Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
Turkiye 🇹🇷, Saudi Arabia 🇸🇦 and Pakistan 🇵🇰 just signed a new alliance, the "Mecca Agreement".
This alliance is a defensive one and can be seen as a "third way" for the Middle East, with the already two existing "alliances"
🔹The Israel-UAE alliance 🇮🇱🇦🇪
🔹The Iran resistance axis 🇮🇷 + Hezbollah, Hamas, PMF, Houthis...
-> 🔹The Mecca Agreement 🇹🇷🇸🇦🇵🇰
This Mecca Agreement can probably add further regional states : 🇶🇦🇸🇩🇾🇪
Why this alliance now and against which threat ? I believe there are 3 threats they want to counter. The first one is the Iranian one, with Iran bombing Saudi Arabia in recent months, but I don't think Turkiye and Pakistan will do much against Iran. The second is the Israeli one : Turkiye needs allies to face recent Israeli threats, as well as to fight Israel's expansionism, especially in Syria, Saudi Arabia shares the same will.
The third one is more interesting and the real one in my opinion. All these states are 'at war' with the UAE military interventions abroad. They oppose the UAE in Yemen, in Libya, but much more the UAE policy in Africa, especially in Somalia and Sudan. Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia and Turkiye are right now the main sponsors of the Sudanese Armed Forces, so this can explain this alliance.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPHlEELXQAADfmZ.jpg
tweet
Turkiye 🇹🇷, Saudi Arabia 🇸🇦 and Pakistan 🇵🇰 just signed a new alliance, the "Mecca Agreement".
This alliance is a defensive one and can be seen as a "third way" for the Middle East, with the already two existing "alliances"
🔹The Israel-UAE alliance 🇮🇱🇦🇪
🔹The Iran resistance axis 🇮🇷 + Hezbollah, Hamas, PMF, Houthis...
-> 🔹The Mecca Agreement 🇹🇷🇸🇦🇵🇰
This Mecca Agreement can probably add further regional states : 🇶🇦🇸🇩🇾🇪
Why this alliance now and against which threat ? I believe there are 3 threats they want to counter. The first one is the Iranian one, with Iran bombing Saudi Arabia in recent months, but I don't think Turkiye and Pakistan will do much against Iran. The second is the Israeli one : Turkiye needs allies to face recent Israeli threats, as well as to fight Israel's expansionism, especially in Syria, Saudi Arabia shares the same will.
The third one is more interesting and the real one in my opinion. All these states are 'at war' with the UAE military interventions abroad. They oppose the UAE in Yemen, in Libya, but much more the UAE policy in Africa, especially in Somalia and Sudan. Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia and Turkiye are right now the main sponsors of the Sudanese Armed Forces, so this can explain this alliance.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPHlEELXQAADfmZ.jpg
tweet
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Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
Good article related
Levent Kemal (@leventkemaI)
My assessment:
The Makkah Agreement is less about forming a new military bloc than it is about establishing a regional deterrence framework among three countries whose strategic interests are increasingly aligned as security threats rise.
leventkemai.substack.com/p/t…
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPH-hvEWIAACavh.jpg
— https://twitter.com/leventkemaI/status/2085728481577455638#m
tweet
Good article related
Levent Kemal (@leventkemaI)
My assessment:
The Makkah Agreement is less about forming a new military bloc than it is about establishing a regional deterrence framework among three countries whose strategic interests are increasingly aligned as security threats rise.
leventkemai.substack.com/p/t…
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPH-hvEWIAACavh.jpg
— https://twitter.com/leventkemaI/status/2085728481577455638#m
tweet
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@clement_molin
La campagne pour l'élection présidentielle 🇫🇷 s'approche et ça s'annonce fatiguant, surtout sur le plan international.
Ce qui va manquer ? De la mesure ! Par populisme et facilité d'esprit, les solutions sont si vite trouvées et le monde est vu de manière binaire, alors que ce n'est pas le cas.
D'un côté, les ingérences russes seront responsables de tout, de l'autre la Russie est une puissance amie. D'un côté il faut couper tous les ponts avec l'Algérie pour qu'ils reprennent leurs OQTF, de l'autre, il faut une relation "constructive" (ça ne veut rien dire) voire une alliance avec Alger, après leur avoir dit pardon.
