@clement_molin
Les moyens de frappes russes 🇷🇺 dans la profondeur continuent de se renforcer, avec plus de frappes et plus de cibles touchées

▫️Missiles balistiques : Iskander M, Kinjal, Oreshnik (peu régulier), KN-23 / KN-24 (nord-coréens)
▫️Missiles de croisière : Kh-101 / Kh-555, Kalibr, Kh-59 / Kh-69, Kh-22 / Kh-32 (moins utilisé)
▫️Défense sol-air réutilisée : S300/400
▫️Autres missiles moins utilisés : Zircon + KH-31P anti-radar

▫️Nouveautés : P-800 Oniks et S8000 Banderol (missile de croisière low-cost)

▫️Drones Shahed (version initiale, désormais appelée Geran) :
➡️Shahed-131 / Geran-1 (livrés par l'Iran, plus utilisé)
➡️Geran-2 : drone le plus utilisé
➡️Geran-3 : amélioration du Geran-2, n'est plus produit
➡️Geran-4 : nouveau drone-jet, production à venir de 3 000 par mois, coût unitaire 3x plus élevé
➡️Geran-5 : version différente de drone-jet, peu utilisée

▫️Drones leurres (pouvant emporter des explosifs) : Gerbera, Italmas (BM-35), Parodiya
▫️Autres drones utilisés plus proche du front : FPV à fibre opptique, Lancet, Molniyah, BM-35...

En août, 200 impacts ont déjà été ajoutés dans ma base de donnée, incluant une majorité de frappes sur les entrepôts à travers le pays, à la fois civils (supermarchés) et potentiellement militaires.

Sur le long terme, les frappes menacent le réseau électrique ukrainien pour l'hiver prochain (la campagne de frappe n'a pas encore débuté à proprement parler).
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Rob Lee (@RALee85)

GUR tells @mil_in_ua that Russia is producing 3,000 jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 as well as up to 80 Banderol missiles per month.
militarnyi.com/uk/news/3-tys…
militarnyi.com/uk/news/rosiy…
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— https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/2087433606847242440#m
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@clement_molin
In a very rare propaganda video showcasing flags, Ukraine 🇺🇦 announced it liberated 26 villages in the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts

If usually, Russians are the ones publishing those kind of videos, this time, Ukraine showed the results of a 6 months operation.

In red, you can see the maximum grey zone where Russian soldiers were operating, in yellow "liberated" villages (I will keep most of those in the grey zone) and the arrows are showing attack axes of the second phase of the offensive. As usual, a flag video is not sufficient to prove a village is under the control of one army. The ones I managed to prove (Russian airstrikes or multiple geolocations) are in the blue area.

The operation is still ongoing and further offensive actions are happening around both Uspenivka and Komar, two small towns with great local importance. Results are taking time because this is a very careful and slow offensive. As you can see, Ukrainian soldiers crossed the Mokri Yali and entered both Zirka and Yalta, which shows how Russia completly lost the momentum there. Remember, they lost hundreds of men assaulting the New Donbas Line section between Ivanivka and Novopavlivka.
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@clement_molin
Video and source : t.me/ua_dshv/8563

Remember, they only show you what they want you to see. Russians are doing the same, they did flag videos all over the area for months to hide this and they will continue, this doesn't mean they control anything, otherwise, you wouldn't see Ukrainians in multiple villages 10km behind what they claim...

Video
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@AndrewPerpetua
Today the Ukrainian General Staff the liberation of 26 settlements in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk Oblasts. A total of 352 square kilometers. It is the highlighted blue area in the image below.
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@clement_molin
As expected, @Deepstate_UA and other Ukrainian 🇺🇦 media outlets followed on the liberation of multiple villages

Despite many "analysts" doubting OPSEC, not too much information filtered from this offensive. Thus, let's get back inside to understand what happened

🧵THREAD🧵⬇️
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@clement_molin
Another one later here :
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Clément Molin (@clement_molin)

The situation of the Novopavlivka-Ivanivka front is currently the most difficult for Russian 🇷🇺 forces

🔹After months of infiltrations, often covered by OPSEC, the Ukrainians 🇺🇦 liberated a bunch of villages and cleared both Ivanivka and Novopavlivka from previous infiltrations. In this area, around 55 km2 of grey zone are most likely under Ukrainian control, as per high FAB strikes number.

