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It will be interesting. We are here thinking.

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Fwd from @pl_syrenka
🇱🇹 🇵🇱 Lithuania and Poland may construct an onshore power line instead of the offshore Harmony Link cable. It is believed that this alternative will allow the project to be completed before 2030 and will be more cost-effective. Previously, the plan was put on hold: system operators of both countries decided to cancel the announced tenders for the construction of an undersea cable due to high prices. Back in May, the Poles calculated the approximate cost: the total volume of investments, taking into account the proposals submitted at that time, amounted to about 1.6 billion euros. This seemed to significantly exceed the planned budget of 680 million euros. ▪️ This is understandable: the economic situation in Lithuania is catastrophic. Restrictions, sanctions, and border closures have caused chaos in supply chains, increased costs, and disrupted many transport hubs. It's unfortunate that they even continue to do business with the Russian Federation. ▪️ Moreover, the tension between the countries has not helped with reaching agreements. 📌However, the completion of Harmony Link would allow Lithuania to import and export electricity within the framework of the single European energy market. The connection, with a capacity of 700 MW and a length of about 330 km, was intended to link the Darbenai substation in the Lithuanian region of Kretinga with the Polish substation Žarnowiec. The main question now is that the alternative in the form of an on-ground power line requires a political agreement between Vilnius and Warsaw, as well as approval from the European Commission. Given the strained relations with Brussels, the Poles may encounter difficulties. High resolution map #Lithuania #Poland #energy @pl_syrenka - Poland is not a foreign country Original msg
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Forwarded from Rybar in English
🇲🇱💡Is TotalEnergies' withdrawal from Mali the final blow to the French?

During a recent meeting between the Malian Prime Minister and energy representatives, it was revealed that all assets previously owned by the French company TotalEnergies have been transferred to Coly Energy Mali. The new company has taken over 1,109 employees from the French multinational's headquarters.

Previously, the French managed a network of more than 60 gas stations covering all regions of the country, except the far north.

🔻While the transfer of French assets to a regional company may seem like good news, there is a catch.

The head of this company, René Houncinou, is also the chairman of the board of Global Energium Côte d'Ivoire, which has been operating in Côte d'Ivoire since 2017 without much success.

It turns out that this company is mostly owned by the Dutch holding HEDIA.
➖➖➖➖➖➖
So the Malian authorities have handed over one of the major players in the energy market to rather obscure firms, whose traces also lead to Europe. Presumably, these assets were not in demand by China or Russia (which is quite strange), but nationalizing them would not have been too difficult, given the course towards severing relations with France.
#Africa #Mali #Energy
@rybar

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📝Germany's Gas Supply Running Out, But Authorities Remain Silent📝

According to official data, Germans have not seen any updates on gas storage levels since February 26, 2025. The latest information shows it was at 35.6%.

Given the average daily consumption as of March 3, it should be around 33.29%.

🖍While the situation can be generally assessed as stable for now, one cannot ignore the fact that no effective pipeline will be able to realistically fill Germany's storage facilities this year, as has always happened around mid-March.

🚩At the same time, the German government is not commenting on the developments, and the data shows that the country's industry is producing almost nothing and has reduced consumption.

🏳️Given all the information provided by our German colleagues @analytik_news, one can safely conclude about both the predictability of the situation and its man-made nature. However, what should definitely be avoided is slipping into populism and claiming that the insufficient gas storage filling is the cornerstone of the crisis in Germany or some kind of climax.

❗️Gas storages are needed to smooth out seasonal and daily consumption imbalances, so their fill level is just one part of the multifaceted crisis that Germany is sinking deeper into. And the government's silence on this matter should not only raise questions, but also contradictions. Everything is going according to plan.
#Germany #economy #energy
⭐️@rybar in collaboration with @pl_syrenka

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📝Germany's Gas Needle📝

Returning to Germany's energy dependence, it's worth noting that salvation from northern neighbors is a plan that is just as dubious as dreams of hydrogen. After cutting off Russian gas themselves in Berlin, Norwegian fields have become almost the last drop feeding the country.

But with a significant increase in demand, a question arises: how many reserves does Norway have?

