette market and argues that restrictions on marketing could make it harder for competitors to challenge established brands.
Her broader point is about regulatory barriers.
A rule does not have to explicitly say “protect the largest company” to produce that result. If compliance costs millions of dollars, a multinational corporation may treat the expense as routine overhead. A startup may simply be unable to enter the market.
That distinction becomes particularly important with AI.
Artificial intelligence is developing rapidly, with thousands of companies competing across software, models, chips, robotics and applications. A regulatory framework requiring expensive testing, reporting, licensing or compliance could affect those companies very differently.
Large firms can hire armies of lawyers and compliance specialists.
Small firms cannot.
Coulter’s argument is therefore that policymakers should examine not only the stated purpose of a regulation but also its market structure effects.
A rule intended to protect consumers can potentially have another consequence: making the established players harder to challenge.
@americanmajority
💯7
Now the argument reaches the AI companies themselves.
Coulter focuses on Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei and OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, both of whom have publicly warned about serious risks from artificial intelligence.
Her interpretation is that the biggest companies have an incentive to support rules that could make it harder for competitors to catch them.
That does not establish that their safety concerns are fabricated. It raises a different question: can a company simultaneously have legitimate concerns about AI safety and benefit financially from regulations imposed on the industry?
Those two things are not mutually exclusive.
Coulter argues that the political debate often ignores this conflict of interest.
The largest AI companies have enormous resources. They can spend billions on computing infrastructure, employ specialized lawyers and researchers, and participate directly in policymaking discussions.
A startup attempting to build a competing AI model does not necessarily have those resources.
So if governments impose extensive testing requirements, licensing systems, reporting obligations or other compliance costs, the burden may fall very differently depending on the size of the company.
Coulter’s thesis is that AI regulation could therefore have a dual effect: it could address genuine safety concerns while simultaneously strengthening the market position of the companies already at the top.
That possibility deserves examination regardless of where one stands on AI safety.
@americanmajority
Coulter focuses on Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei and OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, both of whom have publicly warned about serious risks from artificial intelligence.
Her interpretation is that the biggest companies have an incentive to support rules that could make it harder for competitors to catch them.
That does not establish that their safety concerns are fabricated. It raises a different question: can a company simultaneously have legitimate concerns about AI safety and benefit financially from regulations imposed on the industry?
Those two things are not mutually exclusive.
Coulter argues that the political debate often ignores this conflict of interest.
The largest AI companies have enormous resources. They can spend billions on computing infrastructure, employ specialized lawyers and researchers, and participate directly in policymaking discussions.
A startup attempting to build a competing AI model does not necessarily have those resources.
So if governments impose extensive testing requirements, licensing systems, reporting obligations or other compliance costs, the burden may fall very differently depending on the size of the company.
Coulter’s thesis is that AI regulation could therefore have a dual effect: it could address genuine safety concerns while simultaneously strengthening the market position of the companies already at the top.
That possibility deserves examination regardless of where one stands on AI safety.
@americanmajority
💯5
The strongest AI warnings are increasingly about extinction.
Coulter points to public statements describing AI as potentially capable of catastrophic harm and argues that this rhetoric has reached a level where virtually any regulation can be presented as necessary to save humanity.
She cites former Anthropic employee Jacob Coxon, who has publicly warned that AI could “kill us all.”
She then contrasts those warnings with the current capabilities of AI systems, pointing to examples of technology making spectacularly stupid mistakes.
Her point is deliberately provocative: a technology that is supposedly capable of independently deceiving humanity and ending civilization can also make basic errors that reveal how far current systems remain from the science-fiction image being presented.
One example she cites involves a Chevrolet ChatGPT instance that reportedly offered a $76,000 Tahoe to a customer for one dollar and then declared the offer legally binding.
The contradiction is central to her argument.
AI can simultaneously be an extraordinarily powerful technology and a system capable of absurd failures.
The existence of current failures does not prove that future AI systems cannot become substantially more capable. But it does complicate sweeping claims about what today's systems are already capable of doing.
