Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
The UAE 🇦🇪 foreign policy is very interesting, especially when we look at their investment policy in Africa
In 10 years, the UAE became the 1st Gulf investor in the region. The country is also at the top positions of world direct investors, often in front of many traditional powers, depending on the different counts.
Where are they investing ?
🔹Eastern Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda...)
🔹Central Africa (DRC, Angola, Gabon...)
🔹Western Africa (Guinea, Mali, Nigeria...)
🔹Northern Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Egypt...)
What are their priorities ?
🔹Agricultural lands
🔹Ports
🔹Mining industry, in particular gold
🔹Defense (especially with RSF in Sudan)
🔹Financial investments
This strategy of financial and direct investments is making the UAE one of the most influential states in Africa, which also goes with the UAE strategy in Sudan and Ethiopia in recent years.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO0vIIvW8AAyUBz.jpg
Jack Prandelli (@jackprandelli)
🚨🌍 The UAE has become the Gulf's dominant investor in Africa.
This chart shows a remarkable shift over the past decade.
🇦🇪 The UAE now accounts for the vast majority of Gulf foreign direct investment in Africa, overtaking Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain combined.
This isn't just about capital.
It is a long-term strategy built around:
⚓ Ports and logistics
🛢️ Energy and critical minerals
🌾 Food security
🏗️ Infrastructure and industrial zones
The result is a growing network stretching from the Red Sea to the Atlantic, giving the UAE increasing influence over some of the world's most important trade and energy corridors.
The UAE is positioning itself at the center of future global trade flows.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOvL3oSXEAAtH_0.png
— https://twitter.com/jackprandelli/status/2083983514039459842#m
tweet
The UAE 🇦🇪 foreign policy is very interesting, especially when we look at their investment policy in Africa
In 10 years, the UAE became the 1st Gulf investor in the region. The country is also at the top positions of world direct investors, often in front of many traditional powers, depending on the different counts.
Where are they investing ?
🔹Eastern Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda...)
🔹Central Africa (DRC, Angola, Gabon...)
🔹Western Africa (Guinea, Mali, Nigeria...)
🔹Northern Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Egypt...)
What are their priorities ?
🔹Agricultural lands
🔹Ports
🔹Mining industry, in particular gold
🔹Defense (especially with RSF in Sudan)
🔹Financial investments
This strategy of financial and direct investments is making the UAE one of the most influential states in Africa, which also goes with the UAE strategy in Sudan and Ethiopia in recent years.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO0vIIvW8AAyUBz.jpg
Jack Prandelli (@jackprandelli)
🚨🌍 The UAE has become the Gulf's dominant investor in Africa.
This chart shows a remarkable shift over the past decade.
🇦🇪 The UAE now accounts for the vast majority of Gulf foreign direct investment in Africa, overtaking Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain combined.
This isn't just about capital.
It is a long-term strategy built around:
⚓ Ports and logistics
🛢️ Energy and critical minerals
🌾 Food security
🏗️ Infrastructure and industrial zones
The result is a growing network stretching from the Red Sea to the Atlantic, giving the UAE increasing influence over some of the world's most important trade and energy corridors.
The UAE is positioning itself at the center of future global trade flows.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOvL3oSXEAAtH_0.png
— https://twitter.com/jackprandelli/status/2083983514039459842#m
tweet
❤8😱1
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
People are having a hard time understanding what's the difference between a fiber optic FPV drone and a Fixed Wings long range drone.
The Fiber Optic FPV is directly controled by an operator, it cannot be jammed, it is entirely clear the human salary in Kherson (civilians getting killed and injured everyday by FPV drones) is directly orchestrated by Russia to terrorize and kill civilians.
On the other hand, a Fixed Wings UAV, especially long range ones, are not often operator controled and can be jammed. The tragic beach killing in Russia doesn't seem to be a direct attack, there is air-defense working + jammers and the drone appears to be falling.
