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Ukrainian 🇺🇦 army continues to prepare defenses close to the border with Belarus 🇧🇾. Very large forests have been cut and multiple defensive lines are being prepared, to counter both mechanized assault and infiltrations.
There is currently no threat on Kyiv or western Ukraine from the north, but it is worth noting Ukraine prefers to prepare fortifications in advance in case of a Russian 🇷🇺 push in the next few years.
Recent Russian strikes on western Ukraine had some operator controled drones (strikes on the Yahodin border post), which means they had some relays somewhere, probably in Belarus...
There is currently no threat on Kyiv or western Ukraine from the north, but it is worth noting Ukraine prefers to prepare fortifications in advance in case of a Russian 🇷🇺 push in the next few years.
Recent Russian strikes on western Ukraine had some operator controled drones (strikes on the Yahodin border post), which means they had some relays somewhere, probably in Belarus...
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With the Russian elections just days away, Moscow 🇷🇺 is ramping up pressure and propaganda:
🔹Officially, Moscow claims to control 5,000 km² more territory than the Ukrainians acknowledge, and even 3,000 km² more than pro-Russian analysts estimate.
🔹In reality, the Russian army has captured only 650 km² this year; by comparison, the figure was 3,146 km² during the same period in 2025 and 1,907 km² in 2024.
🔹Many areas claimed to be under Russian control by the army, Russian media, or the president are not actually held by them—for instance, Sviatohirsk, a small town located 25 km from the front line.
The goal of this propaganda regarding figures is primarily domestic: to mask problems and demonstrate that the army is still advancing and achieving victory on the front.
At the same time, Moscow is increasing operations and acts of sabotage against Ukraine's European allies:
🔹Explosions at ammunition depots in Bulgaria 🇧🇬, Italy 🇮🇹, and Germany 🇩🇪.
🔹FPV drones discovered near sensitive military sites in Germany 🇩🇪 and elsewhere.
🔹Widespread sabotage of Dutch 🇳🇱 railway logistics.
🔹Frequent incursions by Russian Gerbera and Geran drones into Romania 🇷🇴 (a 25-minute overflight last week), Poland 🇵🇱 (a Gerbera drone washed up on a beach and a double strike on a border crossing on the Ukrainian side), and Lithuania 🇱🇹 (a drone shot down by an Italian fighter jet near a thermal power plant).
These acts of sabotage are set to intensify in the coming weeks, with a rise in localized, unclaimed attacks on sensitive sites. Moscow will heavily exploit European discontent over fuel prices. In France, Russia will focus particular attention on the presidential election. Russia itself likely views itself as being at war with Europe (indirectly) at this moment; only Europeans speak of hybrid threats, unattributed acts, and appeasement.
🔹Officially, Moscow claims to control 5,000 km² more territory than the Ukrainians acknowledge, and even 3,000 km² more than pro-Russian analysts estimate.
🔹In reality, the Russian army has captured only 650 km² this year; by comparison, the figure was 3,146 km² during the same period in 2025 and 1,907 km² in 2024.
🔹Many areas claimed to be under Russian control by the army, Russian media, or the president are not actually held by them—for instance, Sviatohirsk, a small town located 25 km from the front line.
The goal of this propaganda regarding figures is primarily domestic: to mask problems and demonstrate that the army is still advancing and achieving victory on the front.
At the same time, Moscow is increasing operations and acts of sabotage against Ukraine's European allies:
🔹Explosions at ammunition depots in Bulgaria 🇧🇬, Italy 🇮🇹, and Germany 🇩🇪.
🔹FPV drones discovered near sensitive military sites in Germany 🇩🇪 and elsewhere.
🔹Widespread sabotage of Dutch 🇳🇱 railway logistics.
🔹Frequent incursions by Russian Gerbera and Geran drones into Romania 🇷🇴 (a 25-minute overflight last week), Poland 🇵🇱 (a Gerbera drone washed up on a beach and a double strike on a border crossing on the Ukrainian side), and Lithuania 🇱🇹 (a drone shot down by an Italian fighter jet near a thermal power plant).
These acts of sabotage are set to intensify in the coming weeks, with a rise in localized, unclaimed attacks on sensitive sites. Moscow will heavily exploit European discontent over fuel prices. In France, Russia will focus particular attention on the presidential election. Russia itself likely views itself as being at war with Europe (indirectly) at this moment; only Europeans speak of hybrid threats, unattributed acts, and appeasement.
