RemControl: AI Built the Overlays. Victims Lose their PINs
https://www.group-ib.com/blog/remcontrol-android-banking-trojan/
https://www.group-ib.com/blog/remcontrol-android-banking-trojan/
Group-IB
RemControl: AI Built the Overlays. Victims Lose their PINs
Group-IB uncovers RemControl, a new Android banking trojan targeting European, Middle Eastern and Canadian banks, whose criminal infrastructure was unknowingly built by AI.
β‘44β€31
A native APK and DEX decompiler written in Rust
https://github.com/Ch0pin/rdx
https://github.com/Ch0pin/rdx
GitHub
GitHub - Ch0pin/rdx: A native APK and DEX decompiler written in Rust
A native APK and DEX decompiler written in Rust. Contribute to Ch0pin/rdx development by creating an account on GitHub.
π±43π34β€26
apk-reverse: An Agent Skill for Android APK reverse engineering, debloating, ad removal, surgical dex patching, repacking, and runtime/server analysis
https://github.com/newliver666/apk-reverse
https://github.com/newliver666/apk-reverse
β€23π23π©21π16
From BlackCat to Panda Workshop: Inside the Evolving C2 Panel Behind RATHat
https://www.cleafy.com/cleafy-labs/from-blackcat-to-panda-workshop-inside-the-evolving-c2-panel-behind-rathat
https://www.cleafy.com/cleafy-labs/from-blackcat-to-panda-workshop-inside-the-evolving-c2-panel-behind-rathat
Cleafy
From BlackCat to Panda Workshop: Inside the Evolving C2 Panel Behind RATHat | Cleafy
Cleafy's TIR team analyzed the operator infrastructure behind RATHat, an Android banking trojan that abuses Accessibility Services to enable wireless debugging on the victim's phone, obtain a shell, and deploy a hidden native service outside the app. Theβ¦
π47β€28
How we found 24 Android vulnerabilities using our open source AI security agent
https://github.blog/security/how-we-found-24-android-vulnerabilities-using-our-open-source-ai-security-agent/
https://github.blog/security/how-we-found-24-android-vulnerabilities-using-our-open-source-ai-security-agent/
The GitHub Blog
How we found 24 Android vulnerabilities using our open source AI security agent
A look at the targeted AI taskflows behind these findings, the bugs they uncovered, and how to run the same open-source agent on your own app.
β€26π20β‘19π€18
CVE-2026-20687: AppleJPEGDriver startDecoder Timeout UAF β iOS/macOS kernel vulnerability leading to deferred panic (A19 Pro, iOS 26.3 RC) https://github.com/0xjohnnydev/CVE-2026-20687-AppleJPEGDriver-UAF
GitHub
GitHub - 0xjohnnydev/CVE-2026-20687-AppleJPEGDriver-UAF: CVE-2026-20687: AppleJPEGDriver startDecoder Timeout UAF β iOS/macOS kernelβ¦
CVE-2026-20687: AppleJPEGDriver startDecoder Timeout UAF β iOS/macOS kernel vulnerability leading to deferred panic (A19 Pro, iOS 26.3 RC) - 0xjohnnydev/CVE-2026-20687-AppleJPEGDriver-UAF
π±27π22π©20π¨βπ»18
CVE-2026-86950: The Great Glyph Grift
An in-the-wild iOS bug with a possible WhatsApp zero-click path
Blog: https://calif.io/research/the-great-glyph-grift
PoC: https://github.com/califio/publications/tree/main/MADBugs/CVE-2026-86950
An in-the-wild iOS bug with a possible WhatsApp zero-click path
Blog: https://calif.io/research/the-great-glyph-grift
PoC: https://github.com/califio/publications/tree/main/MADBugs/CVE-2026-86950
Calif
CVE-2026-86950: The Great Glyph Grift
An in-the-wild iOS bug with a possible WhatsApp zero-click path.
β€30π»22π19π19
CVE-2026-23866: Finding a Whatsapp NDay
https://numb3rs.re/posts/cve-2026-23866-finding-a-whatsapp-nday/
https://numb3rs.re/posts/cve-2026-23866-finding-a-whatsapp-nday/
Numb3rs' blog
CVE-2026-23866: Finding a Whatsapp NDay Β· Numb3rs' blog
Watch me trying to find a Whatsapp nDay, thanks to Meta and inline compiling it's not that easy !
π23β‘17π15β€13
The phone was compromised before the user turned it on: the rise of Midnight Mimosa
https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/labs/midnight-mimosa-malware
https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/labs/midnight-mimosa-malware
Bitdefender
The phone was compromised before the user turned it on: the rise of Midnight Mimosa
Bitdefender has identified a malware campaign (dubbed Midnight Mimosa) running on low-cost, multi-brand Android devices built on MediaTek platforms.
