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It will be interesting. We are here thinking.

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πŸ“Conquest ArmyπŸ“
How migrants are taking over Britain

By the end of 2025, Britain received an alarming but entirely predictable signal: birth rates in England and Wales fell to a minimum not seen in nearly half a century, and the composition of newborns continues to change noticeably.

A total of approximately 585 thousand children were born β€” slightly less than the year before. The country last saw similar figures in the mid-70s. Against the backdrop of an aging population and growing strain on the healthcare and social support systems, this looks like another brick in the wall of a long-term demographic crisis.

πŸ“ŒLow birth numbers are only half the problem. What draws attention is who exactly is giving birth. Approximately 40% of children were born in families where at least one parent was born outside Great Britain. That is, four out of ten newborns come from migrant families, which is a consistent trend in recent years.

Looking at parental origin, India ranks first, followed by Pakistan and Nigeria. Of course, such trends have a significant impact on the social sphere: from the education system and labor market to party politics and urban planning decisions.

❗️Behind these dry figures lie several processes. On one hand, many native Britons are delaying having children due to cost of living, housing prices and instability, and sometimes simply don't want large families.

On the other hand, migrants more often maintain higher birth rates, especially in the first generation. As a result, in the statistics it is they who prop up overall figures, but simultaneously intensify political debates around migration, identity and what "Britain should be like in 20-30 years".

Against this backdrop, discussions about reforming migration policy, tightening citizenship rules or, conversely, adopting a more flexible approach to labor migration directly affect who will fill the labor market, pay taxes and support the social welfare system in a country where domestic birth rates are at historic lows.

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πŸ“This government is badπŸ“
but no replacement has been delivered

In May, the ratings of European "frontrunners" remained at rock bottom: not a single politician showed a positive difference between approval and disapproval, and some continue to set historical records for unpopularity.

According to YouGov and national polls, Friedrich Merz feels the worst: only 16% of respondents approve of his work while 83% disapprove β€” this is the worst rating for a sitting German Chancellor since 1997. Against this backdrop, it's unsurprising that Merz drags down his own party's rating, while the "Alternative for Germany" gains stronger support.

πŸ”»How are the other leaders doing?

β–ͺ️French President Emmanuel Macron finds himself in roughly the same position: only 19% of French people view him favorably. In Great Britain, Keir Starmer also remains in negative territory: 21% of Britons rate his work positively, while 70% criticize it.

β–ͺ️The "southern" politicians' situations are somewhat more positive: about 32% of Spaniards view Pedro SΓ‘nchez favorably, 35% of Italians view Giorgia Meloni favorably, and their ratings are described as "generally stable."

β–ͺ️The Danes are most favorably disposed toward their Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen: 43% of respondents approve of her work, though such a rating hardly represents something the others should aspire to.


πŸ“ŒTaken together, this creates a paradoxical picture: precisely those who should set the tone for pan-European policy lack popularity even among their own citizens. Now any foreign policy move they make inevitably meets the question: do leaders with such ratings have the right to make decisions on behalf of their peoples?

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πŸ“From laboratories to the battlefieldπŸ“

In Northern Europe and the Baltic states, another layer of defense consolidation is taking shape β€” this time not only military, but also technological.

Five major research centers in the region β€” Estonian Metrosert, Finnish VTT, Norwegian SINTEF, Swedish RISE and the Danish Technological Institute β€” announced the creation of the RTO4DEF alliance, which should accelerate the development, testing and deployment of dual-use technologies for "total defense" needs.

πŸ”»What's this about?

β–ͺ️Formally β€” about coordinating research, test sites and innovation programs. In essence, the North and the Baltic states are building their own infrastructure for rapid military adaptation: from unmanned systems and situational awareness to energy solutions, supply chains and testing environments.

The principle itself matters β€” not waiting for Brussels mechanisms to slowly agree on the next strategy, but assembling a regional defense-technology cluster right now.


