Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
Kursk operation was a big mistake from Oleksandr Syrskyi, back then commander of the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 army
The operation was conceived as a raid into Russia 🇷🇺 intended to force a Russian redeployment from the east, while capturing prisoners and destroying part of the "Sever/North" force that was attacking Kharkiv.
For a week, Syrskyi disappeared to take direct command of operations, even as the situation in Pokrovsk was becoming catastrophic. The first week of the operation was a success, despite the low number of strikes. Russian resistance in depth proved stronger than anticipated. At that point, the Ukrainians should have withdrawn.
The Ukrainian presence in Kursk lasted nearly eight months, resulting in too many avoidable losses; meanwhile, Russian forces were entering several strategic towns along the Avdiivka–Pokrovsk axis, Novohrodivka, Selydove, and Ukrainsk, which fell without facing significant Ukrainian resistance.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCt-JPWQAAFIJZ.jpg
Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able)
OTD in 2024: After months of quiet preparations, Ukrainian forces begin a large-scale ground offensive into Russia's Kursk Oblast.
In the opening stages of the incursion, the Ukrainians achieve complete tactical and operational surprise and are able to push deep into the region.
However, after deploying reserves, the Russians are able to stabilize the frontline and contain the enemy advance. Ultimately, the Ukrainian forces are completely pushed out of the Kursk Oblast by March 2025, following series of Russian counter-offensives spearheaded by naval infantry and VDV units.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCRsn4WQAAAgEA.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCSDB7WYAAqy9R.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCSZ3ZWcAAeT0T.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCUESwXQAAluNK.jpg
— https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/2085332300032557566#m
tweet
Kursk operation was a big mistake from Oleksandr Syrskyi, back then commander of the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 army
The operation was conceived as a raid into Russia 🇷🇺 intended to force a Russian redeployment from the east, while capturing prisoners and destroying part of the "Sever/North" force that was attacking Kharkiv.
For a week, Syrskyi disappeared to take direct command of operations, even as the situation in Pokrovsk was becoming catastrophic. The first week of the operation was a success, despite the low number of strikes. Russian resistance in depth proved stronger than anticipated. At that point, the Ukrainians should have withdrawn.
The Ukrainian presence in Kursk lasted nearly eight months, resulting in too many avoidable losses; meanwhile, Russian forces were entering several strategic towns along the Avdiivka–Pokrovsk axis, Novohrodivka, Selydove, and Ukrainsk, which fell without facing significant Ukrainian resistance.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCt-JPWQAAFIJZ.jpg
Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able)
OTD in 2024: After months of quiet preparations, Ukrainian forces begin a large-scale ground offensive into Russia's Kursk Oblast.
In the opening stages of the incursion, the Ukrainians achieve complete tactical and operational surprise and are able to push deep into the region.
However, after deploying reserves, the Russians are able to stabilize the frontline and contain the enemy advance. Ultimately, the Ukrainian forces are completely pushed out of the Kursk Oblast by March 2025, following series of Russian counter-offensives spearheaded by naval infantry and VDV units.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCRsn4WQAAAgEA.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCSDB7WYAAqy9R.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCSZ3ZWcAAeT0T.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCUESwXQAAluNK.jpg
— https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/2085332300032557566#m
tweet
💯7🥰2
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
A lot of cope in comments, so here is @Deepstate_UA map for August/September 2024 to show why the situation was critical :
Novhrodivka fell in 6 days, Ukrainsk and Selydove in 10 days ! This led to Pokrovsk battle. Without this and with more soldiers to defend key cities, the battle for Pokrovsk would have started much later...
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2085382239680929792%2Fimg%2F0CeBpbTjU9m0AkxP.jpg
tweet
A lot of cope in comments, so here is @Deepstate_UA map for August/September 2024 to show why the situation was critical :
Novhrodivka fell in 6 days, Ukrainsk and Selydove in 10 days ! This led to Pokrovsk battle. Without this and with more soldiers to defend key cities, the battle for Pokrovsk would have started much later...
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2085382239680929792%2Fimg%2F0CeBpbTjU9m0AkxP.jpg
tweet
👍2
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
Ukraine's 🇺🇦 mid-range strike campaign against Russian 🇷🇺 trucks and vehicles continues, despite lower coverage
In August, already 167 vehicles have been hit. After Ukrainian strikes on multiple bridges, Russia started to put pontoon bridges in many places.
🧵THREAD🧵1/13 ⬇️
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2085418510809702400%2Fimg%2FCPrlZhfqtAu1SrJT.jpg
tweet
Ukraine's 🇺🇦 mid-range strike campaign against Russian 🇷🇺 trucks and vehicles continues, despite lower coverage
In August, already 167 vehicles have been hit. After Ukrainian strikes on multiple bridges, Russia started to put pontoon bridges in many places.
