Since Mykhailo Drapatyi took up the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 Army, a series of new reforms happened :

Here are 5 points interesting to debate :

1. Command style
2. Command structure
3. Purge and renewal of the officer corps
4. Systemic reforms
5. Tactical doctrine

🧵THREAD🧵

1. Command style: an end to micromanagement

🔹Respect for the chain of command. The commander-in-chief no longer commands units directly; orders are routed through the operational commands' force groupings. Syrskyi would sometimes dictate orders down to the level of specific positional coordinates.
🔹End of daily briefings with every commander. This frees up his time and limits the flow of operational information, allowing him to focus on strategic and systemic issues.
🔹Commanders' perspective. The word most frequently used by brigade and corps commanders to describe his first few months is "freedom."

2. Command structure

🔹Six force groupings: North, South, West, Joint Forces Grouping, and two new ones: Center (Andrii Biletsky) and Azov (Denys Prokopenko). Since September, these two young brigadier generals have effectively commanded the defense of the Donetsk Oblast.
🔹Joint Forces Command (proposed, NATO model). Drapatyi intends to entrust it with conducting operations across the entire front; currently, it covers only parts of the Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. The General Staff would refocus on strategic planning, reserves, and international coordination.
🔹Assault regiments :
-recruitment temporarily suspended, with some personnel reassigned;
-units placed under the operational control of various corps

3. Purge and renewal of the officer corps

🔹Dozens of colonels and generals have been transferred to the reserves, while officers sidelined by previous commanders-in-chief have been reinstated.
🔹On September 28, Drapatyi gathered the heads of all General Staff divisions; the General Staff must change before demanding change from the troops.

4. Systemic reforms

🔹War plan : According to two sources cited by UP, this is reportedly the first document of its kind, outlining priorities and the development of the armed forces over three decades. It also addresses concrete issues, such as the value of keeping soldiers on the front line who serve primarily as "eyes and ears" but lack the actual capability to engage the enemy.
🔹Eight strategic priorities, presented immediately upon taking office. The first is transforming the armed forces (command and control, structure, doctrine, training, personnel management, digital and unmanned capabilities, logistics, lessons learned, and command culture).
🔹16 leadership principles defining expectations for commanders and soldiers.
🔹Reform of military education, led by Serhiï Sobko.
🔹Digitization. Drapatyi is pushing commanders to adopt the Delta situational awareness system; some still do not use it.
🔹Reintegration of AWOL soldiers: several units managed to bring back thousands of AWOL troops by promising better organization, an end to violence, and guaranteed pay. Nearly 10,000 soldiers reportedly rejoined the army.

5. Tactical doctrine: drones first

🔹The army has abandoned massive tank assaults preceded by artillery preparation. Every engagement now follows the same sequence:

1. Drone reconnaissance.
2. Strikes against Russian drone operators and interception of enemy drones.
3. Strikes on detected positions and logistics (trucks, motorcycles, infantry supply troops).
4. Infantry engagement, using armored vehicles escorted by drones, once defenses are deemed sufficiently weakened.

What I think about these new changes :

Part of the recent successes are Syrskyi’s legacy. UP notes that Syrskyi left the army in a better position than the one inherited from Zaluzhnyi in 2024, particularly thanks to his corps reform. Some of the current successes (Lyman, Oleksandrivka) build upon earlier momentum.

The first Drapatyi results are mainly organisational, but also defensive, such as the Sloviansk direction. From what I read on the media and from soldiers, new changes are positively welcomed. We will need to wait a bit more to see all the effects of these reforms.

A year ago, the first Russian 🇷🇺 soldiers reached and entered Kostiantynivka, the first city of the fortress belt

A year later, the city is still not captured and Ukrainian 🇺🇦 positions remain inside the city, including claimed drone positions.

From what I understand, in recent weeks, there were very few battles in the city, with both sides trying to bring more soldiers in, and striking the ennemy. I believe a part of the city is under Russian control, since I havn't seen any proof of Ukrainian presence for weeks, while I've seen airstrikes and drone strikes on Russian positions. However, it doesn't mean Ukrainian positions do not remain in the area.

The same applies for the north-eastern part of the city, which is still under Ukrainian control, with proofs of shelling and Ukrainian UAV positions there. The remaining part is still a grey zone.

Many maps, such as deepstate or uamap still show a large grey zone for the city. I don't think they are as wrong as one would believe, since there are still Ukrainian soldiers in most of the city, but I prefer to work with the information I have and show consolidated areas rather than a large grey zone here.

Right now, Russian forces continue to launch attempts to push north of Kostiantynivka, while they still didn't capture the city. Remember, back in June, when people were telling me the city would fall in the next few weeks and I said it would take months, going into autumn...

Donald Trump 🇺🇸 wants to buy diesel from Russia 🇷🇺 to address the shortage, a move that raises several points:

▫️There have been 98 Ukrainian 🇺🇦 strikes on Russian refineries since the start of the year
▫️A significant amount of storage and export infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed
▫️Some of the 32 refineries (including some of Russia's major ones) have halted part or all of their operations

1️⃣ Russia lacks the diesel production capacity to export such large quantities
2️⃣ Russia faces a lack of storage and export capacity and security following the Ukrainian strikes
3️⃣ Russia is already grappling with a severe diesel shortage; agreeing to this 'deal' would only exacerbate it.

Donald Trump’s 🇺🇸 announcement regarding the purchase of diesel from Russia 🇷🇺 once again exposes the total failure of the US foreign policy pursued by his administration.