There is no way you can compare a deliberate attack on a civilian 10 km from the frontline to an accidental event 400 km from the frontline. Moreover, these events appear daily on both sides, with both FP-1/Lyuty and Geran drones ending on appartment building, because they were jammed, downed or simply didn't take into account some buildings in their flight path.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO5h1lwXwAAHUWX.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO5h17mWcAAUZe9.jpg
tweet
People are having a hard time understanding what's the difference between a fiber optic FPV drone and a Fixed Wings long range drone.
The Fiber Optic FPV is directly controled by an operator, it cannot be jammed, it is entirely clear the human salary in Kherson (civilians getting killed and injured everyday by FPV drones) is directly orchestrated by Russia to terrorize and kill civilians.
On the other hand, a Fixed Wings UAV, especially long range ones, are not often operator controled and can be jammed. The tragic beach killing in Russia doesn't seem to be a direct attack, there is air-defense working + jammers and the drone appears to be falling.
There is no way you can compare a deliberate attack on a civilian 10 km from the frontline to an accidental event 400 km from the frontline. Moreover, these events appear daily on both sides, with both FP-1/Lyuty and Geran drones ending on appartment building, because they were jammed, downed or simply didn't take into account some buildings in their flight path.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO5h1lwXwAAHUWX.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO5h17mWcAAUZe9.jpg
tweet
💯18❤2💩1
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
These numbers are completly made up and far from the reality
I mapped around 40 to 50% of monthly reported airstrikes since march 2026. So, I have clear estimations relying on real data.
Nowadays, around 1 KAB out of two is falling in an open terrain (a field), depending on the direction. On some directions, the "precision" is 10% (meaning all other KABs missed their potential target), while on some directions, we reach 80 to 90% precision.
From these, I believe 10 to 20% of the KABs (which are hitting something) are really falling on a real target. I've seen example of 50 KABs on a single treeline or 200 on a single forest. There is no way there are 50 positions in a treeline, there are maximum 3, and most are not occupied. When falling on cities, KABs can destroy buildings, but soldiers are most of the time in the basements, so unless the buildings collapse (not often on soviet buildings), they remain unharmed.
With the 50% precision (falling on a treeline, a forest, a city, a village...), 10% of those may in fact hit a position. This means we can estimate around 5% of all KABs are really hitting something, which does not mean there are soldiers inside and which does not mean the soldiers are harmed. Thus, we can estimate that up to 450 KABs are indeed falling on real positions every month (based on July), while at least 1 000 more fall nearby (cities, field, other part of the treeline and can also kill our wound soldiers.
We already know drones are doing the highest number of casualties, making up some numbers with KABs is not reliable.
Don't mistaken me, I'm not saying there are no casualties from KABs, this is one of the most important problem right now for Ukraine. We can estimate up to 2 000 casualties every month because of those, including dead and wounded. Also, there is a big difference between KAB 250 and KAB 1 500, as well as between a strike 5km to the frontline and one 20km.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO9R3OjXsAICeYW.png
AMK Mapping 🇳🇿 (@AMK_Mapping_)
The Ukrainian General Staff reports that Russia launched a record 8,300+ glide-bombs during July - an average of 268 per day.
If kept up at a monthly rate, Russia would be launching 100,000 glide-bombs per year.
Let's say, hypothetically, that each of these glide-bombs kills one Ukrainian soldier and injures 2 others on average, which would be the bare minimum for such large munitions. That would be an average of 804 casualties per day, or 293,000 per year - just from glide-bombs. You can see that the casualties add up very quickly.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO8BUo6acAAz_Hl.png
— https://twitter.com/AMK_Mapping_/status/2084887456017707192#m
tweet
These numbers are completly made up and far from the reality
I mapped around 40 to 50% of monthly reported airstrikes since march 2026. So, I have clear estimations relying on real data.
Nowadays, around 1 KAB out of two is falling in an open terrain (a field), depending on the direction. On some directions, the "precision" is 10% (meaning all other KABs missed their potential target), while on some directions, we reach 80 to 90% precision.
