🇮🇷🕌 Baghdad, the Gulf, and Tehran’s Two Voices
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf arrived in Baghdad for an official visit and went first to the memorial at Baghdad airport for Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2020.
For Iranian officials, the stop has become a ritual. For Iraq, it remains a political fault line: Soleimani was Iran’s Quds Force commander; al-Muhandis led an Iraqi militia network tied to Tehran. Ghalibaf opened a visit formally devoted to bilateral relations and regional issues by standing beside the memorial to the men whose killing still divides Iraqi politics.
His message was not subtle: remember who killed our people.
At the same time, Iran’s armed-forces chief of staff, Ali Abdollahi, addressed the Gulf states. Governments on the southern shore say they will not allow the United States to use their territory against Iran. Abdollahi said Tehran does not accept that assurance at face value.
He pointed to military aircraft and, in particular, refueling planes at bases in the region. Such deployments, he said, could not take place without the knowledge of host governments. Any assistance or facilitation for U.S. operations, he warned, would be treated as participation in an attack on Iran.
A Gulf government can deny involvement. Iran will decide whether the denial counts.
Then Kayhan, the hard-line daily published under the supervision of the supreme leader’s representative, turned on Tehran’s diplomacy.
The paper called the U.S.-Iran Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding a “piece of paper” that secured American interests, bought time for Israel, and produced a “complete loss” for Iran. It criticized Ghalibaf and President Masoud Pezeshkian for describing the agreement as an honorable achievement.
The Islamabad memorandum was brokered with Pakistani involvement in June. It set out reciprocal steps: an end to the U.S. naval blockade, sanctions relief, the reopening of Hormuz, and a 60-day period for Washington and Tehran to negotiate a broader settlement. The arrangement has since unraveled, with each side accusing the other of violating it.
Kayhan’s claim was that the United States had already voided the agreement by resuming military action after limited energy traffic moved through Hormuz. That is Kayhan’s argument, not an independently established account of the sequence. Its conclusion was clearer: continuing to honor a breached deal sends the enemy a message of weakness.
Ghalibaf went to Baghdad to discuss regional cooperation. Kayhan published the case against diplomacy for his domestic audience.
Iran’s public strategy now has two voices. One warns the Gulf that neutrality may count as hostility. The other warns Iranian officials that negotiations may count as surrender.
#Iran #Iraq #Baghdad #Gulf #Hormuz #Qalibaf #Kayhan #USIran #MiddleEast
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Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf arrived in Baghdad for an official visit and went first to the memorial at Baghdad airport for Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2020.
For Iranian officials, the stop has become a ritual. For Iraq, it remains a political fault line: Soleimani was Iran’s Quds Force commander; al-Muhandis led an Iraqi militia network tied to Tehran. Ghalibaf opened a visit formally devoted to bilateral relations and regional issues by standing beside the memorial to the men whose killing still divides Iraqi politics.
His message was not subtle: remember who killed our people.
At the same time, Iran’s armed-forces chief of staff, Ali Abdollahi, addressed the Gulf states. Governments on the southern shore say they will not allow the United States to use their territory against Iran. Abdollahi said Tehran does not accept that assurance at face value.
He pointed to military aircraft and, in particular, refueling planes at bases in the region. Such deployments, he said, could not take place without the knowledge of host governments. Any assistance or facilitation for U.S. operations, he warned, would be treated as participation in an attack on Iran.
A Gulf government can deny involvement. Iran will decide whether the denial counts.
Then Kayhan, the hard-line daily published under the supervision of the supreme leader’s representative, turned on Tehran’s diplomacy.
The paper called the U.S.-Iran Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding a “piece of paper” that secured American interests, bought time for Israel, and produced a “complete loss” for Iran. It criticized Ghalibaf and President Masoud Pezeshkian for describing the agreement as an honorable achievement.
The Islamabad memorandum was brokered with Pakistani involvement in June. It set out reciprocal steps: an end to the U.S. naval blockade, sanctions relief, the reopening of Hormuz, and a 60-day period for Washington and Tehran to negotiate a broader settlement. The arrangement has since unraveled, with each side accusing the other of violating it.
Kayhan’s claim was that the United States had already voided the agreement by resuming military action after limited energy traffic moved through Hormuz. That is Kayhan’s argument, not an independently established account of the sequence. Its conclusion was clearer: continuing to honor a breached deal sends the enemy a message of weakness.
Ghalibaf went to Baghdad to discuss regional cooperation. Kayhan published the case against diplomacy for his domestic audience.
Iran’s public strategy now has two voices. One warns the Gulf that neutrality may count as hostility. The other warns Iranian officials that negotiations may count as surrender.
#Iran #Iraq #Baghdad #Gulf #Hormuz #Qalibaf #Kayhan #USIran #MiddleEast
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