@clement_molin
Comparaison avec les frappes russes sur les infrastructures électriques ukrainiennes dans le secteur Krivi Rih - Dnipro - Zaporijjia cette année.

La majorité de ces frappes sont réalisées avec des drones Geran, sauf à proximité du front ou des drones FPV à fibre optique sont utilisés.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHN_44VaWMAA6pc8.jpg
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@clement_molin
Point de vue très intéressant. A la fin de la guerre (si elle arrive), la Russie sera une puissance militaire terrestre bien plus avancée que celle de 2022.

Cette réorganisation des unités avec l'expansion des compagnies de drones et de guerre électronique en bataillon et la réduction des bataillons blindés et d'artillerie permettra a terme de créer de nombreuses nouvelles unités, avec comme ligne de mire une prochaine mobilisation.

Très clairement, ce plan vise à étendre l'armée russe d'ici 2030, avec en parallèle des investissements massifs dans les drones, le développement du Geran-4 drone-jet et la production accélérée de missiles. Cela laisse deux angles morts, l'armée de l'air (déjà renforcée avant la guerre et qui ne voit pas une réelle hausse de ses capacités et la Marine, globalement mise de côté.

La production de vehicles blindés et de chars permettra en partie de combler les pertes et d'équiper de nouvelles unités, en sachant que ces moyens sont mis de côté depuis plus d'un an. L'artillerie moderne n'est pas une priorite russe, elle qui compte encore de nombreux obusiers soviétiques.

En fin de compte, si l'armée russe veut gagner en Ukraine, elle doit presque doubler ses forces et sa production pour élargir le front jusqu'à la frontière biélorusse et profiter du manque d'hommes côté ukrainien pour éparpiller les forces. C'est la seule manière réaliste de gagner, mais l'organisation d'une telle armée prendrait du temps et coûterait énormément alors que l'économie russe n'est pas garantie de suivre cet effort de guerre.

Cet effort de guerre focalisé sur l'Ukraine pourrait avoir un autre but dès la fin de la guerre. Pendant ce temps, en Europe et en France, on débat encore régulièrement pour savoir si c'est vraiment équitable de faire intervenir les drones lors des exercices militaires...

Dmytro Putiata (@kriegsforscherD)

The Russian army is in the process of a powerful transformation. In many ways, it even surpasses the changes in the structure of the Ukrainian army. The vision of the Russian command of its army with integrated drones in its CAAs is in many respects more logical and complementary than the Ukrainian approach.

By 2030, the Russian army will be a significantly more serious adversary than it was before.

From recent changes in one of the Russian air defense systems (I am not ready to say that I fully agree with those changes, and I will leave the conclusions to you, but I understand why this is happening):

- in some brigades, a tank battalion is being reduced to a tank company (in my opinion, this is related to the upcoming mobilization and the need for heavy equipment for new units);
- in the brigade, the electronic warfare company is being reformatted into an electronic warfare battalion;
- the UAS company is being reformatted into a UAS battalion under brigade command;
- at the level of artillery units, the number of soldiers in the artillery crew continues to be reduced, and even 1/3 of the artillery batteries in the battalion are being reduced. Soldiers will be sent to counter-UAV units to protect artillery positions.

Typical artillery position of a Russian army that will be covered by:

- observation post with a machine gun with thermal vision;
- EW;
- strong fortifications;
- FPV interceptors that will cover the area where Russian command placed their artillery
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHN-2s-PXcAE-_qg.jpg

— https://twitter.com/kriegsforscherD/status/2080582442688053561#m
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@clement_molin
Year 5 of the Russian 🇷🇺 invasion of Ukraine 🇺🇦, let's check how the NATO countries bordering Russia/Belarus are fortifying :

POLAND 🇵🇱 : Despite many announcements and many videos of fortification work ongoing, only a very small part of the border with Kaliningrad is being covered, inadequately by fortifications.

The fortifications are situated directly on the border, comprising a discontinuous anti-tank ditch (which stops at forest lines) and one or two rows of dragon's teeth, also discontinuous. Fortifications are present in only four zones, the largest spanning 2 km (out of a total border length of 210 km with Russia only). There is no depth to the defenses; where bunkers or trenches do exist, they are located in open fields, and the vast majority of the border, including key roads, remains unprepared. A notable absence of barbed wire is also evident.