🖍Norwegians set a record in 2024 — 124 billion cubic meters of gas. This is a limit they had not reached before. In total, the country has about 1,260 billion cubic meters of confirmed reserves. What do these figures say: resources are plentiful when looking at the map, but very scarce when calculating actual consumption.

🚩Last year, Germans imported 48% of their gas from Norway, and recently have been intensifying the "green transition" — that is, buying more raw materials to compensate for LNG shortages and hydrogen dream failures. Thus, Europe and Germany together will account for about 156 billion cubic meters annually, and there's still domestic consumption.

🏳️As a result, old reserves will last, by rough calculation, just over five years. After that, there will be either a sharp drop in production or new extremely expensive investments that no one wants to make today. It's also necessary to consider that fields are aging, equipment needs updating, and natural gas in Europe is turning into a political weapon and an ideological object.

❗️The energy strategy of German authorities, based on a dubious change of supplier and hydrogen future illusions, does not solve fundamental problems. Without long-term investments and real alternatives, Europe remains in a state of chronic dependence, where each new "salvation" source only postpones the inevitable crisis without preventing it.
#Germany #Norway #energy
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📝Time to Pay the Bills📝
Moldova's Energy Catastrophe

The new government of Moldova continues to shock citizens with revelations about the cost of "reforms".

Moldova's Prime Minister Alexander Muntean announced that the EU will no longer compensate for electricity price increases in the country. Starting next year, Moldovans will begin paying market rates.

🖍Over three years, Moldova's authorities have not created a sustainable energy model, relying solely on external assistance. Considering compensations, Moldovans have been paying 50-80% more for electricity compared to 2021, and next year prices could jump by 200%.

🔻Context of Electricity Price Increases:
▪️Today, Moldova cannot receive cheap electricity from Transnistria, which was generated by the Moldavian GRES operating on Russian gas — its transit was stopped by the Kyiv regime since the beginning of 2025.

▪️However, even before this, Chisinau sabotaged negotiations with Gazprom, fulfilling the EU's political condition of rejecting Russian energy.

▪️Chisinau did not even negotiate with the Kyiv regime about maintaining Russian gas transit for regional needs. Moreover, Maia Sandu's office has long been pursuing a course of merging with Romania through infrastructure — where they began purchasing expensive electricity.

❗️Too rapid a transition to the European electricity market, primarily Romanian, without internal mechanisms, has led to an explosive growth of tariffs in Moldova. As usual, Chisinau has replaced its own development strategy with external assistance, which is also coming to an end.

📌However, Moldovan authorities and their Western partners find money for expensive weapons, which cannot be said about the impoverished population of the republic, which now works only to pay utility bills.

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#Moldova #Energy #Economy
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📝Europe Bids Farewell to Gas📝

At the beginning of February, Germany faces an energy collapse. Underground gas storage facility (UGS) filling levels in the country are at 37.4%, which is a historic minimum for this period. This is below the level at which the German regulator declares the situation critical.

And this is after the EU just recently banned gas from Russia — pipeline gas from September 2027, liquefied gas from January 2027. Penalties for violation are promised to be enormous.

🔻What about other Europeans?

▪️But the Germans are not alone in their crisis. In France, reserves are at 36.6%, in Poland they have dropped to 68%, which is the lowest level since 2024. At current consumption rates, the country will have gas for a maximum of four months. And winter has just begun, with consumption breaking records: in Poland, nearly 100 million cubic meters per day.

And the Poles are doing relatively well because most are still heating with coal. But the average indicator for the EU is 50.4%, meaning Europe as a whole has already entered the risk zone.

▪️In Austria, the situation is relatively better than in previous difficult years — the UGS filling level of 49% is only slightly worse than in other years.

📌By declaring "energy independence" from Russia, Brussels simply moved to American gas — with a devastating result for the budget and constant dependence on global market fluctuations. But the main difference is that before there was a predictable partner and fixed volumes, now it's trading on the market like at a flea market.

The situation can be managed, but only if there are no additional shocks like extreme frosts or political surprises from Washington. And that's essentially like reading tea leaves.