🧵THREAD🧵1/13 ⬇️
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2085418510809702400%2Fimg%2FCPrlZhfqtAu1SrJT.jpg
tweet
❤4👍2
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
Jammers are the biggest threat for Ukrainian strikes, but they are costly and cannot be deployed everywhere, same applies for drone interceptor teams.
On the other hand, a massive number of soldiers (maybe up to 10 000 or more) are doing mobile fire teams AD missions.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPDvbkZWwAAGiQP.png
tweet
Jammers are the biggest threat for Ukrainian strikes, but they are costly and cannot be deployed everywhere, same applies for drone interceptor teams.
On the other hand, a massive number of soldiers (maybe up to 10 000 or more) are doing mobile fire teams AD missions.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPDvbkZWwAAGiQP.png
tweet
👍3
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
There are different missions for mobile fire teams. Some escort convoys, some guard key roads or bridges and some stage ambush to Ukrainian drones.
For now, I'm not really convinced by their efficiency, since I've seen plenty of those teams behind targeted and killed.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPDxjj1XgAI8Iyp.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPDxjj0WQAANVXq.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPDxjjvXwAABKWu.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPDxjnHX0AAwyyp.jpg
tweet
There are different missions for mobile fire teams. Some escort convoys, some guard key roads or bridges and some stage ambush to Ukrainian drones.
For now, I'm not really convinced by their efficiency, since I've seen plenty of those teams behind targeted and killed.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPDxjj1XgAI8Iyp.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPDxjj0WQAANVXq.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPDxjjvXwAABKWu.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPDxjnHX0AAwyyp.jpg
tweet
❤4👎1
@clement_molin
Mid-range strikes against Russian logistics continue for the 4th month this year. They have a limited impact on the Donbass situation, but a much better impact on other fronts, especially Zaporizhzhia.
In total, I have counted 1 623 trucks and vehicles hit in 4 months more than 20km from the frontline.
tweet
Mid-range strikes against Russian logistics continue for the 4th month this year. They have a limited impact on the Donbass situation, but a much better impact on other fronts, especially Zaporizhzhia.
In total, I have counted 1 623 trucks and vehicles hit in 4 months more than 20km from the frontline.
tweet
X (formerly Twitter)
Clément Molin (@clement_molin) on X
20 ans, Lyon 🇫🇷, étudiant en Relations Internationales à Lille, cartes, analyses, suivi des conflits armés et de l'actualité internationale.
👍7❤2
@clement_molin
Thank you for following this new thread on the mid-range subject.
I will later update on Ukraine's strikes on electric substations and both sides strikes on gas stations.
tweet
Thank you for following this new thread on the mid-range subject.
I will later update on Ukraine's strikes on electric substations and both sides strikes on gas stations.
tweet
X (formerly Twitter)
Clément Molin (@clement_molin) on X
20 ans, Lyon 🇫🇷, étudiant en Relations Internationales à Lille, cartes, analyses, suivi des conflits armés et de l'actualité internationale.
👍7
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
Entre le 6 août 2024 et le 26 avril 2025, l'armée ukrainienne 🇺🇦 était présente sur le territoire russe 🇷🇺, dans l'oblast de Koursk.
De nombreuses unités s'y sont relayées. Pendant cette période, l'armée russe a réalisé 45% des gains faits dans le Donbass entre octobre 2023 et 2026...
A titre de comparaison, depuis le début de l'année 2026, ce ne sont que 7% des gains de cette période qui ont été réalisés.
Sur les 9 mois de présence ukrainienne à Koursk, les russes ont pris 8 petites villes (Vouhledar, Velika Novosilka, Kourakhove, Hirynk, Kurakhivka, Ukrainsk, Selydove et Novohrodivka), s'approchant de Pokrovsk et Myrnohrad et entrant dans Torestk.
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2085472197536014336%2Fimg%2FApy2oBxQy5e9sdDv.jpg
Clément Molin (@clement_molin)
Kursk operation was a big mistake from Oleksandr Syrskyi, back then commander of the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 army
The operation was conceived as a raid into Russia 🇷🇺 intended to force a Russian redeployment from the east, while capturing prisoners and destroying part of the "Sever/North" force that was attacking Kharkiv.
For a week, Syrskyi disappeared to take direct command of operations, even as the situation in Pokrovsk was becoming catastrophic. The first week of the operation was a success, despite the low number of strikes. Russian resistance in depth proved stronger than anticipated. At that point, the Ukrainians should have withdrawn.
The Ukrainian presence in Kursk lasted nearly eight months, resulting in too many avoidable losses; meanwhile, Russian forces were entering several strategic towns along the Avdiivka–Pokrovsk axis, Novohrodivka, Selydove, and Ukrainsk, which fell without facing significant Ukrainian resistance.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCt-JPWQAAFIJZ.jpg
— https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/2085364948687896904#m
tweet
Entre le 6 août 2024 et le 26 avril 2025, l'armée ukrainienne 🇺🇦 était présente sur le territoire russe 🇷🇺, dans l'oblast de Koursk.
