Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
Ukraine 🇺🇦 continues to fortify multiple cities and areas across the country
-> 36 cities with ring defenses (including Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Mykolaiv, Odessa)
-> 2-3 lines along borders up to Izium, 4-6 in Donbas, 4-6 in Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia, 1 in Kherson and Odesa
-> Nearly every direction is now adequately covered by mutliple lines
-> Main construction ongoing in border areas, Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro
-> Defensive lines also include cities (basements, bunkers, high rise buildings are part of those)
-> Ukrainian soldiers are now mostly satisfied with the fortifications, especially with the barbed wire and iron wire.
-> In my opinion, priority now is to place barbed wire in critical areas which will be used for infiltrations, especially in cities
-> Some more lines/upgrade are needed in Kharkiv oblast
-> Small hidden bunkers are also a priority for drone teams close to the frontline
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHNdnnadXoAAPMxN.jpg
tweet
Ukraine 🇺🇦 continues to fortify multiple cities and areas across the country
-> 36 cities with ring defenses (including Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Mykolaiv, Odessa)
-> 2-3 lines along borders up to Izium, 4-6 in Donbas, 4-6 in Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia, 1 in Kherson and Odesa
-> Nearly every direction is now adequately covered by mutliple lines
-> Main construction ongoing in border areas, Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro
-> Defensive lines also include cities (basements, bunkers, high rise buildings are part of those)
-> Ukrainian soldiers are now mostly satisfied with the fortifications, especially with the barbed wire and iron wire.
-> In my opinion, priority now is to place barbed wire in critical areas which will be used for infiltrations, especially in cities
-> Some more lines/upgrade are needed in Kharkiv oblast
-> Small hidden bunkers are also a priority for drone teams close to the frontline
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHNdnnadXoAAPMxN.jpg
tweet
❤12👍8😁2
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
We saw how quickly the protest movement escalated. The number of (mainly young) Ukrainians protesting was clearly stagering, streets were full and the government had to act.
People as well as many soldiers openly called for Sirkyi to be dismissed and many want Fedorov back. The movement is growing so fast that Zelensky had to act. We already saw signals that there are discussions about a possible change in the general staff, as well as the possible return of Fedorov.
With protests all over the country, Zelensky cannot close his eyes. This shows how civil society, even during a war, is playing an important role.
Serhii Sternenko (@sternenko)
Дуже багато людей знову вийшли на протести у Києві.
Показуйте що у регіонах.
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2078535698131345408%2Fimg%2Fyg7MNRPFxkX5uj5p.jpg
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2078535698181734400%2Fimg%2FkCO8jcTJf8CWQBAq.jpg
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2078535698223710208%2Fimg%2FCeAC-UL5p-5kNqS8.jpg
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2078535698261434368%2Fimg%2FUZGIUk180HDyYIWQ.jpg
— https://twitter.com/sternenko/status/2078535786509504647#m
tweet
We saw how quickly the protest movement escalated. The number of (mainly young) Ukrainians protesting was clearly stagering, streets were full and the government had to act.
People as well as many soldiers openly called for Sirkyi to be dismissed and many want Fedorov back. The movement is growing so fast that Zelensky had to act. We already saw signals that there are discussions about a possible change in the general staff, as well as the possible return of Fedorov.
With protests all over the country, Zelensky cannot close his eyes. This shows how civil society, even during a war, is playing an important role.
Serhii Sternenko (@sternenko)
Дуже багато людей знову вийшли на протести у Києві.
Показуйте що у регіонах.
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2078535698131345408%2Fimg%2Fyg7MNRPFxkX5uj5p.jpg
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2078535698181734400%2Fimg%2FkCO8jcTJf8CWQBAq.jpg
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2078535698223710208%2Fimg%2FCeAC-UL5p-5kNqS8.jpg
Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2078535698261434368%2Fimg%2FUZGIUk180HDyYIWQ.jpg
— https://twitter.com/sternenko/status/2078535786509504647#m
tweet
❤10👍3
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
Very big Russian 🇷🇺 missile 💥 attack on Kyiv 🇺🇦 right now, one hour with around 50 explosions, very few interceptions...
Not sure this scale happened before, but it was very big. Image from Lukyanivka.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHNjI7_4W0AAQiz4.jpg
tweet
Very big Russian 🇷🇺 missile 💥 attack on Kyiv 🇺🇦 right now, one hour with around 50 explosions, very few interceptions...
