II- Situation on Donbas 🇺🇦 (eastern) front
Unlike the southern front, where the situation improved for the Ukrainian army in 2026, the eastern front has not seen any such improvement. However, the Ukrainians can still be satisfied by the slowing of the Russian advance and the recent stabilization of the front near Sloviansk.
In early 2026, the Ukrainians managed to disengage from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad—since they still held numerous positions in those areas. Even so, intense Russian pressure—exerted by four armies (the 29th, 51st, 41st, and 8th) along a 50-kilometer front—has allowed Russian forces to advance to the outskirts of Dobropilla. The offensive toward the western administrative borders of the Donbas has been halted, and the push toward Druzhkivka has been temporarily repelled.
That said, Russian forces have advanced toward Dobropilla and are carrying out deep infiltrations, reaching the city center and beyond.
Unlike the southern front, where the situation improved for the Ukrainian army in 2026, the eastern front has not seen any such improvement. However, the Ukrainians can still be satisfied by the slowing of the Russian advance and the recent stabilization of the front near Sloviansk.
In early 2026, the Ukrainians managed to disengage from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad—since they still held numerous positions in those areas. Even so, intense Russian pressure—exerted by four armies (the 29th, 51st, 41st, and 8th) along a 50-kilometer front—has allowed Russian forces to advance to the outskirts of Dobropilla. The offensive toward the western administrative borders of the Donbas has been halted, and the push toward Druzhkivka has been temporarily repelled.
That said, Russian forces have advanced toward Dobropilla and are carrying out deep infiltrations, reaching the city center and beyond.
👍37❤10🫡9🙏7🤡3
The city is of critical importance; more significantly, its capture could potentially serve as a springboard for an offensive toward Barvinkove, striking behind the Ukrainian strongholds in the Donbas. While I consider such an offensive unlikely, given the strength of the Ukrainian defensive lines, frequent infiltrations are to be expected.
The battle for Kostiantynivka has now been raging for a year, yet the city has not fallen. I estimate that the Russians hold the advantage in about 50% of the city (though this does not imply firm control or established logistics), while the Ukrainians hold the advantage in about 15%, leaving the remaining 35% contested. For the time being, the advance toward Druzhkivka appears to have slowed, while Ukrainian forces have partially withdrawn from the last positions they held in Chasiv Yar.
Finally, the situation east of the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk—which had deteriorated significantly in 2026—has shown some improvement since September. Ukrainian forces have pushed back the front line near Mykolaivka and Kramatorsk; however, the persistent threat from FPV drones and KAB (guided aerial bombs) remains, having forced the evacuation of tens of thousands of civilians in recent months.
Overall, the military situation in the region is much better than it was in the spring, though it remains tense. The Russians are now within a few kilometers of major cities and new defensive lines, leaving little room for further maneuvering. Consequently, all future combat in the region will likely be frontal. The coming months will be crucial in determining whether the Ukrainian army can successfully stabilize the front and how the Russian advance toward Dobropillia will unfold.
Thank you for following this second update; the next one will cover the situation on the Oskil front.
The battle for Kostiantynivka has now been raging for a year, yet the city has not fallen. I estimate that the Russians hold the advantage in about 50% of the city (though this does not imply firm control or established logistics), while the Ukrainians hold the advantage in about 15%, leaving the remaining 35% contested. For the time being, the advance toward Druzhkivka appears to have slowed, while Ukrainian forces have partially withdrawn from the last positions they held in Chasiv Yar.
Finally, the situation east of the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk—which had deteriorated significantly in 2026—has shown some improvement since September. Ukrainian forces have pushed back the front line near Mykolaivka and Kramatorsk; however, the persistent threat from FPV drones and KAB (guided aerial bombs) remains, having forced the evacuation of tens of thousands of civilians in recent months.
Overall, the military situation in the region is much better than it was in the spring, though it remains tense. The Russians are now within a few kilometers of major cities and new defensive lines, leaving little room for further maneuvering. Consequently, all future combat in the region will likely be frontal. The coming months will be crucial in determining whether the Ukrainian army can successfully stabilize the front and how the Russian advance toward Dobropillia will unfold.
