ELINT News
RT @IranNuances: An Iranian security official warned: If the US strikes #Iran's civilian infrastructure tonight, the Dubai and Abu Dhabi airports, along with the ports of Fujairah and Jebel Ali, must be immediately evacuated to protect citizens from impending Iranian retaliatory attacks. - Fars
tweet

OSINTdefender
RT @hey_itsmyturn: From Bidboland Refinery,
Mahshahr
Khuzestan Province, #Iran https://twitter.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2079713927852638287/video/1
tweet

Michael A. Horowitz
RT @Taylor_Luck: As the #US-#Iran War threatens to widen and the region faces a generational shift, @csmonitor is posting its award-winning Middle East coverage, free of charge, via Substack: https://monitoringmiddleeast.substack.com/p/monitoring-the-middle-east

Join today and experience CS Monitor: independent news for independent thinkers.
tweet

OSINTdefender
Iranian officials have accused Qatar of holding three Iranian military pilots who went missing after their aircraft were downed in March, confirming that Iranian aircraft violated Qatari airspace.

Qatar has rejected the claim, saying the aircraft violated sovereign Qatari airspace and that Qatari authorities attempted to contact the aircraft but received no response. Qatar says that "necessary measures were taken to defend our territory."

Qatar subsequently conducted search-and-rescue operations and says it recovered the remains of one pilot. Doha says it contacted Tehran to coordinate the handover but received no response, and has invited Iranian officials to review the details of the incident.

HE Dr Majed bin Mohammed Al Ansari, Advisor to the Prime Minister and Official Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said in a post on X that Qatar categorically denies claims regarding the detention of Iranian pilots.

@majedalansari

#Qatar #MajedAlAnsari #Iran #qatarairspace #middleeast - Gulf Times
tweet

Faytuks News
Reports of new US airstrikes in Iran

US is attacking several areas in southern Iran in 2 different provinces.

#Iran - Shin
tweet

ELINT News
RT @EGYOSINT: 🇸🇦🇾🇪 The Houthis appear to have struck Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, which carries crude from Abqaiq on the Gulf coast to Yanbu on the Red Sea.

Multiple fire hotspots were detected at six points along the pipeline route at roughly the same time, around 17:56 UTC.

Large smoke plumes were also visible in the attached NOAA-20 and MODIS satellite imagery.

Looks like the Houthis might have actually scored a direct hit on the E/W pipeline. Confidence flag is tagged at maximum, and FRP printing above 70 MW blows way past conventional fire(~30 MW).

FRP >70 MW scream high-pressure crude rupture and blowout conflagration. Brightness is literally maxing out and clipping the saturation cap on the VIIRS I4 band.

Cross-referencing the delta between VIIRS and MODIS orbital passes, FRP anomaly printed 60+ MW for an 8 hour duration minimum. A garden-variety valve leak or routine gas venting simply cannot sustain that burn duration or heat signature.

Faded the controlled burn or flare stack hypothesis too. Pump stations sit dozens of clicks apart on the ROW, but these heat anomalies are tightly clustered along a sub-10km stretch.

No normal maintenance operation or controlled burn is conducted on such a massive scale simultaneously across multiple points spaced just kilometers apart along the pipeline route.

Something definitely went down.

#oott #iran - JH
tweet

Nuno Felix
RT @JasonMBrodsky: "Fourteen Russian spy satellites moved over a US military base in Saudi Arabia two days before a devastating attack by #Iran. The timing and sequencing of the spacecraft gave them access to a large spectrum of data which, US officials and international intelligence sources say, helped Tehran conduct some of its most precise attacks against American assets."

https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/16/world/video/russia-spy-satellites-iran-intelligence-strikes-us-assets-digvid-invs
tweet

OSINTdefender
RT @BretBaier: SPECIAL REPORT EXCLUSIVE: Don’t miss the Iranian President TONIGHT 6pmET on @specialreport @foxnews #foxnews #specialreport #iran https://twitter.com/BretBaier/status/2103128855816892595/video/1
tweet

WarMonitor
RT @hey_itsmyturn: Some kind of clusterfuck is happening near Qeshm island, blasts coming from the sea, too many blasts.
Hormozgan Province, #Iran
tweet

Nuno Felix
RT @citrinowicz: A U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq: For Iran it is a strategic victory

From Tehran’s perspective, a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would represent an extraordinary strategic achievement. Few countries matter more to Iran than Iraq: it shares a long border with the Islamic Republic, has a Shiite-majority population, occupies a critical geographic position at the heart of the Middle East, and is home to powerful armed groups with longstanding ties to Tehran.

