@clement_molin
Again, a video of a lone Russian soldier with a flag, more than 15 km from the front.

This happens regularly, especially on some directions. Sometimes, lost russian soldiers are found 20, 50 or even 80 km from the front, after they lost themselves during an infiltration attempt.

Their value is very small (mainly propaganda and sometimes tracking down drone operators' positions), and there is a big information asymmetry between what Russia shows and what is the reality. There are often cases of lost Russians asking Ukrainian positions (they think the position is Russian) for food or directions. Since they speak the same language at the front, Ukrainian often realise once the Russian soldier left that he was not one of theirs.

Everyday, Russian infiltrators are being killed or captured in different directions. 64 of those have recently been caught on Huliailpole front by Skala (this is not just a show off).

This strategy is much more efficient in cities than in the countryside, and we should remember we see less than 5% of what is happening on the front everyday. Any map showing this even as a grey zone shouldn't be taken seriously...

Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2079952504674988032%2Fimg%2FCA1SGbczetisLc8D.jpg
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@clement_molin
Le nombre de véhicules russes frappés par des drones ukrainien très loin du front reste contant pour le 3ème mois consécutif.

Je publierai très bientôt une nouvelle analyse de ces frappes, notamment à la suite des dernières vidéos de @414magyarbirds, le GUR et d'autres unités ukrainiennes.

J'analyserai par ailleurs les frappes similaires que la Russie a mené sur la même période depuis début mai, à plus de 20km du front pour comparer les deux opérations.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHN2HyQkXsAIPogU.jpg
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@clement_molin
Last time I checked, fortifications covered less than 1% of Polish 🇵🇱 borders.

The way they are digging is in fact similar to how Ukraine dug in 2023-2024, which lead to difficult situations.

The direction is the good one, but there is a lot to learn from the Ukrainian example and errors and the pace is very very slow. The priority is to protect the borders as well as the depth, Suwalki corridor and, obviously, prioritise airdefense and anti-drone defense.

Donald Tusk (@donaldtusk)

Polscy i niemieccy żołnierze razem wzmacniają granicę z Rosją. Takie rzeczy możliwe tylko za Tuska ☺️

Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2079856767178002432%2Fimg%2Fkg5wiUN2uk3lJNw8.jpg

— https://twitter.com/donaldtusk/status/2079856899629928705#m
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@clement_molin
Ukraine's 🇺🇦 mid-range strike campaign against Russian 🇷🇺 logistics continues, with more than 1 350 strikes on trucks and vehicles since early may

Railways, air-defense systems and energy infrastructure is also being hit on a daily basis.

🧵THREAD🧵1/16 ⬇️
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHN75xEiXYAAwpav.jpg
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@clement_molin
With the Ukrainian company @FirePointUA expecting to produce 100 000 FP-1/2 this year, this is twice as much as Russian Geran production.

And remember, Russia is producing Geran in only one factory and it has very few interceptors...
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHN8EMovW8AA8ePF.jpg
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@clement_molin
That's all for today's update. I will continue to follow closely this campaign, and as expected, will analyse what Russia is trying to replicate and how they defend themselves.

If you wish to support my work, you can do it here : buymeacoffee.com/clement.mol…

Thank you !
Link
https://twitter.com/pic/card_img%2F2078381661310390272%2FIR7HcLmZ%3Fformat%3Djpg%26name%3D800x419
CLEMENT MOLIN
Etudant en master à l'Université Catholique de Lille, 20 ans et passionné par la géopolitique et l'étude des conflits.A l'habitude de suivre les guerres et de faire des thread dessus. -> co-directe
buymeacoffee.com
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@clement_molin
Carte des frappes ukrainiennes 🇺🇦 sur l'infrastructure électrique en Crimée occupée par la Russie 🇷🇺

La majorité de la péninsule est sans électricité. Ces frappes sont une réponse aux frappes russes en cours depuis 3 ans sur l'infrastructure électrique ukrainienne.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHN_3u4GXEAAv087.jpg
414 Magyar's Birds (@414magyarbirds)

Magyar's electric update:

⚡️”Crimea’s Power Switch: OFF”

+19 power facilities hit over 48 hours, July 23–24: 17 in Crimea and 2 in other temporarily occupied territories, courtesy of USF pilots.

The total for the operation from July 1–24 now stands at ⚡️136 energy targets.

Smoke the worm out of the peninsula.

Yalta, Hurzuf, Feodosia, Yevpatoria, Sudak, and more.

