Russian 🇷🇺 sources – the Ukrainian 🇺🇦 army is pushing back the front line near Sloviansk

Following months of a Russian offensive against Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, the Ukrainian army has deployed reinforcements and begun stabilizing the front.

Operations to clear out infiltrating forces east of Sloviansk have been underway for at least two months. Most Russian Telegram channels have been reporting on this situation for several weeks, a fact confirmed by numerous videos.

This is further proof that the Ukrainian offensive at Lyman succeeded in stabilizing and subsequently pushing back the front line across a wide area. It appears that all of Biletskyi's 3rd Army Corps currently holds the initiative...

Dobropillia direction.

The situation is quite peculiar tactically:

South, after the clearing conducted since August, some Russian groups still remain in the dotted square, mixed with some new infiltrators, but they aren't significant.

Much further north, above Andriivka, a total of 8 small Russian groups of 2-4 people each are moving as we speak towards Rohanske (3 groups), Starovarvarivka (2 groups), and Novoiavlenka (3 groups). Their infiltration routes are marked with a good degree of precision.
The furthest Russian group was recorded almost 20+ km northwest of the red zone

Further west, Russian infiltrators also moved towards Vesela Hora, apparently, approximately as shown (from the southwest), but I don't have complete information here.

In general, those Russian groups do not constitute an operational or even tactical advancement threat, as they are practically encircling themselves, which makes it completely understandable to suspect that they got a task from their command to conduct a flagging operation.
Tactically, though, they are definitely dangerous, as they can still raid and ambush rear Ukrainian positions. At this depth, we're talking about EW/EI positions, temporary deployment points, and artillery and drone positions.

By now, this is not surprising anymore (I recommend reading this: https://t.me/PlayfraOSINT/6340), especially due to the absolutely massive amount of committed Russian manpower.
Nonetheless, soldiers in these directions would be best advised to follow security measures (https://t.me/PlayfraOSINT/6093, https://t.me/PlayfraOSINT/6094).

During the last 4 months, Russia 🇷🇺 made a slow but steady progress in the direction of Dobropilla

Russian forces continue to advance and capture villages and small towns south of Dobropilla. Shevchenko and Bilytske fell, Russian forces are now attacking Dobropilla from the south and the east.

The battle for the city may start in the next few weeks/months and could last very long. Thanks to the New Donbas Line, part of the offensive to attack the city from the east and north is currently stopped. We should remember how much manpower Russia is using in this direction. We are talking about 3 armies, which are suffering important losses but are getting a big chunk of the manpower reserves right now, which is why multiple other directions are suffering from manpower issues.

Map : @Deepstate_UA

New interview : https://ukrainianweek.com/clement-molin-ukraine-russia/

One of the questions, regarding the Russian 🇷🇺 campaign against Europe :

— In recent months, there’s been growing concern that Vladimir Putin could turn his attention to Europe if the war in Ukraine remains deadlocked. The issue came into sharper focus after CIA Director John Ratcliffe reportedly visited Moscow to warn Russia against attacking European countries. How serious is the threat to Europe? Are you seeing Russian forces building up along Europe’s borders?

– No, they’re not amassing troops on Europe’s borders, and I don’t see Russia launching a ground invasion of any European country in the next few months. If you look at where the Russian army is right now, where its military assets are and where its logistics are concentrated, it’s all in Ukraine or around Ukraine.

If they tried anything in Estonia, Latvia or another country, they would risk being flanked or attacked in Kaliningrad, and they couldn’t defend against that with nuclear deterrence alone. I don’t think that’s a very good idea, and I don’t think the Russian military command is that crazy. That said, we know from the past that they’ve already launched some very audacious invasions, including the invasion of Ukraine with fewer than 200,000 troops.

Yet, I don’t see a ground invasion of a European country happening in the near future.

However, I do think they will carry out sabotage operations targeting the defense industry and energy infrastructure, because Europe is facing some challenges at the moment. In France, for example, there have been protests over fuel prices, mainly because of the situation in the Middle East, but also partly because of the war in Ukraine.

For Russia, this is a good opportunity to weaken support for Ukraine, especially financial support. In France, for example, there’s a debate about whether the country should continue providing Ukraine with so much financial assistance, particularly with elections coming up in April next year.

The difficulty is that Russia isn’t attacking Europe directly. Instead, it is applying pressure in less overt ways, including through sabotage. There are also repeated drone incursions: drones cross into the airspace of the Baltic states and Moldova on a near-daily basis, and occasionally into that of Romania and Poland.

This morning, @Deepstate_UA updated the last part of the Vivaldi operation on the Lyman direction

This map update is weird because it still does not show the main advance, which occured from Nove to Kolodiazi, but it closely follows OPSEC for the eastern part, which is still not officially lifted. What is blue on the map happened before August 20th.

And now, some older geolocations are being published : https://x.com/moklasen/status/2110268949023924228 This one happened on June 20th 2026, 4 months ago... -> For all the people saying nothing happened and there were no proofs.