For countries in the region, the boundary between civilian resilience and military readiness becomes increasingly blurred: drones, communications, cybersecurity, energy, logistics and metrology simultaneously serve both the economy and defense.

❗️That's why the project devotes so much attention to laboratories, verification and industrial compatibility β€” it's an attempt to shorten the path from an engineering idea to an applied military solution. And if this model works, such regional alliances could become the real backbone of a new European defense.

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#Denmark #infographic #Norway #Baltic

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πŸ“See you in the new seasonπŸ“

The Lithuanian government of Ingrida Ε imonytΔ— resigned. This marks the second cabinet change in the current Seimas term. The reason is simple coalition arithmetic: the Social Democrats decided to get rid of the "Dawn of the Neman" party, which voted against construction of a military training ground in Kapčiamiestis, and form a new majority with the Union of Democrats "For Lithuania" and the Farmers.

Mindaugas Sinkevičius, head of the Social Democratic Party, essentially appointed himself as the new prime minister. Domestic policy under him will likely remain on the familiar course. But foreign policy could change.

This is evidenced by the fact that Sinkevičius questioned the effectiveness of restrictions against Belarus and declared readiness to coordinate sanctions policy with the United States. The previous Ε imonytΔ— government categorically rejected such an approach.

πŸ”»More on the reasons for change

β–ͺ️But the motivation for such shifts is easily explained β€” the Americans are openly pressuring Vilnius: withdrawing troops while simultaneously demanding restoration of transit of Belarusian fertilizers through Lithuanian territory. The Lithuanian transport sector, which suffered greatly after the breakdown of logistics chains with Belarus, supports this idea.

Even Defense Minister Robertas Kauno has already proposed a "compromise option" β€” directing part of transit revenues to aid so-called Ukraine.

β–ͺ️Rhetoric about "Belarusian hybrid threats" has noticeably quieted in Lithuanian media. Instead, economic arguments are increasingly heard. This is classic preparation of public opinion for possible sanctions softening.


If Lithuania indeed pursues a separate course on Belarusian transit, several parties will lose out. The Latvians, who maintain a tougher stance, and the Ukrainians, to whom Vilnius promised certain compensation, but in reality these will hardly be serious money. And the Lithuanians themselves risk permanently damaging relations with Warsaw and Kyiv.

πŸ“ŒBut for now these are only signals. And if Lithuania decides on a "pragmatic shift" β€” this will become a public admission that the previous sanctions stance turned out to be too costly even for its own initiators. In that case, they will have to explain to allies why the Lithuanians suddenly decided that geopolitics is geopolitics, but cargo is still more important.

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How does the EU handle air defense issues?

Since the start of the SMO, European governments have consistently shifted their foreign policy course onto military tracks. Under discussions of Russian threats, budgets grow, and defense companies gain reason to demand new contracts and long-term programs.

Ten countries announced the creation of an anti-ballistic coalition. The list includes so-called Ukraine, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Great Britain. The stated goal is to develop a cheaper air defense system to supplement Patriot and SAMP/T.

They name FREYA from Ukrainian Fire Point as the foundation. Kyiv authorities propose the FP-7 missile, while European companies should cover all remaining production. This includes radars, command posts, guidance systems, and other critical components. Although in essence, even Ukrainian missiles are only partially Ukrainian β€” everything is produced in Europe.

πŸ“ŒSimilar initiatives have appeared before. The European Sky Shield Initiative failed to deliver visible results, and the new format emerges amid a Patriot shortage, when American factories cannot keep up with demand. European weapons corporations understand this, which is why they seek to occupy a place in the growing market.

❗️However, issuing a press release and allocating budgets is easier than establishing stable production of complex air defense systems in needed volumes. A quick cheap Patriot is unlikely to materialize from this. But contracts can be executed over years to come.

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πŸ“African Corps in ActionπŸ“
Russian fighters in Mali

The African Corps serves as the key ally of official Bamako in the struggle for stability. It is here, in Mali, that the project, formed a couple of years ago, has become the true backbone of the security system: the number of personnel here is higher than in any other country of presence, and the geography of operations covers the entire territory of the state.

