Forwarded from Playfra - Maps & Analyses
Ukrainian engineering obstacles.
Complete Ukrainian defensive configuration in Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts. Soon on playframap.github.io.
High-resolution pictures in the comments.
Yellow: ditches
Blue: dragon's teeth
Gray: concertina wire or tripwire
*The maps shown do not in any way break OPSEC or represent sensitive data. Everything that was mapped was done using public sources, and both sides know well about what is shown in these maps.
Complete Ukrainian defensive configuration in Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts. Soon on playframap.github.io.
High-resolution pictures in the comments.
Yellow: ditches
Blue: dragon's teeth
Gray: concertina wire or tripwire
*The maps shown do not in any way break OPSEC or represent sensitive data. Everything that was mapped was done using public sources, and both sides know well about what is shown in these maps.
👍15❤3
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
In recent weeks, Russian 🇷🇺 forces have made progress on the Kharkiv front, along the border with Ukraine 🇺🇦
Supported by significant aerial preparation, including hundreds of FAB strikes, Russian forces have continued and expanded their infiltration zones in at least four directions.
Russian forces have entered Kozacha Lopan, northwest of Kharkiv, with a series of clashes occurring between Russian infiltrators and Ukrainian soldiers in recent weeks.
Following the capture of Vovchansk, Russian infiltrations are continuing south of the town, particularly within the area's extensive forests, with the aim of securing crossing points over the river that flows through the town and serves as a natural barrier.
Further east, Russian forces are crossing the border, infiltrating the forests, and then attempting to cross the same river while pushing southward. In both instances, the Russian army is attempting to reach Bilyi Kolodyaz, the Ukrainian logistics hub in the region, which has recently been subjected to intense FAB bombardment.
Finally, Russian infiltrations are continuing further east, this time towards Chorne, with the goal of threatening the Ukrainian presence further north along the border. Intense aerial preparation has also been observed in this area over the past few weeks.
I believe that in this sector, the 11th Army Corps and the 6th Combined Arms Army are executing a maneuver to widen the buffer zone along the border. A push toward Veliky Burluk or Kupiansk appears unrealistic at this stage.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOz1u6fWAAASZe-.jpg
tweet
In recent weeks, Russian 🇷🇺 forces have made progress on the Kharkiv front, along the border with Ukraine 🇺🇦
Supported by significant aerial preparation, including hundreds of FAB strikes, Russian forces have continued and expanded their infiltration zones in at least four directions.
Russian forces have entered Kozacha Lopan, northwest of Kharkiv, with a series of clashes occurring between Russian infiltrators and Ukrainian soldiers in recent weeks.
Following the capture of Vovchansk, Russian infiltrations are continuing south of the town, particularly within the area's extensive forests, with the aim of securing crossing points over the river that flows through the town and serves as a natural barrier.
Further east, Russian forces are crossing the border, infiltrating the forests, and then attempting to cross the same river while pushing southward. In both instances, the Russian army is attempting to reach Bilyi Kolodyaz, the Ukrainian logistics hub in the region, which has recently been subjected to intense FAB bombardment.
Finally, Russian infiltrations are continuing further east, this time towards Chorne, with the goal of threatening the Ukrainian presence further north along the border. Intense aerial preparation has also been observed in this area over the past few weeks.
I believe that in this sector, the 11th Army Corps and the 6th Combined Arms Army are executing a maneuver to widen the buffer zone along the border. A push toward Veliky Burluk or Kupiansk appears unrealistic at this stage.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOz1u6fWAAASZe-.jpg
tweet
👍8❤2
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
The UAE 🇦🇪 foreign policy is very interesting, especially when we look at their investment policy in Africa
In 10 years, the UAE became the 1st Gulf investor in the region. The country is also at the top positions of world direct investors, often in front of many traditional powers, depending on the different counts.
Where are they investing ?
🔹Eastern Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda...)
🔹Central Africa (DRC, Angola, Gabon...)