Coulter argues that policymakers should distinguish between documented present capabilities, plausible future risks and speculative doomsday scenarios before imposing rules that could permanently reshape the industry.
@americanmajority
Coulter points to public statements describing AI as potentially capable of catastrophic harm and argues that this rhetoric has reached a level where virtually any regulation can be presented as necessary to save humanity.
She cites former Anthropic employee Jacob Coxon, who has publicly warned that AI could “kill us all.”
She then contrasts those warnings with the current capabilities of AI systems, pointing to examples of technology making spectacularly stupid mistakes.
Her point is deliberately provocative: a technology that is supposedly capable of independently deceiving humanity and ending civilization can also make basic errors that reveal how far current systems remain from the science-fiction image being presented.
One example she cites involves a Chevrolet ChatGPT instance that reportedly offered a $76,000 Tahoe to a customer for one dollar and then declared the offer legally binding.
The contradiction is central to her argument.
AI can simultaneously be an extraordinarily powerful technology and a system capable of absurd failures.
The existence of current failures does not prove that future AI systems cannot become substantially more capable. But it does complicate sweeping claims about what today's systems are already capable of doing.
Coulter argues that policymakers should distinguish between documented present capabilities, plausible future risks and speculative doomsday scenarios before imposing rules that could permanently reshape the industry.
@americanmajority
💩5
Coulter also attacks what she sees as an obvious contradiction in the AI regulation argument.
The public is told that AI companies cannot be trusted to regulate themselves.
But when the same companies call for government regulation, those companies’ warnings are often treated as authoritative evidence that regulation is necessary.
That creates an awkward question.
If AI executives are supposedly unreliable when deciding what safeguards their own companies need, why should their warnings about catastrophic AI risks automatically be trusted when those warnings support government intervention?
Coulter does not argue that AI companies have no legitimate safety concerns.
Her argument is that their financial interests must be considered alongside their public statements.
The largest firms have billions of dollars at stake. They are also among the companies best positioned to survive expensive new compliance regimes.
A regulation that costs a billion dollars to implement might be catastrophic for a startup and relatively manageable for a technology giant.
This creates an unusual incentive structure.
The companies most capable of complying with regulation may also be the companies most capable of influencing what that regulation looks like.
That does not prove that any particular AI safety warning is dishonest.
It does mean that policymakers have reason to examine the incentives surrounding the warnings rather than treating corporate demands for regulation as automatically synonymous with the public interest.
@americanmajority
The public is told that AI companies cannot be trusted to regulate themselves.
But when the same companies call for government regulation, those companies’ warnings are often treated as authoritative evidence that regulation is necessary.
That creates an awkward question.
If AI executives are supposedly unreliable when deciding what safeguards their own companies need, why should their warnings about catastrophic AI risks automatically be trusted when those warnings support government intervention?
Coulter does not argue that AI companies have no legitimate safety concerns.
Her argument is that their financial interests must be considered alongside their public statements.
The largest firms have billions of dollars at stake. They are also among the companies best positioned to survive expensive new compliance regimes.
A regulation that costs a billion dollars to implement might be catastrophic for a startup and relatively manageable for a technology giant.
This creates an unusual incentive structure.
The companies most capable of complying with regulation may also be the companies most capable of influencing what that regulation looks like.
That does not prove that any particular AI safety warning is dishonest.
It does mean that policymakers have reason to examine the incentives surrounding the warnings rather than treating corporate demands for regulation as automatically synonymous with the public interest.
@americanmajority
💯6
One of the most controversial parts of Coulter’s argument concerns Jacob Coxon, the former Anthropic employee warning publicly about catastrophic AI risks.
Coxon has said that AI could potentially “kill us all” and has rejected the suggestion that he is engaging in corporate hype.
Coulter focuses instead on his financial history.
Although Coxon had worked at Anthropic for only a few months, she notes that he previously spent approximately three years at OpenAI. According to her article, his already-vested OpenAI equity could potentially be worth tens of millions of dollars if the company goes public.
