5/ The scope of the operation is, in reality, somewhat broader than what was reported back in September. Since then, the Ukrainians have continued their push and advancement toward the Zherebets River.

They have reached it at several points, and Russian forces no longer control any territory west of this river—with the exception of the forest east of Lyman. Parts of the foresteast of Lyman, as well as Zarichne and some nearby villages remain in the "gray zone," but despite various rumors, I have not been able to confirm that the Ukrainians have actually crossed the river.

It is quite notable how effectively the Ukrainians have cleared the forests east of Lyman; this has fully secured the city, which now lies well behind the front lines and can therefore be resupplied.

Furthermore, it allows the Ukrainians to position their artillery within these forests to defend Sloviansk, while also enabling them to cross the Siverskyi-Donets River without being under the constant threat of FPV drones.

6/ South of the Donets river, the Ukrainians launched operations—coinciding with the arrival of General Drapati to lead the Ukrainian forces—aimed at pushing back the Russians and eliminating enemy infiltrations.

At this stage, it is clear that these operations have resulted in the recapture of territory and the clearing of certain infiltrated areas; however, I prefer to maintain a broad "gray zone" designation for now, given that many Russian positions still remain.

Thus, on both sides of the Donets River, the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps—now under the command of the "Center" army group—has succeeded in securing the northern flank of the Donbas and continues efforts to stabilize the situation east of Sloviansk, as autumn and winter gradually set in.

What can be expected going forward, and what are the possibilities for the coming weeks and months?

For the time being, I believe the Ukrainians will focus on consolidating their gains and adopting a defensive posture. First, they must secure their gains—notably around Lyman—and continue clearing the forest east of that city, while also securing the eastern approach to Sloviansk, particularly near Mykolaivka.

From there, they need to organize a coherent and solid defensive line between Sloviansk, Lyman, and Borova. At the same time, the Ukrainians—specifically under the command of the "Centre" group—must consolidate the front around Kramatorsk and Sloviansk.

This is General Biletsky’s priority. Future offensive actions could take place during the winter or even in the spring, depending on weather conditions. I do not believe the Ukrainians will cross the Zherebets River. They hold highly advantageous defensive positions; for the Russians, crossing would be extremely difficult, as they would have to navigate a series of about ten dams along the Zherebets River and its associated lakes—a maneuver that would leave them highly vulnerable.

The Ukrainians will therefore need to hold these lines, and they are likely to do so far more effectively than when they suddenly lost ground over a year and a half ago.

As for a future offensive, I could imagine the Ukrainians pushing north from Borova toward Kupiansk, with the aim of shifting the front line away from the Borova sector—and perhaps even reaching the southern outskirts of Kupiansk, thereby freeing the city from some of the ongoing infiltrations. Naturally, this would be carried out in coordination with the Ukrainian forces stationed further to the north.

Thank you for following this new analysis regarding the final information about Vivaldi opeation.

Now that the northern flank of Donbas is secured, at least for some time, the focus will concentrate on the southern flank, as well as Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv.

What Budanov 🇺🇦 says here is highly significant, as it implicitly details Russia’s 🇷🇺 strategy to keep the war going. t.me/Kyrylo_Budanov_Official/922

As the map shows, Russia claims control over 6,500 km² of territory that is actually held by Ukraine. This area includes five cities—Kupiansk, Lyman, Kostiantynivka, Dobropillia, and Orikhiv—that remain partially or entirely under Ukrainian control.

The areas highlighted in yellow are those Moscow claims to control (a false assertion, as has been proven many times over). In the event of negotiations, Russia would likely stall any progress by demanding that the Ukrainians adhere to its claimed line. A ceasefire would also be easily exploited; Russia could claim that Ukrainian forces are firing on Russian soldiers—even when those soldiers might be 10–15 km behind the actual front line—to justify violating the agreement.