🔹Western Africa (Guinea, Mali, Nigeria...)
🔹Northern Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Egypt...)
What are their priorities ?
🔹Agricultural lands
🔹Ports
🔹Mining industry, in particular gold
🔹Defense (especially with RSF in Sudan)
🔹Financial investments
This strategy of financial and direct investments is making the UAE one of the most influential states in Africa, which also goes with the UAE strategy in Sudan and Ethiopia in recent years.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO0vIIvW8AAyUBz.jpg
Jack Prandelli (@jackprandelli)
🚨🌍 The UAE has become the Gulf's dominant investor in Africa.
This chart shows a remarkable shift over the past decade.
🇦🇪 The UAE now accounts for the vast majority of Gulf foreign direct investment in Africa, overtaking Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain combined.
This isn't just about capital.
It is a long-term strategy built around:
⚓ Ports and logistics
🛢️ Energy and critical minerals
🌾 Food security
🏗️ Infrastructure and industrial zones
The result is a growing network stretching from the Red Sea to the Atlantic, giving the UAE increasing influence over some of the world's most important trade and energy corridors.
The UAE is positioning itself at the center of future global trade flows.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOvL3oSXEAAtH_0.png
— https://twitter.com/jackprandelli/status/2083983514039459842#m
tweet
The UAE 🇦🇪 foreign policy is very interesting, especially when we look at their investment policy in Africa
In 10 years, the UAE became the 1st Gulf investor in the region. The country is also at the top positions of world direct investors, often in front of many traditional powers, depending on the different counts.
Where are they investing ?
🔹Eastern Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda...)
🔹Central Africa (DRC, Angola, Gabon...)
🔹Western Africa (Guinea, Mali, Nigeria...)
🔹Northern Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Egypt...)
What are their priorities ?
🔹Agricultural lands
🔹Ports
🔹Mining industry, in particular gold
🔹Defense (especially with RSF in Sudan)
🔹Financial investments
This strategy of financial and direct investments is making the UAE one of the most influential states in Africa, which also goes with the UAE strategy in Sudan and Ethiopia in recent years.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO0vIIvW8AAyUBz.jpg
Jack Prandelli (@jackprandelli)
🚨🌍 The UAE has become the Gulf's dominant investor in Africa.
This chart shows a remarkable shift over the past decade.
🇦🇪 The UAE now accounts for the vast majority of Gulf foreign direct investment in Africa, overtaking Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain combined.
This isn't just about capital.
It is a long-term strategy built around:
⚓ Ports and logistics
🛢️ Energy and critical minerals
🌾 Food security
🏗️ Infrastructure and industrial zones
The result is a growing network stretching from the Red Sea to the Atlantic, giving the UAE increasing influence over some of the world's most important trade and energy corridors.
The UAE is positioning itself at the center of future global trade flows.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOvL3oSXEAAtH_0.png
— https://twitter.com/jackprandelli/status/2083983514039459842#m
tweet
❤8😱1
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
People are having a hard time understanding what's the difference between a fiber optic FPV drone and a Fixed Wings long range drone.
The Fiber Optic FPV is directly controled by an operator, it cannot be jammed, it is entirely clear the human salary in Kherson (civilians getting killed and injured everyday by FPV drones) is directly orchestrated by Russia to terrorize and kill civilians.
On the other hand, a Fixed Wings UAV, especially long range ones, are not often operator controled and can be jammed. The tragic beach killing in Russia doesn't seem to be a direct attack, there is air-defense working + jammers and the drone appears to be falling.
There is no way you can compare a deliberate attack on a civilian 10 km from the frontline to an accidental event 400 km from the frontline. Moreover, these events appear daily on both sides, with both FP-1/Lyuty and Geran drones ending on appartment building, because they were jammed, downed or simply didn't take into account some buildings in their flight path.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO5h1lwXwAAHUWX.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO5h17mWcAAUZe9.jpg
tweet
People are having a hard time understanding what's the difference between a fiber optic FPV drone and a Fixed Wings long range drone.
