🗞 The Seeming Account of Self-Evidence: An Alternative to Audian Account
✍️ #hossein_dabbagh

In this paper, I argue against the epistemology of some contemporary moral intuitionists who believe that the notion of self-evidence is more important than that of intuition. Quite the contrary, I think the notion of intuition is more basic if intuitions are construed as intellectual seemings. First, I will start with elaborating Robert Audi’s account of self-evidence. Next, I criticise his account on the basis of the idea of “adequate understanding”. I shall then present my alternative account of self-evidence which is based on the seeming account of intuition. Finally, I show how the seeming account of self-evidence can make the moral intuitionist epistemology more tenable.

academia.edu/37607316/The_Seeming_Account_of_Self-Evidence_An_Alternative_to_Audian_Account
🌾 @hossein_dabbagh

🗞 Intuiting Intuition: The Seeming Account of Moral Intuition
✍️ #hossein_dabbagh

In this paper, I introduce and elucidate what seems to me the best understanding of moral intuition with reference to the intellectual seeming account. First, I will explain Bengson’s (and Bealer’s) quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuition in terms of intellectual seeming. I then shift from philosophical intuition to moral intuition and will delineate Audi’s doxastic account of moral intuition to argue that the intellectual seeming account of intuition is superior to the doxastic account of intuition. Next, I argue that we can apply our understanding of the intellectual seeming account of philosophical intuition to the moral intuition. To the extent that we can argue for the intellectual seeming account of philosophical intuition, we can have the intellectual seeming account of moral intuition.

academia.edu/37648279/Intuiting_Intuition_The_Seeming_Account_of_Moral_Intuition
🌾 @hossein_dabbagh

🗞 Review of "Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions"
✍️ #hossein_dabbagh

https://www.academia.edu/37674159/Review_of_Moral_Judgments_as_Educated_Intuitions_
🌾 @hossein_dabbagh

🗞 The Problem of Explanation and Reason-Giving Account of pro tanto Duties in the Rossian Ethical Framework
✍️ #hossein_dabbagh

Critics often argue that Ross's metaphysical and epistemological accounts of all-things-considered duties suffer from the problem of explanation. For Ross did not give us any clear explanation of the combination of pro tanto duties, i.e. how principles of pro tanto duties can combine. Following from this, he did not explain how we could arrive at overall justified moral judgements. In this paper, I will argue that the problem of explanation is not compelling. First of all, it is based on the classical account of pro tanto duties. Principles of pro tanto duties can be understood in another way, i.e. in terms of reason-giving account that might be of help to provide a response to the critics. Furthermore, critics fail to see some evidence in Ross about how we can arrive at moral judgements.

✨ → bit.ly/2TiU1aA
🌾 @hossein_dabbagh

🗞 The Ethics of Non-Therapeutic Male Circumcision Under Islamic Law
✍️ #hossein_dabbagh

It is typically assumed among Muslims that circumcision is mandatory according to Sharia. However, in this paper, I will argue that this is not clear in Islamic texts. Because firstly there is no textual evidence in the Quran about this matter and secondly permissibility of circumcision is not an agreed topic among Muslim scholars. Perhaps more importantly this paper helps to introduce new Muslim intellectuals’ argument that moral reasoning is independent from (and even superior to) Islamic law. Since we do not have ultimate and decisive secular reason (e.g., medical reason) against male circumcision in every occasion, therefore, morally speaking, I believe it is not reasonable to say that male circumcision is always wrong. Muslims who support male circumcision still can find some secular reasons to defend this from their cultural identity.

✨ → bit.ly/2GQkl9P
🌾 @hossein_dabbagh

🗞 Review of "The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method"
✍️ #hossein_dabbagh

✨ → bit.ly/2Cmb97q
🌾 @hossein_dabbagh

🗞 Is the epistemology of moral intuitions compatible with admitting a role for emotion? I argue in this paper that moral intuitions and emotions can be partners without creating an epistemic threat. I start off by offering some empirical findings to weaken Singer’s (and Greene’s and Haidt’s) debunking argument against moral intuition, which treat emotions as a distorting factor. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the standard contrast between intuition and emotion is a mistake. Moral intuitions and emotions are not contestants if we construe moral intuition as non-doxastic intellectual seeming and emotion as a non-doxastic perceptual-like state. This will show that emotions support, rather than distort, the epistemic standing of moral intuitions.


✍️ #hossein_dabbagh
🌾 @hossein_dabbagh