The number of Russian 🇷🇺 strikes against Ukrainian 🇺🇦 railway infrastructure has been rising a lot in recent months.

These strikes target locomotives, sometimes wagons, bridges, train stations are rail tracks.

To enable the "Vivaldi" operation, Ukraine's 🇺🇦 3rd Army Corps launched a continuous number of mid-range strikes against Russian 🇷🇺 20th/25th CAA logistics.

In this video, only a small part of their work is shown, which helps understanding how Ukraine is using the strikes in depth to create an "interdiction zone" for Russian logistics.

Thus, supplies, artillery shells, drones and men struggle to move far behind the front and to reach it. This also impacts unit commanders, who are often forced to go close to the front to understand the situation. At least one of them was killed during operation Vivaldi.

-> t.me/ab3army/7492

Map from Russian 🇷🇺 chanel "Rybar" which shows potential targets for strikes in France 🇫🇷 by the Geran-5 drone if a launch site were established in Algeria 🇩🇿, an ally of Russia. Among the targets are nuclear power plants, refineries, airbases, and ports...

This type of Russian propaganda is quite ridiculous, far from reality and the actual threat level. Here, then, is the true state of the 🇷🇺 Geran drone threat:

🔸There are currently 15 fixed launch sites for Geran drones (half of which launch the jet-powered Geran-4/5 models).
🔸The Geran-4 has a range of 850 km and is currently launched solely from fixed rails.
🔸The Geran-5 is launched from rails but also from aircraft; it resembles a missile more than a drone—similar to the low-cost S8000 Banderol missile.
🔸Finally, there is the Geran-2, a standard version derived from the Shahed-136, which reportedly has a range of 2,500 km. It can be launched from rails but also from the back of a pickup truck or lorry, making it more mobile.

-> The Baltic states, Poland, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey are the territories within range of current launch sites.
-> Maps from Rybar featuring Algeria, Mexico, India, North Korea, China, or Iran do not reflect actual risks.

In total, Russia 🇷🇺 damaged or destroyed 100 gas stations in and around Kharkiv 🇺🇦 this year.

Some key roads have no more working gas stations like Kharkiv-Sumy or Kharkiv-Poltava. Those are only geolocated strikes, I added many missing ones thanks to @ShahedTracker.

This morning, the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 army struck several targets in Moscow 🇷🇺, including the refinery for the 4th time this year.

More than a thousand drones and missiles have been launched at Russia. This compilation of maps by t.me/oko_gora
shows the flight paths of Ukrainian drones in September 2026.

Key takeaways from this latest attack:

🔸Moscow's air defense is highly effective; the majority of drones are shot down—which makes sense given that over 140 air defense systems are deployed there.
🔸Despite this five-layer air defense, some drones manage to get through; Ukraine is therefore employing a strategy of concentrating on and saturating a specific area.
🔸This time, Kyiv did not strike fuel depots but targeted critical sections of the refinery directly. During the June attack, the refinery sustained partial damage and only resumed operations in August.
🔸Looking at the Ukrainian strategy, the saturation phase began earlier, around September 17. Ukrainian drones cost less than air defense missiles, meaning this relentless defense comes at a high cost to Moscow.
🔸This marks the seventh attack on a Russian refinery this month and the 91st since the start of the year. This strains Russia's refining capacity and exacerbates fuel shortages in many regions.
🔸Finally, at least 10 different types of drones and missiles were used, demonstrating that Kyiv is accelerating the development of its strike capabilities—albeit lagging somewhat behind Russia, which employed this saturation strategy between 2023 and 2025 but uses it less frequently today.

Given the ongoing debate, it is necessary to revisit the current situation and the balance of power on the Ukraine 🇺🇦/Russia 🇷🇺 front :

🔸There is a near-consensus among analysts that 2026 is a less favorable year for Moscow on several fronts.
🔸Russian territorial gains this year amount to just over 1,100 km²; however, one must subtract the more than 450 km² retaken by Ukrainian counter-attacks, leaving a net gain of approximately 650 km². By comparison, 1,900 km² were captured during the same period in 2024, and 3,100 km² in 2025.
🔸For the first time since late 2023, Ukrainian forces have managed to slow—or even halt—the Russian advance in certain sectors of the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia regions. To cope with this reality, the Kremlin is resorting to repeated falsehoods and presenting maps that depict a much more favorable situation for the Russian army in 2026.
🔸Ukraine holds the advantage in medium-range strikes, particularly within occupied territories, which complicates Russian logistics. Russia holds the advantage in deep-strike capabilities, although the damage inflicted by Ukrainian strikes (e.g., on refineries and ports) is far more costly than the damage caused by Russian strikes.
🔸In terms of manpower, Russian forces are losing slightly more troops than they are recruiting; furthermore, recruitment costs are skyrocketing, placing a significant burden on Russian public finances. A mobilization appears necessary to resume territorial advances.
On the Ukrainian side, the situation is even more critical, with an infantry shortage persisting since 2024. To address this, Kyiv has replaced human personnel with robots—specifically ground drones—for logistics and assault missions, a practice rarely seen on the Russian side.
🔸Economically and financially, both states are suffering severely. Ukraine has been suffering for five years, particularly due to the exodus of its population, Russian strikes, and mobilization. European financial support is helping to sustain the situation. On the Russian side, while the situation remained stable in recent years, it has deteriorated significantly in recent months due to a lack of funds, the loss of substantial hydrocarbon revenues, and the long-term effects of Russia's isolation.

After two very difficult years for Ukrainians in 2024 and 2025, 2026 saw a gradual stabilization of the front line, a localized regaining of the initiative in four sectors, and the development of new warfare capabilities. Russia retains the advantage in several areas—including strikes on the front line and in the rear—but is increasingly suffering the strain of a war that shows no signs of ending.

Ukrainians have nearly completed a series of defensive obstacle lines stretching from the Black Sea to the Polish border along the front, dimming the prospects of a Russian breakthrough in the coming years.

-> Consequently, Russian actions in Europe are primarily aimed at undermining military and financial support for Ukraine within the context of the war on the Eastern Front.

On the map:
🔴Russian advance from 2014 to 2025
🟠Russian advance in 2026
🔵Territories retaken by Ukrainians in 2026

For several weeks, the Russian 🇷🇺 army has been positioning its forces for the autumn offensive, which could aim to attack the Donbas 🇺🇦 from the southwest.

In the coming days, I will publish several analyses regarding Russian strategy, FAB airstrikes, and Ukrainian defenses in the sector.

3/ Based on recent news, the battle for Kostiantynivka is in a stalemate, with fewer fighting. Most of the units moved to the area between Drujkivka and Dobropilla.

In this exact front, the Ukrainians are outnumbered 1 to 6 and Russian strikes are overwhelming.

Thanks for following this 1st thread covering the situation in the Drujkivka/Dobropilla direction. I will cover tomorrow or later Russian airstrikes in this direction, which are massive.

If you want to support my mapping work : buymeacoffee.com/clement.molin