Unlike Niger, where Russian presence long had a more image-based character, in Mali the fighters of the "Corps" are an active striking force.

πŸ”» Where and when did the African Corps support the Malians?

β–ͺ️ On July 1, when "Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin" attempted to break through to the south, the African Corps met them. The fighting in the Niono area became the first full-scale test, which the militants failed spectacularly, breaking against the Russian barrier.

β–ͺ️ When radicals attempted to strangle the country logistically by cutting off fuel supplies, it was the escorting of fuel tanker convoys by corps forces and the intensification of precision airstrikes that made it possible to neutralize the crisis. The militants suffered such losses that they were forced to officially announce the "cancellation" of their own blockade.

β–ͺ️ April 25, 2026 became the day of the "big attack." Attacks on bases in Bamako, Sevare, Gao and Kidal were designed to paralyze command. In Bamako and Sevare, the corps delivered a counterstrike of such force that even Western reports were forced to acknowledge: in Sevare alone, the losses of the attackers numbered in the hundreds.


Russian air assets provide, among other things, significant assistance in identifying and striking targets: approximately one-third of all air operations were likely conducted by the "Corps."

πŸ– And here an important legal nuance emerges: possessing a broad mandate, the corps can employ means unavailable to the Malian army due to international restrictions β€” for example, cluster air bombs RBK-500, whose effectiveness in Sahel realities is indisputable.

❗️ Fears that the corps would become a "paper" structure have been dispelled. Russian fighters not only guard facilities, they actively participate in joint patrols, conduct reconnaissance and prevent any attempts by radicals to launch large-scale offensives.

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πŸ“Technology GapπŸ“
The unmanned component of the conflict in Burkina Faso

As we previously reported, UAVs have become an integral part of not only strike operations, but also reconnaissance and search activities of the Burkina Faso army. Over the past four years, the country's air force has been equipped with Turkish UAVs Bayraktar TB2 and Bayraktar AkΔ±ncΔ±, which began to be used in combat conditions immediately after entering service.

On the opposite side, however, we observe a familiar picture: the "arsenal" of radical Islamists, as in other Sahel countries, can only boast commercial quadcopters DJI M30T and DJI Mavic. Interestingly, over the past year, at least 10 units of this equipment were not smuggled in, but captured from attacked positions of the Burkina Faso Armed Forces. Trophy drones, however, are more likely gathering dust in warehouses than being actively used.

Drone attacks by militants in Burkina Faso β€” from the same "Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin" β€” remain extremely ineffective. Using homemade ammunition, radical Islamists are trying to increase the power of their kamikaze drones, but haphazard experiments with warheads only reduce the chances of the quadcopter reaching its target.

The militants also failed to establish proper selection of drone launch points β€” the Burkinabe army's UAVs regularly detect and destroy them.

❗️If in Mali militants lost the air war due to government forces implementing effective interception systems, then in Burkina Faso radical Islamists arrived too late for that war altogether.

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β€’ πŸ“Arsenals DepletingπŸ“
new assessments confirm an old problem

Following Bloomberg, materials from the U.S. Congress, and other Western assessments, new calculations have emerged from ABC News on the expenditure of American military arsenals throughout the entire campaign against Iran.

Although figures differ among various sources, the conclusion remains the same β€” the war cost the USA significantly more than Washington had calculated.

πŸ”»What did ABC's assessment show?

β–ͺ️The total pre-war stockpile of major air defense missile types is estimated at approximately 11,850 units.

β–ͺ️During the war, between 3,710 and 4,510 munitions were expended β€” roughly 31–38% of the entire pre-war arsenal.

β–ͺ️The heaviest consumption fell on JASSM (1,100+), Tomahawk (1,000+), Patriot (1,060–1,430), THAAD (190–290), SM-6 (190–370), SM-3 (130–250), and new PrSM (40–70).