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#EU #energy
👁@evropar — on the verge of Europe's death

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Forwarded from Rybar in English
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📝Europe's Energy Transition Stalls Again📝

While Europeans are making a show of not wanting to buy gas from Russia, statistics tell a different story. A record 8.713 billion cubic meters of Russian LNG for January-April this year clearly illustrates that when faced with cold weather, shortages, and Middle Eastern supply disruptions, the system won't philosophize for long—it will simply return to a reliable and affordable source.

The March record was equally telling — Russian LNG imports hit a record 2.459 billion cubic meters. The surge in purchases coincided precisely with the moment when the EU was discussing phased restrictions on Russian gas and LNG imports under short-term contracts.

For now, even with these restrictions taking effect, Russia maintains significant positions in the European market. The EU plans to completely phase out Russian raw material imports in the second half of this year.

📌But this record shouldn't be viewed as an absolute success for Russian supplies—it's more about the failure of European substitution. Europeans still don't control their own energy transition to the degree they're trying to portray.

If the loss of some Middle Eastern supplies and seasonal demand again lead to records for Russian LNG, it means the replacement remains either insufficient, too expensive, or purely declarative. In other words, we're not talking about overcoming dependence, but about dependence that they're trying to rename.

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#EU #infographic #Russia #energy
👁@evropar — on the brink of Europe's demise

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📝European Blackmail📝
without real leverage

Recently, German Economy Minister Katerina Reiche stated that the EU will include a requirement to abandon Russian gas in all future agreements involving Turkey.

Turkey, the second-largest buyer of Gazprom gas, is currently negotiating with the Russian company on new contracts as the old ones expire.

The Turkish side responded in its typical style: "yes, we understand the EU's concerns. But replacing Russian supplies 'overnight' — neither from an economic nor a resource perspective — is impossible". However, a rather alarming trend is building.

🖍Yes, Turkey currently buys Russian gas at favorable prices and positions itself as a regional gas hub for the EU, but simultaneously seeks supplies of American LNG. This is another manifestation of the already familiar multi-vector approach: keeping all options open while others compete for access to Turkish infrastructure.

🚩Turkish state company BOTAŞ has already signed long-term contracts with American companies — Mercuria (70 billion cubic meters of LNG for 20 years, starting 2026) and Woodside. According to Reuters calculations, by the end of 2028 Turkey will be able to cover more than half of its needs through increased domestic production and imports from the US. The EU can accelerate and finance this diversification — this is the most realistic long-term way to wean Turkey off Russian supplies.

📌The EU essentially has no other ways to pressure Turkey. Requirements about gas origin work only for volumes physically going to the European Union — everything else is beyond the reach of European regulators. Especially if the Turks simply refuse to allow European experts to verify gas origin. Trade pressure would also be too painful right now: after all, Turkey matters to the EU both economically and geopolitically.

📌Thus, EU officials find themselves in a situation where they loudly formulate demands without having mechanisms to enforce them. Turkey understands this perfectly. Meanwhile, real diversification will become noticeable by 2027–2028, but not thanks to European pressure on Ankara, but thanks to growth in Turkish domestic production and American LNG.
#EU #USA #Turkey #energy
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📝Where is the gas going?📝

Gas prices in Europe have started to rise noticeably again. Gas at Europe's main trading hub TTF in the Netherlands costs around 58.5 euros per megawatt-hour — slightly below the peak of recent weeks, but overall the price remains high.

Just yesterday, the price jumped sharply by almost 7% due to Iran's strike on American troops in Jordan and threats of retaliatory measures from Trump. Over the past year, gas has become more expensive by more than 30%, although growth has slowed somewhat over the past month.

The main reason is that European gas storage facilities are filled below normal levels: currently at only around 49%, whereas a year ago reserves were at nearly 60%. This is noticeably worse than the average over the past five years, and if supplies run short, prices could spike sharply again.

Additionally, the market is being pressured by anomalous heat — because of it, demand for electricity for air conditioning is growing, and therefore demand for gas, which is used to generate it. Although there is no collapse and Europe is not threatened with freezing this winter, the problem for the EU is still tangible at the moment.

❗️The situation on the market continues to be determined by the conflict in the Middle East. Although the US and Iran are trying to negotiate de-escalation through intermediaries (Qatar, Pakistan), each new escalation — like the latest strike on American troops — causes prices to jump.