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I have now reached 130 000 followers, which is a great number considering my age and the number of very influential people following me
First, thank you, everyone, for all those likes, comments, questions... Let me explain what I will do with my account. 👇
🔹As you can see, I switched from talking about multiple conflicts to mainly following one, Ukraine. This one is the most important and requires an enormous amount of time to follow.
🔹This does not mean I stopped following Sudan, Mali, Congo, Ethiopia, Middle East or Myanmar; I just lack time to talk about it. I will try to share as often as possible news about other conflicts.
🔹My coverage has been 60% in English and 40% in French. Why? Part of the French can read English, or the automated translation is helping. On the other side, many can't read French. I will continue to do half and half.
➡️I will use French to talk about wars in Africa, geopolitics, and overall situations in Ukraine and English for precise and detailed analysis.
➡️I will continue to work on multiple data collections on the war in Ukraine, but I clearly lack time. I will still check frontline, airstrikes, fortifications, and Russian long range strikes. For now, I lack time to precisely follow Ukrainian mid-/long-range strikes. Remember this takes a lot of time and is unpaid (and then stolen by hundreds of aggregator accounts like my latest map update).
What I will post :
🔸Updates on Ukraine
🔸News about the drone revolution
🔸Global news about the world/other conflict
🔸Follow of defense, foreign policy and politics in Europe
Now some questions for you :
➡️What would you improve in my account ?
➡️What do you want me to talk more often about ?
➡️Should I post more smaller updates ?
Make sure you follow me on
◽️X : https://x.com/clement_molin
◽️LinkedIn : https://www.linkedin.com/in/clement-molin/ (personal news, follow of the drone revolution)
Thank you, everyone!
For journalists and people who have important things to tell me/collaboration... please contact me on my email : clement.molin2005@gmail.com For everyone, my DMs are always open. Please make sure to text me again, I see very often the message and forget to respond !
First, thank you, everyone, for all those likes, comments, questions... Let me explain what I will do with my account. 👇
🔹As you can see, I switched from talking about multiple conflicts to mainly following one, Ukraine. This one is the most important and requires an enormous amount of time to follow.
🔹This does not mean I stopped following Sudan, Mali, Congo, Ethiopia, Middle East or Myanmar; I just lack time to talk about it. I will try to share as often as possible news about other conflicts.
🔹My coverage has been 60% in English and 40% in French. Why? Part of the French can read English, or the automated translation is helping. On the other side, many can't read French. I will continue to do half and half.
➡️I will use French to talk about wars in Africa, geopolitics, and overall situations in Ukraine and English for precise and detailed analysis.
➡️I will continue to work on multiple data collections on the war in Ukraine, but I clearly lack time. I will still check frontline, airstrikes, fortifications, and Russian long range strikes. For now, I lack time to precisely follow Ukrainian mid-/long-range strikes. Remember this takes a lot of time and is unpaid (and then stolen by hundreds of aggregator accounts like my latest map update).
What I will post :
🔸Updates on Ukraine
🔸News about the drone revolution
🔸Global news about the world/other conflict
🔸Follow of defense, foreign policy and politics in Europe
Now some questions for you :
➡️What would you improve in my account ?
➡️What do you want me to talk more often about ?
➡️Should I post more smaller updates ?
Make sure you follow me on
◽️X : https://x.com/clement_molin
◽️LinkedIn : https://www.linkedin.com/in/clement-molin/ (personal news, follow of the drone revolution)
Thank you, everyone!
For journalists and people who have important things to tell me/collaboration... please contact me on my email : clement.molin2005@gmail.com For everyone, my DMs are always open. Please make sure to text me again, I see very often the message and forget to respond !
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Russian 🇷🇺 forces continue to infiltrate Orikhiv
🔸The first Russian soldiers reached Orikhiv months ago, but infiltrations are being more numerous now
🔸They follow 4 roads: east inside of Mala Tokmachka, south to Novodanylivka, west to Novoandriivka and north to Omelnyk
🔸The trend is worrying for the city since Russian soldiers started to take position in urban areas inside Orikhiv, threatening advanced positions further south or east, which, I they fall, will allow a flow of infiltrations into Orikhiv.
➡️Remember that the 58th, 36th, 5th, 35th armies and 68th AC are attacking Orikhiv from 3 sides.
