How to use Claude Code for Bug Bounty: find fast, validate manually
https://www.yeswehack.com/learn-bug-bounty/llm-series-claude
https://www.yeswehack.com/learn-bug-bounty/llm-series-claude
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[PWN2OWN IRELAND 2025] Bypassing Authentication via Synology DS925+ SAML SSO
https://chanzep.github.io/posts/pwn2own-ireland-2025-bypassing-authentication-via-synology-ds925-saml-sso/?preview=true
https://chanzep.github.io/posts/pwn2own-ireland-2025-bypassing-authentication-via-synology-ds925-saml-sso/?preview=true
chanze's blog
[PWN2OWN IRELAND 2025] Bypassing Authentication via Synology DS925+ SAML SSO · chanze's blog
Human
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AISLE Discovers a One-Click RCE Vulnerability in Cursor, VS Code, and Google Antigravity
https://aisle.com/blog/aisle-discovers-1-click-rce-vulnerability-in-cursor-vs-code-and-google-antigravity
https://aisle.com/blog/aisle-discovers-1-click-rce-vulnerability-in-cursor-vs-code-and-google-antigravity
AISLE
A 1-Click RCE Issue in Cursor, VS Code, and Antigravity
Learn how our AI found a one-click RCE vulnerability in 3 code editors: Cursor, VS Code, and Google Antigravity.
When a Web App Detects Burp Suite via TLS Fingerprinting
https://kecman.co/blog/burp-suite-tls-fingerprint-bot-detection-bypass.html
https://kecman.co/blog/burp-suite-tls-fingerprint-bot-detection-bypass.html
kecman.co
When a Web App Detects Burp Suite via TLS Fingerprinting
Burp Suite is a MITM proxy running two separate TLS connections. The second one has its own fingerprint, and modern bot detection notices. Here's how to spot it and fix it.
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Beyond Prompt Injection: Hacking Apple's Private Cloud Compute
https://blog.sentry.security/beyond-prompt-injection-hacking-apples-private-cloud-compute/
https://blog.sentry.security/beyond-prompt-injection-hacking-apples-private-cloud-compute/
Checkmate
Beyond Prompt Injection: Hacking Apple's Private Cloud Compute
Drinor was awarded $150,000 for CVE-2026-20685 targeting Apple's Private Cloud Compute, the inference backbone of Apple Intelligence capabilities.
This work is my contribution to Sentry's AI Security research initiative, run through SARC, the Sentry Applied…
This work is my contribution to Sentry's AI Security research initiative, run through SARC, the Sentry Applied…
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How to start (or come back to) bug bounties in 2026
https://hakluke.com/how-to-start-or-come-back-to-bug-bounties-in-2026
https://hakluke.com/how-to-start-or-come-back-to-bug-bounties-in-2026
hakluke
How to start (or come back to) bug bounties in 2026 | hakluke
Getting back into bug bounties in 2026? What's changed, how the top hunters actually use AI, which vulns to chase, and where the good writeups live now.
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The Future - On AI Soveriegnity, Vulnerability Research, and Bug Bounty
https://ret2p.lt/2026/08/10/ai-vuln-research-future.html
https://ret2p.lt/2026/08/10/ai-vuln-research-future.html
ret2p.lt
The Future - On AI Soveriegnity, Vulnerability Research, and Bug Bounty
Preface
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Ruby 4.0 Universal RCE Deserialization Gadget Chain
https://www.elttam.com/blog/ruby-4-0-universal-rce-deserialization-gadget-chain
https://www.elttam.com/blog/ruby-4-0-universal-rce-deserialization-gadget-chain
Elttam
Ruby 4.0 Universal RCE Deserialization Gadget Chain - elttam
This post releases a new universal chain that turns a single Marshal.load into command execution on Ruby, built with new gadgets from untapped sources as well as old gadgets put to new use.
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You’re Back In The Room (Citrix NetScaler Pre-Auth RCE CVE-2026-8452(?))
https://labs.watchtowr.com/youre-back-in-the-room-citrix-netscaler-pre-auth-rce-cve-2026-8452/
https://labs.watchtowr.com/youre-back-in-the-room-citrix-netscaler-pre-auth-rce-cve-2026-8452/
watchTowr Labs
You’re Back In The Room (Citrix NetScaler Pre-Auth RCE CVE-2026-8452(?))