Along the Belarusian border, particularly in open areas, only anti-migrant barriers are visible, with minimal reinforcement currently underway. A major weakness is the lack of defensive lines covering the strategic Suwalki Gap. That said, fortification work is in progress, alongside national-level efforts and heightened border surveillance. Based on observations of fortifications in the Caucasus, Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine, the current methodology appears flawed. If requested, I could do a map of supposed future fortifications that I believe would be effective.

LITHUANIA 🇱🇹 : The country most at risk, due to its border with Kaliningrad, the Suwalki Gap, and its long border with Belarus, is paradoxically the one that has fortified the least. I found no defensive structures, despite the existence of an official roadmap. I also noted a lack of road coverage. Nevertheless, significant work is underway to build road infrastructure leading to remote areas along the eastern border; hopefully, fortifications will follow soon.

LATVIA 🇱🇻 : Lithuania, which possesses the greatest strategic depth and significant natural borders featuring extensive forests, is further ahead than its two neighbors. The country has already begun installing dragon's teeth and continues clearing the border area with the aim of establishing a defensive line. As with the others, however, the same problems persist.

ESTONIA 🇪🇪 : Estonia's level of fortification remains very low at present, despite a persistent threat, particularly regarding Narva. While lakes offer protection, they can also be exploited to infiltrate the lines. As with Lithuania, work has not yet begun.

FINLAND 🇫🇮 : Despite having only recently joined NATO, Finland has carried out impressive defensive preparations. While I have not yet spotted any fortifications (satellite imagery is not updated in real time, and the border is long), the construction of infrastructure and the preparation of barriers along the entire border are quite impressive.

NORWAY 🇳🇴: Nothing particular to see

General summary:

I do not believe the threat is direct and immediate, yet the future is uncertain, and guarantees of peace are not always honored. Constructing fortifications adds a further safeguard for one's independence and facilitates defense in the event of an attack. The Suwalki Gap is a critical area, and its protection is essential. Furthermore, it is important to protect critical infrastructure, such as bridges, oil depots, military bases, ports, electrical substations, railway stations, and airports, against sabotage and potential strikes.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOBspWBWEAAznU4.jpg
Clément Molin (@clement_molin)

Last time I checked, fortifications covered less than 1% of Polish 🇵🇱 borders.

The way they are digging is in fact similar to how Ukraine dug in 2023-2024, which lead to difficult situations.

The direction is the good one, but there is a lot to learn from the Ukrainian example and errors and the pace is very[...]

very slow. The priority is to protect the borders as well as the depth, Suwalki corridor and, obviously, prioritise airdefense and anti-drone defense.
— https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/2080204893902553274#m
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@clement_molin
For the first time in months, Russia 🇷🇺 launched a large mechanized assault in the Dobropilla-Drujkivka area

Two armoured columns reinforced by multiple unarmoured vehicles from the 90th tank division and the 41st/8th CAA attempted to breakthrough in the Shakove area.

As you can see in the quoted tweet, this area has been subjected to heavy airstrike campaign for more than one month, while it remained a secondary direction until may. You can see here in white the recent airstrikes impacts in this direction, the same one where Russia obtained a breakthrough last year. Azov 1st Corps, which has been successfully defending the area for nearly a year managed to prevent any armoured breakthrough, showing multiple destroyed vehicles and pontoon bridges. However, infiltrations are slowly getting more frequent and Russian soldiers are often recorded behind the current grey zone, despite the absence of visual proof. As you can see, Russian armies in this direction are not doing too much PR videos with flags, which is why we have fewer flag videos. This area is right now the most strategic of the Donbas, Russia absolutely needs to control it to be able to reach Dobropilla or Drujkivka to have a fire control over the roads leading to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

Why did Russia launch a mechanized assault here ? The main reason is how difficult it is to get there. We've recently seen videos of an impressive number of logistical and assault unarmoured vehicles destroyed on roads leading to here. This area is one of the deadliest, with older Ukrainian fortifications complicating any movement. Launching a mechanized assault helps to bring hundreds of men close to the front (even if 150 die and 150 manage to reach those positions, all of them will be able to assault and infiltrate further in the coming weeks).

