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report incompatible memory information.

**What it does not establish:** I have not physically inspected the memory chips or obtained an independent hardware-level measurement. The kernel itself may have been modified, so its reports must also be treated cautiously.

My working hypothesis is that this may be a device with approximately **4GB of physical RAM being presented as an 8GB model**.

# 3. The storage discrepancy: 256GB in Android, approximately 104 GiB of userdata in Fastboot

Android showed a data filesystem size of approximately **226 GiB**, which would be consistent with a nominal 256GB storage configuration.

However, I rebooted the device into the bootloader and ran:

fastboot getvar all

The bootloader returned:

product: dew
is-userspace: no
partition-size:userdata: 1a14cf8000
partition-type:userdata: f2fs

Converting the hexadecimal partition size:

0x1a14cf8000
= 112018292736 bytes
≈ 104.325 GiB

That is much closer to what one might expect from a 128GB device after accounting for system partitions and other reserved space.

The same Fastboot output reported the `super` partition as 9 GiB.

Again, there is an important limitation.

**The size of the userdata partition is not the same thing as the total physical storage capacity.**

I cannot conclusively claim that the storage chip is 128GB without independently verifying the full device capacity and partition layout.

Nevertheless, Android presenting a roughly 226 GiB data filesystem while Fastboot reports a roughly 104 GiB userdata partition is a serious inconsistency.

Combined with the RAM discrepancy, it raises the possibility that a lower-specification device was modified to appear as the advertised 8/256GB variant.

# 4. Android says the bootloader is locked. Fastboot says it is unlocked.

This was another major finding.

Android reported:

ro.boot.flash.locked=1
ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state=locked
ro.boot.verifiedbootstate=green

But the actual bootloader interface reported:

unlocked: yes
secure: no

The Fastboot session was in bootloader mode, not userspace Fastboot:

is-userspace: no

In other words, the operating system presented the device as locked and verified, while the bootloader reported otherwise.

I am not claiming that Fastboot is an infallible independent hardware trust anchor.

However, these results should not be casually dismissed as normal behavior.

At minimum, the reported security state is inconsistent across interfaces.

This matters because users rely on bootloader state and verified-boot information to understand whether their device's operating system has been modified.

# 5. Unexpected root infrastructure was already running

I did not root this phone.

Yet the investigation found multiple active processes associated with root and runtime modification infrastructure.

Examples include:

zn-daemon
zn-nsdaemon-zygote
zn-zygisk-companion64 network_module
lspd
sdk_server
TEESimulator

The process tree included commands referencing:

/data/adb/ksu/bin/busybox
/data/adb/modules/network_module/service.sh
/data/adb/modules/zygisk_lsposed/service.sh
/data/adb/network/sdk_daemon.sh

The observed parent-child relationship included:

network_module/service.sh
|
v
sdk_server
|
v
TEESimulator

Eight investigated processes were running as UID 0, while `lspd` was running as UID 1000.

The processes reported the SELinux context:

u:r:ksu:s0

SELinux itself was reported as enforcing.

This is not ordinary stock-phone behavior.

These components indicate that the operating system contains an active root and runtime-modification infrastructure.

I have not established who installed it, why it was installed, or whether all of its components are malicious.

# 6. LSPosed was modifying the Android runtime

The investigation discovered two executable files associated with LSPosed that were accessible through existing bind mounts.

The logical source paths were:
/data/adb/modules/zygisk_lsposed/bin/dex2oat32
/data/adb/modules/zygisk_lsposed/bin/dex2oat64

They were mounted over:

/apex/com.android.art/bin/dex2oat32
/apex/com.android.art/bin/dex2oat64

I copied the accessible binaries for static analysis.

The 32-bit wrapper was approximately 4.9KB, and the 64-bit wrapper approximately 7.1KB.

The 64-bit ELF analysis revealed code that:

1. Connects to an abstract Unix-domain socket.
2. Exchanges messages and receives file descriptors through `SCM_RIGHTS`.
3. Requests a hook library identified as `liboat_hook.so`.
4. Adds the argument `--inline-max-code-units=0`.
5. Sets `LD_PRELOAD` using a `/proc/<pid>/fd/<fd>` path.
6. Calls `fexecve()` to execute the received file descriptor.

The Unix socket name embedded in the binary matched an active socket visible in the device's socket tables.

This is consistent with an ART hooking mechanism.

**Crucially, I did not find RAM or storage spoofing logic in these two wrappers.**

The actual hook library and most of the module's files were not accessible.

Therefore, I cannot attribute the specification discrepancies to LSPosed specifically.

But the existence of runtime hooking infrastructure on a supposedly new, stock smartphone is itself a significant finding.