The Fiber Optic FPV is directly controled by an operator, it cannot be jammed, it is entirely clear the human salary in Kherson (civilians getting killed and injured everyday by FPV drones) is directly orchestrated by Russia to terrorize and kill civilians.
On the other hand, a Fixed Wings UAV, especially long range ones, are not often operator controled and can be jammed. The tragic beach killing in Russia doesn't seem to be a direct attack, there is air-defense working + jammers and the drone appears to be falling.
There is no way you can compare a deliberate attack on a civilian 10 km from the frontline to an accidental event 400 km from the frontline. Moreover, these events appear daily on both sides, with both FP-1/Lyuty and Geran drones ending on appartment building, because they were jammed, downed or simply didn't take into account some buildings in their flight path.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO5h1lwXwAAHUWX.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO5h17mWcAAUZe9.jpg
tweet
💯18❤2💩1
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
These numbers are completly made up and far from the reality
I mapped around 40 to 50% of monthly reported airstrikes since march 2026. So, I have clear estimations relying on real data.
Nowadays, around 1 KAB out of two is falling in an open terrain (a field), depending on the direction. On some directions, the "precision" is 10% (meaning all other KABs missed their potential target), while on some directions, we reach 80 to 90% precision.
From these, I believe 10 to 20% of the KABs (which are hitting something) are really falling on a real target. I've seen example of 50 KABs on a single treeline or 200 on a single forest. There is no way there are 50 positions in a treeline, there are maximum 3, and most are not occupied. When falling on cities, KABs can destroy buildings, but soldiers are most of the time in the basements, so unless the buildings collapse (not often on soviet buildings), they remain unharmed.
With the 50% precision (falling on a treeline, a forest, a city, a village...), 10% of those may in fact hit a position. This means we can estimate around 5% of all KABs are really hitting something, which does not mean there are soldiers inside and which does not mean the soldiers are harmed. Thus, we can estimate that up to 450 KABs are indeed falling on real positions every month (based on July), while at least 1 000 more fall nearby (cities, field, other part of the treeline and can also kill our wound soldiers.
We already know drones are doing the highest number of casualties, making up some numbers with KABs is not reliable.
Don't mistaken me, I'm not saying there are no casualties from KABs, this is one of the most important problem right now for Ukraine. We can estimate up to 2 000 casualties every month because of those, including dead and wounded. Also, there is a big difference between KAB 250 and KAB 1 500, as well as between a strike 5km to the frontline and one 20km.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO9R3OjXsAICeYW.png
AMK Mapping 🇳🇿 (@AMK_Mapping_)
The Ukrainian General Staff reports that Russia launched a record 8,300+ glide-bombs during July - an average of 268 per day.
If kept up at a monthly rate, Russia would be launching 100,000 glide-bombs per year.
Let's say, hypothetically, that each of these glide-bombs kills one Ukrainian soldier and injures 2 others on average, which would be the bare minimum for such large munitions. That would be an average of 804 casualties per day, or 293,000 per year - just from glide-bombs. You can see that the casualties add up very quickly.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO8BUo6acAAz_Hl.png
— https://twitter.com/AMK_Mapping_/status/2084887456017707192#m
tweet
These numbers are completly made up and far from the reality
I mapped around 40 to 50% of monthly reported airstrikes since march 2026. So, I have clear estimations relying on real data.
Nowadays, around 1 KAB out of two is falling in an open terrain (a field), depending on the direction. On some directions, the "precision" is 10% (meaning all other KABs missed their potential target), while on some directions, we reach 80 to 90% precision.
From these, I believe 10 to 20% of the KABs (which are hitting something) are really falling on a real target. I've seen example of 50 KABs on a single treeline or 200 on a single forest. There is no way there are 50 positions in a treeline, there are maximum 3, and most are not occupied. When falling on cities, KABs can destroy buildings, but soldiers are most of the time in the basements, so unless the buildings collapse (not often on soviet buildings), they remain unharmed.