As I said a month ago, I was expecting a large scale assault here, in order to unblock the front leading to Drujkivka and Dobropilla. As Russian soldiers are infiltrating and consolidating into Kosiantynivka, they will slowly manage to take full control over the city (maybe until autumn, the same way it happened in Toretsk), now the priority for them is to prepare the next battle, for Drujkivka.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOFAjwdXYAAdHIy.jpg
Clément Molin (@clement_molin)

Here are my guesses of where Russia will push in the next months. These areas are highly targeted, and Russia is always targeting heavily an area where there is good resistance but where they need to take it.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHMOPO61W8AE_Tue.jpg

— https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/2072664641386226075#m
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@clement_molin
About the destroyed vehicles in this area :

Clément Molin (@clement_molin)

When people ask why strikes on logistics (both Ukrainians 🇺🇦 and Russians 🇷🇺) matter, there is an obvious response :

No one will lack vehicles, the issue is about supplies, like in this video on the Dobropilla axis, where there are 62 destroyed Russian vehicles on a 300 meters road.

Each time, supplies are not coming to frontline units, soldiers are dying or being wounded and roads are being obstructed. Is this enough ? Not yet, but russian progress has significantly slowed down in many areas where there are no cities to hide supplies and vehicles.

Are the Ukrainians also suffering from these strikes ? Yes, of course, but first, they have fewer troops on the frontline, they are using more UGVs and Russian FPV drones are not going often that far from the frontline.

Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2075563947617378304%2Fimg%2FapOZZviO3mKX75aY.jpg

— https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/2075566541328797862#m
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@clement_molin
Example of some existing and known kill zone in this area :

Clément Molin (@clement_molin)

I put on a map a video showing 60 russian 🇷🇺 bodies on a 700 meter road along the Kazanny Torets river near the village of Boikivka.

This road is only 1 500 meters from the infamous Novotoretske village with the hundreds dead russian soldiers.

🧵1/7 ⬇️
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHDxRfm_bkAEphH6.jpg

— https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/2034603491373547722#m
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@clement_molin
Again, the strategic town of Barah, north of El Obeid in central Sudan 🇸🇩, is back in the Sudanese armed forces control

For the past year and a half, it has been at the center of back-and-forth battles between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces. As the war drags on, the Kordofan region and El Obeid in particular is fiercely contested.

The army controls the city and the road leading east (under drone fire), while the RSF control the roads to the south, west, and north including the route to Khartoum, which is currently being fought over. The city is not directly threatened, but battle are regular in the region.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOFnh8pXYAApSe9.jpg
BodyBèn (@FCB6O)

في إطار عملياتها العسكرية اليوم بمحور شمال كردفان، القوات المسلحة السودانية تتقدم وتفرض سيطرتها على مدينة بارا بولاية شمال كردفان بعد دحر مليشيا الدعم السريع.

يبدو أننا أمام ملامح عملية عسكرية كبرى لتطهير طريق الصادرات وإعادة ربط مدينة الأبيض بـ أم درمان.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOFfB_DWQAAhbVN.jpg

— https://twitter.com/FCB6O/status/2081048999927189976#m
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@clement_molin
Who controls Kostiantynivka 🇷🇺/🇺🇦 ?

There is a very big debate to know who really controls the city of Kostiantynivka, in the Donbas region.

Many maps are showing the city as Russian controled, which in my opinion is not true, as I will explain it here.

🧵THREAD🧵1/16 ⬇️
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOGECeCWsAEleig.jpg
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@clement_molin
The situation will continue to worsen, Russian flaggers will appear in villages and towns north of the city and Ukrainian troops will slowly leave their positions in the city.

No one is encircled, no one controls anything except basements and buildings.
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@clement_molin
Thank you for following the situation with me.

If you want to debate with me about the situation, I will only reply to people showing me proofs (that I'm wrong) or arguments of why my methodology is incorrect.

Saying that this or that person said the contrary won't be enough.
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