Day after day, the Ukrainians reiterate their readiness for negotiations, call for a ceasefire along current lines, and propose truces regarding aerial attacks. Each time, Russia refuses or attempts to manipulate the negotiation process with lies.

This map serves as evidence that Russia has no intention of ending the war. We could travel to Moscow as often as we like and speak with Putin as frequently as necessary, but as long as he believes he can win, he will continue. This is why I am deeply pessimistic; I believe the war could drag on for years unless a decisive breakthrough is achieved. Short of forcing the Ukrainians to withdraw from their own sovereign territory—something they have no intention of doing—there is little that will bring this war to an end.

10 month after the fall of Hulialpole, a tactically important town on the southern front, Russian 🇷🇺 forces finally secured the railway west of it

Heavily fortified, this railway line was disputed for months and Ukrainian 🇺🇦 forces always stayed on the fortified bunkers.

Map from deepstate_ua

No need to "talk to Putin 🇷🇺 to find out what he wants"—he’s already told American envoys 🇺🇸!

▫️Russia is not prepared to end the war.
▫️Russia opposes any notion of a ceasefire.
▫️Russia has no plans to halt its strikes on Ukraine.
▫️Russia refuses to end the war until it controls the Donbas. For context, it currently controls about 99% of the Luhansk Oblast (a situation that has persisted for three years) and 80% of the Donetsk Oblast (up from 56% in mid-2023).

In 2023, the Russian military controlled 77.66% of the Donbas; today, it controls 89.81%. This means it has seized 12% of the Donbas over the past three years, leaving 11% of the territory—including 6 cities—still outside its control.

-> Furthermore, Russia rejects the idea of ​​Ukraine receiving European security guarantees in the post-war period.

Map @Pouletvolant3

One potential solution to end the Russian 🇷🇺 invasion of Ukraine 🇺🇦 would be for the Ukrainian army to withdraw from the Donbas.

We are talking about a heavily fortified territory: six cities, three lines of obstacles immediately behind them, and kilometers of barbed wire in front. The Ukrainians refuse to cede this territory to the Russians (the war there has been ongoing since 2014). Handing over the remaining 11% of the Donbas would leave Ukraine in immediate danger of a Russian offensive toward the center of the country—as the map of the fortifications clearly shows.

In exchange, Moscow has little to offer. I do not believe the Russians would withdraw from southern Ukraine; they might perhaps pull out of the Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts in return, but that is not an equivalent trade.

I am very curious to see what will come of the much-discussed "Yalta" of 2026. In any case, it is up to the Ukrainians to decide what is best for them...

These last few days, there is an explosion of the number of Russian 🇷🇺 soldiers eliminated as per Ukrainian 🇺🇦official sources

▫️Official sources shouldn't be taken as fully trustworthy, of course, but the trends are important
▫️For example, GSUA numbers of Russian losses in 2022-2024 are in fact very close to the Mediazona count (using a KIA/WIA ratio), which shows that they are still partly accurate
▫️These last few days, the number of eliminated Russian soldiers has exploded, even reaching 2 000 a day.

The USF grouping (only the drone army, not the UA army or special forces) claim they hit 11 800 soldiers this month, more than in August (and we are only on the 22nd). This trend is corroborated by both the USF numbers and the general staff, but why ?

▫️Because Russia is putting a massive effort to attack Dobropilla. They claim they captured the city and they send hundreds of men everyday there. In fact losses are much higher than in Bakhmut in 2023 (known as a bloody battle).

New airstrike map update in the Hulialpole/Orikhiv direction suggest Russia abandonned its plans to capture Ternuvate and fully switched west

🔴KAB impacts from February to August 2026
⚪️KAB impacts in September 2026
🟡KAB impacts in October 2026

Every month this year, Russia launched hundreds of KABs (FAB bombs guided by the UMPK kit) on the Hulialpole frontline. They were targeting Ukrainian positions on treelines and villages.