Certains diront qu'il faut sortir de l'UE ou violer les textes, alors qu'on voit bien que l'UE n'est pas une barrière (exemple parfait du Royaume-Uni), mais un ensemble qui peut être changé. D'autres diront qu'il faut s'allier à la Chine et soutenir le Venezuela...
La plupart des sujets internationaux vont être instrumentalisés à des fins de politique interne (la plupart sont liés, mais les solutions aux problèmes sont avant tout nationales). Ce qui va m'intéresser, c'est de voir si les sujets suivants (secondaires) seront traités et argumentés par les candidats ou s'ils s'en foutent :
🔹Indopacifique
🔹Relations avec Turquie/Caucase/Asie Centrale
🔹Diplomatie et économie en Asie de l'Est et du Sud-Est
🔹 Minerais stratégiques/ressources naturelles
🔹 Investissements économiques
🔹Programmation militaire/drones
Et enfin un Bingo des sujets internationaux :
🔸Débat sur Israël/Palestine - Moyen Orient
🔸Débat sur Ukraine/Russie
🔸Sujets sur l'Algérie/le Maroc
🔸 Éventuellement sujets sur l'Afrique de l'Ouest
🔸 Tous les sujets en rapport avec l'UE, puisqu'ils concernent la politique nationale.
tweet
La campagne pour l'élection présidentielle 🇫🇷 s'approche et ça s'annonce fatiguant, surtout sur le plan international.
Ce qui va manquer ? De la mesure ! Par populisme et facilité d'esprit, les solutions sont si vite trouvées et le monde est vu de manière binaire, alors que ce n'est pas le cas.
D'un côté, les ingérences russes seront responsables de tout, de l'autre la Russie est une puissance amie. D'un côté il faut couper tous les ponts avec l'Algérie pour qu'ils reprennent leurs OQTF, de l'autre, il faut une relation "constructive" (ça ne veut rien dire) voire une alliance avec Alger, après leur avoir dit pardon.
Certains diront qu'il faut sortir de l'UE ou violer les textes, alors qu'on voit bien que l'UE n'est pas une barrière (exemple parfait du Royaume-Uni), mais un ensemble qui peut être changé. D'autres diront qu'il faut s'allier à la Chine et soutenir le Venezuela...
La plupart des sujets internationaux vont être instrumentalisés à des fins de politique interne (la plupart sont liés, mais les solutions aux problèmes sont avant tout nationales). Ce qui va m'intéresser, c'est de voir si les sujets suivants (secondaires) seront traités et argumentés par les candidats ou s'ils s'en foutent :
🔹Indopacifique
🔹Relations avec Turquie/Caucase/Asie Centrale
🔹Diplomatie et économie en Asie de l'Est et du Sud-Est
🔹 Minerais stratégiques/ressources naturelles
🔹 Investissements économiques
🔹Programmation militaire/drones
Et enfin un Bingo des sujets internationaux :
🔸Débat sur Israël/Palestine - Moyen Orient
🔸Débat sur Ukraine/Russie
🔸Sujets sur l'Algérie/le Maroc
🔸 Éventuellement sujets sur l'Afrique de l'Ouest
🔸 Tous les sujets en rapport avec l'UE, puisqu'ils concernent la politique nationale.
tweet
X (formerly Twitter)
Clément Molin (@clement_molin) on X
20 ans, Lyon 🇫🇷, étudiant en Relations Internationales à Lille, cartes, analyses, suivi des conflits armés et de l'actualité internationale.
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Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
Ukraine 🇺🇦 has effectively run out of air-defense 🚀 missiles for at least two weeks. A few missiles remain in air-defense systems in Odesa or Lviv (as evidenced by recent interceptions), but apparently not in Kyiv.
For Ukraine, the solution is not to acquire more anti-aircraft missiles. The solution is to obtain missiles -whether domestically produced or supplied by allies - capable of striking the roughly five crucial sites where Russian missiles, drones, and their key components are manufactured, thereby reducing the number of strikes.
It is also crucial to have the means to track Iskander and S-400 launchers inside Russia (which requires enabling Starlink access in border regions or using other methods) and to acquire air-to-air missiles that would allow F-16s to shoot down some of the aircraft attacking Ukraine.
The solution to the threat of Russian missiles is offensive, not defensive. While Ukraine could attempt to shoot down as many missiles as possible, it is obviously more cost-effective to prevent them from being launched from Russia in the first place. With winter approaching, this is a priority if Kyiv want to avoid widespread power outages and the disconnection of its nuclear power plants...
