@clement_molin
Airstrike map for the area. Red is for february to june, white for july. Strikes in Mykolaivka are all white but cover the last few months.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOVUQ6YXEAAgtfK.jpg
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@clement_molin
As you can see, I have no agenda from anyone and I post what I want, when I want.

Yesterday, I blocked a large number of accounts that are using personnal attacks instead of arguments and I will continue to block accounts that are often disturbing my comment section.

This is the first time I block with this account, but I also need to protect my personnal health. When 2 000 people are liking but 20 people are commenting, the main thing I see are these comments, almost always negative. People who are spreading lies about me, insulting me or harassing me, always with their anonymous accounts (most of them are twice as old as I am, but they hide behind their account), will no more be able to do it.

If you disagree with me, give arguments, explain why, don't use personnal attacks.

Thank you
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@clement_molin
Ce mois, le nombre de frappes russes 🇷🇺 avec des drones Shahed/Geran a drastiquement diminué

Les causes sont multiples, je reviendrai bientôt dessus, mais c'est le signe d'un changement de stratégie :

🔹Production plus faible du Geran-2, qui ne faisait que 60% des drones lancés, à cause des Parody/Gerbera
🔹Arrivée en masse du Geran-4, drone Jet visant à remplacer le Geran-2. Plus rapide, mais plus cher.
🔹Presque aucune frappe dans l'ouest de l'Ukraine, une concentration dans le nord-est, le centre et le sud.
🔹Cibles principales : la logistique ukrainienne, terrestre, ferroviaire et navale.
🔹Pour gagner la guerre de l'OSINT, les vidéos des frappes sont désormais régulièrement publiées.
🔹Tentative de répliquer les frappes Mid-range ukrainiennes, mais avec un drone fait pour le long-range.
🔹Une transition visible est en cours, à suivre sur mon compte d'ici quelques jours.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOWkPuiWkAAkqDa.jpg
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@clement_molin
For the fourth month, Ukraine 🇺🇦 launched more drones into Russia 🇷🇺 than Russia launched drones into Ukraine

With a much bigger territory, Russia is more difficult to defend, but Russian strikes can easily reach all of Ukraine.

🧵THREAD🧵1/12 ⬇️
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@clement_molin
I saw multiple comments saying Ukraine suffers more from this closure, with which I disagree.

Ukrainian exportations already adaptated to export from Romania, while Russian economy is not ready for the closure of the black sea to its commercial fleet.
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@clement_molin
On videos, we saw more than 200 Russian ships attacked, while less than 50 Ukrainians were attacked, including a lot of them in Mykolaiv, a port that have not been used in 4 years...

Russia has more to loose than Ukraine, since they have no other alternative than the black sea.
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@clement_molin
Vous êtes désormais 120 000 à suivre ce compte !

Je ne peux que vous remercier de votre confiance et d'avoir fait de ce profil l'un des plus gros comptes français de suivi des conflits.

N'hésitez pas à poser vos questions et à suggérer des axes d'amélioration en commentaire. Merci !
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@clement_molin
On the Northern (Sever) front, Russia's 11th army corps, 18th, 69th and 71th Motor Rifle Divisions launched a renewed offensive in Kharkiv oblast

This happens after months of heavy airstrike preparation and amid massive fortification effort by Ukrainian forces in the region.

I will later this week analyse the current situation with more data.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOaJrZ4XoAEqgly.jpg
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@clement_molin
La Russie 🇷🇺 mène en ce moment même une attaque massive de drones et de missiles contre l'Ukraine 🇺🇦

Depuis le début de l'année, plus de 1 300 missiles ont été lancés contre l'Ukraine, soit au moins 5 fois plus que le nombre de missiles ASTER fournis à l'Ukraine.

Pour rappel, la production française 🇫🇷 est de moins de 100 missiles anti-aériens par mois et les stocks sont probablement inférieurs au millier d'exemplaires. Depuis plusieurs mois, l'Ukraine manque cruellement d'intercepteurs. La quasi-totalité des lanceurs européens (SAMP-T, IRIS-T, NASAMS...) sont vides depuis bien longtemps (et ces batteries ne sont pas vraiment réputées comme très efficaces) et les stocks de PAC-3 sont pratiquement terminés.

