Version française 🇫🇷:
Après une bataille de 10 mois, l'armée russe 🇷🇺 prend pour la première fois le contrôle complet de Toretsk
Les forces ukrainiennes 🇺🇦 au sud du lac de Kleban semble avoir entamé une retraite localisée, alors que les forces tentent d'approcher Kostiantynivka.
English version 🇬🇧:
After a 10-month battle, the Russian army 🇷🇺 takes complete control of Toretsk for the first time.
Ukrainian forces 🇺🇦 south of Lake Kleban appear to have begun a localized retreat, as they attempt to approach Kostiantynivka.
Après une bataille de 10 mois, l'armée russe 🇷🇺 prend pour la première fois le contrôle complet de Toretsk
Les forces ukrainiennes 🇺🇦 au sud du lac de Kleban semble avoir entamé une retraite localisée, alors que les forces tentent d'approcher Kostiantynivka.
English version 🇬🇧:
After a 10-month battle, the Russian army 🇷🇺 takes complete control of Toretsk for the first time.
Ukrainian forces 🇺🇦 south of Lake Kleban appear to have begun a localized retreat, as they attempt to approach Kostiantynivka.
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Sudan/Soudan 🇸🇩
🇬🇧 Pro-UAE 🇦🇪 General Khalifa Haftar (East Libya) and Rapid Support Forces launched a joint offensive right on the border of Egypt and Sudan against Sudanese Armed Forces, forced to retreat. Concerning news.
🇫🇷 Le général Khalifa Haftar (Libye orientale), pro-émirati 🇦🇪, et les Forces de soutien rapide (FSR) ont lancé une offensive conjointe à la frontière entre l'Égypte et le Soudan contre les forces armées soudanaises, contraintes de se replier. Nouvelles inquiétantes.
🇬🇧 Pro-UAE 🇦🇪 General Khalifa Haftar (East Libya) and Rapid Support Forces launched a joint offensive right on the border of Egypt and Sudan against Sudanese Armed Forces, forced to retreat. Concerning news.
🇫🇷 Le général Khalifa Haftar (Libye orientale), pro-émirati 🇦🇪, et les Forces de soutien rapide (FSR) ont lancé une offensive conjointe à la frontière entre l'Égypte et le Soudan contre les forces armées soudanaises, contraintes de se replier. Nouvelles inquiétantes.
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FR🇫🇷 :
Vu depuis l’espace, l’armée russe mène une préparation massive de frappes aériennes contre la 2e ligne défensive ukrainienne. J’ai localisé près de 1 000 frappes aériennes sur une petite portion du front entre Pokrovsk et Kostiantynivka. C’est tout simplement massif.
Sur une zone restreinte, j’ai cartographié environ 950 frappes récentes dispersées sur des champs et des lisières de forêts proches des positions ukrainiennes. Ces frappes ont commencé autour du 25 mai, il y a moins de 20 jours, après que les troupes russes ont progressé sur cette ligne défensive. On voit clairement la disparition progressive des positions ukrainiennes sous les frappes répétées. Cette zone correspond à celle que j’ai identifiée comme la prochaine cible de l’offensive russe, qui tenterait d’atteindre Droujkivka tout en évitant le combat urbain à Pokrovsk. Les images satellite Sentinel-2 montrent à quel point ces frappes sont massives, souvent précises, ciblant principalement les lisières d’arbres, en réponse à la nouvelle stratégie ukrainienne de positions plus petites et camouflées. Elles sont concentrées sur le flanc ouest des récents gains russes, près des fossés antichars. Il y a moins de frappes sur l’axe Droujkivka-Kostiantynivka, ce qui peut indiquer deux choses : soit les positions ukrainiennes y sont moins solides, soit l’objectif russe est d’encercler Pokrovsk par l’est.