Thank you for following this second update; the next one will cover the situation on the Oskil front.
👍63🫡22🙏6🤣5🎃3❤2❤🔥1
Ua losses updated their count, methodology and map on Ukrainian 🇺🇦 losses in the war, following KIA, MIA and POW
Ukrainian losses:
🔸29k losses in 2022
🔸31k losses in 2023
🔸47k losses in 2024
🔸51k losses in 2025
🔸30k losses in 2026
The database is very useful: we have multiple units, WIA and POW, a map of losses and the possibility to track key battles of the war. The recent data is much better than the Russian one and includes MIA, which is the main difference with Mediazona's count of Russian losses (it is also less conservative).
🔸 ~2k Ukrainian soldiers died during the Kostiantynivka battle, most of which are MIA
🔸~4k Ukrainian soldiers died during the Pokrovsk battle
🔸~1.2k Ukrainian soldiers died in Krinky, Kherson oblast
🔸~6k Ukrainian soldiers died in the Bakhmut battle
🔸~2k soldiers died in the Robotyne counter-offensive and ~1k in the Velika Novosilka counter-offensive
🔸~8k Ukrainian soldiers died during the Kursk operation (all length of it)
Check @LossesUA for details
Ukrainian losses:
🔸29k losses in 2022
🔸31k losses in 2023
🔸47k losses in 2024
🔸51k losses in 2025
🔸30k losses in 2026
The database is very useful: we have multiple units, WIA and POW, a map of losses and the possibility to track key battles of the war. The recent data is much better than the Russian one and includes MIA, which is the main difference with Mediazona's count of Russian losses (it is also less conservative).
🔸 ~2k Ukrainian soldiers died during the Kostiantynivka battle, most of which are MIA
🔸~4k Ukrainian soldiers died during the Pokrovsk battle
🔸~1.2k Ukrainian soldiers died in Krinky, Kherson oblast
🔸~6k Ukrainian soldiers died in the Bakhmut battle
🔸~2k soldiers died in the Robotyne counter-offensive and ~1k in the Velika Novosilka counter-offensive
🔸~8k Ukrainian soldiers died during the Kursk operation (all length of it)
Check @LossesUA for details
😢161🫡26🤡16👍8🤣7🙏2❤1
The war in Ukraine 🇺🇦 has now resulted in nearly one million military deaths 🇺🇦/🇷🇺.
At present, only partial tallies of military casualties exist—tracked by Mediazona on the Russian side and Ualosses on the Ukrainian side. Both sides go to great lengths to conceal their actual losses and likely do not even have an exact count themselves.
What has been verified:
🇺🇦 106,000 dead, 105,000 missing (the majority of whom are likely dead), and 12,000 prisoners of war—totaling approximately 224,000 casualties.
🇷🇺 282,000 dead, with at least another 70,000 added by the end of 2025, totaling approximately 352,000 casualties (losses for 2026 are barely accounted for).
However, these tallies are incomplete. For instance, a significant portion of Russian losses from 2025 and 2026 remain uncounted, due to Russian censorship.
@M0nstas has noted that the official figures released by the Ukrainian side align closely with Russian casualty figures when a variable killed-to-wounded ratio is applied.
At present, only partial tallies of military casualties exist—tracked by Mediazona on the Russian side and Ualosses on the Ukrainian side. Both sides go to great lengths to conceal their actual losses and likely do not even have an exact count themselves.
What has been verified:
🇺🇦 106,000 dead, 105,000 missing (the majority of whom are likely dead), and 12,000 prisoners of war—totaling approximately 224,000 casualties.
🇷🇺 282,000 dead, with at least another 70,000 added by the end of 2025, totaling approximately 352,000 casualties (losses for 2026 are barely accounted for).
However, these tallies are incomplete. For instance, a significant portion of Russian losses from 2025 and 2026 remain uncounted, due to Russian censorship.
