Colombian 🇨🇴 soldiers of Ukraine's 🇺🇦 23rd Assault Regiment liberated some important forests on a tactical height north of Kupiansk

This is an isolated offensive action from Khartya Corps at the edge of Dvorichna in order to relieve western Kupiansk from part of the infiltrations. Remember, the situation in Kupiansk is very similar to the one last year, with most of the city being a grey zone.

The aim here is probably to secure the banks of the Oskil river all the way to Kupiansk in order to avoid a further exploitation, since a Russian offensive is ongoing farther north, near Vovchansk. Good job from Playfra, here, again : https://t.me/PlayfraOSINT/6081

Я так розумію, лінію фронту решти контрольованої Донецької області розділять між 3-м АК та 1-м корпусом НГУ. Відповідно суміжні корпуси та підрозділи перейдуть у підпорядкування Білецькому та Прокопенко.

Лінію зони відповідальності намалював умовну. Але логіка, думаю, буде такою [хоча це не точно :) ]

1/2 In 2026, at least 28 Russian 🇷🇺 refineries⛽️(out of approximately 48) were hit in 81 separate strikes.

Seventeen of the twenty largest Russian refineries were struck during the first eight months of the year, sometimes sustaining significant damage, such as at Orsk, Perm, or Ryazan.

The repeated strikes on major refineries (6 at Yaroslavl; 5 at Ilsky, Saratov, Syzran, and Tuapse; and 4 at Kstovo, TAIF-NK Nizhnekamsk, Ufa Bashneft, and Volgograd) disrupt the restoration of damaged key components, which typically take weeks or months to repair.

At the same time, Ukrainian 🇺🇦 forces continue to target crude oil and fuel storage tanks, both near refineries (in Moscow or Perm...) and at transit points (11 strikes: Perm, Yaroslavl, Vladimir...), storage facilities (26 strikes on major storage sites, excluding occupied Ukrainian territories), and export terminals (11 strikes: Novorossiysk, Ust-Luga, Primorsk...).

2/2 These strikes, targeting both production (which has become intermittent, slowed, or sometimes halted in certain regions) and storage, are contributing to widespread fuel shortages across a number of Russian regions.

In total, nearly 130 strikes on key Russian oil and fuel production, storage, transport, and export facilities have been recorded since the beginning of the year. This represents a tangible loss of revenue, only partially offset by the Iranian conflict and rising oil prices. While refineries are usually repaired quickly, the relentless succession and precision of the strikes are placing a strain on critical infrastructure. While the strikes hitting the storage tanks caused a lot of media attention, given the smoke they generated, it is the strikes hitting the critical parts of the refineries that matter.

My map of Ukrainian 🇺🇦 strikes on Russian 🇷🇺 refineries (red) and other oil/fuel related targets (small pink round) :

NEW MAP / Russian mid-range and long-range strikes against Ukraine during the month of June, day by day. Around 1 000 recorded strikes, the first 3 categories are civilian targets, road transportation/logistics and fuel/oil. The first 3 oblasts are Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Chernihiv. As you can see, the map shows both geolocated and reported strikes for every day of June 2026. This map is the result of a cooperation with
@ShahedTracker
(a must follow) red are drone strikes (mainly Geran drones) and light orange are missiles/combined strikes. I will now publish this kind of animated map for my monthly overview of Russian strikes (which will be around the middle of every month to gather all data).

The Ukrainian 🇺🇦 General Staff is reorganizing the defense of the Donbas by establishing two distinct zones of responsibility in Donbas.

The 3rd Army Corps - formed around the 3rd Assault Brigade (linked to Azov) - is currently successfully holding the northern flank of the Donbas front, between Borova and Lyman (in the direction of Izyum). While this had been announced previously, its operational area now extends to Sloviansk, following the integration of several additional brigades into the corps.

The National Guard's 1st Azov Corps is currently holding the sector between Dobropillia and Druzhkivka, where the Russian offensive is most intense. Having arrived in the sector as a "savior" last year, the Corps boasts an excellent track record, having held a central section of the front for over a year. It appears set to take charge of the defense of Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk, with the 11th and 19th Corps under its command.

2/2 The new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Mykhailo Drapatyi, is entrusting the defense of the Donbas to the two Azov commanders, Andriy Biletsky (3rd AC) and Denys Prokopenko (1st AC). Meanwhile, I believe he will deploy the 7th and 8th Army Corps for offensive operations in the south, as it was the case this year already under Syrskyi.

1/2
5 minutes d'une compilation de frappes du Hezbollah 🟨 contre l'armée israélienne 🇮🇱 au Sud-Liban 🇱🇧

Quelques observations :

🔸La guerre en Ukraine a commencé il y a 4 ans et demi, que faisait Israël ? La guerre des drones actuelle a lieu depuis 2023, ils ne l'ont pas vu ?
🔸Quand on voit le nombre de systèmes de défense aérienne, disposés à découvert, sans filet de protection, les groupes de 10 soldats, les véhicules sans protection supplémentaire contre les drones, on se demande s'ils ont observé la guerre en Ukraine... Et on parle du Hezbollah (un groupe armé décapité en 2024, frappé constamment, et d'Israël, le pays qui dispose d'une des meilleures armées au monde.

Manquements visibles :

🔹Aucun camouflage des équipements
🔹Aucune protection supplémentaire des véhicules (filets, cages en acier...)
🔹Positions d'artillerie et de défense aérienne à découvert
🔹Soldats regroupés, parfois des groupes de 6 à 10 hommes, alors que la guerre en Ukraine a enseigné l'espacement des soldats

2/2 🔹Aucune défense anti-drone (il y a probablement des brouilleurs, mais les FPV à fibre optique ne peuvent pas être brouillés
🔹Où sont les FPV israéliens ? Où est la traque des pilotes de FPV ? On parle d'une guerre où Israël dispose de la suprématie aérienne totale

Ces dernières années, les drones FPV ont été très clairement visibles en Ukraine, mais pas que :

🇸🇾 HTS en Syrie
🇲🇲Rebelles en Birmanie
🇲🇽 Cartels au Mexique
🇲🇱 Djihadistes/rebelles au Mali
🇸🇩 Armée au Soudan
🇪🇹 Rebelles en Ethiopie
🇾🇪 Armée et rebelles au Yémen

Si même après 4,5 ans de guerre en Ukraine, même Israël, une des armées les plus modernes du monde, est incapable d'avoir tiré les enseignements de la guerre des drones, je doute que l'armée française le soit… Je le dis et le répète, la priorité n'est pas d'avoir des pilotes ou des réserves de drones !

La priorité est que l'ensemble des soldats/commandants soit formé à la lutte antidrones, au camouflage et aux "nouvelles règles" qui découlent de la guerre des drones. Avoir une force aérienne ou une artillerie ne sauvera pas les soldats qui resteront en groupe, qui ne camoufleront pas leurs véhicules et qui ne se déplaceront pas de manière espacée et discrète…

8 hours later, already 12 000 people saw my interview in Spanish 🇪🇸, which is very nice as this is my 3rd language !

We talked about my work, OSINT, mid-range strikes, Donbas offensive, FAB airstrikes... Soon, a new interview will be published in English 🇬🇧 !

Gracias a todos por sus mensajes. Link : youtube.com/live/lOmuGTXog
Thank you for all the positive comments despite my difficulties to find my words