@clement_molin
Après avoir terminé les fortifications dans l'est et le sud du pays, l'armée ukrainienne 🇺🇦 renforce désormais des directions secondaires, notamment le nord du pays.

S'il n'y a pas de menace actuelle pour les oblasts de Kyiv ou Tchernihiv, les zones frontalières sont actuellement en plein processus de fortification. Dans la direction de Tchernobyl, les ukrainiens préparent une troisième ligne de défense, tandis qu'ils renforcent les défenses de Chernihiv, au nord-est de Kyiv.

Dans les prochaines semaines, une ligne continue entre Zaporijia, Kramatorsk, Izium, Kharkiv, Soumy et Chernihiv sera complété. Ces défenses sont une garantie future, alors que le conflit se concentre sur un front de 550 km entre Zaporijia et Koupiansk ou 680 km entre Zaporijia et Kharkiv.
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@clement_molin
The Sudanese Armed Forces 🇸🇩 secured their biggest victory in a year and a half today, reopening the strategic route between the capital, Khartoum, and El Obeid.

The Rapid Support Forces, backed and armed by the UAE, have been pushed back.

🧵THREAD🧵1/8 ⬇️
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@clement_molin
Why does this victory matters ?

-The army now controls two supply routes to El Obeid.
-Despite the continuous influx of money, mercenaries, and weapons supplied by the UAE, the RSF are no longer able to advance.
-It is Turkey and Egypt that are securing an indirect military victory; notably, Turkey had supplied a large number of drones to the SAF.

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@clement_molin
Barring any surprises, I find it hard to imagine the Sudanese army pushing deep into Kordofan and then Darfur to strike the RSF's rear lines.

The ongoing war of attrition in Kordofan—marked notably by increased drone use—is likely to continue, with the army potentially capitalizing on the current offensive towards En Nahud. We will see.
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@clement_molin
I mapped 160 Ukrainian 🇺🇦 gas station that have recently been hit across Ukraine.

At least 15 have been hit in Zaporizhzhia, 19 in Sumy and 23 in Kharkiv. Russia remains unable to replicate Ukraine's mid-range campaign against trucks (less than 100 trucks hit since May, at least 20 km and more from the frontline).

Thus, they are targeting gas stations, with focus on key roads, mainly Kyiv-Kharkiv, Dnipro-Kharkiv and in the north-eastern part of the country. During my trip to Zaporizhzhia last week, I saw only 4 gas stations hit on the road leading to Dnipro, with most of the ones in the city starting to be covered by anti-drone nets.

The main Ukrainian challenge here is the organised campaign to cut logistics by strikes on gas station, especially for trucks. Any car can easily go into a city nearby to find gas, but a truck will face much more difficulties.
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Fabrice Deprez (@fabrice_deprez)

Every single gas station on the 100km of highway between Poltava and Kharkiv has been destroyed, acc to a deputy of the Kharkiv city council. Russian started targeting them last month, and has reportedly destroyed more than 200 in frontline regions espreso.tv/viyna-z-rosiyeyu-…
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Всі АЗС від Харкова до Полтави повністю знищені, - депутат Харківської облради Скорик
На Харківщині знищено понад 80 автозаправних станцій, а маршрут Харків – Полтава на сьогодні залишився без жодної діючої АЗС 27 липня, 2026
espreso.tv

— https://twitter.com/fabrice_deprez/status/2081690992650981690#m
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@clement_molin
For the past six months, the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 army has been on the offensive along a 50-kilometer-wide front, gradually retaking villages lost the previous year.

With no official statements and very few videos available, little is known about this "offensive." I have therefore gathered as much information as possible to discuss it.

In 2025, the Russian army doubled its rate of advance compared to 2024. Yet, it was not in the Donbas that they were advancing the most. Very early in the year, they seized Velyka Novosilka and pushed north toward Komar and west toward Huliaipole. By the year's end, the situation for Ukraine was critical: defensive lines facing south had been overrun from the east, and the Russian army was steadily closing in on Zaporizhzhia, a city of 800,000 inhabitants.

After the capture of Huliaipole, everyone expected Pokrovsk'e, Ternuvate (already infiltrated at the time), and then Orikhiv to fall, placing the Russian army at the gates of Zaporizhzhia by the end of the year. Yet, seven months later, the situation remained unchanged; the Russians are still stalled west of Huliaipole. Worse, they have lost significant territory further north, bringing a halt to this offensive, which, while secondary to the main Donbas campaign, had nonetheless committed a massive force, including five armies and an army corps.

