Clément Molin
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French Analyst, following the war in Ukraine and other conflicts
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Clément Molin
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@clement_molin
Je partage ses conclusions sur l'état de l'offensive russe 🇷🇺 dans le secteur d'Houlialpole.

🔹Le nombre de frappes aériennes russes est passé de 500 tous les 10 jours en mai, 350 en juin et moins de 200 actuellement. Le ralentissement dans le secteur est visible depuis plusieurs mois en réalité, avec l'échec de l'offensive vers l'ouest.

🔹Cet échec s'explique par l'impossibilité de prendre le contrôle des positions fortifiées ukrainiennes dans la périphérie ouest d'Houlialpole, en particulier le long du chemin de fer. En outre, le terrain est défavorable aux russes, qui doivent traverser une rivière, puis un fossé anti-char et des barbelés. Les ukrainiens sont eux en hauteur et contrôlent Ternuvate, qui offre une vue dégagée sur une partie de la région.

🔹La capacité d'accumulation russe est très limitée, avec principalement Houlialpole (la ville a tellement été rasée que sa valeur a largement diminué), dont les routes logistiques sont constamment sous le feu ukrainien. Les infiltrations russes, notamment par les porteurs de drapeaux qui doivent mener des missions suicides pour que le commandement puisse continuer de mentir à Moscou, n'ont rien données, aucun des villages infiltré n'est sous contrôle russe.

🔹En parallèle, les ukrainiens ont compliqué la tâche des russes avec des infiltrations (on pourrait même parler de contrôle dans certaines zones) au nord d'Houlialpole, réduisant la fenêtre d'opportunité pour lancer des infiltrations. La petite ville d'Uspenivka fait face à une poussée ukrainienne des deux côtés.

🔹On ne peut pas pour autant dire que l'offensive russe est complètement terminée. S'il n'y a eu aucun gain depuis plusieurs mois, le secteur plus au sud (flèches blanches) a vu une progression plus soutenue.

👉Au total, c'est tout le front sud, long de 175 km où la situation russe n'est pas optimale. La progression rapide de 2025 (45 km vers l'ouest) ne s'est pas poursuivie en 2026, tandis que la menace sur Zaporijjia a été réduite. Les ukrainiens ont même l'avantage sur la moitié de ce front sud.

Le sujet étant cette zone géographique, inutile de me demander quand est-ce que Kostiantynivka va tomber (comme d'habitude, cela sera le sujet de 50 commentaires ici), j'écrivais ceci il y a un mois : "Cela prendra encore de longs mois avant un contrôle total. Nous sommes encore au stade de l'infiltration et aucun quartier n'est sous contrôle russe." La situation s'est, comme attendu, détériorée, avec une présence russe plus importante, mais la ville n'est pas sous contrôle russe.

Carte de base : @M0nstas
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHM99mMTWsAAPYJf.jpg
AMK Mapping 🇳🇿 (@AMK_Mapping_)

Situation on the Hulyaipole/Omelnyk direction, Zaporizhzhia Oblast:

A few weeks ago, I wrote that Russia appears to have postponed their offensive on Orikhiv from the east following Ukrainian counterattacks near Hirke, Vozdyvzhivka, and Verkhnya Tersa.

That continues to remain the case today, as the intensity of fighting has significantly reduced. Russian artillery, MLRS, and KAB shelling has also massively dropped off in recent weeks. The situation now resembles that of other more or less inactive sectors of the frontline, with both sides carrying out sporadic counterattacks and infiltrations using small groups of infantry, while holding overlapping and intermingled positions.

Russia has continued to carry out deep infiltrations into the Ukrainian rear, specifically near the villages of Rivne and Novoselivka, however, these constitute one-time infiltrations, where the infiltrators are typically either killed, captured, or withdraw back to friendly positions.

However, no withdrawal of any Russian units from this direction has been recorded, despite offensive operations clearly being prioritised in the Dobropillya and Slovyansk d[...]
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Clément Molin
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@clement_molin
La guerre au Moyen-Orient revient toutes les semaines puis est éclipsée par un cessez-le feu qui dure quelque jours.