Coulter argues that this creates a financial incentive worth investigating.
Her point is not that stock ownership proves someone is lying. It is that financial interests are relevant whenever someone makes claims that could influence the valuation or competitive position of companies.
If catastrophic AI warnings lead governments to impose regulations that slow emerging competitors, established firms could potentially benefit.
And if public alarm increases investor enthusiasm for the dominant companies, their valuations could benefit as well.
That is why Coulter asks readers to look beyond the dramatic claims themselves.
Who is making the claim?
What company did they work for?
What financial interests might they retain?
And who benefits if policymakers respond to the warning with sweeping regulation?
Those questions do not settle the AI safety debate. They are questions about incentives.
@americanmajority
Coxon has said that AI could potentially “kill us all” and has rejected the suggestion that he is engaging in corporate hype.
Coulter focuses instead on his financial history.
Although Coxon had worked at Anthropic for only a few months, she notes that he previously spent approximately three years at OpenAI. According to her article, his already-vested OpenAI equity could potentially be worth tens of millions of dollars if the company goes public.
Coulter argues that this creates a financial incentive worth investigating.
Her point is not that stock ownership proves someone is lying. It is that financial interests are relevant whenever someone makes claims that could influence the valuation or competitive position of companies.
If catastrophic AI warnings lead governments to impose regulations that slow emerging competitors, established firms could potentially benefit.
And if public alarm increases investor enthusiasm for the dominant companies, their valuations could benefit as well.
That is why Coulter asks readers to look beyond the dramatic claims themselves.
Who is making the claim?
What company did they work for?
What financial interests might they retain?
And who benefits if policymakers respond to the warning with sweeping regulation?
Those questions do not settle the AI safety debate. They are questions about incentives.
@americanmajority
💯5❤2
The larger argument in Coulter’s article is about regulatory capture.
The basic theory is simple: industries sometimes support regulations not because they fear regulation, but because they know regulation can protect them from competition.
A large corporation can survive compliance costs that would kill a startup.
A multinational can employ lawyers, lobbyists and government-relations specialists.
A small company may have one engineer trying to build a product.
The result can be a market where the government technically regulates everyone equally while the economic burden falls disproportionately on the smallest participants.
That is why Coulter invokes George Stigler, whose work on regulatory capture examined the relationship between government rules and established industries.
Applied to AI, the concern is obvious.
Artificial intelligence is still developing rapidly. New models, companies and applications are appearing constantly. The industry has not yet settled into a permanent structure.
Once governments establish expensive licensing systems, mandatory testing regimes and compliance requirements, however, changing that structure becomes much harder.
The companies that dominate the industry after regulation arrives could remain dominant for years.
Coulter’s warning is therefore about timing.
The question is not merely whether AI should eventually be regulated.
It is whether governments should impose rules while the technology and competitive landscape are still changing so quickly — and whether those rules could freeze today’s biggest companies into permanent positions of power.
@americanmajority
The basic theory is simple: industries sometimes support regulations not because they fear regulation, but because they know regulation can protect them from competition.
A large corporation can survive compliance costs that would kill a startup.
A multinational can employ lawyers, lobbyists and government-relations specialists.
A small company may have one engineer trying to build a product.
The result can be a market where the government technically regulates everyone equally while the economic burden falls disproportionately on the smallest participants.
That is why Coulter invokes George Stigler, whose work on regulatory capture examined the relationship between government rules and established industries.
Applied to AI, the concern is obvious.
Artificial intelligence is still developing rapidly. New models, companies and applications are appearing constantly. The industry has not yet settled into a permanent structure.
Once governments establish expensive licensing systems, mandatory testing regimes and compliance requirements, however, changing that structure becomes much harder.
The companies that dominate the industry after regulation arrives could remain dominant for years.
Coulter’s warning is therefore about timing.
The question is not merely whether AI should eventually be regulated.
It is whether governments should impose rules while the technology and competitive landscape are still changing so quickly — and whether those rules could freeze today’s biggest companies into permanent positions of power.