🔹The main Russian problem is logistical. All roads leading to the area are exposed and under fire. The only places used for accumulation are Bahatyr (completly destroyed) and Komar (partially destroyed, hit by Ukrainian airstrikes). After these villages, Russian infantry still need to walk on foot, on open roads from 5 to 10 km to reach "frontline" villages and positions before assaults.

🔹Recent videos showed multiple casualties after Russian infantry were sent across the Vovcha (Bahatyr-Ivanivka), Solena (Novopavlivka) and Mokri Yali (Komar) river. Despite these losses, Russian infantry is still tasked to attack the New Donbas Line section between Novopavlivka and Ivanivka (they need to cross 2 rivers and 3 ditches), which is suicidal, knowing they have been attacking here for 10 months !)

🔹Russian "flaggers" continue to be sighted in Iskra, further west, in an attempt from the 90th tank division to show they control the situation to their command. Regularly on Telegram, Russian bloggers complain about the risk of Ukrainian entrance in Komar, since fighting have been happening in Piddubne for weeks. The situation is not very good for the 29th CAA in this sector, but the danger of further explotation is limited due to rivers.

🔹Ukraine deployed 3 air assault brigades (79th, 80th, 95th) in the direction to push back russian forces behind the Mokri Yali river and further reinforce their lines in the sector. This also gives more losses for Russia forces. The main challenge is the large number of airstrikes falling on their positions. If airstrikes decreased in Hulialpole, they slightly increased here recently, including more than 50 in the large yellow perimeter on the map, inside the grey zone between Komar and Ivanivka.

🔹With Novopavlivka under Ukrainian control and Ivanivka secured, the UAF can move south to pressure and trap russians attempting to attack the New Donbas Line fortified section. But it is probably much more interesting to keep the situation as it is currently, since this is an open kill zone for tens or hundreds of Russians every month. For further exploitation, the Komar/Velika Novosilka directions are much more interesting in order to further slow down or postpone Russian offensive momentum in Hulialpole.

For this situation review, I used @AndrewPerpetua base map and @WarUnitObserver observations about unit deployment.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHNC867DW4AEWT4T.jpg

— https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/2076374428523385158#m
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@clement_molin
And the latest here :
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Clément Molin (@clement_molin)

For the past six months, the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 army has been on the offensive along a 50-kilometer-wide front, gradually retaking villages lost the previous year.

With no official statements and very few videos available, little is known about this "offensive." I have therefore gathered as much information as possible to discuss it.

In 2025, the Russian army doubled its rate of advance compared to 2024. Yet, it was not in the Donbas that they were advancing the most. Very early in the year, they seized Velyka Novosilka and pushed north toward Komar and west toward Huliaipole. By the year's end, the situation for Ukraine was critical: defensive lines facing south had been overrun from the east, and the Russian army was steadily closing in on Zaporizhzhia, a city of 800,000 inhabitants.

After the capture of Huliaipole, everyone expected Pokrovsk'e, Ternuvate (already infiltrated at the time), and then Orikhiv to fall, placing the Russian army at the gates of Zaporizhzhia by the end of the year. Yet, seven months later, the situation remained unchanged; the Russians are still stalled west of Huliaipole. Worse, they have lost significant territory further north, bringing a halt to this offensive, which, while secondary to the main Donbas campaign, had nonetheless committed a massive force, including five armies and an army corps.

🔸So, what happened?

It began in February, when several air-assault brigades repositioned to the region, launched an armored assault under cover of fog, deploying their infantry into contested villages, often behind the initial Russian infiltrators. The villages were methodically cleared, and Ukrainian soldiers began infiltrating southward themselves. In March, they were positioned east and west of Uspenivka, blocking Russian attempts to advance toward Pokrovske and Ternuvate.