Il n'en reste que ce fut une incroyable erreur de l'administration américaine...

OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical)

Bahrain has come under attack from Iran again this morning, with air raid sirens going off at the moment.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHNAFUIZWcAAZxuU.png

— https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/2076165448979099681#m
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Clément Molin
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@clement_molin
The situation of the Novopavlivka-Ivanivka front is currently the most difficult for Russian 🇷🇺 forces

🔹After months of infiltrations, often covered by OPSEC, the Ukrainians 🇺🇦 liberated a bunch of villages and cleared both Ivanivka and Novopavlivka from previous infiltrations. In this area, around 55 km2 of grey zone are most likely under Ukrainian control, as per high FAB strikes number.

🔹The main Russian problem is logistical. All roads leading to the area are exposed and under fire. The only places used for accumulation are Bahatyr (completly destroyed) and Komar (partially destroyed, hit by Ukrainian airstrikes). After these villages, Russian infantry still need to walk on foot, on open roads from 5 to 10 km to reach "frontline" villages and positions before assaults.

🔹Recent videos showed multiple casualties after Russian infantry were sent across the Vovcha (Bahatyr-Ivanivka), Solena (Novopavlivka) and Mokri Yali (Komar) river. Despite these losses, Russian infantry is still tasked to attack the New Donbas Line section between Novopavlivka and Ivanivka (they need to cross 2 rivers and 3 ditches), which is suicidal, knowing they have been attacking here for 10 months !)

🔹Russian "flaggers" continue to be sighted in Iskra, further west, in an attempt from the 90th tank division to show they control the situation to their command. Regularly on Telegram, Russian bloggers complain about the risk of Ukrainian entrance in Komar, since fighting have been happening in Piddubne for weeks. The situation is not very good for the 29th CAA in this sector, but the danger of further explotation is limited due to rivers.

🔹Ukraine deployed 3 air assault brigades (79th, 80th, 95th) in the direction to push back russian forces behind the Mokri Yali river and further reinforce their lines in the sector. This also gives more losses for Russia forces. The main challenge is the large number of airstrikes falling on their positions. If airstrikes decreased in Hulialpole, they slightly increased here recently, including more than 50 in the large yellow perimeter on the map, inside the grey zone between Komar and Ivanivka.

🔹With Novopavlivka under Ukrainian control and Ivanivka secured, the UAF can move south to pressure and trap russians attempting to attack the New Donbas Line fortified section. But it is probably much more interesting to keep the situation as it is currently, since this is an open kill zone for tens or hundreds of Russians every month. For further exploitation, the Komar/Velika Novosilka directions are much more interesting in order to further slow down or postpone Russian offensive momentum in Hulialpole.

For this situation review, I used @AndrewPerpetua base map and @WarUnitObserver observations about unit deployment.
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Clément Molin
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@clement_molin
See how they never explain why 10 Turks, 19 Moroccans, 12 Senegalese, 15 Tunisians or 9 Iraqis are not born and trained in « their » country

French team (and slowly other teams) is reflecting demographics (+ overseas territories) and only French people can talk and act about it.

Sir Goodman (@sirgoodmn)

Fransa’nın Dünya Kupası Kadrosu Gerçek Ülkeleri İçin Oynasaydı🇫🇷

Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2076202107183517696%2Fimg%2FiEz8StsmVbcJ5cFD.jpg


— https://twitter.com/sirgoodmn/status/2076202177018703898#m
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Clément Molin
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@clement_molin
Happy to be in Kyiv 🇺🇦 for the first time !

Feel free to text me if you are here !
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Clément Molin
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@clement_molin
Très fier de la démonstration de force de l'armée française 🇫🇷, qui prouve une fois de plus qu'on peut compter sur elle.

Vive la France et gloire à l'armée ! 🇫🇷🇫🇷🇫🇷
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Clément Molin
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@clement_molin
If the situation in the south recently improved, it continues to worsen in the Donbas, especially on the Sloviansk front.

Russian 🇷🇺 forces continue to push west after they took Siversk (7 months ago) and have down nearly half of the path leading to Siversk. The current situation is not very good for Ukraine 🇺🇦 in this direction.