@M0nstas has noted that the official figures released by the Ukrainian side align closely with Russian casualty figures when a variable killed-to-wounded ratio is applied.
🤯23🤣10❤5👍5💔5😭5😁1🤡1
He concludes that a substantial share of the losses from 2025 and 2026 have not been recorded.
Consequently, the actual number of Russian deaths is likely closer to 500,000–600,000.
On the Ukrainian side, too, the figures are underreported. *Ualosses* explains that obtaining precise data is quite difficult for large cities, the Transcarpathian region, and the occupied territories in the south and east. It should be noted that obtaining data from the Ukrainian side is easier, given the lower level of censorship and the existence of an official registry of missing persons.
I estimate Ukrainian casualties—in terms of deaths—to be between 300,000 and 400,000, though such estimates are fraught with difficulty.
➡️ Focusing solely on Ukrainian and Russian losses overlooks tens of thousands of other deaths. This includes foreign volunteers/mercenaries, Ukrainians from occupied territories (such as the DPR and LPR, as well as other regions) who were conscripted into the Russian army and subsequently killed, and the 2,000 North Koreans killed in the Kursk region.
➡️ Furthermore, it is important to remember that for every person killed, at least two others have been wounded—including tens of thousands who have suffered amputations on both sides. This helps explain, for instance, the official Ukrainian figure of 1.5 million total military casualties.
The true toll is therefore far higher than one million deaths. To fully grasp these trends, one must also account for cases of PTSD, deserters, and soldiers who have been demobilized.
This war is a bloodbath, and each passing year appears deadlier than the last.
Sources: Charts by @M0nstas, using data from @mediazona_en and @LossesUA.
Consequently, the actual number of Russian deaths is likely closer to 500,000–600,000.
On the Ukrainian side, too, the figures are underreported. *Ualosses* explains that obtaining precise data is quite difficult for large cities, the Transcarpathian region, and the occupied territories in the south and east. It should be noted that obtaining data from the Ukrainian side is easier, given the lower level of censorship and the existence of an official registry of missing persons.
I estimate Ukrainian casualties—in terms of deaths—to be between 300,000 and 400,000, though such estimates are fraught with difficulty.
➡️ Focusing solely on Ukrainian and Russian losses overlooks tens of thousands of other deaths. This includes foreign volunteers/mercenaries, Ukrainians from occupied territories (such as the DPR and LPR, as well as other regions) who were conscripted into the Russian army and subsequently killed, and the 2,000 North Koreans killed in the Kursk region.
➡️ Furthermore, it is important to remember that for every person killed, at least two others have been wounded—including tens of thousands who have suffered amputations on both sides. This helps explain, for instance, the official Ukrainian figure of 1.5 million total military casualties.
The true toll is therefore far higher than one million deaths. To fully grasp these trends, one must also account for cases of PTSD, deserters, and soldiers who have been demobilized.
This war is a bloodbath, and each passing year appears deadlier than the last.
Sources: Charts by @M0nstas, using data from @mediazona_en and @LossesUA.
😢68❤6🤡6👍5💯3😭1
Several hundred Ukrainian civilians 🇺🇦 who had been living under Russian 🇷🇺 occupation in Oleshky for four and a half years have arrived in Ukraine.
This unprecedented humanitarian operation speaks volumes about the war in Ukraine.
🔹️These civilians lived in a town located on the front line in the Kherson region (a static front along the Dnipro River). The town fell on February 24, 2022, and has since been used by the Russian military to shell the city of Kherson. From the buildings in this town, a "human safari" has been carried out—a form of target practice for Russian drone operators, who use civilians in Kherson as their targets.
🔹️Consequently, the town has been heavily bombarded by the Ukrainian military, while the Russians blocked all exits and allowed a state of widespread famine to take hold over the past several months, preventing both the entry of food supplies and the departure of civilians.
What key aspects of this ceasefire should be noted?
👉 For the first time, a ceasefire was fully respected by both sides (including Russia, which typically violates such agreements unless it has initiated them itself).