Cela permettrait potentiellement de relancer le front ouest de Pokrovsk tout en attaquant simultanément par l’est, pour capturer Pokrovsk et Kostiantynivka avant 2026. Il n’existe pas ailleurs en Ukraine, à part à Sumy (j’y reviendrai), une telle concentration de frappes aériennes. Par exemple, au sud de Pokrovsk, dans l’un des secteurs les plus actifs, on observe à peine une quinzaine de frappes récentes. Ce n’est pas la première fois que j’observe une telle densité de frappes sur un périmètre réduit : c’était déjà le cas à Robotyne en 2023 ou à Koursk en 2024. Une concentration similaire est visible dans l’oblast de Sumy, au nord de la ville, notamment dans les forêts où les soldats ukrainiens se cachent pour contenir l’offensive russe. Il y a peu de vidéos récentes du terrain montrant ces frappes, mais j’en ai trouvé une au nord de Nova Poltavka, localisée par @giK1893. Grâce aux images satellites, je peux effectuer beaucoup de travail OSINT sur les fortifications, les axes d’offensive, les frappes aériennes...
EN🇬🇧 :
Seen from space, the Russian army is carrying out a massive airstrike preparation against the 2nd Ukrainian defensive line. I located nearly 1,000 airstrikes on a small section of the frontline between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka. This is simply massive. In a compact area, I mapped around 950 recent airstrikes scattered across fields and treelines near Ukrainian positions. These strikes started around May 25, less than 20 days ago, after Russian troops made progress on the defensive line. You can clearly see how Ukrainian positions disappear after repeated airstrikes. This area is the one I marked as the likely next objective of the Russian offensive, aiming to reach Droujkivka while avoiding direct fighting inside Pokrovsk. Sentinel-2 satellite imagery shows how large and targeted these airstrikes are, often striking treelines directly in response to Ukraine’s new tactic of smaller, hidden positions. Most of these strikes are located on the western salient of recent Russian gains, near anti-tank ditches. There are fewer strikes along the Droujkivka-Kostiantynivka axis, which suggests two possibilities: either Ukrainian positions there are weaker, or Russia aims to encircle Pokrovsk from the east. This could allow them to reopen the western Pokrovsk front while launching attacks from the east, potentially achieving the goal of capturing Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka before 2026. There is no other place in Ukraine, aside from Sumy (which I’ll address), where this level of concentrated airstrikes can be seen.
Vu depuis l’espace, l’armée russe mène une préparation massive de frappes aériennes contre la 2e ligne défensive ukrainienne. J’ai localisé près de 1 000 frappes aériennes sur une petite portion du front entre Pokrovsk et Kostiantynivka. C’est tout simplement massif.
Sur une zone restreinte, j’ai cartographié environ 950 frappes récentes dispersées sur des champs et des lisières de forêts proches des positions ukrainiennes. Ces frappes ont commencé autour du 25 mai, il y a moins de 20 jours, après que les troupes russes ont progressé sur cette ligne défensive. On voit clairement la disparition progressive des positions ukrainiennes sous les frappes répétées. Cette zone correspond à celle que j’ai identifiée comme la prochaine cible de l’offensive russe, qui tenterait d’atteindre Droujkivka tout en évitant le combat urbain à Pokrovsk. Les images satellite Sentinel-2 montrent à quel point ces frappes sont massives, souvent précises, ciblant principalement les lisières d’arbres, en réponse à la nouvelle stratégie ukrainienne de positions plus petites et camouflées. Elles sont concentrées sur le flanc ouest des récents gains russes, près des fossés antichars. Il y a moins de frappes sur l’axe Droujkivka-Kostiantynivka, ce qui peut indiquer deux choses : soit les positions ukrainiennes y sont moins solides, soit l’objectif russe est d’encercler Pokrovsk par l’est.
Cela permettrait potentiellement de relancer le front ouest de Pokrovsk tout en attaquant simultanément par l’est, pour capturer Pokrovsk et Kostiantynivka avant 2026. Il n’existe pas ailleurs en Ukraine, à part à Sumy (j’y reviendrai), une telle concentration de frappes aériennes. Par exemple, au sud de Pokrovsk, dans l’un des secteurs les plus actifs, on observe à peine une quinzaine de frappes récentes. Ce n’est pas la première fois que j’observe une telle densité de frappes sur un périmètre réduit : c’était déjà le cas à Robotyne en 2023 ou à Koursk en 2024. Une concentration similaire est visible dans l’oblast de Sumy, au nord de la ville, notamment dans les forêts où les soldats ukrainiens se cachent pour contenir l’offensive russe. Il y a peu de vidéos récentes du terrain montrant ces frappes, mais j’en ai trouvé une au nord de Nova Poltavka, localisée par @giK1893. Grâce aux images satellites, je peux effectuer beaucoup de travail OSINT sur les fortifications, les axes d’offensive, les frappes aériennes...