🔹With Siversk, Soledar and Bakhmut, Russian forces have a very good accumulation possibility, reinforced by the large Donbas industrial and mining complexes. It is therefore easier to have troops ready for assault at any moment. Their logistics are hit very hard, especially before entering Siversk or Soledar (mid-range strikes), but it's obviously not enough to slow the momentum.

🔹On the other hand, the Ukrainian logistical situation is slowly degrading. Sloviansk and Kramatorsk are being hit daily, the Sloviansk-Mykolaivka roads are under constant fire and this also threatens roads for Lyman, on the other side of the river. The Ukrainians increasingly rely on UGVs for their logistics in this direction.

🔹Russian purpose is clearly to take control of Mykolaivka before the end of the year, as well as the heights around Rai Oleksandrivka, to be able to target logistics entering Sloviansk and launch the battle for the city next year. We can see this with the intense air-strike campaign ongoing all around Mykolaivka. Russian infiltrations are quite deep and part of the grey zone is under their control.

🔹Recently, Russian forces started to pressure Kramatorsk with infiltreations are flag raising west of the Donets Canal, which serves as the main fortification line in the region (white arrows west of the blue line). Russians have been sighted in multiple villages there, but it is not yet critical, as they didn't consolidate their control there. The risk is that they can secure crossing and threaten Kramatorsk from the East.

This situation remains the most difficult for Ukrainian forces, this is where they lost the biggest amount of territory this year. From Kostiantynivka to here is the main offensive action currently being taken by Russians.

Map base : @M0nstas
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Clément Molin
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@clement_molin
Since the start of the year, Ukraine 🇺🇦 hit 200 Russian 🇷🇺air-defense and radar systems

On this map, you can see where those systems have been targeted, more than half have been geolocated and the other half is mapped according to @414magyarbirds video. Around half of the systems have been destroyed, the other half is damaged and we should count around 10% decoy.

In total, more than 125 air-defense systems and 75 radars have been hit by Ukrainian drones this year alone, in particular in the south and in Crimea.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHNQMFBDWEAA-B7H.jpg
414 Magyar's Birds (@414magyarbirds)

Magyar's update on the Air Defense Fall by the USF Birds:

32 air defense systems engaged in June.
195 since the beginning of the year.

The skies over the swamps and Crimea must stay clear of the worms' air defense systems.

Eyes and Sting—the worms’ worst nightmare.

USF online scoreboard “PIDRAKHUIKA”
sbs-group.army

MAGYAR 🇺🇦
04.07.26

Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2073427081300529152%2Fimg%2Ft2IH3NoA7Kku36n3.jpg


— https://twitter.com/414magyarbirds/status/2073427952990085343#m
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Clément Molin
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@clement_molin
I'm sharing @SebaGobert thoughts here, following Fedorov's removal from the MOD.

To make it simple, Fedorov did a lot of good reforms for the Army, even if he was not universally popular. He was by far the most popular minister, respected both at home and abroad. His reforms, in particular, brought about a real revolution in the purchase and use of drones.

Even if he wasn't perfect, he long resisted certain lobbying groups and the "deep state" that have a detrimental influence on the country.

Yet today, another faction has won: the one that sends recruits to assault divisions, that micromanages the situation instead of looking at the big picture, that oversees violent recruitment, and that is corrupting the country. It must be said, but the president bears a significant share of the responsibility for the country's situation since 2023, having authoritatively dismissed certain popular figures.

The silence of the Europeans (either they don't see it, or they don't want to see it) is quite distressing, given that they could at least demand transparency...

There is no way this will reinforce Zelensky's popularity and there is no way this will help Ukraine... We will soon see the reactions and I will try to observe those.

Sébastien Gobert (@SebaGobert)

Mikhaylo Fedorov démis de ses fonctions de ministre de la Défense, six mois après sa nomination. Crédité des progrès de la numérisation des services publics depuis 2019 et de sa politique active de dronisation, il avait initié une série de réformes au ministère 1/
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— https://twitter.com/SebaGobert/status/2077461152435462332#m
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