👉 The majority of the civilians chose Ukraine, while a minority chose Russia (it should be noted that the latter will only be able to return home one day by remaining within Russia).
👉 The scenes of joy, the reception provided by the Ukrainian population (see video), and the symbolic significance of the operation underscore a clear reality: these civilians were not liberated by Russia, but by Ukraine. This offers a glimpse into the situation currently endured by many others in Berdiansk, Melitopol, Tokmak, and across the occupied south. 👉Furthermore, I have seen several videos from the Ukrainian-held side of the Dnipro, featuring civilians who show the extent of the damage—footage I intend to share. We are talking about a vast city that has been destroyed and ransacked, with civilians massacred for no reason by Russian drones...
What happens now?
▫️The ceasefire ends tomorrow evening, which points to the likely resumption of a campaign of massive strikes by both sides. The Russians have used the last few days to stockpile ammunition and are preparing for a large-scale bombardment of Kherson. For their part, the Ukrainians will be able to shell Oleshky with fewer qualms, now that some of the civilians have left (an indirect benefit of such an operation).
▫️Can we expect similar missions elsewhere in occupied Ukraine? I’m not particularly optimistic about that at the moment, but there are many villages and towns along the front line that absolutely must be evacuated...
This unprecedented humanitarian operation speaks volumes about the war in Ukraine.
🔹️These civilians lived in a town located on the front line in the Kherson region (a static front along the Dnipro River). The town fell on February 24, 2022, and has since been used by the Russian military to shell the city of Kherson. From the buildings in this town, a "human safari" has been carried out—a form of target practice for Russian drone operators, who use civilians in Kherson as their targets.
🔹️Consequently, the town has been heavily bombarded by the Ukrainian military, while the Russians blocked all exits and allowed a state of widespread famine to take hold over the past several months, preventing both the entry of food supplies and the departure of civilians.
What key aspects of this ceasefire should be noted?
👉 For the first time, a ceasefire was fully respected by both sides (including Russia, which typically violates such agreements unless it has initiated them itself).
👉 The majority of the civilians chose Ukraine, while a minority chose Russia (it should be noted that the latter will only be able to return home one day by remaining within Russia).
👉 The scenes of joy, the reception provided by the Ukrainian population (see video), and the symbolic significance of the operation underscore a clear reality: these civilians were not liberated by Russia, but by Ukraine. This offers a glimpse into the situation currently endured by many others in Berdiansk, Melitopol, Tokmak, and across the occupied south. 👉Furthermore, I have seen several videos from the Ukrainian-held side of the Dnipro, featuring civilians who show the extent of the damage—footage I intend to share. We are talking about a vast city that has been destroyed and ransacked, with civilians massacred for no reason by Russian drones...
What happens now?
▫️The ceasefire ends tomorrow evening, which points to the likely resumption of a campaign of massive strikes by both sides. The Russians have used the last few days to stockpile ammunition and are preparing for a large-scale bombardment of Kherson. For their part, the Ukrainians will be able to shell Oleshky with fewer qualms, now that some of the civilians have left (an indirect benefit of such an operation).
▫️Can we expect similar missions elsewhere in occupied Ukraine? I’m not particularly optimistic about that at the moment, but there are many villages and towns along the front line that absolutely must be evacuated...
❤🔥54❤31🙏17👍9🤔3🤡2
Forwarded from Maps and stuff
GSUA reported 6 549 attacks and 54 200 IvanZ in October, the highest monthly figure of the war.
58% of the attacks are undefined.
Average losses per identified attack reached 21 men per attack, up from 18 in September.
Magyar's USF reported 16 821 personnel hit, 31% of the GSUA figure and its highest month so far.
Russia's net gain was 57 km² of red: 138 taken, 81 lost. That is about 960 IvanZ per km², against about 700 in September.
Assaults and ground did not line up: 589 assaults at Toretsk brought 2 km² of red, while Lyman saw 221 assaults and lost 81 km².
Russian activity decreased on most fronts. Gulyaipole is the exception with +141 assaults and the largest gain, 45 km².
The distribution of the 2 772 identified assaults can be found above.