➡️This city is strategic, protecting Zaporizhzhia's south-eastern flank and a fortified 'castle'.
➡️For now, Ukraine managed to contain the advance from the north-east (but infiltrations continue to go deep behind the lines).
🔸The first Russian soldiers reached Orikhiv months ago, but infiltrations are being more numerous now
🔸They follow 4 roads: east inside of Mala Tokmachka, south to Novodanylivka, west to Novoandriivka and north to Omelnyk
🔸The trend is worrying for the city since Russian soldiers started to take position in urban areas inside Orikhiv, threatening advanced positions further south or east, which, I they fall, will allow a flow of infiltrations into Orikhiv.
➡️Remember that the 58th, 36th, 5th, 35th armies and 68th AC are attacking Orikhiv from 3 sides.
➡️This city is strategic, protecting Zaporizhzhia's south-eastern flank and a fortified 'castle'.
➡️For now, Ukraine managed to contain the advance from the north-east (but infiltrations continue to go deep behind the lines).
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At 12:58 PM today, Russian forces 🇷🇺 shelled the Yahodyn border crossing between Poland 🇵🇱 and Ukraine 🇺🇦 for the third time.
The two previous strikes occurred:
🔹 On the afternoon of September 13, destroying the locomotive of a freight train (two passenger trains—one carrying European officials—were located about 500 meters away).
🔹 On September 14, around 5:00 AM, targeting a group of trucks and a nearby service station, 1.4 km from Poland.
Both strikes were filmed live by drones—likely camera-equipped Geran drones (four of them?)—marking a first for the western part of the country.
The two previous strikes occurred:
🔹 On the afternoon of September 13, destroying the locomotive of a freight train (two passenger trains—one carrying European officials—were located about 500 meters away).
🔹 On September 14, around 5:00 AM, targeting a group of trucks and a nearby service station, 1.4 km from Poland.
Both strikes were filmed live by drones—likely camera-equipped Geran drones (four of them?)—marking a first for the western part of the country.
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To enable the "Vivaldi" operation, Ukraine's 🇺🇦 3rd Army Corps launched a continuous number of mid-range strikes against Russian 🇷🇺 20th/25th CAA logistics.
In this video, only a small part of their work is shown, which helps understanding how Ukraine is using the strikes in depth to create an "interdiction zone" for Russian logistics.
Thus, supplies, artillery shells, drones and men struggle to move far behind the front and to reach it. This also impacts unit commanders, who are often forced to go close to the front to understand the situation. At least one of them was killed during operation Vivaldi.
-> t.me/ab3army/7492
In this video, only a small part of their work is shown, which helps understanding how Ukraine is using the strikes in depth to create an "interdiction zone" for Russian logistics.
Thus, supplies, artillery shells, drones and men struggle to move far behind the front and to reach it. This also impacts unit commanders, who are often forced to go close to the front to understand the situation. At least one of them was killed during operation Vivaldi.
-> t.me/ab3army/7492
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This type of Russian propaganda is quite ridiculous, far from reality and the actual threat level. Here, then, is the true state of the 🇷🇺 Geran drone threat:
🔸There are currently 15 fixed launch sites for Geran drones (half of which launch the jet-powered Geran-4/5 models).
🔸The Geran-4 has a range of 850 km and is currently launched solely from fixed rails.
🔸The Geran-5 is launched from rails but also from aircraft; it resembles a missile more than a drone—similar to the low-cost S8000 Banderol missile.
🔸Finally, there is the Geran-2, a standard version derived from the Shahed-136, which reportedly has a range of 2,500 km. It can be launched from rails but also from the back of a pickup truck or lorry, making it more mobile.
-> The Baltic states, Poland, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey are the territories within range of current launch sites.
-> Maps from Rybar featuring Algeria, Mexico, India, North Korea, China, or Iran do not reflect actual risks.
🔸There are currently 15 fixed launch sites for Geran drones (half of which launch the jet-powered Geran-4/5 models).
🔸The Geran-4 has a range of 850 km and is currently launched solely from fixed rails.
🔸The Geran-5 is launched from rails but also from aircraft; it resembles a missile more than a drone—similar to the low-cost S8000 Banderol missile.
🔸Finally, there is the Geran-2, a standard version derived from the Shahed-136, which reportedly has a range of 2,500 km. It can be launched from rails but also from the back of a pickup truck or lorry, making it more mobile.
