@clement_molin
Thus, these kind of geolocations closer to frontline by @AndrewPerpetua (some logistic roads on the kill zone) are not counted.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHL-odHNWEAAOxTn.jpg
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@clement_molin
If I talked about road logistics, we shouldn't forget that other strikes continue.

-> Rail/Ferry logistics
-> Oil/Gas/Electricity infrastructure
-> Rear bases and depots
-> Training ground/Ammunition depots

All those strikes complicate the logistical situation.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHL-qZESWwAA_nyk.jpg
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@clement_molin
Analysis :

The increase in deep-strike operations is a reality the Russian army cannot counter. The progression —seeing 7, then 9, and finally 29 trucks or vehicles hit daily over the course of a month — demonstrates that despite having time to adapt and implement defensive measures, the Russian army continues to fall behind.

Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics have effectively frozen the southern front, marking the initial results of this strategy. The Russian offensive at Huliaipole has slowed, and Russian forces are being slowly pushed back along the entire front between the Dnipro River and Novopavlivka. Roads, bridges, and even open fields are under constant surveillance. Russian air defense systems and radars continue to be targeted, particularly in Crimea. The peninsula is becoming increasingly isolated, facing widespread fuel shortages, the near-closure of the land bridge to Russia, and the destruction of most ferries. Currently, only military airfields (as any air bridge appears highly dangerous) and the Crimean Bridge (vulnerable given recent strikes on Kerch) provide a lifeline for the peninsula.

The Russian army is attempting to counter these strikes through three measures. The first involves providing air defense escorts for strategic convoys—a strategy that has proven ineffective, as Ukrainian drones are fast, small, and often silent. Interceptor drones offer a potential solution, yet they remain insufficient; the number of operational teams is too low to cover such a vast territory (especially given the need to protect Russia itself and the front line). Consequently, Russia is attempting to mount a similar campaign within Ukraine—with varying degrees of success—a topic I will revisit in the coming days. Medium-range strikes are carried out predominantly by Geran drones (whereas BM35s, Molniyahs, and fiber-optic FPVs often fail to reach long distances due to connectivity issues); these Gerans are far larger and more expensive than the myriad Ukrainian drones that compete among themselves. This strike campaign—targeting service stations, truck depots, and electrical substations, among other sites—comes at the expense of deep-strike operations and bears absolutely no comparison to the Ukrainian strike campaign.

Given the ongoing Ukrainian strike campaign, one should expect a more pronounced regaining of the initiative on specific fronts during the summer and autumn, aimed at exploiting breaches caused by Russian logistical failures. In the long run, the introduction of long-range FPV drones (capable of a 50km range with perfect video quality) spells disaster for Moscow. These drones are extremely low-cost, can be mass-produced in the tens of thousands, are rarely jammed (thanks to a "mothership" drone ensuring connectivity), and will be able to stealthily strike logistical assets located tens of kilometers behind the front line. The Russians, meanwhile, remain stuck relying on fiber-optic cables...
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@clement_molin
I will continue to update key numbers around the Ukrainian Mid-range strike campaign, with the new videos, datas and geolocations in the next few days.

Thank you for following, I will continue to catch up this week, with other subjects (frontline, fortifications...)
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHL-vP8oWAAAa49H.jpg
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@clement_molin
Per week and now per day *
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@clement_molin
Les 6 derniers mois ont été mauvais pour l'armée russe 🇷🇺 en Ukraine 🇺🇦, qui conquiert 699 km², soit une baisse de 70 % par rapport aux 6 derniers mois de 2025.

Il semblerait que Vladimir Poutine ne soit pas vraiment au courant de la réalité du front au vu de ses dernières déclarations. En juin, l'armée russe a pris le contrôle d'environ 29 km² du territoire ukrainien (l'Ukraine a regagné sur la même période 14 km² de zone grise).

Il faut bien comprendre que l'armée ukrainienne perd des territoires sur la zone grise (958 km² en 2026) et l'armée russe gagne des territoires sur cette même zone grise (699 km² en 2026). Il n'en reste que les chiffres sont mauvais, même en comparant aux premiers mois de 2025.

Poutine a fait plusieurs déclarations qui montrent sa déconnexion, ou les mensonges qui lui sont propagés par le haut commandement :

🔹 Les Russes seraient à 10 km de Soumy (ils sont à 19).
🔹Les contre-attaques ukrainiennes à Koupiansk auraient échoué (la ville est majoritairement sous contrôle ukrainien)
🔹La majeure partie de Lyman serait sous contrôle russe (la ville est sous contrôle ukrainien)
🔹Les forces russes seraient à 8 km de Sloviansk (14 km en réalité)
🔹Les forces russes auraient atteint Dobropilla (elles sont à 10km de la ville) et il n'y aurait aucune ligne de défense derrière (il y en a 4)
🔹Les forces russes progresseraient sur une large partie du front de Zaporizhzhia (elles ne progressent concrètement que très lentement sur une petite partie du front, tandis que les Ukrainiens ont l'initiative partout ailleurs au sud).

Les courbes de progression sont souvent décriées, on répète sans cesse que c'est une guerre d'attrition… mais mois après mois, les Ukrainiens qui étaient "censés s'effondrer" se relèvent, innovent et portent l'attrition chez les Russes, de plus en plus en profondeur. Sur les 10 dernières semaines, les Ukrainiens ont eu un gain net de territoires sur 6 d'entre elles.

On entend souvent que les gains russes sont sous-évalués par mes sources (ici @Pouletvolant3 et @Majakovsk73), mais jamais que les gains ukrainiens le sont eux aussi (cf. la situation à Lyman, Stepnohirsk et Komar qui est sous le coup de l'OPSEC).
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHMAYqnDXkAAMRAy.jpg
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@clement_molin
In recent months, Ukraine 🇺🇦 continued to reinforce its fortifications across the country

6 months ago, Zaporizhzhia direction was lacking defensive preparation, it now has 5 defensive lines, which shows how fast Ukraine can adapt.

🧵THREAD🧵1/12 ⬇️
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHME2sW_WoAA_RFq.jpg
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@clement_molin
Here in red are all the new fortifications built from january to jun 2026. Lines are stretching from Chernihiv to Odessa.

You can see priority was given to Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblast.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHMErBoMWAAAyYZU.jpg
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@clement_molin
Near Zaporizhzhia, are still digging new lines, with currently 5 lines protecting the city from the east.

Red are lines dug in 2026, yellow in 2025 and white in 2024 (mostly obsolete).
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHMErT_UWoAAKqRT.jpg
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@clement_molin
These fortifications are protecting key roads and towns, which are turned into fortified strongholds.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHMErlg2XUAA7L8S.jpg
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@clement_molin
In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, there are now 5 lines between the frontline and Pavlohrad.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHMErsCNXYAAHUTS.jpg
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