Iran would almost certainly seek to exploit a reduced American presence to deepen its political, security, and economic influence in Baghdad and across Iraq. Iranian leaders could also portray the withdrawal as further evidence that sustained pressure on the United States eventually produces an American retreat from the region.

The timing therefore matters. A U.S. drawdown while Washington remains engaged in a broader confrontation with Tehran risks sending a message very different from the one the United States intends. Rather than strengthening deterrence or constraining Iranian influence, Tehran could interpret the withdrawal as confirmation that it can withstand American pressure while continuing to expand its leverage in one of the most strategically important countries in the Middle East.

The controversy surrounding Iraq’s decision to ban flights to Iran only underscores just how deeply entrenched Iranian influence has become inside Iraq. Tehran’s leverage extends far beyond its relationships with armed militias; it is embedded across significant parts of Iraq’s political, economic, and security landscape. Whatever happens to the U.S. military presence, this influence is not going to disappear. Any American strategy toward Iraq must begin with that reality rather than assume that pressure on Iran alone will fundamentally weaken Tehran’s position in Baghdad.

For Washington, the central question is therefore not simply how many American troops remain in Iraq, but what political and security architecture is left behind. Without an effective strategy to strengthen Iraqi state institutions and limit the autonomy of Iran-aligned armed groups, a military withdrawal could create precisely the strategic space Tehran has spent years trying to secure.

#iraq
#iran

US forces exit Iraq after two decades, leaving opening for Iran
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-forces-exit-iraq-after-two-decades-leaving-opening-iran-2026-09-29/ - Matthew Levitt
tweet

Nuno Felix
RT @PatrickBury: Good stuff here on the realities of the “only fuel smugglers” hypothesis

I have received various questions and comments on some of my previous assessments on the #RAF #Fairford major incident — including suggestions that it “may have been a dry run”, and others that it was simply five lads trying to nick diesel. Public facts do not settle it, but they sit poorly with opportunistic fuel theft.
- I'll explain:
- Police found petrol — described as an accelerant — and no #IEDs. So if it was a dry run, it was not a dry run in the sense of empty rehearsal vehicles. There was fuel on board. They also released the five men on bail with strict conditions while the investigation continues. That does not prove innocence; it also does not prove a completed bomb plot.
- The farmer who called it in says she did not see five men. She puts it at eight to ten, hooded and in balaclavas, splitting across fields and towards the base when her headlights hit them.
- Police arrested five and have indicated they are not looking for anyone else. Night can inflate a count. It can also mean people ran and were not caught.
- I also looked at #UK diesel theft cases to try to discern a pattern. Some surface details overlap with diesel nicking — and several important ones do not.
- While vans, drums and fake fuel livery may not be exotic for the job, they are not the norm. Large teams are definitely not the norm.
- A van may be a standard tool when thieves want volume, not a quick field raid. Modified vans with concealed tanks are an established tactic for taking large amounts from bowsers, generators and tanks.
- Fake or cloned fuel-company markings are not unheard of; a van that looks like a delivery or “Fuel 2You” vehicle draws less attention on a country lane at night.
- Barrels in the back fit the usual kit list. Cotswold villages around Fairford include off-grid properties that store heating oil, and farms and sites store diesel. In that narrow sense, “vans, barrels, fuel branding” is not exotic.
- But, caught rural jobs are usually two men, sometimes one or three — often local or from the next county (7–20 miles), on quads or a single van, after farm tanks, bowsers or HGVs. They steal red diesel, white diesel or heating oil, then leave.
- Fairford does not match that. The suspects were 23–25 and from Camden, Westminster and Willesden — about 80–100 miles away.
- Three vans as a convoy, masks, petrol not farm diesel, and a pitch-up next to a US-used bomber base at 1am is not where you go to pinch a heating-oil tank.
- You do not need eight to ten people to siphon a bowser. Extra bodies are a liability.
- Fuel thieves also tend to run away from the hard target, not towards the perimeter.
- So the vans and barrels can look like theft. The distance, the crowd, the masks, the petrol and the location do not.
- I'd say judging from the above a dry run or interrupted approach is a cleaner fit with those facts. The vans and fuel could be logistics for a later incendiary or vehicle-borne attack; the night visit could be route reconnaissance, timing, or testing access while already carrying the accelerant.
- “Just five lads after diesel” is the weakest fit.
- Two last points. First, the release of the five suspects on bail, as much as it was surprising, matches a run of recent UK and European cases involving disposable, single-use agents recruited by hostile states—chiefly #Russia and #Iran.
- In similar UK proxy cases that I have looked at (warehouse arsons, attacks on #Jewish sites, reconnaissance jobs) suspects have also been bailed while police investigate who directed them and what they knew. Detention without charge is tightly limited; proving the wider network or state link takes longer.
- Second, a night-time approach to RAF Fairford with petrol and fake fuel vans could have been a deniable signal from a malign actor that they can reach the base used against them, even without a finished bomb. A “message” does not need explosives to be the[...]