Suddenly, you’re in a room. You look around - oh, you’re surrounded by other new starters at your new job. Yes, it’s Monday, and you’re being onboarded.
You know the drill - it’s the typical enterprise “please don’t be a bad person or we may have
You know the drill - it’s the typical enterprise “please don’t be a bad person or we may have
Part 1/6 | Systemic Risks in the Managed PostgreSQL Industry: Extension Risks Are Real! Exploiting PostGis Memory Corruption Bug at NeonDB, SupaBase and Many More
https://mehmetince.net/part-1-6-systemic-risks-in-the-managed-postgresql-industry-extension-risks-are-real-exploiting-postgis-memory-corruption-bug-at-neondb-supabase-and-many-more/
https://mehmetince.net/part-1-6-systemic-risks-in-the-managed-postgresql-industry-extension-risks-are-real-exploiting-postgis-memory-corruption-bug-at-neondb-supabase-and-many-more/
Mehmet Ince @mdisec - Vulnerability Researcher | Building security products | Security Advisor | Amateur Muay Thai fighter
Part 1/6 | Systemic Risks in the Managed PostgreSQL Industry: Extension Risks Are Real! Exploiting PostGis Memory Corruption Bug…
Back in April, I was talking with our system and software engineering teams at PRODAFT about the possibilities of using a managed database service. Due to the nature of our business, we simply cannot start using managed services right away. I told my team…
From a Schema Name to RCE in n8n
https://simonkoeck.com/writeups/n8n-gsuiteadmin-prototype-pollution-rce
https://simonkoeck.com/writeups/n8n-gsuiteadmin-prototype-pollution-rce
Simon Koeck
CVE-2026-33696: From a Schema Name to RCE in n8n | Simon Koeck
n8n used a user-supplied schema name as a key on a plain object. Setting it to __proto__ polluted the prototype and led to RCE through the Git node.
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The Critical Unauthenticated RCE Vulnerability In CircleCI’s MCP Server
https://remedio.io/blog/the-critical-unauthenticated-rce-vulnerability-in-circlecis-mcp-server/
https://remedio.io/blog/the-critical-unauthenticated-rce-vulnerability-in-circlecis-mcp-server/
Remedio
The Critical Unauthenticated RCE Vulnerability In CircleCI's MCP Server - Remedio
A critical unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in CircleCI’s Model Context Protocol (MCP) server allowed attackers to spoof client headers and execute arbitrary pipeline code without credentials.
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Chaining IDOR to Privilege Escalation: A $$$$ Microsoft Bug Bounty
https://medium.com/@dsmodi484/chaining-idor-to-privilege-escalation-a-microsoft-bug-bounty-936656cf47a2
https://medium.com/@dsmodi484/chaining-idor-to-privilege-escalation-a-microsoft-bug-bounty-936656cf47a2
Medium
Chaining IDOR to Privilege Escalation: A $$$$ Microsoft Bug Bounty
Hello Everybody, Today in this writeup I am going to explain my findings of a Microsoft’s Important Severity bug which ultimately leads to…
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Pre-Auth RCE in UniFi OS - CVE-2026-34909: One Request to Root Behind Seven Products ($42,751)
https://www.catchify.sa/post/pre-auth-rce-unifi-os-one-request-to-root
https://www.catchify.sa/post/pre-auth-rce-unifi-os-one-request-to-root
Catchify
Pre-Auth RCE in UniFi OS - CVE-2026-34909: One Request to Root Behind Seven Products ($42,751) | Catchify Security
SQL injection + root command injection + CVSS 10.0 nginx bypass + unauthenticated JWT minting = one request to root on any UniFi OS device. Full technical writeup.
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When the NASA Ground Station Has No Lock on the Door: Unauthenticated Command Execution in AIT-GUI (GHSA-p9r8-2q67-fp86)
https://cycode.com/blog/ait-gui-unauthenticated-command-execution/
https://cycode.com/blog/ait-gui-unauthenticated-command-execution/
Cycode
When the NASA Ground Station Has No Lock on the Door - Cycode
Cycode research: NASA/JPL's AMMOS AIT-GUI ground console ships with no auth, no CSRF, and a 0.0.0.0 bind, enabling unauthenticated command execution. Fixed in 2.5.2.
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