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPKEU5SW8AI_ksD.jpg
tweet
Ukraine 🇺🇦 has effectively run out of air-defense 🚀 missiles for at least two weeks. A few missiles remain in air-defense systems in Odesa or Lviv (as evidenced by recent interceptions), but apparently not in Kyiv.
For Ukraine, the solution is not to acquire more anti-aircraft missiles. The solution is to obtain missiles -whether domestically produced or supplied by allies - capable of striking the roughly five crucial sites where Russian missiles, drones, and their key components are manufactured, thereby reducing the number of strikes.
It is also crucial to have the means to track Iskander and S-400 launchers inside Russia (which requires enabling Starlink access in border regions or using other methods) and to acquire air-to-air missiles that would allow F-16s to shoot down some of the aircraft attacking Ukraine.
The solution to the threat of Russian missiles is offensive, not defensive. While Ukraine could attempt to shoot down as many missiles as possible, it is obviously more cost-effective to prevent them from being launched from Russia in the first place. With winter approaching, this is a priority if Kyiv want to avoid widespread power outages and the disconnection of its nuclear power plants...
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPKEU5SW8AI_ksD.jpg
tweet
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Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
In January 2026, I did two map scenarios of the Russian 🇷🇺 Donbas offensive with what I believed would be mid-year and full-year objectives.
The black line is the worst-case scenario for Russia (6 months) (which, in my opinion, back then was the one that was going to happen). I thought Russia would try to flank Kostiantynivka to attack directly Drujkivka, but this didn't happen, same for the Lyman push (it happened, but was pushed back). If you take some pro-RU maps, even 40 days after the mid-year, you can see my predictions are close to what they report.
I predicted back then the slow crawling in the Dobropilla and Sloviansk direction as well as the long resistance in Kostiantynivka. This shows how predictable the war is in this region. With airstrikes, unit movements, and offensive pace, it's not very difficult to understand what the trends and objectives are.⬇️
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPNYMVVXEAETGp2.jpg
tweet
In January 2026, I did two map scenarios of the Russian 🇷🇺 Donbas offensive with what I believed would be mid-year and full-year objectives.
The black line is the worst-case scenario for Russia (6 months) (which, in my opinion, back then was the one that was going to happen). I thought Russia would try to flank Kostiantynivka to attack directly Drujkivka, but this didn't happen, same for the Lyman push (it happened, but was pushed back). If you take some pro-RU maps, even 40 days after the mid-year, you can see my predictions are close to what they report.
I predicted back then the slow crawling in the Dobropilla and Sloviansk direction as well as the long resistance in Kostiantynivka. This shows how predictable the war is in this region. With airstrikes, unit movements, and offensive pace, it's not very difficult to understand what the trends and objectives are.⬇️
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPNYMVVXEAETGp2.jpg
tweet
👍6
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
In my 12 months predictions, I thought Lyman and Kostiantynivka would fall and the battles for Drujkivka and Dobropilla would start (which is not totally impossible, but not sure Lyman will fall).
I didn't see correctly the situation in Sloviansk and I will probably be wrong there. We'll see for Drujkivka, since the path is still quite long.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPNbRO5WcAEkaEC.jpg
tweet
In my 12 months predictions, I thought Lyman and Kostiantynivka would fall and the battles for Drujkivka and Dobropilla would start (which is not totally impossible, but not sure Lyman will fall).
I didn't see correctly the situation in Sloviansk and I will probably be wrong there. We'll see for Drujkivka, since the path is still quite long.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPNbRO5WcAEkaEC.jpg
tweet
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Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
After 3 very difficult months (losses as high as usual and low progress across all fronts), Russian forces will start again to gain more territory in August.
Most of the gains will happen in the Donbas (mainly in Dobropilla, Kostiantynivka and Sloviansk directions, following Russian offensive). They will probably continue to lose ground near Lyman (60km2 currently in red which should be blue/grey) and in Komar (also in Donetsk oblast) which means final numbers may not reflect the pace of advance in the central part of Donbas.
Km2 are not the most important thing but they show trends. If the number of km2 taken in an attritional war (it should be exponential) is going down, maybe the attrition is not on the side we are looking. This also shows the results of strikes on logistics, personnal losses and fortifications.