WarMonitor
RT @NOELreports: ❗️Russia is providing Iran with missiles, a Western official told Bloomberg. The official said Moscow also reportedly assisted Tehran in targeting US bases across the region that were subsequently damaged or destroyed. Bloomberg reports that Iran preserved its missile and drone factories despite months of US-Israeli bombing, allowing Tehran to replenish its arsenals during the current lull in fighting. Iran is also said to retain part of its anti-ship missile arsenal. #Iran
tweet

Nuno Felix
This is definitely an important read

Regime Change in Iran Will Not Solve all of Israel’s Strategic Problems

Even the collapse of the Islamic Republic would neither resolve Israel’s fundamental security challenges nor automatically pave the way for normalization with the Arab world. Suggesting otherwise reflects a profound misunderstanding of the region’s political and strategic realities.

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the Iranian regime collapses tomorrow. Would that lead to the lifting of international sanctions imposed in response to Israeli policies in the West Bank? Would Hamas suddenly surrender? Would Hezbollah disappear? Even the so-called Axis of Resistance, while undoubtedly weakened, would not simply cease to exist. And is Israel really prepared to occupy Lebanon in an attempt to eliminate Hezbollah once and for all?

There is no question that the collapse of the Islamic Republic could significantly improve Israel’s strategic environment. Iran is a major source of regional instability, and weakening its ability to project power would be a substantial achievement. But a more favorable strategic environment is not the same as a solution to Israel’s fundamental security challenges.

More importantly, this argument reflects a much broader strategic misconception that has shaped Israeli policy for decades: the belief that Israel can bypass the Palestinian question by focusing on shared threats, particularly Iran, and that common security interests will eventually translate into normalization with Arab states.

The latest war should have exposed the limitations of this approach. Israel is increasingly perceived by several regional governments as a destabilizing actor in its own right, even as those same governments remain deeply concerned about Iran's behavior and regional ambitions. From their perspective, Israel's efforts to encourage Washington to launch another military campaign against Iran threatened their own security, economic stability, and strategic interests.

This is not to suggest that Arab governments suddenly regard Iran as a benign actor. Far from it. Rather, opposition to Iran does not automatically translate into support for Israeli policies, let alone a willingness to normalize relations while the Palestinian issue remains unresolved.

The assumption that removing the Iranian threat would somehow eliminate the political obstacles to normalization is therefore fundamentally flawed.

Indeed, Israel's persistent attempts to circumvent the Palestinian question have contributed to one of the most serious crises of international legitimacy it has faced since its establishment. The developments in the West Bank over the past two days alone should serve as a reminder that Israel's challenges extend far beyond Tehran.

Ultimately, Iran is a major strategic challenge for Israel, but it is neither Israel's only challenge nor an exclusively Israeli problem. The Palestinian question, Israel's relations with its immediate neighbors, and its deteriorating international standing will remain central to its national security regardless of who governs Tehran.

Regime change in Iran might improve Israel's strategic position. It will not substitute for a coherent Israeli strategy toward the Palestinians, the Arab world, or the broader region.

Confusing the two is precisely the kind of strategic thinking that has brought Israel to its current predicament.

#iran - Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
tweet

Open Source Intel
Drones in the air ?

2207Z, AA activity in western Tehran
#Tehran Province, #Iran - Shin
tweet

Nuno Felix
RT @GerardAraud: Suivez ce compte. La meilleure analyse géopolitique du Moyen Orient que je connaisse.