In response to this offensive, the Russian army sends several naval infantry brigades and divisions, as well as the 68th Army Corps, as reinforcements.

Starting in April, air assault brigades repositioned further north with the mission of advancing on Komar. The goal of this redeployment was to prevent the 90th Tank Division from shifting its assets toward Dobropilla. There was no mechanized offensive this time, as the terrain, specifically the presence of several rivers, most notably the Vovtcha, precluded it. Instead, small Ukrainian infantry groups managed to gradually infiltrate as far as the next river, the Mokri Yali. It is important to understand that, despite having been in the area for at least eight months, Russian forces had been unable to consolidate their positions; a network of rivers complicated logistics, and the small size of the villages made it impossible to concentrate large numbers of troops.

Consequently, the Ukrainians were able to advance relatively stealthily behind enemy lines, reaching the Mokri Yali River. A strict information blackout was imposed in the area. Apart from a single video (since deleted) showing Ukrainian troops raising a flag over a liberated village, the Ukrainians released nothing regarding an operation that had already been underway for three months. For their part, the Russians continued to obscure the situation: the Vostok Group released only videos that were difficult to geolocate and persisted in sending "suicide" flag-bearers troops, who would reach Iskra and raise the Russian flag, creating an illusion of control.

On the map, I have roughly depicted the situation as it has stood over the last few weeks, relying primarily on a handful of geolocated videos, satellite imagery showing air and artillery strikes, and scattered social media statements. Simply put, little is known about the actual state of the front, other than the fact that Ukrainian forces are at the gates of [...]

Komar, a move that has forced the 90th Tank Division to keep half its strength committed to that sector.

What I am certain of is that all Russian troops positioned north of the Vovcha River (in Ivanivka) or the Solena (in Novopavlivka) have either been killed or captured, judging by the number of Russian air strikes, at least a hundred, carried out in the area. Consequently, the section of the "New Donbass Line" in this sector has held for the tenth consecutive month. It is certain that the Ukrainians have retaken control of the few villages to the south, given the air strikes observed in the zone. For the time being, I will respect Ukrainian OPSEC protocols and refrain from providing further details regarding an ongoing operation, as long as more confirmation are not coming.

🔸You might be wondering how such an operation is structured.

The Ukrainians are making extensive use of drones to establish a wide exclusion zone in the sector, extending particularly along the river as far as Velyka Novosilka. The operation is proceeding cautiously, with small infantry teams advancing gradually, supported by artillery positioned in the woods to the west and occasional Ukrainian air strikes on Russian drone operator positions in Komar.

Overall, it is important to understand that this operation is taking place because the Russian army is unable to bring reinforcements to the front. Furthermore, anti-tank ditches prevent any Russian mechanized or motorized assault aimed at delivering reinforcements. To understand the disarray within the local command, one need only look at its use of air power. Air strikes are being carried out daily deep behind the lines, as far as Prossiana and Chaplyne, 35 to 40 km from the front. While the goal is to hinder the Ukrainian presence, these strikes primarily highlight the ineffectiveness of Russian drones in the sector, particularly the Molniya models.

To conclude, this operation not only gained time for Ukraine to further fortify the Pavlohrad direction, it is a direct push in the foot of Russian forces, which can continue further this summer and later in the autumn. I'll continue to monitor this and wait for more official informations regarding the situation here.

Thank you for reading !
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— https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/2081776514949857694#m
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@clement_molin
Thus, the operation was very difficult to understand because there was a clear lack of information. Local Russian units were trying to hide the situation (flag videos, zoomed videos of their strikes) and Ukrainian units put up a total blackout (except Skala...).

Why this OPSEC matters ? Because when OSINT analysts start to talk about it, think tanks and journalists start to talk a lot about it, to debate and try to find information. This means it can highlight a situation some regional commander wouldn't have seen.
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