🔹Despite his promises, Trump has not stopped a single war worldwide (aside from those that had already ended).
🔹The war he waged against Iran was a total failure—particularly on the political front—damaging the US image and the global economy.
🔹Trump has failed repeatedly regarding Ukraine, and the United States has lost a significant amount of influence over the conflict.
🔹Trump’s actions concerning Canada and Greenland have united Europeans—who refused to follow him into his wars.
🔹The "pivot to Asia" has yet to materialize, especially since Trump has alienated most of his allies in the region while suffering humiliation at the hands of China.
🔹The abandonment of Middle Eastern allies serves as a prime example of how the United States is no longer a reliable partner for many allies.

Domestically, Trump is weakened because he has not truly improved the daily lives of the Americans who voted for him—largely due to his war against Iran.

By purchasing diesel from Russia (supplies he is unlikely to actually receive due to Ukrainian strikes), Trump is playing into Putin's hands, even though the move will have virtually no impact on the global economy...

At the moment a Russian 🇷🇺 truck enters occupied Ukraine 🇺🇦, it becomes a target

A very important bunch of geolocations from @99Dominik_ with this video from @Exilenova_plus, which was filmed 130km from the frontline, north of Luhansk.

-> If we always talk about Ukraine's middle strikes in the south, we shouldn't forget how the east is being constantly targeted
-> Hundreds of trucks and vehicles are regularly being targeted in the east, between key Donbas cities.

Geolocation

4/4 Right now, Russia's strategy is like that :

-Missiles for heavily defended + underground targets (industrial/power plant)
-Drone missiles (Banderol, Dan-t, Geran-5) against fixed and middle targets
-Geran-4 drones against fixed/moving targets, mainly more important ones
-Geran-2 drones for saturation and targets close to the border

Thanks for following.

Addendum : on October 7th, at least 4 additional missile impacts can be seen in Lozova, Kharkiv oblast. t.me/osint_alarm/6286

Russia 🇷🇺 bombed multiple data centers in Kyiv, Dnipro or Odesa these last few weeks and proudly showed footage about it

Now, Ukraine is bombing Yandex data centers and causing much more harm to Russia than Russia did to Ukraine.

This is another example of symmetrical war. In September, I explained why I believed targeting Wildberries indirectly triggered a massive strike campaign against Ukrainian civilian warehouses, there were strikes before but it sharply increased in mid-July.

In fact, I do believe both Russia and Ukraine are replying to each other strikes. After Russia targeted Ukraine's energy infrastructures, Ukraine started doing the same. This applies to Ports, gas stations, trucks, railway infrastructure, bridges... What should be kept in mind is how an army must think about the consequences of any offensive action.

Thus, bombing refineries is very useful because Russia cannot bomb any Ukrainian refinery (all of them are out of use).

Less than 2 hours after Trump 🇺🇸 announced an energy ceasefire, Russia hit Kharkiv Thermal Power Plant

🔹️Ukraine 🇺🇦 didn't know about the ceasefire before Trump announced it
🔹️Russia 🇷🇺 broke it directly, or maybe didn't know about it ?

Two possibilities :

➡️ Trump is making deals alone without even asking anyone
➡️ Or it only concerns refineries, which is funny because Ukraine has no working refinery, so they would have no interest respecting this deal if Russia continues to attack Ukraine's energy infrastructure.

Usual Trump moment, thinking he is the best negotiator...

On the Velika Novosilka front, Ukraine 🇺🇦 continues to make advances on a large front against Russia 🇷🇺's 29th Army

Based on incomplete information available via OSINT (geolocated videos, satellite imagery, and Telegram channels updates), Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive operations along the southern front and have advanced several kilometers.

These operations are being conducted under the command of the DShV (Air Assault Forces), a formation established specifically for this sector earlier in the year, facing the Russian 29th Army, which is grappling with mounting difficulties. The Novopavlivka sector is also in a precarious state following the redeployment of the 41st Army toward Dobropillia, leaving few defensive units in the area.

🔹To the north, Ukrainian forces are advancing from Novopavlivka toward Dachne, while Russian infiltration units continue to attempt attacks toward Ivanivka (though without reaching previously liberated areas).

🔹Ukrainian troops continue to cross the Mokri Yali River and are infiltrating deep into the area in small groups. Urban combat has reportedly been underway in Komar for over a month, evidenced by the frequent shelling of their positions in the forests and villages to the north and west.
🔹At the same time, it appears they have entered Fedorivka, although there is currently no visual evidence to confirm this.

🔹Further south, Ukrainian forces have reached a significant portion of the second line of defense established in 2023, extending almost to the Mokri Yali River. According to various Russian and Ukrainian Telegram channels, Shevchenko is reportedly under Ukrainian control, with continued, though unconfirmed, advances to the south and east. There is only a single piece of visual evidence showing Ukrainian troops in Shevchenko. For the time being, I prefer to maintain a large "gray zone" due to the lack of information and the frequent presence of Russian soldiers behind Ukrainian lines.

The Ukrainians' main success is having reached the Mokri Yali River, a difficult obstacle for Russian forces to cross, thereby distancing key urban centers and roads in the Dnipropetrovsk region (the junction between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk) from the front line. At the same time, Ukrainian forces have retaken a significant portion of the 2023 defensive line, specifically the bunkers that allow for the establishment of strong positions for drone operators.

What comes next? For now, the Ukrainians appear to be focusing on urban combat in Komar and Sevchenko. Should these settlements fall, they would provide two key villages where forces could be concentrated and concealed ahead of winter. Meanwhile, several pontoon bridges have been destroyed at Velyka Novosilka, as the small town—the region's primary logistics hub—comes under increasing pressure.

Thank you for following along. The information presented here is based solely on open-source data that is at least 10 days old; both Russian and Ukrainian forces are avoiding the release of information regarding this sector, which complicates research efforts.