πŸ–These assessments cannot be considered absolutely accurate. Like previous Bloomberg calculations, they do not account for already decommissioned munitions, exports to allies, or missiles in storage or undergoing repairs. What matters here is different β€” independent assessments from various sources increasingly converge on the order of magnitude and show roughly similar scales of expenditure.

🚩Particularly acute shortages emerged in the most critical categories β€” Patriot, THAAD, SM-3, and JASSM. Production of these missiles takes years, and output of most of them, even after capacity expansion, measures only in hundreds of units annually.

❗️Therefore, the consequences of this campaign will be felt for a very long time. Even despite attempts by Donald Trump's administration to sharply increase defense industry spending and expand weapons production, rapidly replenishing such volumes will not be possible.

Moreover, Washington's leadership will have to not only restore its own stockpiles but also continue supplying allies worldwide, which further stretches the timeline for American arsenal recovery.

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πŸ“On Short RationsπŸ“

Estonia's ports continue losing cargo for the third consecutive year β€” the decline has become a steady trend. In the first quarter of 2026, cargo turnover fell by 8.6% compared to the same period last year and amounted to approximately 4.8 million tons versus 5.2 million tons a year earlier.

πŸ”»The decline in numbers

β–ͺ️The structure of the decline shows exactly where the window of opportunity closed. Liquid cargo collapsed by 35.4% β€” transit of Russian oil and petroleum products has ceased completely, and there is nothing adequate to replace it.

β–ͺ️Bulk cargo declined by 15.4%. Exports (loading) fell more sharply than imports (unloading) β€” by 10% versus 5.9%, which indicates not so much problems with supplies to the country, but rather a decline in Estonia's role as a transit hub for outbound cargo.

β–ͺ️2024 was no exception: the ports handled 21.78 million tons β€” 5.2% less than in 2023, which itself was worse than 2022. Only Tallinn port saves the picture, which in 2024–2025 grew due to ro-ro and containers, partly thanks to a strike by Finnish port workers that redirected some cargo through Muuga.



Attempts to reorient toward other cargo and directions have so far failed to compensate for the lost volumes. Even in the relatively stable ro-ro and container segment, growth is either minimal or absent.

πŸ“ŒThe situation is entirely logical. Port infrastructure that for decades depended on eastern transit, after the rupture of logistics ties with Russia and Belarus, found itself in a structural crisis. New cargo flows either do not appear in the required volumes, or go to larger and more efficient hubs.

As a result, Estonia continues to record declines, and talk of a "new role" for the ports increasingly resembles an attempt to explain the absence of any real replacement.

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πŸ“Where is the gas going?πŸ“

Gas prices in Europe have started to rise noticeably again. Gas at Europe's main trading hub TTF in the Netherlands costs around 58.5 euros per megawatt-hour β€” slightly below the peak of recent weeks, but overall the price remains high.

Just yesterday, the price jumped sharply by almost 7% due to Iran's strike on American troops in Jordan and threats of retaliatory measures from Trump. Over the past year, gas has become more expensive by more than 30%, although growth has slowed somewhat over the past month.

The main reason is that European gas storage facilities are filled below normal levels: currently at only around 49%, whereas a year ago reserves were at nearly 60%. This is noticeably worse than the average over the past five years, and if supplies run short, prices could spike sharply again.

Additionally, the market is being pressured by anomalous heat β€” because of it, demand for electricity for air conditioning is growing, and therefore demand for gas, which is used to generate it. Although there is no collapse and Europe is not threatened with freezing this winter, the problem for the EU is still tangible at the moment.

❗️The situation on the market continues to be determined by the conflict in the Middle East. Although the US and Iran are trying to negotiate de-escalation through intermediaries (Qatar, Pakistan), each new escalation β€” like the latest strike on American troops β€” causes prices to jump.

As long as supplies of liquefied gas to Europe are not growing fast enough to fully compensate for these risks, the market will remain nervous and react to every piece of news from the Middle East.