Not sure this scale happened before, but it was very big. Image from Lukyanivka.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHNjI7_4W0AAQiz4.jpg
tweet
🤬18🔥6🙏1
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
L'évolution des frappes russes 🇷🇺 est assez intéressante dernièrement
🔹️L'emploi des drones Geran 2/3 a très largement diminué, avec trois points : un remplacement progressif par les drones jet Geran-4 (qui sont plus rapides et manœuvrables), l'emploi plus accru des autres Geran proche du front (operator controled) pour des frappes mid-range et une baisse qui pourrait être due à des frappes ukrainiennes sur certaines usines de composants ou l'évolution des intercepteurs.
🔹️Les frappes de missiles évoluent avec des frappes très rapide (moins de 7 minutes), avec du S300/S400 et du Iskander, en particulier sur Kyiv (les alertes aériennes arrivent souvent après les frappes), comme hier soir. Avec la pénurie généralisée de missiles de défense aérienne, ces frappes sont beaucoup plus efficaces. Ces frappes s'accompagnent de quelques Kinzhal lancés depuis des avions et les cibles sont principalement les usines/entrepôts militaire ou civils.
🔹️Les frappes employant les bombardiers stratégiques restent beaucoup plus prévisibles et arrivent plusieurs fois par mois. Globalement, la Russie n'empile pas les réserves, elle utilise rapidement sa production. Les frappes depuis des navires ont quasiment disparues.
🔹️Les cibles ont aussi évolué, avec un focus actuel sur la logistique (ferroviaire, routière, énergétique), des frappes sur les ports et sur des entrepôts à l'arrière du front.
Source de la carte : t.me/monitoringwar/25943
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHNm05-fXgAAFHc_.jpg
Clément Molin (@clement_molin)
Very big Russian 🇷🇺 missile 💥 attack on Kyiv 🇺🇦 right now, one hour with around 50 explosions, very few interceptions...
Not sure this scale happened before, but it was very big. Image from Lukyanivka.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHNjI7_4W0AAQiz4.jpg
— https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/2078632167056519465#m
tweet
L'évolution des frappes russes 🇷🇺 est assez intéressante dernièrement
🔹️L'emploi des drones Geran 2/3 a très largement diminué, avec trois points : un remplacement progressif par les drones jet Geran-4 (qui sont plus rapides et manœuvrables), l'emploi plus accru des autres Geran proche du front (operator controled) pour des frappes mid-range et une baisse qui pourrait être due à des frappes ukrainiennes sur certaines usines de composants ou l'évolution des intercepteurs.
🔹️Les frappes de missiles évoluent avec des frappes très rapide (moins de 7 minutes), avec du S300/S400 et du Iskander, en particulier sur Kyiv (les alertes aériennes arrivent souvent après les frappes), comme hier soir. Avec la pénurie généralisée de missiles de défense aérienne, ces frappes sont beaucoup plus efficaces. Ces frappes s'accompagnent de quelques Kinzhal lancés depuis des avions et les cibles sont principalement les usines/entrepôts militaire ou civils.
🔹️Les frappes employant les bombardiers stratégiques restent beaucoup plus prévisibles et arrivent plusieurs fois par mois. Globalement, la Russie n'empile pas les réserves, elle utilise rapidement sa production. Les frappes depuis des navires ont quasiment disparues.
🔹️Les cibles ont aussi évolué, avec un focus actuel sur la logistique (ferroviaire, routière, énergétique), des frappes sur les ports et sur des entrepôts à l'arrière du front.
Source de la carte : t.me/monitoringwar/25943
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHNm05-fXgAAFHc_.jpg
Clément Molin (@clement_molin)
Very big Russian 🇷🇺 missile 💥 attack on Kyiv 🇺🇦 right now, one hour with around 50 explosions, very few interceptions...
Not sure this scale happened before, but it was very big. Image from Lukyanivka.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHNjI7_4W0AAQiz4.jpg
— https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/2078632167056519465#m
tweet
👍5❤2
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
According to many sources, massive changes are currently ongoing inside the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 political-military leadership.
Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Commander in Chief of the ZSU will most likely be replaced, after civilian and military pressure. There are multiple candidates, including many that met with Zelensky today :
🔹Andriy Biletsky: Commander, 3rd Army Corps (Azov) (Land Forces)
🔹Mykhailo Drapaty: Commander, Joint Forces of Ukraine (most likely)
🔹Oleh Apostol: Commander, Air Assault Forces
🔹Volodymyr Horbatyuk: Deputy Chief of the General Staff
🔹Ihor Obolensky: Commander, 2nd National Guard Corps ("Khartia")
🔹Viktor Nikolyuk: Commander, Operational Command East (most likely)
Changes may also include the chief of staff of ground forces. Additionally, discussions are ongoing to bring back Fedorov to the government. I will update as soon as official changes are brought to the light.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHNrcPbYX0AEjZtp.jpg
tweet
According to many sources, massive changes are currently ongoing inside the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 political-military leadership.
Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Commander in Chief of the ZSU will most likely be replaced, after civilian and military pressure. There are multiple candidates, including many that met with Zelensky today :
🔹Andriy Biletsky: Commander, 3rd Army Corps (Azov) (Land Forces)
🔹Mykhailo Drapaty: Commander, Joint Forces of Ukraine (most likely)
🔹Oleh Apostol: Commander, Air Assault Forces
🔹Volodymyr Horbatyuk: Deputy Chief of the General Staff
🔹Ihor Obolensky: Commander, 2nd National Guard Corps ("Khartia")
🔹Viktor Nikolyuk: Commander, Operational Command East (most likely)
Changes may also include the chief of staff of ground forces. Additionally, discussions are ongoing to bring back Fedorov to the government. I will update as soon as official changes are brought to the light.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHNrcPbYX0AEjZtp.jpg
tweet
❤8🙏3
Clément Molin
Photo
@clement_molin
About offensive operations with drones :
While drones have paradoxically "eliminated" movement and mechanized maneuvering for 3 years, they could allow the return of movement as early as this summer.
If the planning, joint organization (assault + drones), logistics, suppression of enemy drone operators and the exclusion zone are well executed, then we could see some better results than the 2023 counter-offensive.
Except in Donbas, this can happen on most of the fronts, we already saw 4 small scale successful similar operations this year : Pokrovsk'e (known) and 3 others (I won't give details), where exploitation could or can be possible.
Rob Lee (@RALee85)
I filmed a podcast with @kriegsforscherD and @RyanO_ChosenCoy on Friday to discuss last week's events. In part one we talk about Fedorov's time as minister of defense and his removal, Ukraine's theory of victory, the assault regiments, prospects for offensive operations, manpower problems, and other topics.
piped.video/watch?v=JAdR7Ey6…
Link
https://twitter.com/pic/card_img%2F2079193919837847552%2FNeZiKhsK%3Fformat%3Djpg%26name%3D800x320_1
Ep 10 – Zelensky Fires His Defense Minister: Soldiers Speak Out (Part...
On July 15, 2026, President Zelensky dismissed his entire cabinet —...
youtube.com
— https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/2079195777159622673#m
tweet
About offensive operations with drones :
While drones have paradoxically "eliminated" movement and mechanized maneuvering for 3 years, they could allow the return of movement as early as this summer.
If the planning, joint organization (assault + drones), logistics, suppression of enemy drone operators and the exclusion zone are well executed, then we could see some better results than the 2023 counter-offensive.
Except in Donbas, this can happen on most of the fronts, we already saw 4 small scale successful similar operations this year : Pokrovsk'e (known) and 3 others (I won't give details), where exploitation could or can be possible.
Rob Lee (@RALee85)
I filmed a podcast with @kriegsforscherD and @RyanO_ChosenCoy on Friday to discuss last week's events. In part one we talk about Fedorov's time as minister of defense and his removal, Ukraine's theory of victory, the assault regiments, prospects for offensive operations, manpower problems, and other topics.
piped.video/watch?v=JAdR7Ey6…
Link
https://twitter.com/pic/card_img%2F2079193919837847552%2FNeZiKhsK%3Fformat%3Djpg%26name%3D800x320_1
Ep 10 – Zelensky Fires His Defense Minister: Soldiers Speak Out (Part...
On July 15, 2026, President Zelensky dismissed his entire cabinet —...
youtube.com
— https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/2079195777159622673#m
tweet
❤7👍2🤔1