@clement_molin
En réalité, avec la situation actuelle au nord du Donbass, difficile de ne pas repenser au 30 juillet 2022, il y a 4 ans.

A l'époque, l'armée russe contrôlait Lyman et Izioum, les deux verrous au nord de Sloviansk. Depuis 4 ans, l'armée russe tente par tous les moyens de reprendre Lyman, pendant qu'Izioum semble inatteignable. Seul point positif pour les russes, ils ont pris Siversk à l'est de Sloviansk fin 2025.

La contre-offensive ukrainienne de Kharkiv en septembre 2022 aura été un désastre complet dans la durée pour Moscou, permettant de délayer la bataille pour Sloviansk d'au moins 4 ans. Les ukrainiens ont remarquablement bien tenu sur leur tête de pont Lyman-Koupiansk, malgré le peu de ponts et la présence de la rivière dans leur dos. La manoeuvre russe en cours entre Lyman et Dobropilla ne fait que débuter.

Rappelons que la "prise du Donbass" (on parlait de 6 villes de plus de 50 000 habitants) est un objectif demandé par Poutine à de nombreuses reprises depuis 2022...
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOf4l8JXQAApDoH.jpg
Clément Molin (@clement_molin)

2 months ago, Ukraine 🇺🇦 launched a counter-attack north of Lyman, in order to relieve pressure on the city

At the same time, Russian 🇷🇺 forces continue to infiltrate the city and attempt to isolate it from all sides.

Very few informations filtered regarding Ukrainian counter-attack in the direction of Lyman. As the operation is still ongoing, I will outline the situation as it stood a little over a month ago, without going into much details.

In late May, as Russian infiltrations into Lyman were increasing, the Azov 3rd Army Corps, a well-trained unit and one of the Ukrainian army's best, launched an attack to relieve pressure on the city. The offensive began with a mechanized assault that penetrated deep behind enemy lines; only a few fiber-optic drones that had escaped jamming managed to strike a handful of armored vehicles. Ukrainian troops, deployed behind Russian lines, were able to clear several villages, thereby expanding the "gray zone."

Several geolocated videos show Ukrainian positions more than 5 km deep within the "red zone" on the DeepState map; notably, there has been a complete absence of footage showing a Russian presence in the area for over two months. Starting in late June, Russian aviation intervened to stabilize the situation, carrying out more than 200 airstrikes in the area during July, an indication of significant Ukrainian advances. The situation I am describing reflects the state of affairs in late June; operations have continued since then, with the most recent geolocated video from the sector dating to July 2 (both sides have published almost no footage, confirming what I previously said regarding OPSEC).

Elsewhere, Russia continued to launch deep infiltrations, especially on both sides of the Siverki Donets river where they advanced. The town of Lyman, a Ukrainian stronghold remains firmly under Ukrainian control, with regularly Russian soldiers reaching the city center after a long walk. The main challenge for Ukraine is the difficulty to organize logistics, with strikes everyday on key roads and bridge over the Donets.

Further north, Russian infiltrations continue in the forest areas near Pryshyb, with regular attempts to target drone and artillery teams. In total, more than 450 airstrikes fell on the yellow circles I added on my map, mainly in June. The situation in Lyman is not particularly good for Ukraine, but there is still hope the situation can improve if the 3rd Corps offensive succeeds, which would give Lyman additionnal months to survive and Sloviansk some air.

Despite many people saying this is a secondary front, I disagree. This area is directly linked to the main Donbass front, with Lyman being the northern flank of remaining Ukrainian Donbass. Lyman has a similar role to Kostiantynivka or Dobropilla, as the entr[...]

ance door of the fortified valley. Further update will come later, when informations will be more numerous.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOfB9cPWoAARnwZ.jpg

— https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/2082860645679055021#m
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@clement_molin
Progression par mois depuis juin 2022 :

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https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2082909655898918912%2Fimg%2FpalLm3pG6qnyPrIr.jpg
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@clement_molin
A Ceuta 🇪🇸 aujourd'hui, 40 000 jeunes marocains 🇲🇦 (à 95% des hommes de 15 à 40 ans, principalement des marocains) ont forcé la frontière et sont entrés illégalement en Espagne.

Pour rappel, c'est autant que le nombre de tentatives de forcer les frontières polonaises 🇵🇱 et lituaniennes 🇱🇹 lors de l'instrumentalisation migratoire russo 🇷🇺-biélorusse 🇧🇾 de 2021.

Il est très clair que c'est une instrumentalisation directe et visible du phénomène migratoire par le Maroc contre l'Espagne, après un récent rapprochement hispano-algérien. A la vue des vidéos, la grande majorité de ceux forçant la frontière sont de jeunes marocains, ce qui met à mal des années de récit sur la modernité du royaume, avec une jeunesse prête à tout pour partir. L'arrivée de 40 000 jeunes en âge de combattre, dans une enclave de 82 000 habitants n'est pas anodin, c'est un acte de guerre hybride bien visible.