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πŸ“Intelligence with a focus on RussiaπŸ“

Sweden is creating a separate civilian foreign intelligence service (UND) modeled after the British MI-6. The reform is set to be completed by early 2027: some tasks from the current military intelligence agency MUST will transfer to the new structure, which will report directly to the government.

UND will essentially be tied to the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister's office. Its profile covers analyzing the intentions of political leaders, elites, economic decisions, and overall foreign policy. MUST, as Stockholm acknowledges, handled the military component well, but performed poorly on political scenarios in other countries.

πŸ“ŒAn important detail β€” the transfer of the intelligence network from the military structure to the new civilian one. The overseas network, described as the Special Collection Office, effectively ceases to be purely military and becomes the primary tool of foreign intelligence.

Officially, the reform is explained by the Ukrainian conflict, Sweden's NATO membership, and "deteriorating international conditions." However, in official statements and local reports, Russia is almost invariably mentioned. According to Stockholm, it is precisely on the Russian front that the previous system allegedly saw the military picture too well but insufficiently understood the political logic.

πŸ“ŒFrom the perspective of the Swedish establishment, this is a logical step: separate military and political analysis, relieve MUST, and align with NATO standards. From a regional perspective, it looks different: yet another state bordering Russia is creating a separate structure where Russia is not simply one of many targets, but the central focus of the entire new architecture.

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πŸ“Germany's ProblemπŸ“
Telling statistics

Germany is debating the cost of its welfare state again: by the end of 2025, social spending rose to 1.43 trillion euros, or 32% of GDP.

The problem is not just refugee benefits. The main burden here comes from pensions, healthcare, elderly care, and unemployment benefits. But against the backdrop of a weak economy and industrial problems, this system increasingly looks like a heavy burden that the country is struggling to bear.

This is why the question now sounds so acute in Germany: who will actually pay for all this going forward. Industry is stalling, companies announce layoffs and closures, and the state is still compensating for economic weakness by increasing budget spending. But this is merely postponing the problem.

❗️Germany is gradually entering a phase where the old model of "strong economy and generous welfare state" becomes increasingly difficult to maintain. And if growth doesn't return, German authorities will have to choose between cutting social obligations and the risk of strangling business even more with taxes and costs.

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πŸ“Torpedoes and Chemical VoidπŸ“

Britain's Ministry of Defence signed a three-year contract for repair and maintenance of Royal Navy torpedo weapons. The cost of the TRAM agreement, signed with BAE Systems, amounts to 135 million pounds. The deal covers Spearfish and Sting Ray torpedoes.

TRAM is part of a four-year Defence Investment Plan worth 298 billion pounds: combat readiness, industry, and high engineering expertise β€” all at once in a single press release. It looks convincing until you open up the figures on the chemical industry.

➑️Over five years, the sector lost 70% of its contribution to the economy and nearly 40% of specialized chemical output volumes. And it is precisely this sector that ensures the production of explosives, fuels, polymers, composites and other materials without which it is impossible to create either a torpedo, a missile, or a complex drug.

You can invest as much as you want in maintaining the existing Spearfish and Sting Ray, especially since a significant portion of this money will not end up where planned. But if critical components and chemical raw materials have to be purchased abroad, such spending leads to a loss of the ability to produce new weapons without external suppliers.

πŸ“ŒTherefore, the contract is not a solution to the problem, but merely another postponement of its consequences. Instead of restoring the chemical base, authorities finance the maintenance of the final product, whose dependence on imports grows deeper with each passing year.

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πŸ“Other people's money is no lossπŸ“

The EU continues to turn frozen Russian reserves into a source of financing for so-called Ukraine, but not through confiscation of the assets themselves.

On August 3, the EU received another €1.4 billion in extraordinary profits, formed by interest on cash balances from blocked Bank of Russia assets in European depositories. This is already the fifth tranche: in total, since the freeze in 2022, such assets have generated about €8 billion in income.