-> The Baltic states, Poland, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey are the territories within range of current launch sites.
-> Maps from Rybar featuring Algeria, Mexico, India, North Korea, China, or Iran do not reflect actual risks.
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In total, Russia 🇷🇺 damaged or destroyed 100 gas stations in and around Kharkiv 🇺🇦 this year.
Some key roads have no more working gas stations like Kharkiv-Sumy or Kharkiv-Poltava. Those are only geolocated strikes, I added many missing ones thanks to @ShahedTracker.
Some key roads have no more working gas stations like Kharkiv-Sumy or Kharkiv-Poltava. Those are only geolocated strikes, I added many missing ones thanks to @ShahedTracker.
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This morning, the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 army struck several targets in Moscow 🇷🇺, including the refinery for the 4th time this year.
More than a thousand drones and missiles have been launched at Russia. This compilation of maps by t.me/oko_gora
shows the flight paths of Ukrainian drones in September 2026.
More than a thousand drones and missiles have been launched at Russia. This compilation of maps by t.me/oko_gora
shows the flight paths of Ukrainian drones in September 2026.
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Key takeaways from this latest attack:
🔸Moscow's air defense is highly effective; the majority of drones are shot down—which makes sense given that over 140 air defense systems are deployed there.
🔸Despite this five-layer air defense, some drones manage to get through; Ukraine is therefore employing a strategy of concentrating on and saturating a specific area.
🔸This time, Kyiv did not strike fuel depots but targeted critical sections of the refinery directly. During the June attack, the refinery sustained partial damage and only resumed operations in August.
🔸Looking at the Ukrainian strategy, the saturation phase began earlier, around September 17. Ukrainian drones cost less than air defense missiles, meaning this relentless defense comes at a high cost to Moscow.
🔸This marks the seventh attack on a Russian refinery this month and the 91st since the start of the year. This strains Russia's refining capacity and exacerbates fuel shortages in many regions.
🔸Finally, at least 10 different types of drones and missiles were used, demonstrating that Kyiv is accelerating the development of its strike capabilities—albeit lagging somewhat behind Russia, which employed this saturation strategy between 2023 and 2025 but uses it less frequently today.
🔸Moscow's air defense is highly effective; the majority of drones are shot down—which makes sense given that over 140 air defense systems are deployed there.
🔸Despite this five-layer air defense, some drones manage to get through; Ukraine is therefore employing a strategy of concentrating on and saturating a specific area.
🔸This time, Kyiv did not strike fuel depots but targeted critical sections of the refinery directly. During the June attack, the refinery sustained partial damage and only resumed operations in August.
🔸Looking at the Ukrainian strategy, the saturation phase began earlier, around September 17. Ukrainian drones cost less than air defense missiles, meaning this relentless defense comes at a high cost to Moscow.
🔸This marks the seventh attack on a Russian refinery this month and the 91st since the start of the year. This strains Russia's refining capacity and exacerbates fuel shortages in many regions.
🔸Finally, at least 10 different types of drones and missiles were used, demonstrating that Kyiv is accelerating the development of its strike capabilities—albeit lagging somewhat behind Russia, which employed this saturation strategy between 2023 and 2025 but uses it less frequently today.
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🔸There is a near-consensus among analysts that 2026 is a less favorable year for Moscow on several fronts.
🔸Russian territorial gains this year amount to just over 1,100 km²; however, one must subtract the more than 450 km² retaken by Ukrainian counter-attacks, leaving a net gain of approximately 650 km². By comparison, 1,900 km² were captured during the same period in 2024, and 3,100 km² in 2025.
🔸For the first time since late 2023, Ukrainian forces have managed to slow—or even halt—the Russian advance in certain sectors of the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia regions. To cope with this reality, the Kremlin is resorting to repeated falsehoods and presenting maps that depict a much more favorable situation for the Russian army in 2026.
🔸Ukraine holds the advantage in medium-range strikes, particularly within occupied territories, which complicates Russian logistics. Russia holds the advantage in deep-strike capabilities, although the damage inflicted by Ukrainian strikes (e.g., on refineries and ports) is far more costly than the damage caused by Russian strikes.
🔸In terms of manpower, Russian forces are losing slightly more troops than they are recruiting; furthermore, recruitment costs are skyrocketing, placing a significant burden on Russian public finances. A mobilization appears necessary to resume territorial advances.