🔸So, what happened?

It began in February, when several air-assault brigades repositioned to the region, launched an armored assault under cover of fog, deploying their infantry into contested villages, often behind the initial Russian infiltrators. The villages were methodically cleared, and Ukrainian soldiers began infiltrating southward themselves. In March, they were positioned east and west of Uspenivka, blocking Russian attempts to advance toward Pokrovske and Ternuvate.

In response to this offensive, the Russian army sends several naval infantry brigades and divisions, as well as the 68th Army Corps, as reinforcements.

Starting in April, air assault brigades repositioned further north with the mission of advancing on Komar. The goal of this redeployment was to prevent the 90th Tank Division from shifting its assets toward Dobropilla. There was no mechanized offensive this time, as the terrain, specifically the presence of several rivers, most notably the Vovtcha, precluded it. Instead, small Ukrainian infantry groups managed to gradually infiltrate as far as the next river, the Mokri Yali. It is important to understand that, despite having been in the area for at least eight months, Russian forces had been unable to consolidate their positions; a network of rivers complicated logistics, and the small size of the villages made it impossible to concentrate large numbers of troops.

Consequently, the Ukrainians were able to advance relatively stealthily behind enemy lines, reaching the Mokri Yali River. A strict information blackout was imposed in the area. Apart from a single video (since deleted) showing Ukrainian troops raising a flag over a liberated village, the Ukrainians released nothing regarding an operation that had already been underway for three months. For their part, the Russians continued to obscure the situation: the Vostok Group released only videos that were difficult to geolocate and persisted in sending "suicide" flag-bearers troops, who would reach Iskra and raise the Russian flag, creating an illusion of control.

On the map, I have roughly depicted the situation as it has stood over the last few weeks, relying primarily on a handful of geolocated videos, satellite imagery showing air and artillery strikes, and scattered social media statements. Simply put, little is known about the actual state of the front, other than the fact that Ukrainian forces are at the gates of Komar, a move that has forced the 90th Tank Division to keep half its strength committed to that sector.

What I am certain of is that all Russian troops positioned n[...]

orth of the Vovcha River (in Ivanivka) or the Solena (in Novopavlivka) have either been killed or captured, judging by the number of Russian air strikes, at least a hundred, carried out in the area. Consequently, the section of the "New Donbass Line" in this sector has held for the tenth consecutive month. It is certain that the Ukrainians have retaken control of the few villages to the south, given the air strikes observed in the zone. For the time being, I will respect Ukrainian OPSEC protocols and refrain from providing further details regarding an ongoing operation, as long as more confirmation are not coming.

🔸You might be wondering how such an operation is structured.

The Ukrainians are making extensive use of drones to establish a wide exclusion zone in the sector, extending particularly along the river as far as Velyka Novosilka. The operation is proceeding cautiously, with small infantry teams advancing gradually, supported by artillery positioned in the woods to the west and occasional Ukrainian air strikes on Russian drone operator positions in Komar.

Overall, it is important to understand that this operation is taking place because the Russian army is unable to bring reinforcements to the front. Furthermore, anti-tank ditches prevent any Russian mechanized or motorized assault aimed at delivering reinforcements. To understand the disarray within the local command, one need only look at its use of air power. Air strikes are being carried out daily deep behind the lines, as far as Prossiana and Chaplyne, 35 to 40 km from the front. While the goal is to hinder the Ukrainian presence, these strikes primarily highlight the ineffectiveness of Russian drones in the sector, particularly the Molniya models.

To conclude, this operation not only gained time for Ukraine to further fortify the Pavlohrad direction, it is a direct push in the foot of Russian forces, which can continue further this summer and later in the autumn. I'll continue to monitor this and wait for more official informations regarding the situation here.

Thank you for reading !
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@MVC_Dimamir
Ну а поки @Playfra0 катався десь у західній Україні, я тут потрохи готував вам мапу російських укріплень у Криму та Херсонської області.

Але скільки ти їх не малюй, стільки часу в мене немає щоб намалювати повну мапу, тому тримайте якось так 🥲

1/🧵
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@clement_molin
60 commentaires plus tard, personne n'a été capable de me donner des preuves du contrôle total de la ville de Kostiantynivka par l'armée russe.

Quand des analystes répètent que la ville est tombée, sans donner de sources, demandez ce qu'ils font de 95 positions ukrainiennes prouvées dans la ville sur les 40 derniers jours, dont 26 les 10 derniers jours.