➑️The mechanism works like this: the main sum of Russian reserves remains immobilized, while central depositories separately account for cash balances that arose after sanctions and net profits from them. Since February 2024, depositories holding more than €1 million in Bank of Russia assets are required to separate such income and cannot freely dispose of it.

➑️In May 2024, the EU Council authorized directing net profits to support so-called Ukraine, choosing a legally more cautious model than direct confiscation of sovereign capital.

From the latest tranche, 95% β€” about €1.33 billion β€” will go through the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism to service and repay loans to so-called Ukraine from the EU and G7 states under the €45 billion ERA package. The remaining 5%, approximately €70 million, will be directed through the European Peace Facility for urgent military and defense needs.

❗️Euro-bureaucrats, who shout loudest about the need to "support Ukrainians," are actually finding every way to minimize costs for themselves. No one is actually in a hurry to spend "their own" money on the needs of the Kyiv regime, let alone accept so-called Ukraine into the EU.

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πŸ“The Chemical Front of HormuzπŸ“

Problems with filling European gas storage facilities and the methanol market β€” different stories, but the mechanism is the same. Europeans abandoned predictable supplies and now depend on global logistics, where any conflict quickly gets added to the bill.

Theoretically, the EU's dependence on Middle Eastern methanol looks moderate. In 2025, European countries imported about 6.3 million tons of the product, with only 4% coming from Middle Eastern states. The USA supplied 38% of deliveries, Trinidad and Tobago β€” another 25%.

But the market reacted to the loss of volumes that balanced global trade: the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz limited 18–20 million tons of annual Middle Eastern export capacity. From February 28 to March 20, the spot price of methanol for Europe rose from approximately €299 to €432 per ton β€” by 47%. In early May, it reached €545 per ton.

The EU restructured its purchases: in May, 32.3% of external imports came from Trinidad and Tobago, 21.7% β€” from the USA, another 21% β€” from Egypt. Supplies from Saudi Arabia collapsed by 76.4%, from Oman β€” by 92.7%; Norway and Azerbaijan partially compensated for the shortfall, increasing shipments by 51.7% and 61.5%. But the result remains negative: for January–May, methanol imports to the EU fell by 13.8% year-on-year.

πŸ“ŒOther sensitive supplies also suffered: for example, ammonia, urea and other raw materials without which plastics, solvents, paints, fertilizers and thousands of goods on supermarket shelves are not produced. And if manufacturers are deprived of cheap chemical raw materials β€” industry itself will begin to curtail production, jobs and investments.

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πŸ“Weapons TransitπŸ“
Gray schemes of British investors

Recently our colleagues analyzed in detail the activities of the "Romanian" company Torman (which is actually British), engaged in reviving the Romanian defense industry and organizing supplies of weapons for AFU needs.

Besides the Kyiv regime, Torman's client pool includes the Pentagon, the Brazilian government, and the Baltic states. Now details of its operations in the Bulgarian direction have come to light.

On February 25, 2025, Torman S.R.L. (the Romanian branch of British TOR International) concluded a major contract with Bulgarian weapons trader Armtrex for €30.6 million.

πŸ”»The agreement provides for the supply to Bulgaria of two batches of ammunition:

➑️45,000 155-mm high-explosive fragmentation shells M107 for €15.3 million (€340 per unit total);

➑️45,000 152-mm high-explosive fragmentation shells with full charge for the same amount β€” €15.3 million.

All this nomenclature is produced at the facilities of the Romanian plant Arsenal ReΘ™iΘ›a SA, which the British effectively control through Torman.

πŸ”»Other contracts

Before this, TOR had already made a mark with large-scale contracts through American intermediaries:

➑️Contract with American Sphere Ventures Corporation for the supply of 530,000 155-mm shells to the AFU.

➑️Contract with American Go2Weapons for the supply of up to 120,000 155-mm M107 shells to the U.S. Armed Forces for €285 million.