Depuis le début de l'année, la Russie a donc lancé 40 000 drones d'attaques (70% de Geran et 30% de Gerbera/Parody) et 1 300 missiles de tous types. En termes de production, on parle d'environ 200 missiles russes qui sortent des usines chaque mois et environ 6 000 drones Geran. Avec l'arrivée de plusieurs drones jet, les Geran-4, Geran-5 et Banderol, il devient plus difficile d'intercepter les vagues de drones. C'est donc des centaines de missiles à "bas coût" en plus qui sortent des usines chaque mois.

Pendant ce temps en France, on essaie de nous faire croire que nous sommes passés en économie de guerre et que nous suivons en direct les enseignements de la guerre à l'Est…
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@clement_molin
During the war, Russia has recruited nearly 2 million men for its army.

Even taking into account the army's increase of 500,000 men (is that actually the case), that leaves 1.5 million men who have "disappeared."

It can be estimated that around 500,000 reached the end of their contracts, so 1 million Russian soldiers simply vanished...

Preston Stewart (@prestonstew_)

"In 2023, the army received approximately 540,000 contract soldiers
In 2024, it was 440,000.
In 2025, recruitment fell to 400,000.
The forecast for 2026 gives a range of 320–350,000 people.
A decrease of 35–40% in three years is not a fluctuation; it's an exhaustion of resources.

Financial incentives and one-time payments – everything that worked in 2023–2024 – no longer attracts recruits.

Those who were willing to go for money have already gone. Those who remain are soberly assessing the risks.

The campaign of pressure in universities – signing contracts under the threat of expulsion – is no longer voluntary recruitment. It's a hidden forced mobilization, but without a decree."

-Russian milblogger Officer at the Front
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOeOy5HWEAA5jc_.jpg

— https://twitter.com/prestonstew_/status/2082790952121323725#m
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@clement_molin
2 months ago, Ukraine 🇺🇦 launched a counter-attack north of Lyman, in order to relieve pressure on the city

At the same time, Russian 🇷🇺 forces continue to infiltrate the city and attempt to isolate it from all sides.

Very few informations filtered regarding Ukrainian counter-attack in the direction of Lyman. As the operation is still ongoing, I will outline the situation as it stood a little over a month ago, without going into much details.

In late May, as Russian infiltrations into Lyman were increasing, the Azov 3rd Army Corps, a well-trained unit and one of the Ukrainian army's best, launched an attack to relieve pressure on the city. The offensive began with a mechanized assault that penetrated deep behind enemy lines; only a few fiber-optic drones that had escaped jamming managed to strike a handful of armored vehicles. Ukrainian troops, deployed behind Russian lines, were able to clear several villages, thereby expanding the "gray zone."

Several geolocated videos show Ukrainian positions more than 5 km deep within the "red zone" on the DeepState map; notably, there has been a complete absence of footage showing a Russian presence in the area for over two months. Starting in late June, Russian aviation intervened to stabilize the situation, carrying out more than 200 airstrikes in the area during July, an indication of significant Ukrainian advances. The situation I am describing reflects the state of affairs in late June; operations have continued since then, with the most recent geolocated video from the sector dating to July 2 (both sides have published almost no footage, confirming what I previously said regarding OPSEC).

Elsewhere, Russia continued to launch deep infiltrations, especially on both sides of the Siverki Donets river where they advanced. The town of Lyman, a Ukrainian stronghold remains firmly under Ukrainian control, with regularly Russian soldiers reaching the city center after a long walk. The main challenge for Ukraine is the difficulty to organize logistics, with strikes everyday on key roads and bridge over the Donets.

Further north, Russian infiltrations continue in the forest areas near Pryshyb, with regular attempts to target drone and artillery teams. In total, more than 450 airstrikes fell on the yellow circles I added on my map, mainly in June. The situation in Lyman is not particularly good for Ukraine, but there is still hope the situation can improve if the 3rd Corps offensive succeeds, which would give Lyman additionnal months to survive and Sloviansk some air.

Despite many people saying this is a secondary front, I disagree. This area is directly linked to the main Donbass front, with Lyman being the northern flank of remaining Ukrainian Donbass. Lyman has a similar role to Kostiantynivka or Dobropilla, as the entrance door of the fortified valley. Further update will come later, when informations will be more numerous.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOfB9cPWoAARnwZ.jpg
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