I've noticed how every month, impacts moved further west, as if Russia was trying to destroy methodically every fixed/known position from east to west. Indeed, there is barely any new strike on places which were already bombed, probably to let infiltrations work.

However, the strikes have now moved 10 to 15km east of the frontline, which in itself has barely moved and is still stuck near the first bunch of villages west of Hulialpole. The focus of the strikes and the montly concentration helps understand what was and is Russian plan in this direction :

-> It seems they abandonned Ternuvate, which is a very big victory for Ukraine, since this town protects all the northern flank of this offensive and has multiple high rise buildings were Ukrainian soldiers can hide.
-> Any offensive northwards no seems very difficult, thanks to Ukrainian Oleksandrivka counter-offensive. This forces Russia to fight on the lower ground without controling the heights.
-> The main push is ongoing from Hulialpole in the direction of Zaporizhzhia, aiming at avoiding Orikhiv. Russia is currently dropping bombs in the area of the unfinished second defensive line despite the fact it still has not crossed the first one.

Thank you for following, I will later try to analyse more deeply this direction and what happened this year, especially how Ukraine managed to nearly stop the offensive on Zaporizhzhia. Remember as well how the infiltrations inside of Orikhiv failed and how Ukraine cleaned the city from infiltrators.

The chances of a Russian 🇷🇺 breakthrough in Ukraine 🇺🇦 are diminishing year by year as Ukrainian fortifications are strengthened.

🟡 Fortifications from 2014–2024 (primarily 2024) — some are currently in active combat zones, while others lie behind Russian lines, complicating movement.
🟠 Fortifications from 2025 (based on a new doctrine) — the front line has not yet reached these positions.
🔴 Fortifications for 2026.

Following non-stop fortification efforts over the past few years, the Ukrainian army has significantly slowed down the construction of new defenses in the east and south this summer—a shift explained by successes in various sectors and a high level of overall readiness.

Work has been underway in recent weeks near Pavlohrad, Izyum, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Kyiv. Closer to the front, Kyiv continues to reinforce anti-infantry obstacles, particularly with barbed wire and concertina wire.

More than just defensive lines, Ukraine 🇺🇦 also placed a large number of barbed wire lines near the frontline.

These lines can be placed inside cities, around them, near key roads and are very important to increase enemy losses, since those are anti-infantry obstacles.

3 years ago, Russia 🇷🇺 launched the Avdiivka offensive that slowly turned into the 3rd Donbas 🇺🇦 battle of the full-scale war

3 years later, the Russian offensive is still ongoing, at a much slower pace than before. 2026 was a very difficult year, and Russia failed to keep up the advance pace it had in 2024 and 2025, even suffering from 2 counterattacks in Komar and Lyman.

🟥Russian control before 2024
🔴Territory taken in 2024
🟠Territory taken in 2025
🟡Territory taken in 2026
Big ⬜️ line : Donbas administrative border
Small ◽️line : main roads

If the Russian 🇷🇺 offensive on the Donbas was initially centered on the southern and western direction, it moved north, with the main battle ongoing near Dobropilla. You can easily follow the chain of towns from Kurakhove, Pokrovsk and all the way to Barvinkove, behind the Donbas fortress that Russia is attacking.

At the same time, Russian advance on the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia highway was stopped, while the one further south was slowed down.

What the map tells us :

-> Setbacks in 2024 and 2025 were due to multiple factors, including bad unit coordination, absence of fortifications, and a high number of Russian human resources. Since then, most of the issues have been resolved.
-> The "attritional war" narrative that should witness a slow increase of Russian gains until Ukrainian collapse didn't happen. On the contrary, Russia is advancing slower and slower, and Russian losses are increasing.

Every time someone is saying Russia is definitely winning the war, show them this map and ask why the "2nd most powerful army in the world" is struggling that much in Donbas while losing more and more men.

I- Situation on Ukraine's 🇺🇦 southern front

In 2026, the Ukrainian army has succeeded in stabilizing the southern front, reclaiming more territory than it has lost.