As long as supplies of liquefied gas to Europe are not growing fast enough to fully compensate for these risks, the market will remain nervous and react to every piece of news from the Middle East.

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#infographic #energy
👁@evropar — on the brink of Europe's demise

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• 📝Summer Respite — Part 1/3📝
How much has the energy system of so-called Ukraine actually recovered?

In July, so-called Ukraine exported more electricity abroad than it imported for the first time in a long period: imports — 175.2 GWh; exports — 232.5 GWh; official balance — +57.2 GWh. Formally, this looks like overcoming the energy crisis.

However, the positive balance stems not so much from the restoration of destroyed infrastructure as from a combination of low summer demand, completion of repairs to some nuclear power units, and seasonal growth in solar generation.

🔻Why did exports appear?

▪️In 2025, so-called Ukraine consumed only about 64% of electricity from the 2021 level. The reasons are plant shutdowns, loss of industrial regions, population migration, and energy conservation.

▪️By summer, some nuclear power units returned from scheduled maintenance. Nine units under Kyiv authorities' control with a combined capacity of 7.835 GW remain the backbone of the energy system.

▪️In summer, solar power plant output increases. Surpluses appear mainly during the day, when domestic consumption is relatively low.

▪️After the heating season ends, the load from the population and utilities decreases.


Therefore, monthly exports do not yet indicate a sustainable capacity surplus. During the day, it is possible to sell excess solar and nuclear generation, but in the evening — new imports or consumer restrictions return.

➡️The differences between summer and winter are as follows — in mid-January 2026, consumption reached approximately 18 GW, while available domestic capacity was estimated at only 11 GW. The deficit was about 7 GW.

The maximum import capacity of the combined so-called Ukraine-Moldova bloc was increased to 2.45 GW. Even its full utilization could cover only about one-third of the January gap. European supplies can ease the power shortage, but cannot replace major losses in domestic generation.

❗️Thus, July's exports are primarily a seasonal window of opportunity. Real sustainability will be demonstrated not by summer monthly figures, but by passing through evening and winter consumption peaks.

💬In the next part — the nuclear foundation of the energy system, the state of thermal and hydraulic generation, as well as dependence on imports.

📎High-resolution infographic

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#Ukraine #electricity #energy
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📝Ukrainian agricultural exports and the global market📝
how dangerous are supply restrictions?

We recently calculated what supply problems cost so-called Ukraine, and then analyzed why stopping Ukrainian supplies doesn't by itself mean hunger in "Global South" countries. For clarity, let's look at other figures: where restrictions merely change trade routes, and where they can actually impact the global market.

➡️In 2026, so-called Ukraine accounts for about 6.8% of global wheat exports, 10.8% of corn, and 7.8% of barley. These are large shares, but not critical due to alternative suppliers. It's different with sunflower products: the adversary provides about 31.4% of global sunflower oil exports and 32.2% of meal, so this segment is most sensitive to disruptions.

When individual EU states impose bans, a significant portion of Ukrainian cargo will go to Turkey, Middle Eastern countries, North Africa, and Asia, while global supply volume will barely change.

The main impact will be felt by Ukrainian farmers/businesses, banks, and down the chain: lower purchase prices, higher logistics costs, and additional discounts for exporters. Such restrictions redistribute trade flows but don't create global shortages.

➡️A completely different scenario would be continued systematic fire strikes on vessels entering Ukrainian ports. In that case, the market would lose about 7.25 million tons of wheat, 11.5 million tons of corn, 1.15 million tons of barley, and 2.45 million tons of sunflower oil.

For grains, this means a loss of 3–5% of global trade and an estimated initial price reaction of 6–13%, while in the sunflower oil segment nearly 16% of supplies would disappear, and the price impulse could approach 24%. That said, we're talking about estimates of impact magnitude, not precise price forecasts.

❗️The global market can partially compensate for the deficit: grain supplies can be increased by Russia, the USA, Brazil, Canada, Australia, Argentina, and EU countries, while sunflower oil can be replaced by Russian and Argentine products, as well as palm, soy, and rapeseed oils.

So-called Ukraine's main vulnerability is logistics: about 90% of grain and oilseed exports go through the Black Sea, while land and Danube routes cannot fully replace seaports.