On the Ukrainian side, the situation is even more critical, with an infantry shortage persisting since 2024. To address this, Kyiv has replaced human personnel with robots—specifically ground drones—for logistics and assault missions, a practice rarely seen on the Russian side.
🔸Economically and financially, both states are suffering severely. Ukraine has been suffering for five years, particularly due to the exodus of its population, Russian strikes, and mobilization. European financial support is helping to sustain the situation. On the Russian side, while the situation remained stable in recent years, it has deteriorated significantly in recent months due to a lack of funds, the loss of substantial hydrocarbon revenues, and the long-term effects of Russia's isolation.
After two very difficult years for Ukrainians in 2024 and 2025, 2026 saw a gradual stabilization of the front line, a localized regaining of the initiative in four sectors, and the development of new warfare capabilities. Russia retains the advantage in several areas—including strikes on the front line and in the rear—but is increasingly suffering the strain of a war that shows no signs of ending.
Ukrainians have nearly completed a series of defensive obstacle lines stretching from the Black Sea to the Polish border along the front, dimming the prospects of a Russian breakthrough in the coming years.
-> Consequently, Russian actions in Europe are primarily aimed at undermining military and financial support for Ukraine within the context of the war on the Eastern Front.
On the map:
🔴Russian advance from 2014 to 2025
🟠Russian advance in 2026
🔵Territories retaken by Ukrainians in 2026
🔸Russian territorial gains this year amount to just over 1,100 km²; however, one must subtract the more than 450 km² retaken by Ukrainian counter-attacks, leaving a net gain of approximately 650 km². By comparison, 1,900 km² were captured during the same period in 2024, and 3,100 km² in 2025.
🔸For the first time since late 2023, Ukrainian forces have managed to slow—or even halt—the Russian advance in certain sectors of the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia regions. To cope with this reality, the Kremlin is resorting to repeated falsehoods and presenting maps that depict a much more favorable situation for the Russian army in 2026.
🔸Ukraine holds the advantage in medium-range strikes, particularly within occupied territories, which complicates Russian logistics. Russia holds the advantage in deep-strike capabilities, although the damage inflicted by Ukrainian strikes (e.g., on refineries and ports) is far more costly than the damage caused by Russian strikes.
🔸In terms of manpower, Russian forces are losing slightly more troops than they are recruiting; furthermore, recruitment costs are skyrocketing, placing a significant burden on Russian public finances. A mobilization appears necessary to resume territorial advances.
On the Ukrainian side, the situation is even more critical, with an infantry shortage persisting since 2024. To address this, Kyiv has replaced human personnel with robots—specifically ground drones—for logistics and assault missions, a practice rarely seen on the Russian side.
🔸Economically and financially, both states are suffering severely. Ukraine has been suffering for five years, particularly due to the exodus of its population, Russian strikes, and mobilization. European financial support is helping to sustain the situation. On the Russian side, while the situation remained stable in recent years, it has deteriorated significantly in recent months due to a lack of funds, the loss of substantial hydrocarbon revenues, and the long-term effects of Russia's isolation.
After two very difficult years for Ukrainians in 2024 and 2025, 2026 saw a gradual stabilization of the front line, a localized regaining of the initiative in four sectors, and the development of new warfare capabilities. Russia retains the advantage in several areas—including strikes on the front line and in the rear—but is increasingly suffering the strain of a war that shows no signs of ending.
Ukrainians have nearly completed a series of defensive obstacle lines stretching from the Black Sea to the Polish border along the front, dimming the prospects of a Russian breakthrough in the coming years.
-> Consequently, Russian actions in Europe are primarily aimed at undermining military and financial support for Ukraine within the context of the war on the Eastern Front.
On the map:
🔴Russian advance from 2014 to 2025
🟠Russian advance in 2026
🔵Territories retaken by Ukrainians in 2026
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For several weeks, the Russian 🇷🇺 army has been positioning its forces for the autumn offensive, which could aim to attack the Donbas 🇺🇦 from the southwest.
In the coming days, I will publish several analyses regarding Russian strategy, FAB airstrikes, and Ukrainian defenses in the sector.
In the coming days, I will publish several analyses regarding Russian strategy, FAB airstrikes, and Ukrainian defenses in the sector.
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