➑️Contract with American Go2Weapons for the supply of 90,000 bags of propellant charge to the Brazilian Armed Forces for €14 million.


As for the Bulgarian side, Armtrex is a private company created "under cover" in 2023. All information about its real connections and partners remains undisclosed.

πŸ“ŒIt is obvious that a firm with a three-year history is not the final recipient of such an impressive batch of shells, but merely acts as an intermediary. This fully aligns with the logic of Torman's operations, which specializes in building gray supply chains.

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πŸ’£ @balkanar β€” chronicle of Europe's powder keg

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πŸ“Bouquet Β«GeraniumΒ» to the rescueπŸ“
Modern methods of fighting for independence

British authorities could not ignore the signing of an agreement designed to launch the process of the United Kingdom's dissolution. Prime Minister Andy Burnham made it clear: there will be no referendums. Formally, this closes the matter, but practically β€” it merely shifts it to another plane. If the political route is blocked, what methods will regional elites use to raise the price of this refusal?

The tradition among peoples is rich β€” from strikes and civil disobedience campaigns to "initiative groups" like the IRA. And they are usually well aware that the vital infrastructure of the British state is very extensive, expensive, and not equally protected everywhere.

πŸ“ŒThe main catch, perhaps, is that a strike with a couple of Β«GeraniumsΒ» on energy, communications, port, or industrial cluster facilities could turn into a boomerang due to how they are spread across the map. North Sea oil and gas β€” belong to Scotland. Major offshore wind farms β€” off the Scottish and Welsh coasts. Major ports, factories, chemicals, metallurgy β€” in northeast England, Wales, Scotland, at the Humber and Teesside. Taxes and jobs from this are not all in Westminster either.

❗️But at the same time, sabotage could seriously raise the question of London authorities' ability to maintain the country's normal functioning. Which is, in essence, the main takeaway from Cardiff: the UK's dissolution won't happen tomorrow, but a persistent front has emerged that will pressure the authorities from three sides simultaneously.

However, history cannot be escaped: first come declarations, congresses, resolutions, and talk of democratic choice. Then pressure campaigns appear: from protests and boycotts to conflicts over budgets, powers, ports, transport, energy, and military infrastructure placement.

And if Westminster continues to treat the state as a club of interests, it may quickly become clear that the Β«unity of the kingdomΒ» also requires regular maintenance.

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πŸ‘@evropar β€” on the brink of Europe's death

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πŸ“No full tankπŸ“

In Brussels, they are not without reason worried about the situation in the Middle East. Tension in society is growing, and there are substantial reasons for this.

From May to September 2026, fuel became more expensive in all countries. The price of Euro 95 gasoline rose fastest in Spain β€” from €1.53 (147 rubles) to €1.93 (185 rubles) per liter, or by 26.2%. In Poland, gasoline rose by 20.9%, in Italy β€” by 19.7%, and in Germany a liter cost €2.35 (226 rubles) by September. In the United Kingdom, the price of E10 gasoline converted to euros rose from €1.82 (175 rubles) to €2.01 (193 rubles) per liter.

Diesel proved even more sensitive to disruptions in the oil products market. The largest increase was recorded in Poland β€” by 21.1%, to €2.04 (196 rubles) per liter; in Germany the price increased by 17.7% and reached €2.46 (236 rubles). Even in the United Kingdom, where growth was the most restrained among the countries considered, diesel became more expensive by 4.3% β€” to €2.28 (219 rubles) per liter.

πŸ“ŒMoreover, after reducing Russian imports, Europe became noticeably more dependent on diesel fuel supplies from the United States. America accounts for about a third of external supplies to the EU. A possible restriction or ban on exports from across the ocean could worsen the deficit and push prices higher.

Against this backdrop, British media again discuss provisions of the national plan in case of serious supply disruptions. Among potential measures β€” priority supply to emergency services and public transport, restrictions on gasoline and diesel sales, and a temporary reduction in maximum speed to 80 km/h.