EN🇬🇧 :
Seen from space, the Russian army is carrying out a massive airstrike preparation against the 2nd Ukrainian defensive line. I located nearly 1,000 airstrikes on a small section of the frontline between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka. This is simply massive. In a compact area, I mapped around 950 recent airstrikes scattered across fields and treelines near Ukrainian positions. These strikes started around May 25, less than 20 days ago, after Russian troops made progress on the defensive line. You can clearly see how Ukrainian positions disappear after repeated airstrikes. This area is the one I marked as the likely next objective of the Russian offensive, aiming to reach Droujkivka while avoiding direct fighting inside Pokrovsk. Sentinel-2 satellite imagery shows how large and targeted these airstrikes are, often striking treelines directly in response to Ukraine’s new tactic of smaller, hidden positions. Most of these strikes are located on the western salient of recent Russian gains, near anti-tank ditches. There are fewer strikes along the Droujkivka-Kostiantynivka axis, which suggests two possibilities: either Ukrainian positions there are weaker, or Russia aims to encircle Pokrovsk from the east. This could allow them to reopen the western Pokrovsk front while launching attacks from the east, potentially achieving the goal of capturing Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka before 2026. There is no other place in Ukraine, aside from Sumy (which I’ll address), where this level of concentrated airstrikes can be seen.
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For instance, south of Pokrovsk—despite being one of the most active frontlines—there are no more than 15 recent strikes. This isn’t the first time I’ve observed such concentrated strikes on a small perimeter: it happened in Robotyne in 2023 and Kursk in 2024. A similar airstrike concentration is visible in Sumy oblast, north of the city, especially in forest areas where Ukrainian troops are hiding while holding back Russian advances. There are only a few recent field videos showing these strikes; I found one north of Nova Poltavka, geolocated by @giK1893. Thanks to satellite imagery, I can do extensive OSINT work on fortifications, offensive axes, and airstrikes...
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The Ukrainian army is facing the multiplication of small salients all along the eastern front. The Russian army pushes into a targeted area for several weeks, then threatens encirclement and forces a Ukrainian withdrawal.
Moreover, the Russian army is using fewer and fewer armored vehicles. We see a dominance of modern light cavalry (motorbikes, quads, civilian vehicles) and infantry for assaulting positions. This strategy is a direct response to the ultra-dronization of the war: it has become nearly impossible to move armored vehicles within the last five kilometers before the front line. As a result, the Russian army now leads assaults mostly on foot — which creates more targets for drones, and therefore more casualties.
But is this a problem? Not really — Moscow recruits between 30,000 and 40,000 men each month.
@AndrewPerpetua tracks the daily number of Russian soldiers killed on video.
He has counted 34,943 in the last 289 days based only on visually confirmed losses. Including the wounded who later die, he estimates around 80,000 deaths over the same period. On a yearly basis, that's approximately 102,000 Russian soldiers killed.
The lack of armored vehicle use is also explained by the “killzone,” which spans 5 to 10, or even 15 kilometers, where any vehicle can be targeted by a fiber-optic drone.
The Ukrainian army is now producing versions with ranges of 40 or 50 kilometers — enough to change the dynamics of strike warfare.
But by avoiding the use of armored vehicles, the Russian army can also rebuild its reserves — possibly preparing for exploiting a local breakthrough, which could be disastrous for the already overstretched Ukrainian forces.
On the Ukrainian side, a major issue is becoming increasingly apparent: desertions. 90,000 legal proceedings have been opened since the start of this year.
January 2025: 18,145
February 2025: 17,809
March 2025: 16,349
April 2025: 18,331
May 2025: 19,956
Since the beginning of 2022, a total of 213,722 desertion cases have been recorded. This adds to the many killed, wounded, or captured soldiers who are not being replaced, due to a suffocating mobilization system.
The Ukrainian army lacks manpower to hold positions, leading to a tacit form of front-line control — especially through drones.