@americanmajority
❤4
The final point of Coulter’s article is not that artificial intelligence has no dangers.
It is that fear of AI can itself become a political and economic weapon.
The technology is powerful. Its future capabilities are uncertain. Serious safety questions exist. But uncertainty also creates an enormous opportunity for established companies to argue that only they can safely manage the technology — and that competitors must face increasingly expensive government requirements.
That is the monopoly problem at the center of the article.
Coulter’s historical examples are meant to show that established industries have repeatedly warned that competition would produce disaster. Sometimes the warnings involved genuine concerns. But regulations can also protect incumbents by making market entry more difficult.
Her AI argument follows the same pattern.
The largest AI companies are already spending billions on infrastructure and research. They have access to policymakers and enormous legal resources. If regulation becomes sufficiently complex and expensive, smaller competitors may simply disappear.
At the same time, apocalyptic predictions can generate public support for exactly those regulations.
That creates a potentially dangerous feedback loop:
Fear produces regulation.
Regulation raises the cost of competition.
Higher costs strengthen incumbents.
Incumbents gain even more influence over the future rules.
Whether one accepts Coulter’s interpretation or not, that is the central question she puts on the table: when politicians promise to save humanity from AI, are they also creating a regulatory system that could hand the largest AI companies unprecedented control over the technology?
@americanmajority
It is that fear of AI can itself become a political and economic weapon.
The technology is powerful. Its future capabilities are uncertain. Serious safety questions exist. But uncertainty also creates an enormous opportunity for established companies to argue that only they can safely manage the technology — and that competitors must face increasingly expensive government requirements.
That is the monopoly problem at the center of the article.
Coulter’s historical examples are meant to show that established industries have repeatedly warned that competition would produce disaster. Sometimes the warnings involved genuine concerns. But regulations can also protect incumbents by making market entry more difficult.
Her AI argument follows the same pattern.
The largest AI companies are already spending billions on infrastructure and research. They have access to policymakers and enormous legal resources. If regulation becomes sufficiently complex and expensive, smaller competitors may simply disappear.
At the same time, apocalyptic predictions can generate public support for exactly those regulations.
That creates a potentially dangerous feedback loop:
Fear produces regulation.
Regulation raises the cost of competition.
Higher costs strengthen incumbents.
Incumbents gain even more influence over the future rules.
Whether one accepts Coulter’s interpretation or not, that is the central question she puts on the table: when politicians promise to save humanity from AI, are they also creating a regulatory system that could hand the largest AI companies unprecedented control over the technology?
@americanmajority
👍5
The United States is completing its full military withdrawal from Iraq today, September 30, 2026.
The total pullout of the remaining 2,500 U.S. troops was scheduled for completion by September 30, 2026, concluding a 23-year military presence that originally began with the 2003 invasion.
The State Department stated that Iraqi security forces, "including Kurdish Peshmerga," have demonstrated "increased capabilities," and that the withdrawal of US troops "is a sign that Iraq and the United States have turned an important page in our bilateral relationship."
However, the Kurds have criticized this decision. Masrour Barzani, the leader of the Kurds in northern Iraq, stated that Washington is abandoning its allies without protection in the face of Iranian attacks.
"The threat is real – we are vulnerable, we are being attacked. To be left alone now without any, shall we say, proper defense system is shameful," Barzani said.
The government of the Kurdistan Region has no air defense systems of its own, and they are not being sold such weapons.
He noted that further instability, especially at a time when influential Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militias are refusing to lay down their arms, could undermine the country's federal system and ultimately threaten the hard-won autonomy of the Kurds from Baghdad.
@americanmajority
The total pullout of the remaining 2,500 U.S. troops was scheduled for completion by September 30, 2026, concluding a 23-year military presence that originally began with the 2003 invasion.
The State Department stated that Iraqi security forces, "including Kurdish Peshmerga," have demonstrated "increased capabilities," and that the withdrawal of US troops "is a sign that Iraq and the United States have turned an important page in our bilateral relationship."