The Russian army is continuing its offensive from Huliaipole along a 30-km-wide front, though its rate of advance remains limited. Russia has committed the bulk of its regional forces to this sector—specifically the 35th, 36th, and 5th Armies, along with the 68th Army Corps.

Elsewhere, Russian forces are either on the defensive (further to the east, involving the 29th Army) or engaged in limited offensive operations to the west, toward Orikhiv (involving the 58th Army). Consequently, the primary Russian effort remains concentrated between Ternuvate and Huliaipole, where progress is slow and relies on deep-infiltration tactics aimed at reaching the Orikhiv–Novomykolaivka road. The frontal offensive against Orikhiv—which began with infiltrations during the summer—now appears to be faltering due to Ukrainian consolidation efforts.

This year, Ukrainian forces have managed to halt the Russian offensive south of Zaporozhye, pushing Russian troops back from the area north of Stepnohirsk. Simultaneously, they have pressed against the northern flank of the Russian offensive near Huliaipole and are closing in on Velyka Novosilka. The Ukrainians have reversed the gains Russia made in this sector in 2025, regaining control of the banks of the Mokri Yali River as well as the second line of defense that extends toward Zaporozhye.

At present, Ukrainian operations have enabled them to consolidate their position in Komar and along both the eastern and western banks of the Mokri Yali River. These efforts put an end to the threat of a Russian offensive toward Pokrovske, Novomykolaivka, and eastern Zaporizhzhia, as well as toward Pavlohrad and Dnipro.

Thank you for following this first frontline update (next one: II- Donbas)

II- Situation on Donbas 🇺🇦 (eastern) front

Unlike the southern front, where the situation improved for the Ukrainian army in 2026, the eastern front has not seen any such improvement. However, the Ukrainians can still be satisfied by the slowing of the Russian advance and the recent stabilization of the front near Sloviansk.

In early 2026, the Ukrainians managed to disengage from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad—since they still held numerous positions in those areas. Even so, intense Russian pressure—exerted by four armies (the 29th, 51st, 41st, and 8th) along a 50-kilometer front—has allowed Russian forces to advance to the outskirts of Dobropilla. The offensive toward the western administrative borders of the Donbas has been halted, and the push toward Druzhkivka has been temporarily repelled.

That said, Russian forces have advanced toward Dobropilla and are carrying out deep infiltrations, reaching the city center and beyond.

The city is of critical importance; more significantly, its capture could potentially serve as a springboard for an offensive toward Barvinkove, striking behind the Ukrainian strongholds in the Donbas. While I consider such an offensive unlikely, given the strength of the Ukrainian defensive lines, frequent infiltrations are to be expected.

The battle for Kostiantynivka has now been raging for a year, yet the city has not fallen. I estimate that the Russians hold the advantage in about 50% of the city (though this does not imply firm control or established logistics), while the Ukrainians hold the advantage in about 15%, leaving the remaining 35% contested. For the time being, the advance toward Druzhkivka appears to have slowed, while Ukrainian forces have partially withdrawn from the last positions they held in Chasiv Yar.

Finally, the situation east of the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk—which had deteriorated significantly in 2026—has shown some improvement since September. Ukrainian forces have pushed back the front line near Mykolaivka and Kramatorsk; however, the persistent threat from FPV drones and KAB (guided aerial bombs) remains, having forced the evacuation of tens of thousands of civilians in recent months.

Overall, the military situation in the region is much better than it was in the spring, though it remains tense. The Russians are now within a few kilometers of major cities and new defensive lines, leaving little room for further maneuvering. Consequently, all future combat in the region will likely be frontal. The coming months will be crucial in determining whether the Ukrainian army can successfully stabilize the front and how the Russian advance toward Dobropillia will unfold.

Thank you for following this second update; the next one will cover the situation on the Oskil front.