With the 50% precision (falling on a treeline, a forest, a city, a village...), 10% of those may in fact hit a position. This means we can estimate around 5% of all KABs are really hitting something, which does not mean there are soldiers inside and which does not mean the soldiers are harmed. Thus, we can estimate that up to 450 KABs are indeed falling on real positions every month (based on July), while at least 1 000 more fall nearby (cities, field, other part of the treeline and can also kill our wound soldiers.
We already know drones are doing the highest number of casualties, making up some numbers with KABs is not reliable.
Don't mistaken me, I'm not saying there are no casualties from KABs, this is one of the most important problem right now for Ukraine. We can estimate up to 2 000 casualties every month because of those, including dead and wounded. Also, there is a big difference between KAB 250 and KAB 1 500, as well as between a strike 5km to the frontline and one 20km.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO9R3OjXsAICeYW.png
AMK Mapping 🇳🇿 (@AMK_Mapping_)
The Ukrainian General Staff reports that Russia launched a record 8,300+ glide-bombs during July - an average of 268 per day.
If kept up at a monthly rate, Russia would be launching 100,000 glide-bombs per year.
Let's say, hypothetically, that each of these glide-bombs kills one Ukrainian soldier and injures 2 others on average, which would be the bare minimum for such large munitions. That would be an average of 804 casualties per day, or 293,000 per year - just from glide-bombs. You can see that the casualties add up very quickly.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO8BUo6acAAz_Hl.png
— https://twitter.com/AMK_Mapping_/status/2084887456017707192#m
tweet
👍16❤3👎1😢1
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
En termes d'OPSEC, je crois qu'on a rarement vu pire que les russes 🇷🇺
On a vu les ukrainiens qui filmaient les Patriots en action, les nombreuses vidéos du Moyen-Orient, mais alors la Russie, c'est à un autre niveau !
En termes de BDA, en 5 minutes sur TikTok, on peut retracer l'ensemble des frappes sur un même lieu, avec 30 angles différents et des vidéos qui permettent de visionner aisément le résultat des frappes.
Évidemment, je dis ça, mais je ne fais absolument aucune confiance aux français pour faire mieux, ça serait 100 fois pire, on aurait des centaines de vidéos d'un même évènement sur X, TikTok, Snapchat.
Dans le cas russe, c'est évidemment un problème, puisque des comptes comme Exilenova/Supernova vont pouvoir récupérer des centaines de vidéos, qui seront réutilisées par le renseignement ukrainien. On observe la même chose sur les routes logistiques, dans les unités elles-mêmes…
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2085088353527922689%2Fimg%2FcrKewQ37jy9k2mBI.jpg
tweet
En termes d'OPSEC, je crois qu'on a rarement vu pire que les russes 🇷🇺
On a vu les ukrainiens qui filmaient les Patriots en action, les nombreuses vidéos du Moyen-Orient, mais alors la Russie, c'est à un autre niveau !
En termes de BDA, en 5 minutes sur TikTok, on peut retracer l'ensemble des frappes sur un même lieu, avec 30 angles différents et des vidéos qui permettent de visionner aisément le résultat des frappes.
Évidemment, je dis ça, mais je ne fais absolument aucune confiance aux français pour faire mieux, ça serait 100 fois pire, on aurait des centaines de vidéos d'un même évènement sur X, TikTok, Snapchat.
Dans le cas russe, c'est évidemment un problème, puisque des comptes comme Exilenova/Supernova vont pouvoir récupérer des centaines de vidéos, qui seront réutilisées par le renseignement ukrainien. On observe la même chose sur les routes logistiques, dans les unités elles-mêmes…
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2085088353527922689%2Fimg%2FcrKewQ37jy9k2mBI.jpg
tweet
❤8👍2