# 7. TEESimulator and injection into Android Keystore

This is one of the parts that concerns me most.

The logs from two separate boots showed TEESimulator reporting that it successfully loaded:

/data/adb/modules/network_module/sdk_tricky.so

into the Android `keystore2` process.

Related log entries referenced:

sdk_tricky.dex
libcertgen.so
keybox.xml
/data/adb/network

The logs also described loading package configurations and creating software-backed cryptographic operations.

Android Keystore is a security-sensitive component involved in cryptographic key management and hardware-backed security functionality.

The presence of a module attempting to modify its behavior deserves scrutiny.

One possible explanation is that this infrastructure was intended to simulate or manipulate device attestation or security-related responses.

However, I want to be precise:

* The logs report successful injection; I did not independently dump the target process's memory.
* I have not verified the contents of `keybox.xml`.
* I have not demonstrated a successful forged hardware attestation.
* I have not proven that cryptographic secrets were stolen.
* I have not established that the installed binaries match the source code of any similarly named open-source project.

I am reporting what the device actually logged, not claiming a proven compromise of every Android security mechanism.

# 8. I installed the official KernelSU Manager. It disappeared after reboot.

Because the running processes referenced KernelSU-related paths, I attempted to investigate using the official KernelSU Manager.

I obtained two releases from the official project:

KernelSU Manager v3.3.1
KernelSU Manager v0.9.5

Neither recognized the installed root implementation.

The newer version reported that the driver interface could not be accessed, including a syscall blocked by seccomp.

That result does not establish that the existing root infrastructure was absent.

After a reboot, the older manager was gone.

I had not manually uninstalled it.

The Android PackageManager log contained this entry:

11-16 11:15:36.396
pm_critical_info:
Uninstall pkg: me.weishu.kernelsu
u0 flags:2 from u0/3572 of null

Subsequent events confirmed that the package had been fully removed.

The important detail is:

from u0/3572

The uninstall request was attributed to UID 0.

My ADB shell was UID 2000 and had not been granted root access.

This means a privileged process requested the removal.

**I have not identified the specific process or script responsible.**

It would be premature to say that a particular root module deliberately removed the manager to hide itself.

Nevertheless, an official root-management app disappearing after a reboot, with a root-attributed uninstall event
in the logs, is highly unusual for a device sold as new.

# 9. Developer Options and USB debugging kept turning off

Every time the phone rebooted, I had to re-enable Developer Options and USB debugging.

I investigated the Settings and SecurityCenter APKs using JADX.

In the decompiled SecurityCenter code, I found a method named:

DevModeModel.optimize()

Its implementation includes operations that:

* Hide Developer Options in the UI.
* Send `com.android.settings.action.DEV_CLOSE`.
* Write `adb_enabled=0` to `Settings.Secure`.
* Write `development_settings_enabled=0` to `Settings.Global`.

This is a possible mechanism for disabling both features.

However, the static analysis did not establish that this method was called during boot.

I also ran temporary observers across controlled reboots.

They recorded both settings initially enabled, but the observers did not capture the exact transition to the disabled state.

So the responsible component remains unknown.

The fact that a method capable of disabling these settings exists is not, by itself, proof of malicious behavior.

# 10. A root-owned network socket was listening on port 15678

The investigation also found a TCP/IPv6 listening socket bound to a wildcard address:

Port: 15678
UID: 0

What I could not determine:

* The owning PID.
* The application protocol.
* Whether authentication was required.
* Whether the socket was reachable from outside the device.
* Whether it was related to any of the root modules.

I did not connect to it or perform active network probing.

This is a finding worth investigating, but **it is not proof of a remote-access backdoor**.

# 11. How much of the hidden root software could I actually extract?

Not much, unfortunately.

The final investigation performed **117 read attempts** against candidate module and executable paths.

Results:

Successful module-file reads: 2
Permission denied: 115

The two accessible files were the LSPosed ELF wrappers described above.

The main scripts remained inaccessible:

network_module/service.sh
network_module_ksu/service.sh
zygisk_lsposed/service.sh
sdk_daemon.sh

The contents of the root modules could not be reconstructed reliably from process names alone.

I did not exploit vulnerabilities, bypass permissions, inject code, modify SELinux, or flash the device to obtain further access.

The final root-investigation phase was read-only.

Earlier diagnostic steps did include user-authorized reboots and installation attempts involving official KernelSU Manager APKs.

# 12. After the factory reset, the phone switched to Chinese

After preserving the diagnostic evidence, I performed a factory reset in preparation for returning the phone.

The phone had been sold as a **Global** Redmi 15C.

Following the reset, its initial system interface and power menu appeared in Chinese.

I had not completed the HyperOS setup wizard at that point.

This was surprising, given how the phone had originally presented itself.