However, the Kurds have criticized this decision. Masrour Barzani, the leader of the Kurds in northern Iraq, stated that Washington is abandoning its allies without protection in the face of Iranian attacks.
"The threat is real – we are vulnerable, we are being attacked. To be left alone now without any, shall we say, proper defense system is shameful," Barzani said.
The government of the Kurdistan Region has no air defense systems of its own, and they are not being sold such weapons.
He noted that further instability, especially at a time when influential Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militias are refusing to lay down their arms, could undermine the country's federal system and ultimately threaten the hard-won autonomy of the Kurds from Baghdad.
@americanmajority
👏10❤1
The level of trust in the media among Americans stands at only 33%, remaining near its lowest point in 50 years, according to the results of a new Gallup poll.
Both of these figures are among the lowest in the past half-century. The record high was set in 1976, when 72% of Americans trusted the media.
@americanmajority
Both of these figures are among the lowest in the past half-century. The record high was set in 1976, when 72% of Americans trusted the media.
@americanmajority
❤7👍7💯3
Ukraine may run out of F-16 fighter jets by the end of the year, as more than half of the aircraft are currently waiting for maintenance, according to The Wall Street Journal.
The publication notes that after approximately 300 hours of flight time, the fighter jets must undergo a check of their main systems. In the United States, this procedure typically takes between two and six weeks, while in Belgium, where the aircraft of the Kiev regime are serviced, it can take up to 40 weeks.
At the current rate of operation and maintenance, Kiev may exhaust its remaining F-16s by the end of the year, a source reported.
@americanmajority
The publication notes that after approximately 300 hours of flight time, the fighter jets must undergo a check of their main systems. In the United States, this procedure typically takes between two and six weeks, while in Belgium, where the aircraft of the Kiev regime are serviced, it can take up to 40 weeks.
At the current rate of operation and maintenance, Kiev may exhaust its remaining F-16s by the end of the year, a source reported.
@americanmajority
😁14👍6🤡2
The Trump administration’s use of paid social-media influencers has triggered outrage in some quarters. But according to Ted Galen Carpenter, there is nothing particularly new about the basic tactic.
The Pentagon and other parts of the national-security bureaucracy have been using supposedly independent analysts to sell government policy to the public for decades.
The new wrinkle is social media.
In late August, The Washington Post reported that the Department of Defense was employing paid social-media “influencers” to build public support for the Trump administration’s foreign-policy positions and military reforms. The Bulwark had reported similar allegations shortly beforehand.
But Carpenter argues that today’s arrangement is actually less deceptive than some of its predecessors.
Why? At least some of the new influencers are officially identified as government employees. Two prominent hires reportedly had active government email addresses and were assigned to the office of Anthony Tata at the Pentagon. Their addresses carried the “.civ” designation, identifying them as civilian employees rather than contractors.
That is hardly the picture of an independent commentator.
But at least the government connection is visible.
The darker history begins when the government’s relationship with supposedly independent analysts is hidden from the audience entirely.
And that history goes back decades.
@americanmajority
The Pentagon and other parts of the national-security bureaucracy have been using supposedly independent analysts to sell government policy to the public for decades.
The new wrinkle is social media.
In late August, The Washington Post reported that the Department of Defense was employing paid social-media “influencers” to build public support for the Trump administration’s foreign-policy positions and military reforms. The Bulwark had reported similar allegations shortly beforehand.
But Carpenter argues that today’s arrangement is actually less deceptive than some of its predecessors.
Why? At least some of the new influencers are officially identified as government employees. Two prominent hires reportedly had active government email addresses and were assigned to the office of Anthony Tata at the Pentagon. Their addresses carried the “.civ” designation, identifying them as civilian employees rather than contractors.
That is hardly the picture of an independent commentator.
But at least the government connection is visible.
The darker history begins when the government’s relationship with supposedly independent analysts is hidden from the audience entirely.
And that history goes back decades.
@americanmajority
🤡5💯3