@clement_molin
Meanwhile, Pashinyan was being pressured domestically by nationalists and the Church to reignite the war.

Yet, all signs indicate that Armenia would have been crushed, particularly with the Azerbaijani offensive on the border in September 2022.
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@clement_molin
Furthermore, between 2018 and 2026, Armenia's GDP more than doubled, boosted by the arrival of young Russians fleeing the mobilization at the end of 2022. The country is developing faster than ever and is gradually emerging from poverty.

Yerevan has a key role to play, as a pivotal point in the Caucasus, on the North-South and East-West trade routes.
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@clement_molin
Pashinyan may have abandoned Nagorno-Karabakh, but he saved Armenia from annihilation.

His numerous negotiation efforts are slowly beginning to bear fruit, allowing for the redrawing of the border (Armenia occupies approximately 80 km² of Azerbaijani border territory) and Azerbaijan slightly more than 200 km².
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@clement_molin
Since 2023, Armenia has found two powerful allies: India and France, which have significantly increased arms sales, enabling the army to strengthen itself and regain its deterrent role.

Relations with Turkey have improved considerably, and détente with Azerbaijan has slowly begun.
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@clement_molin
This record, which he is defending in the upcoming elections, faces a largely divided opposition, which, if he fails to secure a majority, could complicate his work.

Russian interference is increasing in the country, even though the intelligence services have already thwarted some attempts.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHJqSN4qXsAM7ykz.jpg https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHJqSegBXYAYBfLD.jpg
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@clement_molin
But Pashinyan also steered the country in a new political direction. The country is now a candidate for the European Union 🇪🇺, moving closer to Europe and further away from Russia, while also making progress in press freedom and the fight against corruption.
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@clement_molin
Fearing that the victory of the Civil Contract party candidate would definitively seal Yerevan's rapprochement with the West, Russia implemented extensive disinformation campaigns in favor of pro-Russian Armenian candidates.
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@clement_molin
Since Armenians are not allowed to vote from abroad, Moscow could organize the transport of tens of thousands of Armenians living in Russia to vote and influence the election.

Online disinformation campaigns have also intensified in recent weeks to discredit Nikol Pashinyan's government ahead of the elections, which aim to renew the 101 seats in the National Assembly.
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@clement_molin
Next weekend's elections are primarily about the opposition between a liberal, pro-European and pro-peace project and a more conservative, religious, pro-Russian project that favors confrontation with Azerbaijan.
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@clement_molin
A thread worth reading to understand the current situation on the frontlines.

I made some scenarios for Donbas in january :

🔹Optimistic scenario for Russia :
-> Reach Druzhkivka by mid-year while investing in Kostiantynivka and Lyman
-> Reach Kramatorsk and Sloviansk by the end of the year, after capturing the three previous cities
-> Possibility of advancing to capture Dobropilla, but it would take several months to take the city.

(no Drujkivka, Lyman or Dobropilla offensive yet, Kostiantynivka holding longer than thought)

🔹Scenario 2 : pessimistic for Russia

-> The Druzhkivka sector held firm, Kostiantynivka fell late, the Ukrainians held east of Kramatorsk, no advance to the west
-> The Battle of Druzhkivka began late, the town resisted attempts at encirclement, the Russians only took Lyman late, and the Battle of Kramatorsk did not begin that year.

That's what is currently happening. The situation in January was much more difficult than it currently is. The fall of Kostiantynivka (probably in the summer) will not be a big victory for Russia, since it is not ready for the next battle (no Drujkivka offensive yet, no push to Lyman, no direct control on supply roads leading to the city). It may really look like the situation in Toretsk last summer.

Situation elsewhere is not much better, apart from Huliaipole where Russia can hope to push the frontline a bit thanks to massive strikes.

Map I made in january (least optimistic one for Russia, with in red the expected mid-year advances (still one month to go) and in white the second part of the year advances (black is current frontline). Even with this scenario, Kramatorsl battle will not start in 2026, which means the war will continue at least 1 (maybe 2) years more (unless some political decisions or unexpected changes).
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHJrbm0xWoAMwMVp.jpg Vitaly (@M0nstas)

Season of the Weak Arrows: Spring 2026 Retrospective

Russia entered spring with three objectives and left it with none of them meaningfully advanced.
The primary effort was always Kramatorsk. Zaporizhzhia was the secondary push. The northern border was supposed to become a formalized buffer zone.
The Green offensive launched on schedule in May. The results, so far, are not worth the schedule.
https://twitter.com/pic/media%2FHJlx8qUWoAI7Og6.jpg

— https://twitter.com/M0nstas/status/2060805664356638759#m
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