From these, I believe 10 to 20% of the KABs (which are hitting something) are really falling on a real target. I've seen example of 50 KABs on a single treeline or 200 on a single forest. There is no way there are 50 positions in a treeline, there are maximum 3, and most are not occupied. When falling on cities, KABs can destroy buildings, but soldiers are most of the time in the basements, so unless the buildings collapse (not often on soviet buildings), they remain unharmed.
With the 50% precision (falling on a treeline, a forest, a city, a village...), 10% of those may in fact hit a position. This means we can estimate around 5% of all KABs are really hitting something, which does not mean there are soldiers inside and which does not mean the soldiers are harmed. Thus, we can estimate that up to 450 KABs are indeed falling on real positions every month (based on July), while at least 1 000 more fall nearby (cities, field, other part of the treeline and can also kill our wound soldiers.
We already know drones are doing the highest number of casualties, making up some numbers with KABs is not reliable.
Don't mistaken me, I'm not saying there are no casualties from KABs, this is one of the most important problem right now for Ukraine. We can estimate up to 2 000 casualties every month because of those, including dead and wounded. Also, there is a big difference between KAB 250 and KAB 1 500, as well as between a strike 5km to the frontline and one 20km.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO9R3OjXsAICeYW.png
AMK Mapping 🇳🇿 (@AMK_Mapping_)
The Ukrainian General Staff reports that Russia launched a record 8,300+ glide-bombs during July - an average of 268 per day.
If kept up at a monthly rate, Russia would be launching 100,000 glide-bombs per year.
Let's say, hypothetically, that each of these glide-bombs kills one Ukrainian soldier and injures 2 others on average, which would be the bare minimum for such large munitions. That would be an average of 804 casualties per day, or 293,000 per year - just from glide-bombs. You can see that the casualties add up very quickly.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHO8BUo6acAAz_Hl.png
— https://twitter.com/AMK_Mapping_/status/2084887456017707192#m
tweet
👍16❤3👎1😢1
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
En termes d'OPSEC, je crois qu'on a rarement vu pire que les russes 🇷🇺
On a vu les ukrainiens qui filmaient les Patriots en action, les nombreuses vidéos du Moyen-Orient, mais alors la Russie, c'est à un autre niveau !
En termes de BDA, en 5 minutes sur TikTok, on peut retracer l'ensemble des frappes sur un même lieu, avec 30 angles différents et des vidéos qui permettent de visionner aisément le résultat des frappes.
Évidemment, je dis ça, mais je ne fais absolument aucune confiance aux français pour faire mieux, ça serait 100 fois pire, on aurait des centaines de vidéos d'un même évènement sur X, TikTok, Snapchat.
Dans le cas russe, c'est évidemment un problème, puisque des comptes comme Exilenova/Supernova vont pouvoir récupérer des centaines de vidéos, qui seront réutilisées par le renseignement ukrainien. On observe la même chose sur les routes logistiques, dans les unités elles-mêmes…
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2085088353527922689%2Fimg%2FcrKewQ37jy9k2mBI.jpg
tweet
En termes d'OPSEC, je crois qu'on a rarement vu pire que les russes 🇷🇺
On a vu les ukrainiens qui filmaient les Patriots en action, les nombreuses vidéos du Moyen-Orient, mais alors la Russie, c'est à un autre niveau !
En termes de BDA, en 5 minutes sur TikTok, on peut retracer l'ensemble des frappes sur un même lieu, avec 30 angles différents et des vidéos qui permettent de visionner aisément le résultat des frappes.
Évidemment, je dis ça, mais je ne fais absolument aucune confiance aux français pour faire mieux, ça serait 100 fois pire, on aurait des centaines de vidéos d'un même évènement sur X, TikTok, Snapchat.
Dans le cas russe, c'est évidemment un problème, puisque des comptes comme Exilenova/Supernova vont pouvoir récupérer des centaines de vidéos, qui seront réutilisées par le renseignement ukrainien. On observe la même chose sur les routes logistiques, dans les unités elles-mêmes…
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2085088353527922689%2Fimg%2FcrKewQ37jy9k2mBI.jpg
tweet
❤8👍2
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
Kursk operation was a big mistake from Oleksandr Syrskyi, back then commander of the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 army
The operation was conceived as a raid into Russia 🇷🇺 intended to force a Russian redeployment from the east, while capturing prisoners and destroying part of the "Sever/North" force that was attacking Kharkiv.