You can see here :
1- Overall km2 change / monthly (source @Pouletvolant3)
2- Weekly km2 gain for Russia
3- Weekly km2 lost (to grey zone) for Ukraine
4- Donbas km2 change / monthly
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPN-6I7XAAAwiri.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPN_AePW4AAyDHQ.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPN_E9pXAAAOErk.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPN_KKbWMAAjLem.jpg
tweet
After 3 very difficult months (losses as high as usual and low progress across all fronts), Russian forces will start again to gain more territory in August.
Most of the gains will happen in the Donbas (mainly in Dobropilla, Kostiantynivka and Sloviansk directions, following Russian offensive). They will probably continue to lose ground near Lyman (60km2 currently in red which should be blue/grey) and in Komar (also in Donetsk oblast) which means final numbers may not reflect the pace of advance in the central part of Donbas.
Km2 are not the most important thing but they show trends. If the number of km2 taken in an attritional war (it should be exponential) is going down, maybe the attrition is not on the side we are looking. This also shows the results of strikes on logistics, personnal losses and fortifications.
You can see here :
1- Overall km2 change / monthly (source @Pouletvolant3)
2- Weekly km2 gain for Russia
3- Weekly km2 lost (to grey zone) for Ukraine
4- Donbas km2 change / monthly
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPN-6I7XAAAwiri.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPN_AePW4AAyDHQ.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPN_E9pXAAAOErk.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPN_KKbWMAAjLem.jpg
tweet
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Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
L'ensemble de l'aide française à l'Ukraine correspond à 10 jours de dépenses des retraites en 2025 🇫🇷🇺🇦
Pourtant, « les milliards que Macron donne à l'Ukraine » est un sujet qui revient souvent. Prenons l'estimation de 12 milliards d'€ (celle de 19 prenant en compte le coût de remplacement des équipements fournis qui étaient déjà en cours de remplacement et celle de 7.9 ne donne que l'aide directe).
Elle comprend plus de 5 milliards d'€ de cessation d'équipements militaires, une partie étant obsolète, une autre permettant un retour d'expérience sur leur qualité (SAMP-T, Caesar, GM-200, AASM-100...). Cela comprend aussi le Fond Européen pour la Paix, le soutien humanitaire, l'aide financière via l'UE pour maintenir les institutions et les services publics et l'aide aux réfugiés.
Autre moyen de comparer, l'aide à l'Ukraine est deux fois moins importante (de manière annuelle) que l'aide publique au développement à destination de l'Afrique (en 2023), d'autant que la moitié des 12 milliards n'est pas de l'argent à proprement parler mais du matériel.
Graphique par @MatthieuGariel
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPOl2CaWgAAnfAb.jpg
Matthieu Gariel — eu/acc 🇺🇦 (@MatthieuGariel)
mdr
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPMwHHyXQAAHGT3.jpg
— https://twitter.com/MatthieuGariel/status/2086063956292997184#m
tweet
L'ensemble de l'aide française à l'Ukraine correspond à 10 jours de dépenses des retraites en 2025 🇫🇷🇺🇦
Pourtant, « les milliards que Macron donne à l'Ukraine » est un sujet qui revient souvent. Prenons l'estimation de 12 milliards d'€ (celle de 19 prenant en compte le coût de remplacement des équipements fournis qui étaient déjà en cours de remplacement et celle de 7.9 ne donne que l'aide directe).
Elle comprend plus de 5 milliards d'€ de cessation d'équipements militaires, une partie étant obsolète, une autre permettant un retour d'expérience sur leur qualité (SAMP-T, Caesar, GM-200, AASM-100...). Cela comprend aussi le Fond Européen pour la Paix, le soutien humanitaire, l'aide financière via l'UE pour maintenir les institutions et les services publics et l'aide aux réfugiés.
Autre moyen de comparer, l'aide à l'Ukraine est deux fois moins importante (de manière annuelle) que l'aide publique au développement à destination de l'Afrique (en 2023), d'autant que la moitié des 12 milliards n'est pas de l'argent à proprement parler mais du matériel.
Graphique par @MatthieuGariel
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPOl2CaWgAAnfAb.jpg
Matthieu Gariel — eu/acc 🇺🇦 (@MatthieuGariel)
mdr
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHPMwHHyXQAAHGT3.jpg
— https://twitter.com/MatthieuGariel/status/2086063956292997184#m
tweet
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