🔥110 kV electrical substation “Malorichenske”, Crimea, 9th Battalion “Kairos”, 414th USF Brigade “Magyar’s Birds”
🔥110/35 kV electrical substation “Prymorskyi”, Prymorskyi, Crimea, 1st Separate Center, USF
🔥110/10 kV electrical substation “Hurzuf”, Hurzuf, Crimea, 413th Separate Regiment, USF “Raid”
🔥110 kV electrical substation “Nasosna-16”, Vasylkove, Crimea, 1st Separate Center, USF
🔥110 kV electrical substation “Voskhod”, Feodosia, Crimea, 1st Separate Center, USF
🔥110 kV electrical substation “Oleksiivka”, Oleksiivka, Crimea, 427th USF Brigade “Raroh”
🔥110 kV electrical substation “Vesele”, Vesele, Crimea, 413th Separate Regiment, USF “Raid”
🔥110 kV electrical substation “Kholodylnyk”, Yevpatoria, Crimea, 427th USF Brigade “Raroh”
🔥110 kV electrical substation “Haspra”, Haspra, Crimea, 20th USF Brigade “K-2”
🔥110 kV electrical substation “Krainie”, Krainie, Crimea, 9th Battalion “Kairos”, 414th USF Brigade “Magyar’s Birds”
🔥110 kV electrical substation “Skvortsovo”, Skvortsovo, Crimea, 9th Battalion “Kairos”, 414th USF Brigade “Magyar’s Birds”
🔥110/10 kV electrical substation “Blyzhni Kamyshi”, Feodosia, Crimea, 1st Separate Center, USF
🔥110 kV electrical substation “Hlibivka”, Vnukove, Crimea, 9th Battalion “Kairos”, 414th USF Brigade “Magyar’s Birds”
🔥110 kV electrical substation “Koktebel”, Shchebetivka, Crimea, 413th Separate Regiment, USF “Raid”
🔥110 kV electrical substation “Berehove”, Molochne, Crimea, 427th USF Brigade “Raroh”
🔥110 kV electrical substation “Sudak”, Sudak, Crimea, 413th Separate Regiment, USF “Raid”
🔥110/10 kV electrical substation “Yalta”, Yalta, Crimea, 413th Separate Regiment, USF “Raid”
🔥Electrical substation, Kremenivka, Donetsk Oblast, 3rd Battalion, 414th USF Brigade “Magyar’s Birds”
🔥Electrical substation, Druzhba, Donetsk Oblast, 20th USF Brigade “K-2”
We will stand.
Moscow will fall.
Crimea will be fed back up and rebuilt.
USF online scoreboard “PIDRAKHUYKA”
sbs-group.army/
MAGYAR🇺🇦
24.07.26

Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2080618207472209920%2Fimg%2Fen5-TcQzmL_m47Dr.jpg

— https://twitter.com/414magyarbirds/status/2080621383336308845#m
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@clement_molin
Comparaison avec les frappes russes sur les infrastructures électriques ukrainiennes dans le secteur Krivi Rih - Dnipro - Zaporijjia cette année.

La majorité de ces frappes sont réalisées avec des drones Geran, sauf à proximité du front ou des drones FPV à fibre optique sont utilisés.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHN_44VaWMAA6pc8.jpg
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@clement_molin
Point de vue très intéressant. A la fin de la guerre (si elle arrive), la Russie sera une puissance militaire terrestre bien plus avancée que celle de 2022.

Cette réorganisation des unités avec l'expansion des compagnies de drones et de guerre électronique en bataillon et la réduction des bataillons blindés et d'artillerie permettra a terme de créer de nombreuses nouvelles unités, avec comme ligne de mire une prochaine mobilisation.

Très clairement, ce plan vise à étendre l'armée russe d'ici 2030, avec en parallèle des investissements massifs dans les drones, le développement du Geran-4 drone-jet et la production accélérée de missiles. Cela laisse deux angles morts, l'armée de l'air (déjà renforcée avant la guerre et qui ne voit pas une réelle hausse de ses capacités et la Marine, globalement mise de côté.

La production de vehicles blindés et de chars permettra en partie de combler les pertes et d'équiper de nouvelles unités, en sachant que ces moyens sont mis de côté depuis plus d'un an. L'artillerie moderne n'est pas une priorite russe, elle qui compte encore de nombreux obusiers soviétiques.

En fin de compte, si l'armée russe veut gagner en Ukraine, elle doit presque doubler ses forces et sa production pour élargir le front jusqu'à la frontière biélorusse et profiter du manque d'hommes côté ukrainien pour éparpiller les forces. C'est la seule manière réaliste de gagner, mais l'organisation d'une telle armée prendrait du temps et coûterait énormément alors que l'économie russe n'est pas garantie de suivre cet effort de guerre.

Cet effort de guerre focalisé sur l'Ukraine pourrait avoir un autre but dès la fin de la guerre. Pendant ce temps, en Europe et en France, on débat encore régulièrement pour savoir si c'est vraiment équitable de faire intervenir les drones lors des exercices militaires...