Beaucoup de commentaires me renvoient à d'autres cartographes, me disant "eux l'ont dit". Quand on cherche un peu, ces cartographes suivent tous +/- la même ligne, qui cartographie une zone comme russe au moindre drapeau russe mais omet volontairement des frappes russes sur des positions ukrainiennes dans des dizaines d'immeubles dans toute la ville.

Donc je réitère, Kostiantynivka n'est pas tombée, les ukrainiens et les russes sont présents dans presque toute la ville et les combats continuent. Une fois de plus, un analyste sérieux qui expliquerai que la ville est tombée, sans prouver que mon raisonnement est faux n'est pas un analyste sérieux...

Clément Molin (@clement_molin)

Who controls Kostiantynivka 🇷🇺/🇺🇦 ?

There is a very big debate to know who really controls the city of Kostiantynivka, in the Donbas region.

Many maps are showing the city as Russian controled, which in my opinion is not true, as I will explain it here.

🧵THREAD🧵1/16 ⬇️
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— https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/2081127433969819846#m
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@clement_molin
For months, the situation on the Sloviansk front has been deteriorating

The new Chief of the General Staff of the Ukrainian 🇺🇦Army, Mykhailo Drapaty, must respond as the first Russian 🇷🇺 units have reached approximately 10 km east of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

Since the fall of Siversk in December 2025, attributed to errors by several local commanders, this front has been the most successful for the Russian army throughout 2026.

Not only have Russian forces managed to consolidate their hold on Siversk, which had resisted them for three years, but they have also pushed 10 to 15 km westward, drawing significantly closer to the last major urban centers of the Donbas: Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. While a future assault on the cities from the east seems unlikely due to the terrain, this strategic position allows the Russians to monitor and bomb the urban area and its logistical supply lines.

Three weeks ago, the first Russian infiltrators were captured in Mykolaivka, a town about 10 km east of Sloviansk. Recently, Russian soldiers have been spotted in buildings on the eastern edge of the town; this could signal the imminent start of the battle for the town, which serves as the eastern gateway to Sloviansk. Russian forces are advancing on Mykolaivka along two main routes, following the Siverskyi Donets River and moving through forests via Kryva Luka, Pyskunivka, and Starodubivka, while taking cover in houses and wooded areas. Countering these infiltrations is difficult due to the dense forests along the Donets River.

The second infiltration route runs through a forest north of Rai Oleksandrivka. Russian forces have been actively using this forest for over a month to enter Rai Oleksandrivka. This small village, seemingly insignificant at first glance, is actually of strategic importance, as the surrounding high ground overlooks the city of Sloviansk. In recent weeks, Russian forces have been consolidating their hold on the village and the surrounding heights, even though Ukrainian troops still maintain positions in many areas.

Further south, the situation is hardly better. Russian forces are infiltrating daily along the Donets Canal, with some units crossing this canal, which serves as a makeshift fortification, to advance toward Kramatorsk. Several villages west of the canal have thus shifted into the "gray zone," a source of growing concern for the Ukrainian command. If these infiltrations continue, we could see the first Russian soldiers in the Bilenke district of Kramatorskbefore the end of the year.

Why is the situation so difficult for the Ukrainians? First, the geography complicates the Ukrainian defense: the Donets Canal aids the Ukrainian defense just as much as it facilitates the Russian offensive. The situation here mirrors the one described yesterday, but in reverse. Crossing the canal, reaching Mykolaivka, and massing troops there is a highly complex undertaking. The Russian army will face the same challenge: crossing the canal, particularly around the Sloviansk power plant and its network of waterways, will come at a very high cost, especially given the extensive fortifications the Ukrainians have built in the area over recent months. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that the battle for Sloviansk will begin this year, not least because the fighting in Mykolaivka is likely to be prolonged.

Another key factor is the high frequency of Russian airstrikes targeting forests and buildings, particularly in Mykolaivka, as illustrated in the map included in the following tweet.

Ultimately, Ukrainian resources in the area are insufficient - comprising only five or six brigades - though doing better is difficult given the local logistical challenges. Russian losses in the sector are significant, particularly when troops are forced to advance across open ground; nevertheless, this has not halted their steady progress this year.

In the coming weeks, attention must shift to the Do[...]

nbas, specifically the area between the Donets River and Dobropilla, where the Russian army is concentrating its forces. Elsewhere, however, potential offensive opportunities are opening up for Kyiv.

Thank you for following this new analysis. Sources include open source data, sattelite images, geolocated videos and some private sources.
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