These last few days, there is an explosion of the number of Russian 🇷🇺 soldiers eliminated as per Ukrainian 🇺🇦official sources

▫️Official sources shouldn't be taken as fully trustworthy, of course, but the trends are important
▫️For example, GSUA numbers of Russian losses in 2022-2024 are in fact very close to the Mediazona count (using a KIA/WIA ratio), which shows that they are still partly accurate
▫️These last few days, the number of eliminated Russian soldiers has exploded, even reaching 2 000 a day.

The USF grouping (only the drone army, not the UA army or special forces) claim they hit 11 800 soldiers this month, more than in August (and we are only on the 22nd). This trend is corroborated by both the USF numbers and the general staff, but why ?

▫️Because Russia is putting a massive effort to attack Dobropilla. They claim they captured the city and they send hundreds of men everyday there. In fact losses are much higher than in Bakhmut in 2023 (known as a bloody battle).

New airstrike map update in the Hulialpole/Orikhiv direction suggest Russia abandonned its plans to capture Ternuvate and fully switched west

🔴KAB impacts from February to August 2026
⚪️KAB impacts in September 2026
🟡KAB impacts in October 2026

Every month this year, Russia launched hundreds of KABs (FAB bombs guided by the UMPK kit) on the Hulialpole frontline. They were targeting Ukrainian positions on treelines and villages.

I've noticed how every month, impacts moved further west, as if Russia was trying to destroy methodically every fixed/known position from east to west. Indeed, there is barely any new strike on places which were already bombed, probably to let infiltrations work.

However, the strikes have now moved 10 to 15km east of the frontline, which in itself has barely moved and is still stuck near the first bunch of villages west of Hulialpole. The focus of the strikes and the montly concentration helps understand what was and is Russian plan in this direction :

-> It seems they abandonned Ternuvate, which is a very big victory for Ukraine, since this town protects all the northern flank of this offensive and has multiple high rise buildings were Ukrainian soldiers can hide.
-> Any offensive northwards no seems very difficult, thanks to Ukrainian Oleksandrivka counter-offensive. This forces Russia to fight on the lower ground without controling the heights.
-> The main push is ongoing from Hulialpole in the direction of Zaporizhzhia, aiming at avoiding Orikhiv. Russia is currently dropping bombs in the area of the unfinished second defensive line despite the fact it still has not crossed the first one.

Thank you for following, I will later try to analyse more deeply this direction and what happened this year, especially how Ukraine managed to nearly stop the offensive on Zaporizhzhia. Remember as well how the infiltrations inside of Orikhiv failed and how Ukraine cleaned the city from infiltrators.

The chances of a Russian 🇷🇺 breakthrough in Ukraine 🇺🇦 are diminishing year by year as Ukrainian fortifications are strengthened.

🟡 Fortifications from 2014–2024 (primarily 2024) — some are currently in active combat zones, while others lie behind Russian lines, complicating movement.
🟠 Fortifications from 2025 (based on a new doctrine) — the front line has not yet reached these positions.
🔴 Fortifications for 2026.

Following non-stop fortification efforts over the past few years, the Ukrainian army has significantly slowed down the construction of new defenses in the east and south this summer—a shift explained by successes in various sectors and a high level of overall readiness.

Work has been underway in recent weeks near Pavlohrad, Izyum, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Kyiv. Closer to the front, Kyiv continues to reinforce anti-infantry obstacles, particularly with barbed wire and concertina wire.

More than just defensive lines, Ukraine 🇺🇦 also placed a large number of barbed wire lines near the frontline.

These lines can be placed inside cities, around them, near key roads and are very important to increase enemy losses, since those are anti-infantry obstacles.

3 years ago, Russia 🇷🇺 launched the Avdiivka offensive that slowly turned into the 3rd Donbas 🇺🇦 battle of the full-scale war

3 years later, the Russian offensive is still ongoing, at a much slower pace than before. 2026 was a very difficult year, and Russia failed to keep up the advance pace it had in 2024 and 2025, even suffering from 2 counterattacks in Komar and Lyman.

🟥Russian control before 2024
🔴Territory taken in 2024
🟠Territory taken in 2025
🟡Territory taken in 2026
Big ⬜️ line : Donbas administrative border
Small ◽️line : main roads

If the Russian 🇷🇺 offensive on the Donbas was initially centered on the southern and western direction, it moved north, with the main battle ongoing near Dobropilla. You can easily follow the chain of towns from Kurakhove, Pokrovsk and all the way to Barvinkove, behind the Donbas fortress that Russia is attacking.

At the same time, Russian advance on the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia highway was stopped, while the one further south was slowed down.