Il y a déjà eu des précédents historiques, qui ont été plus ou moins bien gérés. Le déferlement migratoire syrien de 2015, via la Turquie et les Balkans et la traversée massive de migrants depuis la Libye vers Lampeduza et la Sicile ont été globalement mal gérés, les résultats de ces épisodes sont encore bien présents dans les esprits de l'opinion publique européenne. Au contraire, l'instrumentalisation russo-biélorusse contre la Pologne, les pays Balte et la Finlande ont été bien gérés, les Etats étant très fermes dès le début.

La situation est assez intéressante car l'Espagne est désormais l'un des seuls Etat de l'Union Européenne dirigé par la gauche, qui a régularisé 500 000 immigrés clandestins cette année. La majorité des autres Etats européens oscille entre prudence (France, Allemagne...) et dénonciation directe (Italie, Pologne...). Avec la montée des partis nationalistes partout en Europe (1er dans les sondages en France, Allemagne, Italie, Autriche, Belgique, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni (hors UE)...), surfant sur le rejet de l'immigration, l'Espagne offre probablement un coup de pouce à ces partis.
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@clement_molin
Alors que la guerre en Mer Noire redouble d'intensité, je suis en train de réaliser un projet cartographique pour comprendre les grande ligne de ce front naval

Ukrainiens 🇺🇦 et russes 🇷🇺 utilisent activement la mer noire pour leurs activités militaires et économiques, les frappes des deux côtés s'intensifient et les côtes deviennent d'importantes bases arrières.

Frappes de moyenne portée, défense aérienne, drones navals, routes logistiques, sous-stations électriques, je vais rassembler un maximum d'informations dans une carte et une analyse qui seront publiées ce weekend.
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@clement_molin
In 2026, Ukraine 🇺🇦 dug more than 3 800 km of fortifications across the country. For the 1st time since 2022, the state of fortifications is satisfying.

With heavy defensive work done in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, Ukraine managed to finish the work on the main front. Thus, everywhere on the front is currently less than 15km from the New Donbass Line, this new kind of defensive line that replaced previous fortifications in 2025.

Russia reached only 3 sections of the New Donbass Line, in Kucheriv Yar, where the line helped to prevent a further breakthrough and in Novopavlivka, where the line, unfinished, held for 10 months and is not on the frontline anymore thanks to Ukrainian counter-attacks. There is however one area where a fortified line is currently being reached : in Shevchenko, south of Dobropillia.

To explain what will be interesting about this, you have first to know that this is the very first section that was completed in the "NDL" style. This section appears quite good but I believe roads are not correctly covered (the road cover appeared later) and Russian infiltrators will be able to go through. However, the aim of this line is to force Russian troops on key roads where they will be under fire and will suffer losses. I will closely monitor everything that will happen around this area.

As you can see in red on the map (2026 fortifications), Ukraine dug a large number of new ditches near Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, without any strategy, in order to complicate as much as possible the entrance into these cities from the east, the south or the north. Further west are standing 2 defensive lines (dug in 2025) and a third one is being completed.

I have no word to describe the scale of the work that is being finished on the central part of this Donets-Dnipro front (Pavlohrad direction). A real kill zone with squares is being set up every 5km, treelines are being destroyed in front of every line to avoid the ennemy from having any cover and the roads are being protected. Pavlohrad, Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia rings are being finished, which also shows Ukraine is willing to fortify big cities, even far from the front.

In general in this eastern/southern front, there is no room for any manoeuver farther than 10km from the front. This is the amount of territory Ukraine is allowing itself to loose if the goes on furthern than 2028.

I will later quote this tweet with some zoom on key sections, focus elsewhere on the front and some views of some incredibly big barbed wire coverage !
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOlfJ_UWcAA0jHy.jpg
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@clement_molin
In the fields of eastern Ukraine 🇺🇦, the defenses are looking like an endless chessboard. Fortifications are creating separate squares which are as much kill zones as possible.

This strategy is being expanded elsewhere in Ukraine and is efficient, if one square is lost, all the other ones around will be able to turn it into a death zone.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOoLmMJXEAALzm8.jpg
Clément Molin (@clement_molin)

In 2026, Ukraine 🇺🇦 dug more than 3 800 km of fortifications across the country. For the 1st time since 2022, the state of fortifications is satisfying.

With heavy defensive work done in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, Ukraine managed to finish the work on the main front. Thus, everywhere on the front is currently less than 15km from the New Donbass Line, this new kind of defensive line that replaced previous fortifications in 2025.

Russia reached only 3 sections of the New Donbass Line, in Kucheriv Yar, where the line helped to prevent a further breakthrough and in Novopavlivka, where the line, unfinished, held for 10 months and is not on the frontline anymore thanks to Ukrainian counter-attacks. There is however one area where a fortified line is currently being reached : in Shevchenko, south of Dobropillia.