Dmytro Putiata (@kriegsforscherD)

The Russian army is in the process of a powerful transformation. In many ways, it even surpasses the changes in the structure of the Ukrainian army. The vision of the Russian command of its army with integrated drones in its CAAs is in many respects more logical and complementary than the Ukrainian approach.

By 2030, the Russian army will be a significantly more serious adversary than it was before.

From recent changes in one of the Russian air defense systems (I am not ready to say that I fully agree with those changes, and I will leave the conclusions to you, but I understand why this is happening):

- in some brigades, a tank battalion is being reduced to a tank company (in my opinion, this is related to the upcoming mobilization and the need for heavy equipment for new units);
- in the brigade, the electronic warfare company is being reformatted into an electronic warfare battalion;
- the UAS company is being reformatted into a UAS battalion under brigade command;
- at the level of artillery units, the number of soldiers in the artillery crew continues to be reduced, and even 1/3 of the artillery batteries in the battalion are being reduced. Soldiers will be sent to counter-UAV units to protect artillery positions.

Typical artillery position of a Russian army that will be covered by:

- observation post with a machine gun with thermal vision;
- EW;
- strong fortifications;
- FPV interceptors that will cover the area where Russian command placed their artillery
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHN-2s-PXcAE-_qg.jpg

— https://twitter.com/kriegsforscherD/status/2080582442688053561#m
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@clement_molin
Year 5 of the Russian 🇷🇺 invasion of Ukraine 🇺🇦, let's check how the NATO countries bordering Russia/Belarus are fortifying :

POLAND 🇵🇱 : Despite many announcements and many videos of fortification work ongoing, only a very small part of the border with Kaliningrad is being covered, inadequately by fortifications.

The fortifications are situated directly on the border, comprising a discontinuous anti-tank ditch (which stops at forest lines) and one or two rows of dragon's teeth, also discontinuous. Fortifications are present in only four zones, the largest spanning 2 km (out of a total border length of 210 km with Russia only). There is no depth to the defenses; where bunkers or trenches do exist, they are located in open fields, and the vast majority of the border, including key roads, remains unprepared. A notable absence of barbed wire is also evident.

Along the Belarusian border, particularly in open areas, only anti-migrant barriers are visible, with minimal reinforcement currently underway. A major weakness is the lack of defensive lines covering the strategic Suwalki Gap. That said, fortification work is in progress, alongside national-level efforts and heightened border surveillance. Based on observations of fortifications in the Caucasus, Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine, the current methodology appears flawed. If requested, I could do a map of supposed future fortifications that I believe would be effective.

LITHUANIA 🇱🇹 : The country most at risk, due to its border with Kaliningrad, the Suwalki Gap, and its long border with Belarus, is paradoxically the one that has fortified the least. I found no defensive structures, despite the existence of an official roadmap. I also noted a lack of road coverage. Nevertheless, significant work is underway to build road infrastructure leading to remote areas along the eastern border; hopefully, fortifications will follow soon.

LATVIA 🇱🇻 : Lithuania, which possesses the greatest strategic depth and significant natural borders featuring extensive forests, is further ahead than its two neighbors. The country has already begun installing dragon's teeth and continues clearing the border area with the aim of establishing a defensive line. As with the others, however, the same problems persist.

ESTONIA 🇪🇪 : Estonia's level of fortification remains very low at present, despite a persistent threat, particularly regarding Narva. While lakes offer protection, they can also be exploited to infiltrate the lines. As with Lithuania, work has not yet begun.

FINLAND 🇫🇮 : Despite having only recently joined NATO, Finland has carried out impressive defensive preparations. While I have not yet spotted any fortifications (satellite imagery is not updated in real time, and the border is long), the construction of infrastructure and the preparation of barriers along the entire border are quite impressive.

NORWAY 🇳🇴: Nothing particular to see

General summary:

I do not believe the threat is direct and immediate, yet the future is uncertain, and guarantees of peace are not always honored. Constructing fortifications adds a further safeguard for one's independence and facilitates defense in the event of an attack. The Suwalki Gap is a critical area, and its protection is essential. Furthermore, it is important to protect critical infrastructure, such as bridges, oil depots, military bases, ports, electrical substations, railway stations, and airports, against sabotage and potential strikes.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOBspWBWEAAznU4.jpg
Clément Molin (@clement_molin)

Last time I checked, fortifications covered less than 1% of Polish 🇵🇱 borders.

The way they are digging is in fact similar to how Ukraine dug in 2023-2024, which lead to difficult situations.

The direction is the good one, but there is a lot to learn from the Ukrainian example and errors and the pace is very[...]