GSUA published no morning report on 18 October, so that day is extrapolated from the 22:00 update.
58% of the attacks are undefined.
Average losses per identified attack reached 21 men per attack, up from 18 in September.
Magyar's USF reported 16 821 personnel hit, 31% of the GSUA figure and its highest month so far.
Russia's net gain was 57 km² of red: 138 taken, 81 lost. That is about 960 IvanZ per km², against about 700 in September.
Assaults and ground did not line up: 589 assaults at Toretsk brought 2 km² of red, while Lyman saw 221 assaults and lost 81 km².
Russian activity decreased on most fronts. Gulyaipole is the exception with +141 assaults and the largest gain, 45 km².
The distribution of the 2 772 identified assaults can be found above.
GSUA published no morning report on 18 October, so that day is extrapolated from the 22:00 update.
👍40🔥11🤡6🤣3❤🔥2❤1🙏1
After a short break and strikes on Russian 🇷🇺 oil/fuel reserves in October (Rostov, Saint Petersburg, Samara), Ukraine 🇺🇦 hit 3 refineries in 3 days
The Samara, Ufa and Kstovo refineries were hit on October 30th, 31st and November 1st. Multiple fires were seen, which confirms that this operation was successful.
These successful strikes are very important to periodically stop multiple Russian refineries from working, which creates a fuel penury in Russia and fewer exportations, which means less money for the state.
The Samara, Ufa and Kstovo refineries were hit on October 30th, 31st and November 1st. Multiple fires were seen, which confirms that this operation was successful.
These successful strikes are very important to periodically stop multiple Russian refineries from working, which creates a fuel penury in Russia and fewer exportations, which means less money for the state.
👍59❤33🔥29❤🔥6🤡4🎉2😈2🤬1
III- Situation on Oskil 🇺🇦 (eastern) front
The front across the Oskil river was the most successful one for Ukraine this year, from Lyman to Kupiansk. A year ago, Russia was on the brink to capture Kupiansk, was reaching Borova and Lyman and cutting the southern part of this direction in two parts.
A year later, the situation in Kupiansk barely changed, the city remains partly a grey zone, Ukraine took back some positions near Borova and launched a successful counter-offensive in Lyman, cutting the edge of Russian progression and fully securing Lyman.
▫️Right now, there is a stabilization on the southern part of this frontline, around Lyman. Ukrainian forces continue to consolidate their gains in the forests east of the city and will take up defensive positions for the winter on the Zherebets river.
▫️Further north, largely unnoticed actions happened around Borova (and east of it). Further proofs are needed, but it seems Ukraine advanced slowly and took back multiple positions.
The front across the Oskil river was the most successful one for Ukraine this year, from Lyman to Kupiansk. A year ago, Russia was on the brink to capture Kupiansk, was reaching Borova and Lyman and cutting the southern part of this direction in two parts.
A year later, the situation in Kupiansk barely changed, the city remains partly a grey zone, Ukraine took back some positions near Borova and launched a successful counter-offensive in Lyman, cutting the edge of Russian progression and fully securing Lyman.
▫️Right now, there is a stabilization on the southern part of this frontline, around Lyman. Ukrainian forces continue to consolidate their gains in the forests east of the city and will take up defensive positions for the winter on the Zherebets river.
▫️Further north, largely unnoticed actions happened around Borova (and east of it). Further proofs are needed, but it seems Ukraine advanced slowly and took back multiple positions.
👍50❤30🏆6🤣4🤡2🤪1
▫️Finally, the situation is more difficult near Kupiansk, but the operation inside tunnels north of the city stopped the flow of infiltrators, while most of the city and the eastern part of it remains a grey zone.
Thus, the situation largely improved in 2026 in this direction, I'm expecting further offensive operations, particularly north of Borova next year to push back the Russians from Kupiansk.
Thus, the situation largely improved in 2026 in this direction, I'm expecting further offensive operations, particularly north of Borova next year to push back the Russians from Kupiansk.
❤55👍21🎉3🤡2🤣2💩1