A highly significant development with implications that go well beyond the meetings in Tehran.

For #Tehran, the Mecca Agreement was an important development in its own right. It reflected a growing recognition among regional states that they need to diversify their security partnerships rather than rely exclusively on the United States. This is part of a broader effort to develop a more independent regional security architecture.

The decision to engage directly with Tehran is equally significant. It reflects not only recognition of the Iranian regime but also an understanding that Iran remains a central regional player whose influence cannot simply be ignored. This is particularly relevant to Iran's relationships with the members of the so called "axis of Resistance", especially the Houthis, even though Tehran's actual control over Houthi decision-making is considerably more limited than many assume.

Against the backdrop of a possible resumption of hostilities between Iran and the United States, these meetings are especially important. Gulf states understand that they could pay a devastating price for another war, particularly through attacks on energy infrastructure, ports, and maritime trade. They therefore have a clear interest in encouraging Tehran to moderate its demands while reassuring the Iranian leadership that the Mecca Agreement is not directed against Iran or its interests.

There is no contradiction between strengthening regional security cooperation and engaging diplomatically with Iran. In fact, these are two sides of the same strategy: building greater security independence and deterrence while simultaneously reducing the likelihood of confrontation through dialogue.

The meetings also highlight an important reality that Washington and Jerusalem should not overlook: even countries deeply concerned about Iran's regional ambitions do not necessarily support another military campaign against it. They understand the limitations of military force and recognize that another war, regardless of its intensity, is unlikely to eliminate the Iranian challenge. It could, however, inflict enormous damage on their economies and regional stability.

There is also a broader message for Washington. America's regional partners are increasingly pursuing their own interests, developing independent security arrangements, and maintaining channels of communication with Tehran. Their priorities do not necessarily align with those of Washington, and certainly not with those of the Israeli government.

None of this means that the profound differences between Iran and its neighbors have disappeared, or that these diplomatic efforts will necessarily succeed. But it does reflect an important strategic reality: regional governments increasingly recognize that Iran cannot be bombed out of the Middle East, and that any sustainable regional security architecture will eventually have to take its interests and influence into account.

The bottom line is that key regional players are increasingly looking for ways to prevent another war and establish a more sustainable security framework. That is a significant strategic development

#IranWar
#Iran
#KSA
#Pakistan
#Turkey - Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
tweet

Nuno Felix
RT @citrinowicz: Reasons for Both Optimism and Pessimism

On the one hand, Eizenkot is right about one thing: Israel cannot bring down the Islamic Republic through airpower alone, even with full American military support.

On the other hand, the Iranian regime has no intention of abandoning its nuclear and conventional military capabilities or its relationships with the so-called Axis of Resistance. As long as the regime survives, these will remain central pillars of its national security strategy.

This leaves Israel and the United States facing a fundamental strategic dilemma. Military operations may damage Iranian capabilities, but they cannot eliminate them. And even another large-scale military campaign is unlikely to produce the political transformation in Tehran that some in Washington and Jerusalem continue to envision.

The conclusion should be obvious: Israel's next government must fundamentally reassess its strategy toward Iran. The current approach is neither realistic nor sustainable. Worse, it risks trapping Israel, and potentially the United States, in an endless cycle of military confrontations without achieving a decisive strategic outcome.

Before Washington and Jerusalem contemplate another attack, they should answer a basic question: What exactly is the strategic objective, and how would another war achieve what the previous two failed to accomplish?

After two military campaigns, Iran's military capabilities have not been eliminated, and the Islamic Republic remains in power.

At some point, policymakers must confront an uncomfortable question: Is there really a military solution to the Iranian challenge, or are we simply preparing for another war that will leave us confronting the same fundamental threats, at an even higher cost?

Military force can be an instrument of strategy. It cannot substitute for one.

#Iran
#iranwar

Israel's Gadi Eisenkot on Iran:

Making regime change an objective of war is not the right thing to do.

Destroying the Iranian nuclear program, the missile program, and the proxies — that is the right thing to do.

And I know how to do that. https://twitter.com/clashreport/status/2114761774151221315/video/1 - Clash Report
tweet

Status-6
RT @CarlaBNatSec: Current and former official says the administration plans to strike #Iran following US elections next week. Aircraft are moving into position. MOAB use expected.
tweet