These last 5 days, taking advantage of the Starshield speed restriction (which doesn't seem to end), Russia 🇷🇺 sent thousands of drones against Ukraine 🇺🇦

Russia launched a continuous flow of Geran-4/5 drones (blue on the map), as usual, as well as a large number of Geran-2 (yellow), which are slower and flying in large groups. Hundreds of targets were struck in the country, including many civilian ones.

For the first time in months, western Ukraine was heavily targeted with repeated strikes in Lutsk, Kovel, Rivne and other cities. The trend is very worrying, since drones can move nearly everywhere in the country and threaten energy infrastructure, industries and warehouses. I will soon update on the strikes on Kyiv and western Ukraine.

Source of the maps: t.me/StrategicaviationT

Map of Russian 🇷🇺 drones and missiles strikes against Ukraine 🇺🇦 every month of 2026

This summer, Russia concentrated strikes against the eastern and central part of the country. Odesa and Kyiv suffered a lot at the end of the summer. Right now, many strikes are happening in the western side of the country, as Russia is targeting Ukraine's energy facilities.

Main focus every month this year :
▫️January to April : civilian residential (partly from misses) and electrical targets are on top. Russia tried to collapse the energy system.
▫️April to June : fuel, roads and industries take the lead, Russia tried to retaliate to Ukraine's mid-range strikes.
▫️July to October see a rise of attacks against warehouses, roads, railways and ports, while fuel continued to be attacked.
▫️October saw a total switch to energy targets as winter is closing in.

Situation in Dobropilla 🇺🇦/🇷🇺

The situation in the city has recently deteriorated, with Russian forces now being spotted in various neighborhoods and started the first flag videos for their propaganda efforts.

For several weeks, if not months, Russian forces have made repeated attempts to infiltrate the area, utilizing two main routes: one leading to the northeast of the city and another, more recently, to the southwest. Russian forces continue to advance into the southern outskirts, particularly following the capture of Bilytske and Shevchenko, and the "gray zone" has now expanded into parts of the city itself.

The battle for Dobropilia began a little over a month ago, and we now have a clearer picture of the current, real-world situation. While Ukrainian forces still hold the city, the presence of Russian infiltrators is becoming increasingly apparent. The situation is broadly similar to that of Kostiantynivka a year ago (the city is still disputed).

However, Ukraine retains a defensive advantage, as it still controls the flanks, supported by defensive lines that protect the rear of the city, as well as its eastern and northern sides.

With autumn and winter approaching, the Russians are under pressure to reach the city, as infiltration will become significantly more difficult once the leaves fall, especially given the defensive lines, trenches, and barbed wire established by the Ukrainians.

Right now, the battle for Dobropilia is the primary ongoing engagement; the Russians have committed massive manpower, while the Ukrainian side, defended by the National Guard’s Azov Corps, is fighting for every square kilometer, while their strategic reserves remain held behind for now.

The geography of Russian 🇷🇺 strikes in Ukraine 🇺🇦:

As the number of targets hit has surged (from 666 in January to 1,572 in September), the geographical focus of Russia’s strike campaign—involving one-way-attack (OWA) drones and missiles—against Ukraine has shifted.

▫️Between January and June, the priority was on areas near the front line.
▫️Since July, there has been a noticeable increase in strikes targeting Kyiv, Odesa, and the western regions.

This map draws on data published via Russian Telegram channels—information I have been able to corroborate through my own work in geolocating the impact sites.

Since mid-September, strikes have occurred almost daily in the western part of the country, with a primary focus on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

Yesterday, Ukraine 🇺🇦 approved a fortification plan for the country, with a target date of 2028. The construction of extensive defensive lines will continue.

As a reminder, the lines visible in the photo below are already complete in the eastern part of the country. New lines of this type are currently being prepared in the north and northeast to protect Ukraine against Russian offensives.

These lines—consisting of three anti-tank ditches, "dragon's teeth," and extensive barbed and concertina wire—are extremely difficult to cross, which increases the number of casualties on the Russian side.

2/ 40 days later, let's come back to the fact that I "revealed" the information, which sparked criticism :

-I did not reveal the offensive; there were already numerous rumors and posts circulating online.
-A number of Russian and pro-Russian accounts had shared a great deal of information starting August 15, indicating that they were already aware of it.
-Most of the offensive operations—including the effort to cut off the salient—had already concluded by September 9; I used only information dating from August 25 or earlier.
-The offensive was initially slated to be announced before the end of August, but the publication date was pushed back by two weeks following further successes (which I did not cover).
-In reality, the criticism is primarily directed at the fact that I did not follow the official release schedule (I acknowledge that adhering to such a schedule is part of the units' duties).

Now, I would like to address the massive gaps in information, whether on the part of recognized analysts, think tanks, or media outlets.

Barely any of them had foreseen the operation; most only discovered it the day I published my findings. Only a handful of volunteers, researchers, individuals, osinters, and experts were truly in the know. Others possessed only fragments of information. This highlights the extent to which the information available to us regarding the war in Ukraine actually originates from a very small number of independent actors.

Furthermore, I must point out the repeated theft of my maps that day—often without any attribution—as well as the vague or imprecise way in which some cited their sources. This operation serves as evidence that, while operational secrecy can never be absolute, it is nonetheless effective at concealing a significant portion of information. Only a select few analysts have access to such data and control the narrative.