What the map tells us :

-> Setbacks in 2024 and 2025 were due to multiple factors, including bad unit coordination, absence of fortifications, and a high number of Russian human resources. Since then, most of the issues have been resolved.
-> The "attritional war" narrative that should witness a slow increase of Russian gains until Ukrainian collapse didn't happen. On the contrary, Russia is advancing slower and slower, and Russian losses are increasing.

Every time someone is saying Russia is definitely winning the war, show them this map and ask why the "2nd most powerful army in the world" is struggling that much in Donbas while losing more and more men.

I- Situation on Ukraine's 🇺🇦 southern front

In 2026, the Ukrainian army has succeeded in stabilizing the southern front, reclaiming more territory than it has lost.

The Russian army is continuing its offensive from Huliaipole along a 30-km-wide front, though its rate of advance remains limited. Russia has committed the bulk of its regional forces to this sector—specifically the 35th, 36th, and 5th Armies, along with the 68th Army Corps.

Elsewhere, Russian forces are either on the defensive (further to the east, involving the 29th Army) or engaged in limited offensive operations to the west, toward Orikhiv (involving the 58th Army). Consequently, the primary Russian effort remains concentrated between Ternuvate and Huliaipole, where progress is slow and relies on deep-infiltration tactics aimed at reaching the Orikhiv–Novomykolaivka road. The frontal offensive against Orikhiv—which began with infiltrations during the summer—now appears to be faltering due to Ukrainian consolidation efforts.

This year, Ukrainian forces have managed to halt the Russian offensive south of Zaporozhye, pushing Russian troops back from the area north of Stepnohirsk. Simultaneously, they have pressed against the northern flank of the Russian offensive near Huliaipole and are closing in on Velyka Novosilka. The Ukrainians have reversed the gains Russia made in this sector in 2025, regaining control of the banks of the Mokri Yali River as well as the second line of defense that extends toward Zaporozhye.

At present, Ukrainian operations have enabled them to consolidate their position in Komar and along both the eastern and western banks of the Mokri Yali River. These efforts put an end to the threat of a Russian offensive toward Pokrovske, Novomykolaivka, and eastern Zaporizhzhia, as well as toward Pavlohrad and Dnipro.

Thank you for following this first frontline update (next one: II- Donbas)

II- Situation on Donbas 🇺🇦 (eastern) front

Unlike the southern front, where the situation improved for the Ukrainian army in 2026, the eastern front has not seen any such improvement. However, the Ukrainians can still be satisfied by the slowing of the Russian advance and the recent stabilization of the front near Sloviansk.

In early 2026, the Ukrainians managed to disengage from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad—since they still held numerous positions in those areas. Even so, intense Russian pressure—exerted by four armies (the 29th, 51st, 41st, and 8th) along a 50-kilometer front—has allowed Russian forces to advance to the outskirts of Dobropilla. The offensive toward the western administrative borders of the Donbas has been halted, and the push toward Druzhkivka has been temporarily repelled.

That said, Russian forces have advanced toward Dobropilla and are carrying out deep infiltrations, reaching the city center and beyond.

The city is of critical importance; more significantly, its capture could potentially serve as a springboard for an offensive toward Barvinkove, striking behind the Ukrainian strongholds in the Donbas. While I consider such an offensive unlikely, given the strength of the Ukrainian defensive lines, frequent infiltrations are to be expected.

The battle for Kostiantynivka has now been raging for a year, yet the city has not fallen. I estimate that the Russians hold the advantage in about 50% of the city (though this does not imply firm control or established logistics), while the Ukrainians hold the advantage in about 15%, leaving the remaining 35% contested. For the time being, the advance toward Druzhkivka appears to have slowed, while Ukrainian forces have partially withdrawn from the last positions they held in Chasiv Yar.

Finally, the situation east of the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk—which had deteriorated significantly in 2026—has shown some improvement since September. Ukrainian forces have pushed back the front line near Mykolaivka and Kramatorsk; however, the persistent threat from FPV drones and KAB (guided aerial bombs) remains, having forced the evacuation of tens of thousands of civilians in recent months.

Overall, the military situation in the region is much better than it was in the spring, though it remains tense. The Russians are now within a few kilometers of major cities and new defensive lines, leaving little room for further maneuvering. Consequently, all future combat in the region will likely be frontal. The coming months will be crucial in determining whether the Ukrainian army can successfully stabilize the front and how the Russian advance toward Dobropillia will unfold.

Thank you for following this second update; the next one will cover the situation on the Oskil front.