However, I cannot claim that this alone proves the device is a Chinese-market variant.

A reset can change locale settings, and I have not yet verified whether Russian or English remains available in the setup language selector.

I am including this observation because it occurred after the other discrepancies had already been documented.

# 13. What I actually preserved

The investigation generated a substantial evidence archive containing:

* Original ADB and Fastboot output.
* Android boot logs.
* Kernel memory and process information.
* PackageManager uninstall events.
* Process ancestry and SELinux contexts.
* Socket tables and mount information.
* Copies of accessible ELF binaries.
* Decompiled Android application classes.
* APK and DEX inventories.
* SHA-256 hashes.
* Static-analysis reports.
* Screenshots and video evidence of the specification discrepancies.

The archive includes separate technical reports covering the initial diagnosis and the root-component investigation.

The analysis was performed using Linux, ADB, Fastboot, Python, JADX, `readelf`,
`strings`, and `llvm-objdump`, with assistance from OpenAI Codex.

I have not published the raw archive yet because it may contain serial numbers, device identifiers, package information, and other potentially sensitive data.

I would need to sanitize it first.

# 14. My current interpretation

I see three major issues.

**First: The advertised hardware specifications are questionable.**

The 4 GiB physical-page accounting and 104.3 GiB Fastboot userdata partition are consistent with the possibility of a lower-specification device being presented as an 8/256GB model.

That is a strong hypothesis, not a confirmed identification of the physical chips.

**Second: The software environment is clearly not an ordinary untouched stock installation.**

The running root infrastructure, LSPosed modifications, and Keystore-related injection logs demonstrate substantial modifications.

**Third: The device's security reporting cannot be trusted at face value.**

The conflicting bootloader states, unexpected privileged package removal, and repeated disabling of debugging features make the system difficult to assess.

I do not know whether the seller installed these modifications, whether the phone was refurbished, whether it originated from another market, or whether some earlier party modified it.

I am not accusing Xiaomi of installing this software.

I am describing the state of one device that was sold to me as new.

# Conclusion

This investigation documents a Redmi 15C sold as a new Global 8GB/256GB device, with substantial inconsistencies in hardware reporting, bootloader state, and operating-system integrity.

The evidence includes:

* A discrepancy between approximately 8GB reported by /proc/meminfo and 4 GiB accounted for by /proc/zoneinfo.
* A discrepancy between Android's reported storage capacity and the Fastboot userdata partition size.
* Conflicting bootloader security states reported by Android and Fastboot.
* Active root infrastructure, LSPosed-related ART modifications, and logs reporting injection into keystore2.
* An unexpected KernelSU Manager uninstall request attributed to UID 0.

These observations establish that the device's software environment was substantially modified. They do not conclusively establish the physical RAM or storage capacity, identify the party responsible, or prove malicious intent.

This case illustrates why Android-reported specifications and security properties should not always be treated as independent evidence of device integrity.

The findings apply to this particular device and should not be generalized to all Redmi 15C units or Xiaomi devices.

# Visual Evidence

Screenshots documenting the RAM, storage, and bootloader security-state discrepancies:

[https://imgur.com/a/XQ4ANzo](https://imgur.com/a/XQ4ANzo)

The screenshots contain Russian annotations. All measurements, calculations, and their limitations are explained in the technical sections above.

https://redd.it/1xxlyyw
@reddit_android
Lock your apps with app lock, available for testing in the Android 17 QPR3 beta!

Hi Reddit,

I’m excited to give you a preview of a highly requested security feature coming to Android: App lock.

App lock addresses multiple user concerns relating to phone theft and device sharing. Many of you have asked for a feature like this to add an extra layer of protection to apps that lack their own built-in app locks, such as some social media apps, mail apps, or cloud storage apps. We’ve also heard that many of you want a feature like this so you can hand your unlocked phone to a friend or family member without worrying about them snooping through your private apps.

# Introducing App Lock

App lock is a new, easy to use security feature that allows you to quickly lock apps to prevent unauthorized access. 

When an app is locked, it can’t be launched without entering your device credential (PIN, pattern, or password) or biometric. While an app is locked, its notification content is hidden, widgets and shortcuts are removed, and content in the recents screen is redacted.

https://preview.redd.it/nsikg4ol5f2i1.png?width=2048&format=png&auto=webp&s=f4fe1b2758e5601b9b90ba931fbebc4032ceaf0c

Pixel users can test the app lock feature on their devices starting with the Android 17 QPR3 Beta 3 release. 

If you have a Pixel device enrolled in the Android Beta program, please help us test it! The product team is planning to release the app lock feature with the Android 17 QPR3 platform release in Q1 2027, and any feedback you can share with us will help us to deliver a seamless, high-quality app locking experience.  