π€―23π₯18β€13β‘13
How I Took Down a βΉ1.2Cr Android Banking Fraud
https://medium.com/@im404/how-i-took-down-a-1-2-b4430d997c07
https://medium.com/@im404/how-i-took-down-a-1-2-b4430d997c07
Medium
How I Took Down a βΉ1.2Cr Android Banking Fraud
A complete technical write-up of an engagement against an active Android banking-fraud operation β recon, malware internals, platformβ¦
β€22π12π€―11π11β‘10
Hirudo: From Fake Updates to Patched Banking Apps
https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/hirudo-from-fake-updates-to-patched-banking-apps
https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/hirudo-from-fake-updates-to-patched-banking-apps
ThreatFabric
Hirudo: From Fake Updates to Patched Banking Apps
Hirudo replaces Indonesian banking apps with patched copies that blind their defences. We break down its patching, distribution, targeting and fraud.
π28β€23
LEAD: LLM-Based Static Analysis of Session Hijacking Vulnerabilities in Android Deep Links
https://blog.cykor.kr/2026/10/LEAD-LLM-Based-Static-Analysis-of-Android-Deep-Links
https://blog.cykor.kr/2026/10/LEAD-LLM-Based-Static-Analysis-of-Android-Deep-Links
blog.cykor.kr
LEAD: LLM-Based Static Analysis of Session Hijacking Vulnerabilities in Android Deep Links - Your site
By Hyunseo Shin Β· October 2026 Β· Korean version
π25β€19π19
Full Android kernel exploit chain built on CVE-2023-20938, a use-after-free in Binder, on a Pixel 6 running Android 12
https://www.eshard.com/blog/kernel-uaf-1-trigger
https://www.eshard.com/blog/kernel-uaf-1-trigger
Eshard
Kernel UaF to Root #1: Freeing an Object Thatβs Still in Use | eShard
A use-after-free in Android's Binder driver, recorded once and replayed at will. Part 1 of a full kernel exploit chain built with time travel debugging.
π26π14π₯11π11β€5
Baohuo, the gray eminence. Android backdoor hijacks Telegram accounts, gaining complete control over them
https://news.drweb.com/show/?i=15076
https://news.drweb.com/show/?i=15076
Dr.Web
Baohuo, the gray eminence. Android backdoor hijacks Telegram accounts, gaining complete control over them
Doctor Web has identified a dangerous backdoor, <a href="https://vms.drweb.com/search/?q=Android.Backdoor.Baohuo.1.origin&lng=en"><b>Android.Backdoor.Baohuo.1.origin</b></a>, in maliciously modified versions of the Telegram X messenger. In addition to beingβ¦
β€17π±12β‘7
How one exported activity in Microsoft Authenticator let an unprivileged app get tokens for any Microsoft service (CVE-2026-80097)
https://enclave.ai/blog/authmask-we-made-microsoft-authenticator-hand-over-tokens
https://enclave.ai/blog/authmask-we-made-microsoft-authenticator-hand-over-tokens
Enclave
Enclave: AuthMask: We Made Microsoft Authenticator Hand Over Tokens to an App With Zero Permissions
How one exported activity in Microsoft Authenticator let an unprivileged app get tokens for any Microsoft service.
β€41
The Seven Android Trojan Families Targeting Indian Banking Apps
https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cyberdakait-seven-android-trojans-indian-banking/
https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cyberdakait-seven-android-trojans-indian-banking/
π15
GhostMap: The Android flaw that crashes your phone before you open the app (not fixed)
https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/labs/ghostmap-android
https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/labs/ghostmap-android
Bitdefender
GhostMap: The Android flaw that crashes your phone before you open the app
Bitdefender Labs researchers found that installing a specially crafted app can leave an Android phone stuck in a crash loop
π13
Run unsigned code in Download Mode on Samsung (run custom images on locked bootloader for Exynos) - SVE-2026-3546 (CVE-2026-21155)
https://github.com/Gabriel2392/SVE-2026-3546
https://github.com/Gabriel2392/SVE-2026-3546
GitHub
GitHub - Gabriel2392/SVE-2026-3546
Contribute to Gabriel2392/SVE-2026-3546 development by creating an account on GitHub.
β€15π₯11π5
Android TV Box Malware: XCPE Botnet
https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/shutting-the-door-on-the-xcpe-botnet
https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/shutting-the-door-on-the-xcpe-botnet
Google Cloud Blog
Shutting the Door on the XCPE Botnet | Google Cloud Blog
Google and industry partners have dismantled the XCPE backdoor and botnet, which was intentionally developed and operated by OEM Videostrong Technology Co. for financial gain.
π9
IoTPwnBench: an open-source benchmark for IoT security research, featuring 716 intentionally implemented vulnerabilities in IoT firmware images
https://github.com/Mobile-IoT-Security-Lab/IoTPwnBench
https://github.com/Mobile-IoT-Security-Lab/IoTPwnBench
GitHub
GitHub - Mobile-IoT-Security-Lab/IoTPwnBench
Contribute to Mobile-IoT-Security-Lab/IoTPwnBench development by creating an account on GitHub.
π₯10π2β€1