For a week, Syrskyi disappeared to take direct command of operations, even as the situation in Pokrovsk was becoming catastrophic. The first week of the operation was a success, despite the low number of strikes. Russian resistance in depth proved stronger than anticipated. At that point, the Ukrainians should have withdrawn.
The Ukrainian presence in Kursk lasted nearly eight months, resulting in too many avoidable losses; meanwhile, Russian forces were entering several strategic towns along the Avdiivka–Pokrovsk axis, Novohrodivka, Selydove, and Ukrainsk, which fell without facing significant Ukrainian resistance.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCt-JPWQAAFIJZ.jpg
Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able)
OTD in 2024: After months of quiet preparations, Ukrainian forces begin a large-scale ground offensive into Russia's Kursk Oblast.
In the opening stages of the incursion, the Ukrainians achieve complete tactical and operational surprise and are able to push deep into the region.
However, after deploying reserves, the Russians are able to stabilize the frontline and contain the enemy advance. Ultimately, the Ukrainian forces are completely pushed out of the Kursk Oblast by March 2025, following series of Russian counter-offensives spearheaded by naval infantry and VDV units.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCRsn4WQAAAgEA.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCSDB7WYAAqy9R.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCSZ3ZWcAAeT0T.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCUESwXQAAluNK.jpg
— https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/2085332300032557566#m
tweet
Kursk operation was a big mistake from Oleksandr Syrskyi, back then commander of the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 army
The operation was conceived as a raid into Russia 🇷🇺 intended to force a Russian redeployment from the east, while capturing prisoners and destroying part of the "Sever/North" force that was attacking Kharkiv.
For a week, Syrskyi disappeared to take direct command of operations, even as the situation in Pokrovsk was becoming catastrophic. The first week of the operation was a success, despite the low number of strikes. Russian resistance in depth proved stronger than anticipated. At that point, the Ukrainians should have withdrawn.
The Ukrainian presence in Kursk lasted nearly eight months, resulting in too many avoidable losses; meanwhile, Russian forces were entering several strategic towns along the Avdiivka–Pokrovsk axis, Novohrodivka, Selydove, and Ukrainsk, which fell without facing significant Ukrainian resistance.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCt-JPWQAAFIJZ.jpg
Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able)
OTD in 2024: After months of quiet preparations, Ukrainian forces begin a large-scale ground offensive into Russia's Kursk Oblast.
In the opening stages of the incursion, the Ukrainians achieve complete tactical and operational surprise and are able to push deep into the region.
However, after deploying reserves, the Russians are able to stabilize the frontline and contain the enemy advance. Ultimately, the Ukrainian forces are completely pushed out of the Kursk Oblast by March 2025, following series of Russian counter-offensives spearheaded by naval infantry and VDV units.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCRsn4WQAAAgEA.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCSDB7WYAAqy9R.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCSZ3ZWcAAeT0T.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPCUESwXQAAluNK.jpg
— https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/2085332300032557566#m
tweet
💯7🥰2
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
A lot of cope in comments, so here is @Deepstate_UA map for August/September 2024 to show why the situation was critical :
Novhrodivka fell in 6 days, Ukrainsk and Selydove in 10 days ! This led to Pokrovsk battle. Without this and with more soldiers to defend key cities, the battle for Pokrovsk would have started much later...
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2085382239680929792%2Fimg%2F0CeBpbTjU9m0AkxP.jpg
tweet
A lot of cope in comments, so here is @Deepstate_UA map for August/September 2024 to show why the situation was critical :
Novhrodivka fell in 6 days, Ukrainsk and Selydove in 10 days ! This led to Pokrovsk battle. Without this and with more soldiers to defend key cities, the battle for Pokrovsk would have started much later...
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2085382239680929792%2Fimg%2F0CeBpbTjU9m0AkxP.jpg
tweet
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