# How to lock an app

You can quickly lock apps from your home screen or manage them in bulk via Settings:

Lock an app via the home screen: Long-press the app icon, select "App lock," and authenticate using your device credential (PIN, pattern, or password) or biometric.
Lock apps in Settings: Go to Settings > Security & privacy > App lock, authenticate, and enable app lock for one or more apps.

# How to disable app lock

Disable app lock via the home screen: Long-press the app icon, select "Remove app lock," and authenticate using your device credential (PIN, pattern, or password) or biometric.
Disable app lock in Settings: Go to Settings > Security & privacy > App lock, authenticate, and disable app lock for one or more apps.

# FAQs

Is app lock available for all apps? 
App lock is available for all apps except for certain preloaded apps and apps that hold certain roles.
Can data from locked apps still be accessed by other apps? 
AI agents and services you've allowed to access locked apps will still be able to access their data. Furthermore, photos and videos from locked apps may still show in other apps that have access to your photos and videos. For more protection, we recommend using private space.
Does an app reveal that it is locked through any visual cues on your home screen? 
No, it does not. To avoid potential privacy issues, the icon for a locked app will remain unchanged. 
Does app lock work with alternative launchers?
Yes, app lock works with alternative launchers. When set as the default home app, alternative launchers can utilize new APIs available starting in Android 17 QPR2 to trigger app lock enablement and disablement from the home screen on devices that support the feature. 
When do locked apps relock after I unlock them?
Once you authenticate to open a locked app, it stays unlocked while it's in the foreground and for a short grace period after you leave it. Locked apps also lock immediately whenever you lock your device.

Try this feature out today in the Android 17 QPR3 Beta and let us know in the comments if you have any feedback!



https://redd.it/1xznwhs
@reddit_android
I built an ultra-lightweight TUI launcher (15–20MB RAM) that brings modern LLM AI back to 10-year-old Android devices (Android 5.0+)

Hi r/Android!



Like many of you, I have a drawer with a few older Android phones (Galaxy S4/S5 era, Nexus 5, old budget MediaTek phones). Hardware-wise, they are still fine, but modern Android apps and web browsers have made them virtually unusable. Heavy web frameworks crash under 1GB RAM, Google Play Services drain what's left of the battery, and modern AI tools like ChatGPT or Gemini require Android 10+.



I wanted to see if I could give these legacy devices a genuinely useful second life in 2026. So I built **Tdroid** — a pure text-based (TUI) launcher designed from the ground up for minimal resource usage, privacy, and speed.



\---



\### 🧠 The LLM / AI Integration

The biggest challenge on older devices (Android 5.0 Lollipop & 6.0 Marshmallow) is running modern AI. Heavy web apps freeze the browser, and TLS certificate issues often block HTTPS calls on ancient WebViews.



In Tdroid:

\- Built a native, lightweight network engine with proper TLS support.

\- Integrated a direct **AI Chat** interface that opens instantly without waiting for a browser engine to spin up.

\- Added quick command-line queries directly from the home screen: simply type `ai <your question>` to get answers.

\- Works smoothly even on single/dual-core chips without lag or thermal throttling.



\---



\### ⚡ Key Features & Performance:

\- **Tiny footprint:** Consumes only **15–25 MB of RAM** (idle is under 20MB). Zero background battery drain.

\- **Direct Canvas Rendering:** No Compose, no heavy XML hierarchies, no WebViews — just high-speed monospace terminal rendering.

\- **Two Releases:**

\- **Modern Edition (Android 7.0 – 15):** Full sensor bars, dynamic themes, Material-styled TUI.

\- **Legacy Pro Edition (Android 5.0 – 6.0+ / API 21+):** Backported and verified specifically for old hardware.

\- **Built-in Offline Ecosystem:**

\- Dual-pane **T-Commander** (full file manager with SD card, FTP, WebDAV).

\- Quick notes, task manager, TXT book reader, scientific calculator.

\- Built-in **TDScript IDE** with bytecode execution for lightweight terminal automation.

\- 14 retro terminal games (Snake, Tetris, 2048, Roguelike, Space Invaders).

\- 100% functional without Google Play Services or an active internet connection (except for LLM queries).



\---



\### 📲 Download & Testing

The project is available for both modern phones and older devices:

\- **Download APK directly:** [https://fido2465724100-creator.github.io/my-developer-site/\](https://fido2465724100-creator.github.io/my-developer-site/)

*(For Android 5/6 devices, look for the `Tdroid-Pro-Legacy.apk` package in the green legacy download card).*



I'd love to hear your feedback, bug reports, and see what old hardware you manage to revive with it!

https://redd.it/1xzubee
@reddit_android