To contain the Russian army, Ukraine is relying on two strengths: its drone force, which it hopes will keep Russian logistics at a distance of 5 to 10 kilometers or more, and its defensive fortifications.
Kyiv has finally grasped the stakes and adopted a new strategy: frontline brigades now fortify their own positions; in the rear, the army's engineering corps takes charge, while the new Donbas defense line is being built by private companies.
This line includes three anti-tank ditches, dragon's teeth, barbed wire, and camouflaged positions behind hedgerows. It’s meant to serve as the main fallback line if the last cities in the Donbas fall.
Previously, armored vehicle losses were key indicators — but these have drastically decreased in recent months. For instance, only one MRAP was lost at Kursk, and few armored vehicles were destroyed in the Pokrovsk sector.
This leads to two opposite hypotheses:
The Russian army is not as strong as it seems. It's pulling armored vehicles from the front due to drones, trying to advance at all costs with infantry, and cannot hope for a real breakthrough — only to push the front back slowly.
The Russian army is reserving its armored vehicles in anticipation of a return to maneuver warfare. It's advancing faster, wearing down the Ukrainian army, and getting closer to a breaking point.
Both theories seem plausible — and, as often, the truth likely lies somewhere in between.
Moreover, the Russian army is using fewer and fewer armored vehicles. We see a dominance of modern light cavalry (motorbikes, quads, civilian vehicles) and infantry for assaulting positions. This strategy is a direct response to the ultra-dronization of the war: it has become nearly impossible to move armored vehicles within the last five kilometers before the front line. As a result, the Russian army now leads assaults mostly on foot — which creates more targets for drones, and therefore more casualties.
But is this a problem? Not really — Moscow recruits between 30,000 and 40,000 men each month.
@AndrewPerpetua tracks the daily number of Russian soldiers killed on video.
He has counted 34,943 in the last 289 days based only on visually confirmed losses. Including the wounded who later die, he estimates around 80,000 deaths over the same period. On a yearly basis, that's approximately 102,000 Russian soldiers killed.
The lack of armored vehicle use is also explained by the “killzone,” which spans 5 to 10, or even 15 kilometers, where any vehicle can be targeted by a fiber-optic drone.
The Ukrainian army is now producing versions with ranges of 40 or 50 kilometers — enough to change the dynamics of strike warfare.
But by avoiding the use of armored vehicles, the Russian army can also rebuild its reserves — possibly preparing for exploiting a local breakthrough, which could be disastrous for the already overstretched Ukrainian forces.
On the Ukrainian side, a major issue is becoming increasingly apparent: desertions. 90,000 legal proceedings have been opened since the start of this year.
January 2025: 18,145
February 2025: 17,809
March 2025: 16,349
April 2025: 18,331
May 2025: 19,956
Since the beginning of 2022, a total of 213,722 desertion cases have been recorded. This adds to the many killed, wounded, or captured soldiers who are not being replaced, due to a suffocating mobilization system.
The Ukrainian army lacks manpower to hold positions, leading to a tacit form of front-line control — especially through drones.
To contain the Russian army, Ukraine is relying on two strengths: its drone force, which it hopes will keep Russian logistics at a distance of 5 to 10 kilometers or more, and its defensive fortifications.
Kyiv has finally grasped the stakes and adopted a new strategy: frontline brigades now fortify their own positions; in the rear, the army's engineering corps takes charge, while the new Donbas defense line is being built by private companies.
This line includes three anti-tank ditches, dragon's teeth, barbed wire, and camouflaged positions behind hedgerows. It’s meant to serve as the main fallback line if the last cities in the Donbas fall.
Previously, armored vehicle losses were key indicators — but these have drastically decreased in recent months. For instance, only one MRAP was lost at Kursk, and few armored vehicles were destroyed in the Pokrovsk sector.
This leads to two opposite hypotheses:
The Russian army is not as strong as it seems. It's pulling armored vehicles from the front due to drones, trying to advance at all costs with infantry, and cannot hope for a real breakthrough — only to push the front back slowly.
The Russian army is reserving its armored vehicles in anticipation of a return to maneuver warfare. It's advancing faster, wearing down the Ukrainian army, and getting closer to a breaking point.
Both theories seem plausible — and, as often, the truth likely lies somewhere in between.
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