Ua losses updated their count, methodology and map on Ukrainian 🇺🇦 losses in the war, following KIA, MIA and POW

Ukrainian losses:
🔸29k losses in 2022
🔸31k losses in 2023
🔸47k losses in 2024
🔸51k losses in 2025
🔸30k losses in 2026

The database is very useful: we have multiple units, WIA and POW, a map of losses and the possibility to track key battles of the war. The recent data is much better than the Russian one and includes MIA, which is the main difference with Mediazona's count of Russian losses (it is also less conservative).

🔸 ~2k Ukrainian soldiers died during the Kostiantynivka battle, most of which are MIA
🔸~4k Ukrainian soldiers died during the Pokrovsk battle
🔸~1.2k Ukrainian soldiers died in Krinky, Kherson oblast
🔸~6k Ukrainian soldiers died in the Bakhmut battle
🔸~2k soldiers died in the Robotyne counter-offensive and ~1k in the Velika Novosilka counter-offensive
🔸~8k Ukrainian soldiers died during the Kursk operation (all length of it)

Check @LossesUA for details

He concludes that a substantial share of the losses from 2025 and 2026 have not been recorded.

Consequently, the actual number of Russian deaths is likely closer to 500,000–600,000.

On the Ukrainian side, too, the figures are underreported. *Ualosses* explains that obtaining precise data is quite difficult for large cities, the Transcarpathian region, and the occupied territories in the south and east. It should be noted that obtaining data from the Ukrainian side is easier, given the lower level of censorship and the existence of an official registry of missing persons.

I estimate Ukrainian casualties—in terms of deaths—to be between 300,000 and 400,000, though such estimates are fraught with difficulty.

➡️ Focusing solely on Ukrainian and Russian losses overlooks tens of thousands of other deaths. This includes foreign volunteers/mercenaries, Ukrainians from occupied territories (such as the DPR and LPR, as well as other regions) who were conscripted into the Russian army and subsequently killed, and the 2,000 North Koreans killed in the Kursk region.
➡️ Furthermore, it is important to remember that for every person killed, at least two others have been wounded—including tens of thousands who have suffered amputations on both sides. This helps explain, for instance, the official Ukrainian figure of 1.5 million total military casualties.

The true toll is therefore far higher than one million deaths. To fully grasp these trends, one must also account for cases of PTSD, deserters, and soldiers who have been demobilized.

This war is a bloodbath, and each passing year appears deadlier than the last.

Sources: Charts by @M0nstas, using data from @mediazona_en and @LossesUA.

Several hundred Ukrainian civilians 🇺🇦 who had been living under Russian 🇷🇺 occupation in Oleshky for four and a half years have arrived in Ukraine.

This unprecedented humanitarian operation speaks volumes about the war in Ukraine.

🔹️These civilians lived in a town located on the front line in the Kherson region (a static front along the Dnipro River). The town fell on February 24, 2022, and has since been used by the Russian military to shell the city of Kherson. From the buildings in this town, a "human safari" has been carried out—a form of target practice for Russian drone operators, who use civilians in Kherson as their targets.
🔹️Consequently, the town has been heavily bombarded by the Ukrainian military, while the Russians blocked all exits and allowed a state of widespread famine to take hold over the past several months, preventing both the entry of food supplies and the departure of civilians.

What key aspects of this ceasefire should be noted?

👉 For the first time, a ceasefire was fully respected by both sides (including Russia, which typically violates such agreements unless it has initiated them itself).
👉 The majority of the civilians chose Ukraine, while a minority chose Russia (it should be noted that the latter will only be able to return home one day by remaining within Russia).
👉 The scenes of joy, the reception provided by the Ukrainian population (see video), and the symbolic significance of the operation underscore a clear reality: these civilians were not liberated by Russia, but by Ukraine. This offers a glimpse into the situation currently endured by many others in Berdiansk, Melitopol, Tokmak, and across the occupied south. 👉Furthermore, I have seen several videos from the Ukrainian-held side of the Dnipro, featuring civilians who show the extent of the damage—footage I intend to share. We are talking about a vast city that has been destroyed and ransacked, with civilians massacred for no reason by Russian drones...

What happens now?

▫️The ceasefire ends tomorrow evening, which points to the likely resumption of a campaign of massive strikes by both sides. The Russians have used the last few days to stockpile ammunition and are preparing for a large-scale bombardment of Kherson. For their part, the Ukrainians will be able to shell Oleshky with fewer qualms, now that some of the civilians have left (an indirect benefit of such an operation).
▫️Can we expect similar missions elsewhere in occupied Ukraine? I’m not particularly optimistic about that at the moment, but there are many villages and towns along the front line that absolutely must be evacuated...