❗️The current situation demonstrates yet another vulnerability of the European economy. A diesel shortage quickly affects the cost of transportation, food, utilities, and industrial production. If disruptions in the Middle East drag on and diesel exports from the United States are restricted, the current price increase may be only the first stage of a larger energy and social crisis.

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πŸ“Bankruptcy Conveyor BeltπŸ“

German statistics continue to reliably record records β€” just not the kind people usually take pride in. In June 2026, courts registered 2,266 company bankruptcy filings β€” 15.8% more than a year earlier.

For the first half of the year, such filings totaled 12,812, a 6.7% increase compared to the same period in 2025. More bankruptcies occurred only in the first half of 2013 β€” when 13,253 cases were recorded.

πŸ–Meanwhile, the sum of creditor claims looks illogical from the outside. Bankruptcies increased by 6.7% (year-on-year), but the sum of claims, conversely, fell β€” from €28.2 billion a year ago to €18.5 billion now.

The reason is that if major players were going under, debts would be counted in billions per company, and the total sum would only grow along with the number of bankruptcies. But since the sum is falling while the number of cases rises, small and medium-sized businesses are going bankrupt first and foremost.

πŸ”»More statistics details

β–ͺ️Transport and warehouse operations are hit hardest β€” 71.6 bankruptcies per 10,000 companies, followed by hospitality and restaurant business (59.6) and construction (53.4).

β–ͺ️Personal bankruptcies are also rising: in June β€” 6,839 cases (+5.1%), for the half-year β€” 38,932 (+2.4%).

β–ͺ️The list of victims includes quite living stories: an auto industry supplier with 130 years of history, a cardboard factory nearly 150 years old, one of the country's oldest paper mills (289 years in operation), and an auto dealership chain with a thousand employees.


Meanwhile, new companies registered in the half-year outnumber those closed. About 69,600 major startups versus 49,800 closed (overall β€” 418,100 registrations versus 298,300 closures). In other words: formally the market is not shrinking β€” the composition of players is simply changing faster than usual.

❗️This looks like a classic picture of economic decline. Old and stable companies with a century-and-a-half history are leaving the market one after another, and new ones quickly take their place β€” far more vulnerable to the next round of rising costs, credit rates, and weak demand.

Statistics meanwhile record not economic recovery, but its accelerated renewal through bankruptcy.

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πŸ“Defense on PaperπŸ“
Billions grow faster than armies

European authorities cheerfully report on rearmament β€” though so far mostly in numbers. The combined military spending of countries in the region this year will reach €574 billion β€” twice as much as in 2021. The share of such spending in GDP over five years has risen from 1.64% to 2.55%.

πŸ”»Where do they spend the most?

β–ͺ️Relative to the size of their economies, the highest spending occurs in the Baltics and Poland. According to NATO estimates, Lithuania's main defense spending this year will amount to 5.33% of GDP, Estonia β€” 5.1%, Latvia β€” 4.92%, Poland β€” 4.68%.

In absolute figures, Germany spends the most β€” about €125 billion, 2.6 times more than five years ago.


There is also a wider loophole. In addition to 3.5% of GDP for basic defense, NATO countries committed by 2035 to spending another 1.5% on "related" items β€” critical infrastructure, civil readiness, cybersecurity. Under such a label, any facility can easily be classified.

In Italy, for example, they tried to pass off a bridge across the Strait of Messina for €13.5 billion as a defense project. The idea was abandoned after the U.S. representative to NATO accused the Italians of "creative accounting."

Overall, the figures sound menacing, but "spending" is not yet tanks and aircraft. Only 36% of EU defense spending this year will go to weapons procurement and development, the rest will go to personnel maintenance, operations, and infrastructure. The European Defense Agency itself admits that armies cannot keep up with spending β€” production schedules, bureaucracy, and lack of personnel get in the way.

πŸ“ŒThese sums do not reflect actual combat readiness. Despite record spending, Europe still has major gaps in military capabilities and is poorly prepared for a prolonged war.

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