To explain what will be interesting about this, you have first to know that this is the very first section that was completed in the "NDL" style. This section appears quite good but I believe roads are not correctly covered (the road cover appeared later) and Russian infiltrators will be able to go through. However, the aim of this line is to force Russian troops on key roads where they will be under fire and will suffer losses. I will closely monitor everything that will happen around this area.

As you can see in red on the map (2026 fortifications), Ukraine dug a large number of new ditches near Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, without any strategy, in order to complicate as much as possible the entrance into these cities from the east, the south or the north. Further west are standing 2 defensive lines (dug in 2025) and a third one is being completed.

I have no word to describe the scale of the work that is being finished on the central part of this Donets-Dnipro front (Pavlohrad direction). A real kill zone with squares is being set up every 5km, treelines are being destroyed in front of every line to avoid the ennemy from having any cover and the roads are being protected. Pavlohrad, Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia rings are being finished, which also shows Ukraine is willing to fortify big cities, even far from the front.

In general in this eastern/southern front, there is no room for any manoeuver farther than 10km from the front. This is the amount of territory Ukraine is allowing itself to loose if the goes on furthern than 2028.

I will later quote this tweet with some zoom on key sections, focus elsewhere on the front and some views of some incredibly big barbed wire coverage !
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOlfJ_UWcAA0jHy.jpg

— https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/2083307310345048232#m
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@clement_molin
In July, Ukrainian 🇺🇦 unmanned forces hit 656 trucks across occupied territories, some of which are in this video

At the same time, Russia 🇷🇺 captured around 30 km2 and launched a record number of airstrikes. Here are the key numbers of this month :

🧵THREAD🧵1/15 ⬇️

Video
https://twitter.com/pic/amplify_video_thumb%2F2083577080931811328%2Fimg%2FXFx3B7_d0eMzEjhj.jpg
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@clement_molin
Outside of cities, the infiltrations tactics have proven their limits when Ukraine uses an active defense. In Hulialpole, it managed to stop Russian momentum.

One thing Ukraine lacks : airstrikes, to counter Russian drone teams and accumulation in cities.
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@clement_molin
Thank you for following, I will in the next few days write a much bigger analysis.

This will arrive after my thread in french on the Black Sea war, my update on airstrikes and the end of my frontline review (I did Komar, Lyman, Sloviansk and Kostiantynivka).

Thank you !
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@clement_molin
Le plus grand danger pour bon nombre d'Etats d'Europe Centrale et Orientale à l'heure actuelle n'est pas la Russie, c'est leur démographie !

Si l'effondrement démographique ukrainien à l'heure actuelle est massif, il s'explique notamment par l'exil de millions de jeunes ukrainiennes. Pour l'Ukraine, l'avenir démographique est noir, le pays aura bientôt moins de naissances que le Kirghizistan.

Mais la situation ailleurs n'est guère mieux. Avec à peine 4 000 naissances en 6 mois, l'Estonie est un de ces Etats qui se dirige vers une réduction massive de sa population à l'horizon 2050 puis 2100. Une situation similaire peut être observée en Lituanie, Lettonie, Pologne et dans de nombreux autres Etats de la région, y compris dans les Balkans (le problème est mondial et touche plus certaines régions à l'heure actuelle). Un exemple assez parlant, la Macédoine du Nord :

Dans ce pays, l'émigration des jeunes restreint les perspectives démographiques tandis que la minorité albanaise (environ 30% de la population) représente désormais presque 40% des naissances, bien qu'elle ne soit présente que dans une petite région du nord-ouest. Et bien c'est la même chose ailleurs. Les populations locales diminuent, les minorités ethniques prennent de l'ampleur, en particulier lorsqu'un Etat a eu recours à l'immigration, ce qui créé des problèmes sociaux, économiques et identitaires dans de nombreux cas.

Pour l'Europe Centrale et Orientale, le problème est triple, il y a une baisse des naissances, une émigration des jeunes et une perspective de guerre avec la Russie (exemple pour l'Ukraine) qui sont un tout négatif. Pour cette raison, c'est une très bonne chose que la Pologne s'enrichisse et devienne une puissance économique régionale. Les jeunes des pays voisins ne rêveront plus de l'Allemagne, du Royaume-Uni ou des Etats-Unis, mais de cette Pologne, bien plus proche de leurs Etats de naissance. Pour la démographie, par contre, il n'y a aucun remède, le problème me semble lié à l'émergence des réseaux sociaux et à l'urbanisation accrue du monde.

Seul point positif ? Un léger rebond de la natalité au premier semestre 2026, mais sera-t-il durable ?
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHOqXDKOWsAAQ6Nb.jpg
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