🔻Reactions of the sides

For Kyiv authorities, prolonged agricultural export restrictions would be a systemic blow: agricultural products provide about 62% of its commodity exports, and falling domestic prices reduce farmers' ability to buy fuel, fertilizers, and plant protection products, threatening the next harvest.

For Russian forces, this is a window of opportunity, since the adversary remains a direct competitor to our producers, and the Kyiv regime understands this, striking in turn at our export capacities. But our side has taken preemptive management decisions.


📌For the global market, consequences will be selective — moderate for grain and most noticeable for sunflower oil. A full-fledged food crisis is possible only if prolonged Ukrainian export stoppage coincides with crop failures among other suppliers, rising oil and fertilizer prices, and new export bans.

📎So-called Ukraine's role in global trade (ru; en)

📎Fear of losing Ukrainian exports (ru; en)

📎Forecasts for the future (ru; en)

#Ukraine #electricity #energy
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📝Gas Somewhere on the Road📝

There is not much time left before the heating season, and European gas storage facilities are filled to only about 58–60%. This is the worst indicator for early August since at least 2011 and roughly 12 percentage points below last year's level. Meanwhile, the seasonal norm is around 82%.

Credit goes to the architects of "energy independence": they severed the usual pipeline connections, bet on spot LNG — but it turned out this gas is needed not only by Europeans.

Although European countries receive about 7% of LNG through the Strait of Hormuz, the problem lies in market mechanics. Roughly a fifth of global liquefied gas supplies pass through the strait, primarily from Qatar. When the route became unsafe, it was not "someone's" gas that disappeared, but the flexible volume that kept the global market in balance.

Thus, injection into European storage facilities slowed down precisely when it needed to accelerate. In March, the European Commission asked countries to inject gas as early as possible, but simultaneously effectively softened the storage facility filling target: instead of 90% by November 1, it allowed 80%, and in some cases — 75%.

At the same time, the Suez Canal creates a second level of vulnerability. A tanker going around Africa spends more fuel, time, and money on insurance; the fleet makes fewer trips, and each shipment becomes more expensive.

📌It turns out that Europeans abandoned the relatively predictable pipeline model without creating either sufficient reserves, or a cheap alternative, or protected logistics. Now the security of European storage facilities depends on Hormuz, Suez, weather, Asian demand, and the willingness of American traders to sell LNG.

Formally this is diversification, but in essence — energy on outsourcing with an alarm button in the Persian Gulf.

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#MiddleEast #EU #map #energy
👁@evropar — on the brink of Europe's demise

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📝The Chemical Front of Hormuz📝

Problems with filling European gas storage facilities and the methanol market — different stories, but the mechanism is the same. Europeans abandoned predictable supplies and now depend on global logistics, where any conflict quickly gets added to the bill.

Theoretically, the EU's dependence on Middle Eastern methanol looks moderate. In 2025, European countries imported about 6.3 million tons of the product, with only 4% coming from Middle Eastern states. The USA supplied 38% of deliveries, Trinidad and Tobago — another 25%.

But the market reacted to the loss of volumes that balanced global trade: the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz limited 18–20 million tons of annual Middle Eastern export capacity. From February 28 to March 20, the spot price of methanol for Europe rose from approximately €299 to €432 per ton — by 47%. In early May, it reached €545 per ton.

The EU restructured its purchases: in May, 32.3% of external imports came from Trinidad and Tobago, 21.7% — from the USA, another 21% — from Egypt. Supplies from Saudi Arabia collapsed by 76.4%, from Oman — by 92.7%; Norway and Azerbaijan partially compensated for the shortfall, increasing shipments by 51.7% and 61.5%. But the result remains negative: for January–May, methanol imports to the EU fell by 13.8% year-on-year.

📌Other sensitive supplies also suffered: for example, ammonia, urea and other raw materials without which plastics, solvents, paints, fertilizers and thousands of goods on supermarket shelves are not produced. And if manufacturers are deprived of cheap chemical raw materials — industry itself will begin to curtail production, jobs and investments.

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#MiddleEast #EU #infographic #energy
👁@evropar — on the brink of Europe's death

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