De nombreuses unités s'y sont relayées. Pendant cette période, l'armée russe a réalisé 45% des gains faits dans le Donbass entre octobre 2023 et 2026...
A titre de comparaison, depuis le début de l'année 2026, ce ne sont que 7% des gains de cette période qui ont été réalisés.
Sur les 9 mois de présence ukrainienne à Koursk, les russes ont pris 8 petites villes (Vouhledar, Velika Novosilka, Kourakhove, Hirynk, Kurakhivka, Ukrainsk, Selydove et Novohrodivka), s'approchant de Pokrovsk et Myrnohrad et entrant dans Torestk.
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2085472197536014336%2Fimg%2FApy2oBxQy5e9sdDv.jpg
Clément Molin (@clement_molin)
Kursk operation was a big mistake from Oleksandr Syrskyi, back then commander of the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 army
The operation was conceived as a raid into Russia 🇷🇺 intended to force a Russian redeployment from the east, while capturing prisoners and destroying part of the "Sever/North" force that was attacking Kharkiv.
For a week, Syrskyi disappeared to take direct command of operations, even as the situation in Pokrovsk was becoming catastrophic. The first week of the operation was a success, despite the low number of strikes. Russian resistance in depth proved stronger than anticipated. At that point, the Ukrainians should have withdrawn.
The Ukrainian presence in Kursk lasted nearly eight months, resulting in too many avoidable losses; meanwhile, Russian forces were entering several strategic towns along the Avdiivka–Pokrovsk axis, Novohrodivka, Selydove, and Ukrainsk, which fell without facing significant Ukrainian resistance.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCt-JPWQAAFIJZ.jpg
— https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/2085364948687896904#m
tweet
💯3👍2😢1
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
Turkiye 🇹🇷, Saudi Arabia 🇸🇦 and Pakistan 🇵🇰 just signed a new alliance, the "Mecca Agreement".
This alliance is a defensive one and can be seen as a "third way" for the Middle East, with the already two existing "alliances"
🔹The Israel-UAE alliance 🇮🇱🇦🇪
🔹The Iran resistance axis 🇮🇷 + Hezbollah, Hamas, PMF, Houthis...
-> 🔹The Mecca Agreement 🇹🇷🇸🇦🇵🇰
This Mecca Agreement can probably add further regional states : 🇶🇦🇸🇩🇾🇪
Why this alliance now and against which threat ? I believe there are 3 threats they want to counter. The first one is the Iranian one, with Iran bombing Saudi Arabia in recent months, but I don't think Turkiye and Pakistan will do much against Iran. The second is the Israeli one : Turkiye needs allies to face recent Israeli threats, as well as to fight Israel's expansionism, especially in Syria, Saudi Arabia shares the same will.
The third one is more interesting and the real one in my opinion. All these states are 'at war' with the UAE military interventions abroad. They oppose the UAE in Yemen, in Libya, but much more the UAE policy in Africa, especially in Somalia and Sudan. Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia and Turkiye are right now the main sponsors of the Sudanese Armed Forces, so this can explain this alliance.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPHlEELXQAADfmZ.jpg
tweet
Turkiye 🇹🇷, Saudi Arabia 🇸🇦 and Pakistan 🇵🇰 just signed a new alliance, the "Mecca Agreement".
This alliance is a defensive one and can be seen as a "third way" for the Middle East, with the already two existing "alliances"
🔹The Israel-UAE alliance 🇮🇱🇦🇪
🔹The Iran resistance axis 🇮🇷 + Hezbollah, Hamas, PMF, Houthis...
-> 🔹The Mecca Agreement 🇹🇷🇸🇦🇵🇰
This Mecca Agreement can probably add further regional states : 🇶🇦🇸🇩🇾🇪
Why this alliance now and against which threat ? I believe there are 3 threats they want to counter. The first one is the Iranian one, with Iran bombing Saudi Arabia in recent months, but I don't think Turkiye and Pakistan will do much against Iran. The second is the Israeli one : Turkiye needs allies to face recent Israeli threats, as well as to fight Israel's expansionism, especially in Syria, Saudi Arabia shares the same will.
The third one is more interesting and the real one in my opinion. All these states are 'at war' with the UAE military interventions abroad. They oppose the UAE in Yemen, in Libya, but much more the UAE policy in Africa, especially in Somalia and Sudan. Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia and Turkiye are right now the main sponsors of the Sudanese Armed Forces, so this can explain this alliance.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPHlEELXQAADfmZ.jpg
tweet
👍8